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Abstract 
The aim of the dissertation is to investigate and clarify Martin Luther’s understanding of 
faith and of reality in his biblical lectures between the years 1513 and 1521. The method 
of the study is systematic analysis. With regard to its content the work can be seen as an 
investigation of the history of ideas or dogma. 
The general context of the study is the examination of the cognition of God in terms of 
“knowledge of acquaintance,” as in the tradition of divine illumination. The specific 
background is the understanding of faith as union with Christ in the Finnish School of 
Luther research. The study first examines Luther’s understanding of reality and then 
Luther’s understanding of faith, as the two are connected. 
With regard to Luther’s understanding of reality, the nature of God, the universe and 
the human being are examined. Central to the understanding of God is the eternal birth of 
Christ seen through the concept of the highest good, the idea of God as light, and the 
divine as uniting contraries. With regard to the universe, the creation as a sign of God, the 
distinction between the visible and the invisible world, and their coming together in Christ 
and the Church are examined. With regard to the human being, the distinction between the 
tripartite and the bipartite anthropologies is analyzed. In them the spirit is the highest part 
of the human being, capable of grasping God. In the carnal person the spirit is dead and 
empty. It is made alive by faith. However, the natural capacities cannot grasp the content 
of faith. Therefore, there is a cognitive and affectual conflict between the flesh and the 
spirit in the Christian person.  
With regard to the understanding of faith, Luther’s relation to divine illumination is 
examined. Luther’s reading of Ps. 4:7 represents a realist, Augustinian view of 
illumination. For Luther, the divine light by which the soul knows the true good is 
precisely the light of faith. Luther defines faith as actual and immediate cognition of God. 
In relation to God, with regard to the intellect, it is an incomprehensible, captivating light. 
With regard to the affect, it is a light which grasps God as the highest good, creating joy 
and delight. In relation to the universe, faith is a light of understanding (intellect) in which 
all things are seen as related to God. It is also a light for the affect that directs through 
tribulations, towards good thoughts and actions. Faith is distinct from the heavenly vision 
because it is only partial possession, it is commixed with the human nature of Christ, and 
it is made enigmatic by sin. Luther understands the cognition of God through the concept 
of infused faith. Acquired faith (dogmas or trust) is secondary, but plays a role in 
tribulations, in which God is not yet perceived as the immediate content of faith. 
Luther’s understanding of faith thus follows in its general form the theory of divine 
illumination. Luther attributes this illumination to the light of faith, which becomes the 
true theological intellect. Luther’s early theology as a whole can be seen as a continuation 
of the theology of the medieval Augustinian School. The centrality of faith, seen in 
interpretation of the divine light precisely as faith, guards the sola gratia principle 
fundamental to Luther. 
  
 
Acknowledgements 
The study you have at hand is the product of years of engagement with Luther and 
Augustinian tradition. Besides the Catechism, I first encountered Luther and Augustine as 
a student at Parola High School around year 1996, when by the suggestion of the local 
youth pastor Jari Wihersaari I read Luther’s De Servo Arbitrio and Augustine’s 
Confessions. This encounter sparked my interest in systematic theology. The episte-
mological theory of Augustine, the doctrine of illumination, has fascinated me ever since.  
When I entered professor Antti Raunio’s seminar in 2003, my aim was to investigate 
the relationship of ontology and epistemology in Luther’s understanding of faith. After 
writing my master’s thesis, in which I only scraped the surface of the subject, I worked for 
a year as a pastor and then in the Diocesan Chapter at Helsinki under bishop, professor 
emeritus Eero Huovinen, who is also a Luther scholar. I thank Eero for his encouragement 
to  take up this task when the opportunity arose. Little did I know that this project would 
draw me back again to Augustine’s doctrine of illumination. I was also unable to predict 
was how many years of my life this research would ultimately take. Especially Luther’s 
anthropology proved to be significantly more complicated than I had expected. The length 
of the process makes me even more indebted to those parties who believed in me and 
enabled me to bring this task to its completion. 
Especially grateful I am of course for my Alma Mater, University of Helsinki, and her 
excellent Faculty of Theology and its Department of Systematic Theology. I thank 
professor of Ecumenics Risto Saarinen for supervising the long process of this work and 
for his abilities at creating an internationally networked and inspiring intellectual 
atmosphere at the Faculty. For professor Antti Raunio, currently at the University of 
Eastern Finland, I wish to express my thanks for guiding me during the preliminary stages 
of this work. I also wish to thank our university lecturers: Without Pekka Kärkkäinen’s 
expertise in late medieval anthropology this work would lack a lot of precision. I also 
reminisce with warmth our co-supervised master’s seminar on Luther’s sermons. I thank 
Olli-Pekka Vainio and Pauli Annala for their feedback as the inspectors of my licentiate 
thesis. Olli’s short but appreciative comments have often been a source of motivation. To 
Pauli Annala I am grateful for enabling me to understand the mystical traditions behind 
Luther’s thought. He is a rare person who not only speaks of mysticism, but lives it. I 
thank Virpi Mäkinen for advising me on Franciscan thought. I also wish to mention docent 
Sammeli Juntunen, who left the Department to be the Vicar of Savonlinna, but not before 
forging a fire for Luther studies in the hearts of many of his students. He worked as one of 
the pre-examiners of this thesis. I also wish to thank professor Miikka Ruokanen for being 
a source of moral support during the long years. The same applies to docent Aku Visala, 
my friend since confirmation school. I have admired Aku’s academic resilience, and 
enjoyed our common discussions on philosophical and theological anthropology. I also 
wish to express my thanks to my colleagues in Ecumenics: Minna Hietamäki, Elina 
Hellqvist, Panu Pihkala, Jason Lepojärvi, Tiina Huhtanen and Heidi Zitting, as well as 
Matti Nikkanen and Sari Wagner, who emigrated to German-speaking countries during 
this process. The same thanks apply to the scholars of scholastic theology: Ritva Palmén, 
Tuomas Vaura and Mikko Posti, who have offered important insights with regard to 
  
 
Luther’s background in the Victorine and Franciscan traditions, as well to Joona Salminen 
who works in Patristics. All of you have contributed with your ideas to my work. Finally I 
wish to express my thanks to the two academic giants of our Faculty: To professor 
emeritus Simo Knuuttila, the chair of the Center of Excellence, who with his questions 
was able to show connections of this study to a number of topics of intellectual history and 
philosophy of religion, and to professor emeritus Tuomo Mannermaa, (1937-2015), who 
in spite of his health invited younger researchers to his home and by the example of his 
person served as a great source of motivation.  
I also extend my thanks to all parties which funded this work: To the Finnish Graduate 
School of Theology for hiring me at a doctoral student position and to the Philosophical 
Psychology, Morality and Politics Center of Excellence which continued this post. These 
institutions allowed me to submit my licentiate thesis at the end of 2013. To the last part 
of my dissertation I received scholarships from Church Research Institute, STI - 
Theological Institute of Finland, and the Doctoral School in Humanities and Social 
Sciences (HYMY) of the University of Helsinki. The Theological Institute of Finland not 
only gave me a research grant, but also allowed me to work at its facilities. I wish to thank 
Ville Auvinen, the general secretary of the institute, Timo Eskola, the long time researcher 
at the institute, as well as the students at the institute, for many interesting discussions at 
the coffee table, as well as for the opportunity to participate at lecturing at the institute. 
Alongside my research I also worked at Church committees and Ecumenical dialogues. 
Through this I was able to achieve a part of my dream of being a Pastor-Scholar, and to 
draw from the research into Ecumenical dialogues and intra-Church discussion. The salary 
from these positions helped to relieve academic poverty, and the support received from the 
people in the committees was a source of inspiration. I also wish to express my thanks to 
Department for International Relations of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland 
for a number of travel grants received during the course of this work.  
I also thank the many ecclesial organizations which have invited me to give 
presentations during my studies. It is a great source of motivation to see that there are 
people who are interested on the subject one works with. The same applies to my 
colleagues at a number of international conferences, who are too numerous to list here. I 
will only mention professor Anna Vind from Copenhagen, whom I have known since 
2004. She worked as the other pre-examiner of my thesis and will also serve as my 
opponent. I also thank dr. Grant White, who has revised the language of this dissertation. 
Moreover, I wish to thank my other friends who have contributed to this work and to 
bearing its burden. You too are too numerous to list, but I will mention doctoral student, 
m.th., fil.cand. Juha Leinonen, theol.cand. Kimmo Saastamonen (who might merit a 
honorary degree in theology on the basis of his actual knowledge), pastor Pauli Selkee, dr. 
Mari Stenlund and cantor Jukka Stenlund. I also wish to express my thanks to all my 
colleagues at the Divinity Students Alumni organization, to all the people upholding 
traditions at Hämäläis-Osakunta student nation, and to the people fighting for the rights of 
the Academic proletariat at Helsinki University Researchers’ and Teachers’ Association. 
My thanks go also to all doctoral students of theology who have worked within the 
Doctoral School in Humanities and Social Sciences to make the Doctoral Programme in 
Theology a better place.  
  
 
Finally I wish to thank those who have suffered most from my years of hard work with 
this thesis: my two sons Tiitus and Justus. To them I dedicate this work. I also wish to 
thank my other relatives for their support with this work, as well as my ex-father-in-law 
Sakari Meinilä for inspiring theological discussions regarding Luther’s thought, and my 
ex-spouse Salla for the burden she has carried during the times when this work has forced 
me to be absent. 
 
Helsinki, on the 4th week of Advent 2016 
 
 
 
Ilmari Karimies 
  
 
 
  
 
Contents 
Abstract  .......................................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 4 
Contents  .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 10 
1.1. The Rationale of the Study ......................................................................................... 10 
1.2. The Aim, Methods and Outline of the Study ............................................................. 17 
1.3. The Sources of the Study ............................................................................................ 19 
2. Luther’s Understanding of Reality ................................................................................. 22 
2.1. The Question of Luther’s Platonism in Previous Research ........................................ 22 
2.2. God ............................................................................................................................. 30 
2.2.1. God as the Eternally Moving and Resting Trinity ................................................. 30 
2.2.2. God as the Highest Good and Giver ...................................................................... 37 
2.2.3. God as Light and Wisdom ..................................................................................... 45 
2.2.4. God as Incomprehensible and Hidden ................................................................... 51 
2.2.4.1 The Different Aspects of God’s Incomprehensibility and Hiddenness ............... 51 
2.2.4.2 God as Incomprehensible .................................................................................... 55 
2.2.4.3 God as Hidden ..................................................................................................... 66 
2.3. Universe ...................................................................................................................... 70 
2.3.1. The Creation as a Sign ........................................................................................... 70 
2.3.2. The Works of God ................................................................................................. 76 
2.3.3. The Relationship of the Visible and Invisible World ............................................ 82 
2.3.3.1 Their General Nature ........................................................................................... 82 
2.3.3.2 Can they be Interpreted Non-Ontologically? ...................................................... 85 
2.3.3.3 The Three Stages as the Key: Visible Creation, Church, Heavenly Glory ......... 87 
2.4. The Human Being ....................................................................................................... 94 
2.4.1. Composition ........................................................................................................... 94 
2.4.1.1 The Natural Constituents (Body, Soul, Spirit) .................................................... 94 
2.4.1.2 The Role of the Spirit as the Determining Part ................................................. 117 
2.4.1.3 Spirit and Flesh as a Qualitative Distinction ..................................................... 124 
2.4.2. The Christian ....................................................................................................... 129 
2.4.2.1 The Infusion of Faith – the Creation of the Spirit ............................................. 129 
2.4.2.2 The Duality of Christian Existence: The Conflict between the Spirit and  
 the Flesh ............................................................................................................ 134 
2.4.2.3 The Relationship of the Flesh and the Spirit in the Same Person ..................... 141 
3. Luther’s Understanding of Faith ................................................................................... 150 
3.1. The Question of the Light of Faith and the Intellect of Faith in Previous  
 Research ................................................................................................................... 150 
3.2. Luther’s Relation to the Tradition of Divine Illumination ....................................... 163 
3.2.1. The General Development of the Theory from Augustine to the Nominalists .... 163 
3.2.2. Traditional Interpretations of Ps. 4:7 ................................................................... 172 
3.2.3. Luther’s Interpretation of Ps. 4:7: The Light of the Face of God as the Light  
 of Faith ................................................................................................................. 179 
3.3. The Functions of the Light of Faith .......................................................................... 188 
3.3.1. The Light of Faith in Relation to God ................................................................. 188 
  
 
3.3.1.1 Faith as Actual and Direct Cognition and Union with Christ ........................... 188 
3.3.1.2 The Cognition of God in Relation to the Intellect ............................................. 194 
3.3.1.3 The Cognition of God in Relation to the Affect ................................................ 201 
3.3.2. The Light of Faith in Relation to the Universe .................................................... 204 
3.3.2.1 Faith as Intellectual Illumination ....................................................................... 204 
3.3.2.2 Faith as Moral Direction .................................................................................... 225 
3.4. Faith as the Enigmatic Middle Stage between the Earthly and Heavenly Vision .... 236 
3.4.1. Faith as Theological Sign and Partial Possession ................................................ 236 
3.4.2. Faith and the Human Nature of Christ ................................................................. 244 
3.4.3. Faith and the Conflict between the Spirit and the Flesh ...................................... 252 
3.5. Faith as Beliefs and Trust ......................................................................................... 257 
3.5.1. Acquired and Infused Faith .................................................................................. 257 
3.5.2. Tribulations as a Test of Trust and Teacher of Faith ........................................... 261 
4. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 265 
5. Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 282 
5.1. Sources ...................................................................................................................... 282 
5.1.1. Editions and Abbreviations Used......................................................................... 282 
5.1.2. Martin Luther ....................................................................................................... 283 
5.1.3. Ancient and Medieval Authors ............................................................................ 283 
5.2. Literature .................................................................................................................. 285 
 10 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Rationale of the Study 
Near the beginning of his second encyclical, Spe salvi (2007), Pope Benedict XVI presents 
the question of how the definition of faith given in Hebrews 11:1 should be interpreted. 
Seeing in the issue a major dispute between Lutherans and Catholics not only with regard 
to exegesis, but in the definition of faith as well, he states: 
Ever since the Reformation there has been a dispute among exegetes over the central word 
of this phrase, but today a way towards a common interpretation seems to be opening up 
once more. […] “Faith is the hypostasis of things hoped for; the proof of things not seen”. 
For the Fathers and for the theologians of the Middle Ages, it was clear that the Greek 
word hypostasis was to be rendered in Latin with the term substantia. The Latin translation 
of the text produced at the time of the early Church therefore reads: Est autem fides 
sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium—faith is the “substance” of 
things hoped for; the proof of things not seen.
1
 
Thus for Benedict there are two conflicting interpretations of the verse with regard to 
the words substantia and argumentum, as to whether they are understood to refer to a 
present reality or to an absent object of hope. Presenting the Catholic stance Benedict 
refers to Thomas Aquinas, whom he sees as substantiating the first view: 
Saint Thomas Aquinas[4], using the terminology of the philosophical tradition to which he 
belonged, explains it as follows: faith is a habitus, that is, a stable disposition of the spirit, 
through which eternal life takes root in us and reason is led to consent to what it does not 
see. The concept of “substance” is therefore modified in the sense that through faith, in a 
tentative way, or as we might say “in embryo”—and thus according to the “substance”—
there are already present in us the things that are hoped for: the whole, true life. And 
precisely because the thing itself is already present, this presence of what is to come also 
creates certainty: this “thing” which must come is not yet visible in the external world (it 
does not “appear”), but because of the fact that, as an initial and dynamic reality, we carry 
it within us, a certain perception of it has even now come into existence.
2
  
Against the view of Thomas, the Pope sets Luther, who according to him understood 
faith only in the subjective sense, as an expression of interior attitude, devoid of any 
reality present within the believer: 
To Luther, who was not particularly fond of the Letter to the Hebrews, the concept of 
“substance”, in the context of his view of faith, meant nothing. For this reason he 
understood the term hypostasis/substance not in the objective sense (of a reality present 
                                                 
1
 Benedict XVI 2007: Spe salvi, 7.  
2
 Benedict XVI 2007: Spe salvi, 7. 
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within us), but in the subjective sense, as an expression of an interior attitude, and so, 
naturally, he also had to understand the term argumentum as a disposition of the subject.
3
  
After analysing the modern exegetical discussion the Pope thus arrives at the following 
conclusion: 
“Yet there can be no question but that this classical Protestant understanding is 
untenable”[5]. Faith is not merely a personal reaching out towards things to come that are 
still totally absent: it gives us something. It gives us even now something of the reality we 
are waiting for, and this present reality constitutes for us a “proof” of the things that are 
still unseen. Faith draws the future into the present, so that it is no longer simply a “not 
yet”.4 
In his text Pope Benedict therefore sets against each other the Thomist definition of 
faith as a habitus, that disposes the subject towards eternal life by setting the person into 
connection with what he does not yet see, but what is nevertheless as an initial reality 
already present, and a supposedly Lutheran definition of faith according to which faith 
would only be a subjective interior attitude, a conviction of things that are not yet present 
reality. The juxtaposition presented by Benedict is incorrect, however.
5
 The present work 
will argue, that the actual fact is quite the opposite: Luther sees faith as an even stronger 
participation in the divine reality than the notion of habitus, used by Thomas Aquinas, is 
able to convey. For Thomas, namely, faith as an infused theological virtue is a created 
similitude of the divine light. But for Luther the light of faith is in itself divine, having 
God as its immediate object.  
The comparison of Pope Benedict allows us to approach the question of the nature of 
faith in general. As a broad generalization one can make a distinction between two 
different approaches to defining the concept of faith. The first approach is to analyse faith 
as being composed of two constituents: an assent (fides qua), and the content of faith 
(fides quae). Premodern, modern and postmodern theologians and theologies very often 
follow this option, differing in the emphasis they place on each of the elements. For 
example, in doctrinal orthodoxy the accent usually lies on believing the right doctrinal 
propositions (fides quae), so that “faith” primarily means the conceptual content of faith. 
Classical liberal theology, on the other hand (illustrated for example by Schleiermacher) 
puts the accent on the subjective faith of the individual (fides qua), defined in 
Schleiermacher’s case as a feeling. An existential and personalist emphasis would define 
faith as consisting of a relation (fides qua) and the object (fides quae), the latter 
understood as a person. A second and structurally different approach, however, that can be 
characterized as mostly premodern, attempts to define the concept of faith using the notion 
of intellectual light and illumination. The classical theories of illumination, such as those 
                                                 
3
 Benedict XVI 2007: Spe salvi, 7. 
4
 Benedict XVI 2007: Spe salvi, 7. 
5
 In his conception of the Lutheran understanding of faith Benedict XVI seems to rely on the older 
German existentialist reading of Luther, represented i.a. by Gerhard Ebeling and Wilfrid Joest. The 
ontological presuppositions of Joest and Ebeling are subjected to critical examination especially in chapters 
2.3.3.2 and 3.4.1 of this work. On similar criticism by Catholic philosopher Jean Borella of the Lutheran 
concept of faith, and for refutation of that criticism, see also Rinehart 2013; Rinehart 2014. 
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of Augustine and Bonaventure, contain an ontological link between the object of 
knowledge and the cognition itself. In this approach the two cannot be separated, as the 
quality of the cognition is dependent on the nature of the object. When this theory is 
applied to explain the epistemic nature of faith, faith acquires the nature of immediate and 
intuitive cognition, i.e., “knowledge of acquaintance”, over against representational and 
propositional knowledge. Mediating between these two alternatives are the Thomistic and 
late Franciscan (Scotist and Nominalist) theories of illumination, which also use the notion 
of the light of faith, but in which the concept of light is interpreted more metaphorically, 
not as immediate knowledge of an object, but as propositional knowledge granted 
certainty by supernatural means. For them, faith becomes an infused supernatural virtue, 
but it grants only a mediated cognition of its object.
6
 
The specific background of this dissertation, which examines the nature of Martin 
Luther’s understanding of faith in relation to its ontological preconditions, has been the 
work of the so-called Finnish “Mannermaa School” of Luther research. Its basis lies in the 
work of Tuomo Mannermaa (1937-2015), who served as professor of ecumenics at the 
University of Helsinki from 1980 to 2000. Under Mannermaa the focus on Luther’s 
ontological thought became a central aspect of Finnish Luther research.
7
 In his 
groundbreaking study Christ Present in Faith (originally published in Finnish as In ipsa 
fide Christus adest) Mannermaa observed that at the heart of Luther’s teaching on 
justification lies an ontological or real-ontic idea of union with Christ in faith, who is 
present in the faith of the believer, and that this idea is analogous to the Orthodox 
understanding of justification as deification (theosis).
8
  
However, when one looks at the different definitions of faith, simply citing the concept 
of union does not suffice to explain what faith is. Even if faith is defined as union with its 
object, Christ, one also needs to explain what the relation of the ontological union is to the 
cognition – e.g. knowledge, trust or assent – of the faithful subject. Could the supposition 
of the union be abolished without affecting faith as cognition, or is there an intrinsic 
                                                 
6
 As a comprehensive overview of the uses of the concept of faith in different theological contexts see 
Grünschloß, Schultz et al. 2011. Classical and medieval interpretations of the theory of illumination will be 
analysed in chapter 3.2. For a modern Catholic synthesis and definition of the nature of faith  see Francis 
2013: Lumen Fidei. In Medieval theology the question of the relation faith as cognition has to its object, 
especially in the sense of whether the certitude of faith is of an epistemological or volitional nature, is 
connected to the debate around whether theology can be considered as a science. If certitude is not based on 
the evidentiality of the contents of faith, but on the effect of grace on the will, then theology is not a proper 
science. See Hägglund 1955, 22-42. 
7
 Saarinen 2015 gives an overview of Tuomo Mannermaa’s life work with Luther studies in Finnish. Up-
to-date information on the Finnish Luther research can also be found on Professor Risto Saarinen’s web 
page: http://blogs.helsinki.fi/ristosaarinen/luther-studies-in-finland/. Recent published overviews of Finnish 
Luther research are also available in print in English (Forsberg 2010; Saarinen 2010; Saarinen 2012) and in 
German (Forsberg 2005). There are also two collections of articles in English covering the Finnish research: 
Braaten, Jenson 1998: Union With Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther and Vainio 2010: 
Engaging Luther. A (New) Theological Assessment.  
8
 Mannermaa 1979. Published in German as Der im Glauben gegenwärtige Christus  (Mannermaa 1989) 
and in English as Christ Present in Faith  (Mannermaa 2005). The Finnish scholarship even influenced the 
ecumenical process that led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. 
Especially important was the participation in the dialogues by former Professor of Dogmatics and colleague 
of Mannermaa, Bishop of Helsinki Eero Huovinen, who also wrote several works on Luther’s theology of 
faith, as well as the dissertation of Simo Peura regarding theosis and justification (Peura 1994). This Finnish 
contribution to the dialogue process is described by Forsberg 1997. 
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connection between them?  The question of the specific ontological or metaphysical
9
 
nature of the union that has been the central finding of the Finnish School has up until now 
remained open.
10
 
Mannermaa’s first and major study on the subject, Christ Present in Faith, brings to 
light the widely known text in which Luther describes faith as darkness that sees nothing 
and a cloud in the heart, where Christ is present.
11
 Though Mannermaa’s emphasis in this 
work is on the ontological idea of Christ as the form of faith, he also makes some brief 
comments regarding the cognitive nature of faith. First, he interprets the dark cloud which 
surrounds Christ as signifying partially the law through which the believer is humbled, 
partially the obscurity of God’s providence.12 Mannermaa also argues that in Luther’s 
view human beings cannot gain any knowledge of the presence of the spirit dwelling in 
them by means of their senses.
13
 Finally, Mannermaa cites Luther to point out that through 
the “image of Christ”, of which a believer becomes a participant through the means of 
grace, “God’s people understand and know in the same way as Christ does; that is, they 
understand and know Christ himself”.14 Mannermaa however does not further reflect what 
this knowing Christ means, or how it is related to the aforementioned darkness which 
surrounds Christ. 
In a later work Two Kinds of Love (original edition published in Finnish in 1983 as 
Kaksi rakkautta, expanded edition 1995, English translation 2010) Mannermaa returns to 
the theme, again with an emphasis on the darkness of faith.
15
 There he interprets the 
darkness in which God is hidden by the means of the theology of the Cross: God appears 
not only as nothing, but as that which is negative and repulsive to human love. According 
to Mannermaa’s interpretation, exactly how God is present cannot be understood by 
human reason. God dwells only in those who feel in themselves that they are furthest from 
God and nearest to Satan. Therefore, Mannermaa defines Luther’s notion of faith as trust 
in God and his love hidden in its opposite.
16
 Both portrayals are characterized on the one 
hand by a strong emphasis on the real presence of Christ, but on the other hand a heavy 
accent on the hiddenness of this presence and its contrariety to experience. 
                                                 
9
 In this dissertation I use the term “ontology” to refer to considerations concerning the nature of being in 
general, and the term “metaphysics” as a reference to  elaborated and defined systems of ontology. See also 
footnote 25. 
10
 On the question of how the notion of the union might be understood see especially Bielfeldt 1997. 
Bielfeldt sketches 7 possible models, but stresses that more historical research is required to link Luther’s 
actual thought to them. A more modest attempt consisting of three models is given by Saarinen 1993. 
11
 Mannermaa 2005, 26-28. See also WA 40, 1, 228, 27 – 229, 32. 
12
 “The ’darkness’ and the ’cloud’ of faith in which Christ, in Luther’s view, is really present, is therefore 
obviously also the kind of ’darkness’ and ’turning into nothing’ that follows from gaining self-knowledge 
through the law. [...] It is true, however, that the ’darkness’ of faith does not only refer to the darkness 
brought by the law. That ‘obscurity’, for example, which prevails when one believes in God’s rule and 
providence, is also part of this darkness. On the other hand, it is nevertheless obvious that the ‘nothingness’ 
and ‘darkness’ brought about one’s self-knowledge gained through the law is an essential dimension of the 
‘darkness’ and ‘cloud’ in which Christ is really present.” Mannermaa 2005, 35-36. 
13
 Mannermaa 2005, 73-79. 
14
 Mannermaa 2005, 83. 
15
 Mannermaa 1983; Mannermaa 1995. Published in English as Two Kinds of Love. Martin Luther’s 
Religious World (Mannermaa 2010). 
16
 Mannermaa 2010, 37-38; 59-62; 82-84. 
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However, a very different image of the cognitive nature of faith emerges from the 
work I consider the the most important of Mannermaa’s writings on the topic: the 1994 
article Hat Luther eine trinitarische Ontologie?
17
 In the first and second parts of his article 
Mannermaa discusses the Trinitarian ontology of Luther’s early Christmas sermon of 
1514.
18
 In this sermon Luther examines the whole structure of reality from the perspective 
of the identity of essence and act, first of all in God, but likewise in all creation. As 
background for this idea Luther uses the Aristotelian notion of the relation of potency 
(potentia) to its object, for example intellection and sense perception, where the potency in 
a certain way becomes identical with the form it perceives. Mannermaa stresses that 
according to Luther’s view expressed in this sermon, God is the essence itself of the 
blessed (ipsa essentia beatorum).
19
 In the third part of the article Mannermaa discusses the 
way Luther speaks about faith as a light in which God and the believer become one. He 
refers to Luther’s agreement with the so called Platonic principle of epistemology, simile 
simili cognosci (like is known by like), which Luther explicitly quotes in his writings. 
According to Mannermaa, union with Christ in faith reflects the ontological aspect of 
Luther’s thought, but this union also has its epistemological side. In accordance with the 
Platonic principle it is exactly through this union between the believer and Christ that God 
becomes knowable. In contrast to the two previous works (i.e., Christ Present in Faith and 
Two Kinds of Love), in this article Mannermaa speaks of faith as light: God is the light, by 
the participation in which a human being is able know God.
20
  Thus the divine nature 
becomes the central concept of knowledge instead of human nature, and faith is not 
portrayed as darkness and trust, but as a cognitive light that is ontologically divine.  
The picture that emerges from Mannermaa’s writings regarding the cognitive nature of 
faith thus seems very unclear. Is God known only through the human nature which Christ 
assumed in the Incarnation, or through the divine nature in which one participates in the 
union through faith? Is faith a darkness in which Christ is secretly present, or an 
ontologically divine light making the presence of God known? Or perhaps it is both – but 
if this is the case, then what is the relation of these two? Mannermaa fails to relate the 
different views to each other, no doubt because he discusses these different aspects in 
different works. Neither of Mannermaa’s students, Simo Peura in his doctoral dissertation 
Mehr als ein Mensch? (1994)
21
, or Sammeli Juntunen in his dissertation Der Begriff des 
Nichts bei Luther in den Jahren von 1510 bis 1523 (1996), sheds much light on this 
subject.
22
 The only Finnish scholar to clarify the relationship of the light and darkness of 
faith is Antti Raunio, who discusses the question in his short textbook article Onko 
                                                 
17
 Hat Luther eine trinitarische Ontologie? Mannermaa 1994. Original shorter German version 
(Mannermaa 1993a) and Finnish version Onko Lutherilla teologista ontologiaa? (Mannermaa 1993b) lack 
the discussion on vestigia trinitatis. 
18
 Sermo Lutheri In Natali Christi, WA 1, 20-29. 
19
 Mannermaa 1994, 43-53. 
20
 Mannermaa 1994, 57-60. 
21
 Peura 1994, 200-202 discusses the nature of faith as light, pointing to the connection between the 
ontological and cognitive aspects in a similar manner as Mannermaa 1994: God himself is the light through 
which he is known. But a few pages later also he (Peura 1994, 207) states that faith is darkness. Like 
Mannermaa, Peura does not offer any explanation of the relationship between the two.  
22
 Juntunen 1996, 383-387; 396-400 offers some interesting points regarding the nature of faith, however. 
According to him, the object of faith is such in its nature, that human cognitive capacities are not suited to 
approach it. Juntunen therefore portrays the cognitive nature of faith primarily as darkness. 
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olemassa luterilaista spiritualiteettia? There Raunio attempts to define faith separately in 
relation to reason and in relation to the intellect. According to Raunio, faith is gloom and 
darkness in relation to reason, but for the spiritual intellect, to which the natural light of 
the reason does not extend, it is also a looking at and beholding of Christ. Thus Luther, 
according to Raunio, conceives faith as a ray of divinity, which warms up the will up to 
love, and which illumines the intellect to view the image of God, present to help, inscribed 
onto the heart of the believer. In the light of faith, the illuminated heart and the 
illuminating God become one.
23
 Raunio’s article therefore offers a starting point for 
approaching the relationship between the light and darkness of faith, and also repeats the 
idea of the unity of the ontological and cognitive aspects of faith, initially offered by 
Mannermaa in his Hat Luther eine trinitarische Ontologie? Nevertheless, it remains but a 
short textbook article containing no references and published only in Finnish. It is not a 
proper academic research text. Furthermore, the significance of the humanity of Christ 
with regard to the nature of faith as light is left unclear in the text.  
As can be seen, the question of the relationship of the ontological and cognitive aspects 
of faith: i.e., the relation between the union with Christ and the cognitive nature of faith, is 
to a great degree connected with the Finnish School of Luther interpretation for which the 
union is a central concept. With their mostly existentialist premises, the older German 
interpretations of Luther’s concept of faith differ significantly from the Finnish approach. 
Over against the German tendency to read Luther through the lenses of modernity, the 
Finnish research is characterized by a systematic analysis of concepts and arguments 
within the text, as well as by the attempt to read Luther in closer contact with his Late 
Medieval background, building connections to the history of dogma and the history of 
ideas. For this reason, the work of previous Finnish researchers forms an important 
background for my research. However, the above overview shows, that especially with 
regard to the relationship of the ontological and cognitive aspects of faith, faith as light 
and darkness, and faith as connected to divinity and humanity, no complete or satisfactory 
explanation on the relationship of these aspects has yet been given in Finnish research on 
Luther. Nevertheless, the question of how these aspects are related is central for 
understanding the nature of faith in Luther’s theology. The problem, however, is not 
constituted only by the previous research per se, but by the dichotomies between humanity 
and divinity, darkness and light, absence and presence contained in Luther’s own texts 
which themselves require explanation.
24
  
Moreover, as this study will seek to demonstrate, the ontological nature of the union 
with Christ, which is of major significance for the cognitive nature of faith, cannot 
actually be treated separately from the entire ontological substructure of Luther’s thought. 
Luther’s whole theological cosmology or understanding of reality 
(Wirklichkeitsverständnis) has to be taken into consideration. This understanding includes 
the nature of God, the nature of the universe and the nature of the human being, and the 
way these are related to each other, both concretely and through the general ontological 
principles reflected by them. The rationale for this is that the notion of faith in the 
theology of Martin Luther has both the function of cognition of God and the function of an 
interpretative capacity with regard to the universe. Furthermore, faith as a capacity has its 
                                                 
23
Raunio 2003, 28-32. 
24
 See e.g. AWA 2, 106, 28-108, 5; AWA 2, 139, 7 - 140, 26 vs. AWA 2, 200, 3 – 201, 15. 
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place in the constitution of the human being. As such, the cognitive capacity of faith is 
therefore related to three different areas of reality: 1) God and 2) the universe, which are 
in a certain way its objects; and 3) the human person, in whom faith is actualized. The 
system formed by the relations of these three can be called “theological ontology”, 
“cosmology” or “understanding of reality” – each term meaning approximately the same, 
but with different connotations.
25
 The nature of faith as cognition is related to the 
ontological nature of the system as a whole, as well as to its individual components. 
From the above considerations it follows that one must take into account not only the 
general research on the notion of faith on Luther, but also research on many topics that 
intersect with the notion of faith. Both of the main chapters of the present study begin with 
a review of the research immediately relevant to its particular subject.
26
 Moreover, in the 
subchapters more literature relevant to each subchapter will be introduced. Regarding the 
view of the nature of God I especially utilize Mannermaa, but also the previous research 
on Luther’s relation to mystical theology and the concept of deus absconditus, as well as 
research connected to history of ideas in Medieval Trinitarian theology.
27
 In relation to the 
question of the general nature of Luther’s ontology or understanding of reality I approach 
the issue based on the Platonism thesis of August Wilhelm Hunzinger and its critical 
reception by Gerhard Ebeling, Wilfrid Joest, Steven Ozment and William J. Wright, as 
well as the findings of Edward Cranz, Sammeli Juntunen and Leif Grane.
28
 Regarding 
theological anthropology I build upon the studies of Lauri Haikola, Herbert Olsson and 
Eero Huovinen, again in light of the critical examination of Joest and Ozment.
29
 
Regarding Luther’s understanding of faith, much of the previous research has major 
limitations: they wholly omit the notion of faith as illumination. Moreover, some of the 
prominent works focus only on one source (especially the Dictata super Psalterium), not 
on the entire period of Luther’s early lectures, which due to the limited nature of the 
research material has in my opinion led to skewed and contradictory interpretations.
30
 Due 
to these issues the background of my study in this question has been formed by research in 
the history of ideas of different interpretations of the doctrine of illumination in the Latin 
tradition. My purpose is to try to locate the place of Luther’s theology within that 
tradition.
31
 Nevertheless, previous significant interpretations of faith as offered by older 
Luther research are also taken into account.
32
 The special challenge of this work with 
                                                 
25
 Of the previous researchers on this subject Hunzinger uses all three terms, whereas Ebeling and Wright 
prefer the term Wirklichskeitverständnis, or understanding of reality. In Finnish research the term ontology 
(Fin. “ontologia”, Ger. “Ontologie”) is often used. In this work I use the term ‘metaphysics’ to denote a 
strictly defined system, ‘ontology’ as abroader term emphasizing how the concept of being is understood, 
‘cosmology’ when the structural analogies between God, the Universe (major cosmos) and the composition 
of the human being (minor cosmos) is emphasized, and ‘understanding of reality’ to denote the general 
nature of ontological and cosmological thought. 
26
 See chapters 2.1 The Question of Luther’s Platonism and 3.1 The Question of the Light of Faith and 
the Intellect of Faith. 
27
 See Mannermaa 1994. Discussion of Trinitarian theology can be found in chapters 2.2.1 to 2.2.2 and 
discussion of mystical theology and the deus absconditus in chapter 2.2.4. 
28
 Hunzinger 1905; Ebeling 1951; Joest 1967; Ozment 1969; Wright 2010; Cranz 1959; Juntunen 1996; 
Juntunen 1998; Grane 1997. See the reseach history in chapter 2.1. 
29
 See Haikola 1958; Olsson 1971; Huovinen 1981; Huovinen 1997; Huovinen 2009. 
30
 This is the case with Ozment 1969 and Schwarz 1962, who use only Dictata super Psalterium. 
31
 See chapter 3.2. 
32
 See chapter 3.1. 
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regard to the secondary literature is that the research question is situated at an intersection 
of numerous theologically significant topics, of which there is a vast amount of secondary 
literature. Due to this challenge some topics potentially of significance to the question 
have been left outside the present study. The most important of these is the question of the 
nature of Luther’s theology of the Cross, for which the findings of this study are very 
relevant. However, this subject is not examined within this work systematically, but only 
sporadically in connection with issues where it has relevance for the topic. Due the nature 
of the present study, beside the chapters on research history one should also check the 
references in each chapter to locate the relevant secondary literature. 
1.2. The Aim, Methods and Outline of the Study 
The aim of the present study is to investigate and clarify Martin Luther’s understanding of 
faith and his understanding of reality in his biblical lectures between the years 1513 and 
1521. The method of the study is systematic analysis. By systematic analysis I mean a 
consistent method of close reading that reconstructs the meaning of concepts, arguments 
and their implicit as well as explicit preconditions. The analysis progresses from single 
concepts toward larger arguments and structures. Unless significant historical 
development can be observed, I strive to represent the results as systematized summaries, 
first in each chapter and then in the final conclusions of the study.  
With regard to its content this work can also be seen as an investigation of theological 
or philosophical psychology and an investigation in the history of ideas or dogma, as the 
results show how faith functions as a cognitive capacity in the context formed by Luther’s 
theological anthropology and understanding or reality. Though the aim of this study is not 
to provide an historical explanation of the origins of Luther’s thought, the results of this 
study are nevertheless often compared with Luther’s predecessors (both single authors and 
traditions of thought) with the explicit aim of locating Luther within the wider 
metaphysical and epistemological traditions of Christian theology. Sometimes the study 
will even compare concrete texts in order to show parallels and point to Luther’s use of 
sources and their influence on his use of concepts. At places this is done merely for the 
sake of furthering the understanding of Luther’s use of preceding authors unrecognized by 
previous research – but in terms of the big picture it is my intention to compare Luther 
especially with the Augustinian tradition of Christian Platonism, which can been seen as 
one of the theological schools of the Middle Ages. Some central features of this so-called 
Augustinian School are: its peculiar combination of the Platonism of Augustine and 
Pseudo-Dionysius, reflected e.g. in the application of the Platonic principle of the good to 
Trinitarian theology, and the application of a metaphysics of light to the nature of reality 
and to the functions of the human cognition, as seen especially in the doctrine of divine 
illumination central to the Augustinian tradition. The emphasis of the study is on 
theological Augustinianism, especially with regard to epistemology, represented by the 
Augustinian School. It needs to be distinguished from the more practical Augustinian 
monastic life, represented by the Augustinian order, as the theology of the order did not 
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follow Augustine when it came to epistemology.
33
 Within the context of this work 
Luther’s ideas are thus compared especially to Augustinianism represented by the early 
Augustinian scholasticism of the Victorines and Bonaventure as well as Jean Gerson, 
whose theology can be seen as being in continuity with basic tenets of the illumination 
model developed by Bonaventure. This is done with the aim to demonstrate that Luther’s 
concepts and arguments can best be comprehended in relation to that tradition: either as in 
continuity with it, or as developments which have it as their background. The present 
study suggests, that to measure continuity one should ask, whether the texts of the author 
manifest concepts, ideas and arguments held in common with the aforementioned 
Augustinian School and the Platonic tradition associated with it, and whether the 
arguments expressed would be intelligible from within the premises of that tradition.
34
 
Especially in this sense, besides being a work of systematic analysis, this dissertation is 
also a work in the history of ideas. 
Besides this introduction and the conclusions, this dissertation consists of two main 
chapters. The research is carried out by first examining Luther’s understanding of reality, 
which takes place in the first main chapter (chapter 2). The chapter contains an 
introduction to the research history on the topic (2.1) as well as three subchapters, which 
address Luther’s understanding of God (chapter 2.2), the universe (2.3) and the human 
being (2.4). In this chapter I will argue that Luther’s understanding of reality is of a 
Platonic nature, and related especially to the Augustinian tradition exemplified by the 
Victorines and Bonaventure. This conclusion has consequences for how the nature of God, 
the relation between the invisible and the visible world, and the location of faith in 
Luther’s theological anthropology should be understood. The second main chapter 
(chapter 3) examines Luther’s understanding of faith. It also contains an introduction to 
                                                 
33
 This way of thought can be described in general as Augustianism or the Augustinian school, but it 
incorporated into itself Neoplatonic elements especially from Pseudo-Dionysius and can thus be 
characterized as generally Platonist over against Aristotelian Thomism and later nominalism. As 
Bonaventure is the most famous representative of the school, this school became associated especially with 
Franciscanism, but it is to be distinguished from the later Franciscan theology of Scotus and Occam that 
follows the via moderna, theology which completely overturned its Platonist fundamentals in ontology and 
epistemology. One should furthermore note that the focus of the definition of Augustiniansim is here on 
epistemology, not on the more practical and historical appreciation of Augustine represented by the 
Augustinian order. In this regard Bonaventure is often seen as the most Augustinian theologian of the 
Middle Ages, though he belonged to the Franciscan order. On the other hand, the late mediaeval theologians 
of the Augustinian, such as Gregory of Rimini, do not follow an Augustinian epistemology, but are 
influenced by nominalism, as are the late Franciscans. Their Augustianism is reflected in their treatment of 
the topics such as sin, freedom of the will and predestination. As a thorough overview of how the schools 
have been differentiated in research on Scholasticism see Marrone 2001, 1-4; 18-25. See also Schumacher 
2011, 85-153 and the analysis of the development of the doctrine of illumination from Augustine to the 
Nominalists in chapter 3.2.1 of the present work. On the Augustinianism of the Augustinian order see 
Werner 1883; Steinmetz 1968; Oberman, James et al. 1991 and Saak 2002. Saak examines the research 
history of the definition of Augustianism spanning the course of a century (pp. 681-691) and the relation of 
Luther’s relation to the theology of the Augustinian order (pp. 691-708). As the state of the question 
regarding the theology of the order, one can say that Luther’s familiarity with the major theologians 
representing the Augustinian eremites, such as Gregory of Remini, remains unsolved, and even if there is 
influence, it has to do with areas of theology other than the epistemology of faith. 
34
 The criteria I am proposing here for measuring whether a text can be seen in the context of Augustian 
Platonist thought are correlated to the discussion on the definition of mysticism as expressed in the second 
definition given by McGinn 1991, xiv-xv; Leppin 2007, 167-168 and Hamm 2007, 242-243. According to 
this option the defining criteria are: historical continuity and the place of the text in the tradition. 
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the research history, which focuses especially on how the concepts of the light of faith and 
the intellect of faith have been interpreted in previous research on Luther’s theology of 
faith (chapter 3.1). The body of the chapter is comprised of the subchapters which address 
Luther’s relation to the tradition of divine illumination (3.2), the functions of the light of 
faith in Luther’s theology (3.3), faith as the enigmatic middle stage between the earthly 
and heavenly vision (3.4) and faith as beliefs and trust (3.5). In this second main chapter I 
will argue that Luther’s understanding of faith follows the doctrine of intellectual 
illumination and its classical non-metaphorical interpretation offered by Augustine, 
Bonaventure and Gerson. Luther’s understanding of the light of faith is analysed in 
relation to the other Medieval and Late Medieval interpretations (i.e., Thomism and the 
via moderna), and its functions in relation to God and the universe are examined with 
reference to the aforementioned traditions. In addition, the role of propositional beliefs and 
trust in Luther’s understanding of faith, especially in tribulations, is analysed. These two 
have a special role in the tribulations that is an exception from the illuminationist 
immediacy of faith, because in the tribulations the direct cognition of God is withheld. 
The results of the study are presented in the conclusions (chapter 4). 
1.3. The Sources of the Study 
The sources of the dissertation are all of Luther’s early Biblical commentaries and lecture 
series delivered at the University of Wittenberg between 1513 and 1521.
35
 The first of 
these are the Dictata super Psalterium, Luther’s (first) Lectures on the Psalms held 
between 1513 and 1515. They are published in two editions within the Weimarer 
Ausgabe: WA 3 and 4; WA 55, I and II. Of these I will use exclusively the latter, modern, 
edition (WA 55). Its first volume (WA 55, I) contains interlinear and marginal glosses to 
the printed text of the Psalms and the second volume (WA 55, II) contains Luther’s 
scholia to selected Psalm verses. Both are originally handwritten manuscripts, out the 
basis of which Luther delivered his lectures. His students were given the same printed 
Psalm texts on which to write down their notes after Luther’s dictation, but no such notes 
are extant from these lectures.
36
 Regarding the textual basis of the scholia it is to be noted 
that a few pages containing a later exposition of Psalm 1, dated 1516, have been added at 
the beginning of the manuscript (WA 55, II, 1-24). Luther’s original material from 1513 
begins on page 25. A similar gap exists between Psalms 2 and 4, with the original scholia 
ending at page 46 of WA 55 (Ps. 2:3). These have been replaced with an exposition of Ps. 
4 of 1516. The newer text continues until page 85, after which the text of the original 
manuscript continues with some of the remaining scholia of Ps. 4. A few other pages are 
missing from the manuscript as well, but they have not been replaced with newer 
material.
37
 Besides these, there also remain the so-called Vatican Fragments of Ps. 4 and 
5, which have received variable datings, but are usually considered to have been written in 
1516/1517. They are published in AWA 1, 467-558. They illustrate the development of 
                                                 
35
 For a general introduction to these see Wolff 2005, 322-323. 
36
 On the historical background of the lectures see WA 55, I, L-LIV. 
37
 See WA 55, II, XX-XLVII; AWA 1, 50-52. 
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Luther’s interpretation of the Psalms which are especially important with respect to the 
subject matter of this dissertation. They have therefore been included in the primary 
sources, although their relationship to Luther’s lectures is not clear. Either they represent 
preparations for a new lecture series on the Psalms, which was ultimately not held, or for a 
printed edition of Dictata, which was not realised.
38
 The second lecture series I have used 
as a source is Luther’s Lectures on Romans from 1515-1516, published in WA 56. This 
text is as well divided into glosses and scholia. It contains the original lectures without 
omissions or supplements, therefore requiring no significant textual considerations.
39
 
From these lectures a set of listener’s notes, discovered in the Vatican Libraries in 1899 
and published at WA 57, 1-232 also remains, but in my work I have only used Luther’s 
personal manuscript, as its contents can be trusted to give the most accurate picture of 
Luther’s own thoughts.40 The third lecture series falling into the time frame of my research 
is Luther’s first Lectures on Galatians (1516-1517). Of these lectures only student’s notes 
containing both glosses and scholia are available, published in WA 57, a1-a108.
41
 Luther’s 
own manuscript has been lost, but it has probably served as the basis for the later printed 
work known as the first Commentary on Galatians. Before that work, however, Luther 
also lectured in 1517-1518 on Hebrews. These Lectures on Hebrews follow the same 
model of glosses and scholia as the previous ones. Luther’s own manuscript of this text 
has been lost as well, but the lectures are preserved in two sets of students’ notes, one less 
complete than the other. Having been written from dictation the notes are similar enough 
to have been edited into a single text published at WA 57, b1-238.
42
 After the Hebrews 
lectures Luther quickly edited his Galatians lectures into a commentary known as the first 
or small Commentary on Galatians.  The printed text is much expanded and varied, 
although it follows the lectures closely at some points. The first edition of the 
Commentary appeared in print in 1519 and the second edition, containing a number of 
alterations by Luther, in 1523. The critical edition of the commentary is published at WA 
2, 443-618.
43
  Finally, the last text used as an essential source of this thesis is Luther’s 
Second Psalm Commentary, ie. Operationes in Psalmos published over a two year period 
between 1519 and 1521. The text contains Luther’s exposition of the first 22 Psalms of the 
Latin Psalter (1-21 of the Hebrew). The work is based on Luther’s lectures on the Psalms 
held at the University of Wittenberg between 1518 and 1520. Like the Commentary on 
Galatians, it does not follow the earlier format of glosses and scholia, but represents a 
complete text prepared for publication by Luther himself. The first five psalms appeared in 
print in 1519 and further parts of the work were published as the lectures progressed, until 
Luther had to interrupt his work in order to travel to the Diet of Worms. The last Psalm 
                                                 
38
 See AWA 1, 52-58. There are also short scholia of Ps. 22-24 published at WA 31, I, 464-481that have 
been hypothesized to be a part of the same work. They have not been used in this dissertation. On them see 
AWA 1, 58-62. 
39
 On the precise dates of the lectures and the condition of the manuscript see WA 56, XII-XIII; XXVI-
XXIX. 
40
 On the nature of these notes see WA 57, XI-XXXII. 
41
 On the dates of the lectures and the history of these notes see WA 57, aIII-aaXXII. While refering to a 
volume of the WA containing multiple sets of works with their own page numbers I will use the pagination 
of the electronic edition of WA, with the first work referred to as n, second as an, third as bn etc. where n 
stands for the printed page number. 
42
 On the dates of the lectures and the history of the notes see WA 57, bIII-bXXVII; AWA 1, 73-74. 
43
 On the history of the text see WA 2, 436-442. 
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(22) was finished and sent to print by Luther from the Wartburg castle in 1521 and the 
first printed edition including it only appeared in 1523.
44
 The entire commentary was 
published in WA 5, but a better modern edition of the first 10 Psalms of the commentary 
has been published in the Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe (AWA) series, volume 2. I have 
used this edition for the Psalms contained therein and the older edition in WA 5 for the 
rest.  
The selection of sources has been made with the following points in mind. First of all, 
the lectures and their published versions make up a representative aggregate of Luther’s 
thoughts and their development as expressed in public and given in a university 
environment. Together they contain enough material in order to acquire a representative 
picture of Luther’s ideas regarding the subjects examined, as well as of possible 
chronological developments in his thought. Second, the selection can be justified 
historically. The texts written before the diet of Worms (1521) are aimed at an academic 
audience and are less polemical in nature, whereas after 1521 Luther had to focus on 
polemical writings and texts dealing with practical questions regarding the execution of 
the Reformation. Third, the perspective of the history of ideas justifies the selection. The 
authors and theological schools that influenced the development of Luther’s thought are 
more perceptible in the early writings. They are sometimes even pointed out by name by 
Luther himself. Finally, the subject matter justifies the selection. Questions pertaining to 
ontology and cosmology are especially treated in the Psalm Lectures, and anthropological 
questions form a common thread running through all the aforementioned sources. Finally, 
the notion of faith is treated extensively in the works on the Psalms. 
Alongside the above selection, however, from time to time I have also referred to other 
of Luther’s works. These include: Luther’s annotations to Tauler’s sermons (WA 9, 95-
104), a Christmas Sermon of 1514/1515 (WA 1, 20-29), From the Freedom of a Christian 
of 1520 (WA 7, 12-38), the Disputation of Infused and Acquired Faith (WA 6, 83-86) as 
well as its Resolutions (WA 6, 87-98) of 1520, the Fourteen Consolations (WA 6, 104-
134) of the same year, Luther’s Commentary on the Magnificat of 1521 (WA 7, 538-604) 
and From the Bondage of the Will of 1525 (WA 18, 551-787). In addition, a few of the 
Table Talks have been quoted. These texts are used to illustrate developments or to bring 
ideas into a wider context, but not as an exclusive foundation for the ideas presented. In 
the same way I have also referred to a number of works of Antique, Patristic and Medieval 
authors such as Aristotle, Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Gregory the 
Great, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Johannes Duns 
Scotus, Jean Gerson, Gabriel Biel and Jodocus Trutvetter. 
With regard to the English translations of Luther’s texts, unless otherwise noted, the 
texts have been translated from WA. I have used Concordia Publishing’s Luther’s Works 
(LW) as a baseline when it is close enough to the original Latin, but in most cases 
modifications have been needed to achieve terminological precision in significant parts of 
the texts. The quotes of the texts for which there is no English translation (such as the 
glosses of Dictata (WA 55, I) and Psalms 3-22 of the Operationes in Psalmos (AWA 2 / 
WA 5)) have been translated entirely from scratch. 
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 See  WA 5, 1-7; AWA 1, 4-5; 107-116; 125-177. The volume AWA 1 is for most of its part a 
historical-theological introduction to the Operationes. 
 22 
 
 
2. Luther’s Understanding of Reality 
2.1. The Question of Luther’s Platonism in Previous Research 
As stated in the introduction, for Luther faith has both a function as cognition of God and 
a function as an interpretative capacity with regard to the universe (i.e., the created world). 
Furthermore, faith has a place in the constitution of the human person as well. It is 
therefore related to three different areas of reality: 1) God and 2) the universe, as well as 
3) the human being, in whom faith is actualized. Therefore, forming an adequate picture of 
faith in the theology of Martin Luther requires examining all these three components as 
well as their mutual relations.  
The aim of this main chapter (chapter 2) is to form a picture of Luther’s understanding 
of reality. In this task the above three components of reality and their interrelatedness in 
Martin Luther’s theology is examined. What is sought is to form a composite picture in 
which the so-called cosmology or understanding of reality of the subject theologian is 
examined in order to bring individual ideas into the context of the whole. Through this 
examination we will seek to demonstrate that the close relation between the three is 
intrinsic for Luther’s theology as a whole. This is particularly manifested by the allegory 
of the Tent of the Covenant, which Luther recurringly uses to illustrate all three: the 
anthropological division of the human person, the relation of the visible and invisible 
world, and the relation of God and the human being. I will further argue that such an 
approach to Luther is appropriate, given the nature of Luther’s ontology and 
understanding of reality, which can be described as Christian Platonism related to the 
Augustinian School, drawing from Augustine but integrating also elements from e.g. 
Pseudo-Dionysius, the Victorines and Bonaventure.  Furthermore, I will argue that 
Luther’s theology of faith can be understood best, and even understood fully, only with 
these ontological preconditions as its background. 
The thesis of the Platonic nature of Luther’s cosmology was first made by August 
Wilhelm Hunzinger in his 1905 licentiate thesis Luthers Neuplatonismus in der 
Psalmenvorlesung von 1513-1516. Hunzinger’s central claim is that Luther’s earliest 
Psalm Lectures (Dictata super Psalterium 1513-1515) are penetrated by a principally 
Platonic philosophical (realist) ontology of Neo-Platonist origin, the basic character of 
which is the ontological division of the cosmos into two kinds of objects of opposite 
natures: the sensible (sensibilia); and the spiritual (spiritualia) i.e., intelligible 
(intelligibilia). The former are distinct, many, divided and changing whereas the latter are 
universal, simple, indivisible, one and unchangeable.
45
 This difference is not based on a 
dualistic ontology (of two different cosmic fundamental principles) or a doctrine of 
emanation, but on the notion of God creating two different kinds of creatures ex nihilo. 
Hunzinger agrees that Luther discusses the more precise relationship between these two 
and their relation to God very sparingly – a difficulty I also share. Nevertheless, he states 
that the world of the spiritualia is on the one hand closely connected and even equated 
with God. It is composed of truths (veritates): ideas, forms and reasons (ideae, formae, 
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rationes), through which God is grasped, and forms their apex. On the other hand, 
however, the intelligible creatures of the spiritual sphere seem to possess an existence of 
their own, distinct from God, and form an invisible created world.
46
 Hunzinger concludes 
that at the heart of this division between the two worlds lies Luther’s Platonic concept of 
being: Real being is immutable and undifferentiated, and God is the only such being. 
Creatures truly are only insofar they exist in God, and when they turn to themselves they 
turn into nothingness. The concept of immutable being also works as the measure of the 
created beings’ reality: The more spiritual the created beings are, the more real they are, 
and thus behind Luther’s ontology is a latent concept of emanation. This Platonic ontology 
lays the foundation for Luther’s thought. 
Hunzinger thus accordingly considers that it is this philosophical ontology which 
makes of the created world the “backside” (i.e., opposite) of God, and thus lays the 
foundation for the flesh – spirit distinction in Luther’s anthropology.47  In this sense the 
created things are only a shadow of the true, spiritual reality.
48
 According to Hunzinger, 
the necessity of the Incarnation is based on the difference between these two worlds. The 
spiritual things are ‘open’ to everyone, whereas the nature of the visible things is that they 
conceal. Christ became man to hide his divinity from carnal people, who would only see 
the opposite of his real being. Consequently Hunzinger describes Luther’s Christology as 
almost docetic.
49
 Hunzinger’s licentiate thesis also contains an overview of Luther’s 
understanding of sin, anthropology, intellect grasping the invisible (intellectus 
invisibilium) and Luther’s concept of faith, in which all these loci are examined from the 
viewpoint of his ontological discovery.
50
  
However, it is his general thesis regarding the Platonic nature of Luther’s ontology 
which sparked much discussion in the course of the following century.
51
 Among those 
who received the thesis positively was Edward F. Cranz, who in his work An Essay on the 
Development of Luther’s Thought on Justice, Law and Society (1959) in general agrees 
with Hunzinger with regard to the Dictata, though he sees already in that work a transition 
towards the theology of the Cross.
52
 He agrees that the sections of Luther’s thought, which 
he calls “philosophical theology” or “theological philosophy” (as contrasted to a theology 
of the Cross) “may with qualifications be described as Platonic”.53 Especially important 
for this qualification are the distinctions between the visible and invisible, the connection 
of faith to invisible things and the general concept of transitory things being signs of 
eternal things. However, Cranz also notices already in Luther’s early works a movement 
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towards a more paradoxical hiddenness, in which invisible things are not simply 
contrasted to the visible, but become hidden under sub contraria (i.e., under that which is 
opposite to their proper essence, such as glorious works of God under suffering and 
shame).
54
 In the end Cranz does not categorize Luther’s thought in the Dictata as 
Neoplatonist or Augustinian, but instead describes it as “Christian theology in its own 
right, though we may at the same time note its special connection with various ancient and 
medieval traditions”, although leaving open the question of which specific traditions he 
means.
55
  In what follows, however, I will take a closer look at the two (arguably most 
influential critics) of Hunzinger, who evaluate Hunzinger’s ontological thesis as a whole, 
and offer a comprehensive alternative to it. I will then examine the latest reception of the 
Platonism thesis and the discussion of Luther’s ontology. 
The first opponent of Hunzinger’s thesis of significance for the present study was 
Gerhard Ebeling. In his article Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik published in 1951
56
 
Ebeling admits that the pairs of contraries Hunzinger’s interpretation centers on do appear 
in Luther’s Psalm Commentary. Ebeling claims, however, that the pairs are not to be 
interpreted ontologically, but rather as a distinction concerning the difference between 
present and future things. According to Ebeling the metaphysical duality apparent in the 
Psalm Lectures is not connected with the nature of things, but with the quality of the 
person coram deo; the distinction lies in whether his “substance” (interpreted by Ebeling 
as existence) is based on things of this life, or on the promises of God concerning the 
future. As such the divisions are not ontological, but “existential.” They do not concern a 
dualism between two created worlds (visible and spiritual), but a dualism between God 
and the World – or more precisely – a dualism between two different ways of relating to 
God. This dualism is based on whether God is seen as turned away from (his backside), or 
turned towards (his face) the human being. Thus Luther’s statements do not properly 
speak about the nature of things, but rather about the nature of the person before God, and 
only have a metaphorical meaning. The world is not “nothingness” (vanitas) in any 
ontological sense, but as a sign and figure which points to and anticipates the work of 
redemption in Christ, Church and Gospel.
57
 
The second scholar to offer a comprehensive alternative to Hunzinger’s thesis was 
Steven E. Ozment, who in his study Homo spiritualis (1969) attempts to evaluate both 
Hunzinger’s and Ebeling’s positions.58 Critical of both, he states as his intent as to argue 
that “what Luther initially places in suspension and gradually denies altogether in the 
neoplatonic world-view are the natural, soteriological resources with which it endows the 
soul of man. What he retains and theologically exploits from the neoplatonic world-view 
is the importance of the ‘objective reference.’”59 Ozment’s first point of criticism against 
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the Neo-Platonic thesis concerns the nature of the good. Although he admits that Luther 
speaks about the unitive nature of spiritual good things over against the temporalia, 
according to Ozment’s interpretation the good in spiritual things consists for Luther in that 
they create concord and friendship, and in that way they stand in contrast to “the realities 
of sixteenth century daily life”. Luther’s theology thus expresses “a combination of rare 
teutonic common sense and a theological understanding of the alibi and contraria 
character of the bona fidei”. Thus Ozment argues that the presuppositions for Luther’s 
dualism are not ontological, but rather found in Luther’s theological definition of 
substance.
60
  
Moreover, even though Ozment finds material in Luther’s anthropology to support a 
strict division between the body and the soul, Ozment’s identification of the “old man” 
with the “whole man” and the “flesh” with the “body” make it impossible for him to 
meaningfully discuss the relationship of the natural and qualitative anthropological 
descriptions in Luther, and prevent him from bringing the anthropological discussion to its 
conclusion.
61
 Rather, Ozment’s second point of criticism against Hunzinger’s thesis 
involves Ozment’s reading of the word “soul” (anima). By adducing a scholion in which 
Luther expresses the common late medieval notion that the soul is present in every 
member of the body, Ozment seeks to disprove the existence of a distinction between the 
spiritual and the corporeal in Luther’s thought. Further adding to the confusion, he defines 
the terms mens, spiritus, cor and conscientia as parallel to if not synonymous with anima, 
thus rejecting the common interpretation of spiritus as referring in Luther’s texts to the 
divine-human principle in which the two dimensions are intertwined. The latter view, 
according to Ozment, contradicts the “down-to-earth anthropological meaning of this 
concept for Luther”.62 And while Ozment agrees that Luther’s texts confer multiple 
dignifying titles and attributes on the soul, he nevertheless states that the celestial nature 
attributed to the soul by Luther concerns its imperative to seek heavenly goods, not its 
ontological status. This dignity is rather dependent on the promise of God to dwell in the 
soul. According to Ozment it requires an historical context, and is acquired through faith 
in God. Furthermore, because the enemies of God (sins, miseries and evils) can also dwell 
in the soul, we do not find in Luther “a clear picture of human life as a ‘double life,’ 
divided into two parts, one naturally limited to the sensible world, the other naturally 
oriented to an intelligible order.” Rather “[w]e find a much more complex picture, lacking 
the terminological precision and consistency ... a picture of a man who is operationally 
united (totus homo velut unum membrum)”. According to Ozment Luther therefore is not 
primarily concerned about the nature of the soul, but rather about the life of the whole man 
in subjection to the powers of sin and God’s promises and faith in Christ. The diverse 
theological terms Luther uses merely provide an anthropological ‘shorthand’, which 
Luther can flexibly employ to speak about the life of faith.
63
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After having criticised Hunzinger’s Neoplatonic thesis, Ozment moves on to evaluate 
the existentialist thesis. While rejecting the idea that the interior and exterior man denote 
parts of the human being, and rather interpreting them as the whole man and his way of 
life, Ozment nevertheless concludes that for Luther this relationality requires an objective 
point of reference. Ozment argues that the dimension of ‘turning’ does exist in Luther, but 
that it concerns ‘objective contexts’ instead of merely one’s way of relating to God. 
Ozment suggests that they are two opposite ‘places’ to which and in which the heart of 
man directs and locates its hope and fear, and from which it receives its joy and suffering. 
They are places which can carry the extra nos and pro nobis dimensions as well as speak 
meaningfully of the remembered past and promised future works of God.
64
 Ozment then 
goes on to combine this argument with his interpretation of Luther’s concept of substance. 
According to Ozment substantia (which constitutes a Christian for Luther) is a place on 
which the Christian can stand with all his powers in the face of death. This substance is an 
objective place extra nos, constituted outside of one’s own existence. Ozment thus agrees 
with Ebeling that for Luther substance has an existential definition, but remarks that, seen 
soteriologically, this existence has specific and indispensable termini (and is not thus only 
constituted by one’s turning). It ‘remembers’ the past works of God and ‘hopes’ in the 
future works of God.
65
  
With regard to anthropology, Ozment defines memory (memoria) as the capacity with 
which the soul is fixed upon those objective places and which substantiates one’s life in 
the present.
66
 Contradicting his earlier arguments against Hunzinger, according to which 
the anthropological terms used by Luther are only ‘shorthands’, Ozment accepts the fact 
that Luther, when discussing the powers of the soul, uses the concepts of intellectus and 
affectus much more often than other terms. Moreover, Ozment defines both concepts by 
their objects: As the intellect is for Luther the ability to understand spiritual things, 
Ozment takes that its objects are “events constituting salvation, ‘soteriological’ rather than 
‘epistemological’.” He states that they are not visible or apparent, but rather things spoken 
about in the word of God. Regarding the relationship of the intellect and affect, Ozment’s 
interpretation is that both go hand-in-hand. The intellect as capacity is defined by its 
object, and the quality of the person is defined by the thing loved, both grounded on an 
objective soteriological context.
67
 Thus Ozment contrasts the earthly life, which lacks 
substance capable of supporting man, and is therefore soteriologically de-substantial, with 
the life of faith, which fastens the person upon the works of God.  But because Ozment 
interpretes faith and hope as having as their object future things that are not yet present, 
the faithful still live in the tribulation between “not having” and “having”. The place 
where the faithful live is not yet present in re, only in fide and spe. Nevertheless, 
according to Ozment this journeying to a definite destination is in a certain sense a 
‘substantiating’ form of arrival.68  
Ozment’s reading bases the difference between spiritual and carnal sense of Luther’s 
biblical interpretation solely on the objective viewpoint, not on any special cognitive 
                                                 
64
 Ozment 1969, 101-104. 
65
 Ozment 1969, 105-109. 
66
 Ozment 1969, 110-111. 
67
 Ozment 1969, 111-117. 
68
 Ozment 1969, 118-121. 
 27 
 
 
capacity of the believer, which would be the key to understanding the spritual sense. This 
reading runs into serious trouble, however, when he discusses the relation of the Law and 
Gospel. Especially problematic for Ozment is the relationship between the Law 
understood literally and the Law understood spiritually, the latter according to Luther 
being identical with the Gospel. Ozment argues that the old law spiritually understood is 
not identical with the Gospel nor is an ‘object’ empowering a spiritual understanding, but 
that they rather converge or “‘come together as friends’”. Ozment seeks to establish this 
view by an understanding of the law as a testimony to the Gospel, which viewed from the 
side of the Gospel is not the old law, but orients the believer to the testimonies of God. 
Emphasizing the historical and objective sense of these testimonies Ozments put the 
relationship between these two into an historical-soteriological context. The people of the 
old law believe in God’s promises concerning the coming of Christ in the flesh, the people 
of the Gospel in the promises concerning the coming of Christ in glory. What is common 
for both is that they live believing in future things promised by God. Ozment concludes: 
“behind and before both people stand the opera Dei. Remembering what is past and 
hoping for what is still to come, both people live in a ‘soteriological vacuum.’ 
Anthropological resources cannot ‘fill’ it; if they could there would be no reason to 
remember what is past and to hope for what is still to come.” Ozment, however, agrees 
that this vacuum is filled through faith which recognizes the face of Christ in the adventus 
spiritualis. It is faith that offers the substantial place or substaculum vitae, a ground on 
which the faithful can stand on and not fall into the abyss. This existential subsistence in 
the present is made possible by the objective historical-soteriological context of faith. This 
approach is indicative of Ozment’s desire not to treat the concept of faith from an 
anthropological perspective.
69
  
Ozment finishes his lengthy review by concluding, that there is some evidence 
suggesting Neoplatonic influence, but that it is too weak. He views the existential thesis as 
more fruitful, but lacking. As a corrective he offers his own effort to construct an 
‘objective context’. Ozment further posits that should a defensible clarification of Luther’s 
worldview be made manifest, the following motifs should be taken into account: “the 
concern for the unity of the soul and the predilection of speaking of man coram Deo in 
terms of the active correlation of intellectus and affectus; the soteriologically de-
substantial character of this life; the ‘substantiating’ power of fides and spes; and a 
centrality of a comprehensive objective framework.”70 In a more general sense, however, 
Ozment declares that a major weakness of both the Neoplatonic and existentialist theses is 
their assumption that Luther’s concern is to distinguish and oppose irreconcilable 
‘entities’. According to Ozment, Luther is primarily concerned with the opposite: to 
reconcile them, as in his concept of the simul. However, Ozment bases his interpretation 
on the few passages of the Dictata in which Luther uses the analogy to a movement to 
explain his concept of the simul.
71
 Ozment therefore interprets this simultaneity as being 
in the middle of opposites but not acquiring them, and this explicitly in an exclusive sense. 
Ozment rejects a Christological interpretation where the simul is conceived of through the 
concept of communicatio idiomatum, as participation in both of the opposites (in the case 
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of Christ, humanity and divinity).
72
 In accordance with this interpretation, Ozment stresses 
that the Christian cannot be “‘partly righteous and partly sinful’”. He states: “The present 
life of the fideles ... must be sinful and righteous in such a way that (1) the radical 
opposition between righteousness of God and the sinfulness of man, (2) the distinction 
between divine and human nature and activity, and (3) the miraculous reality of God’s 
presence to man in faith and hope, are clearly preserved and set forth.” Thus Ozment 
stresses at the same time the radical difference between realities opposed to each other, 
and Luther’s reconciled dualism, in which these opposites coexist simultaneously. 
However, this coexistence is understood through his idea of objective contexts of 
reference, which are not acquired or participated in, only believed in and hoped for.
73
 
The question of Luther’s relationship to Platonism and his way of understanding the 
nature of the invisible world is also treated by William Wright, who in his recent work 
Martin Luther’s Understanding of God’s Two Kingdoms (2010) explores Renaissance 
Neoplatonism in detail.
74
 In my opinion Wright is successful in demonstrating that 
Luther’s theology is not related to the semi-pagan Platonism represented by some of the 
humanist writers of the Renaissance. However, Wright does not distinguish between the 
pagan Renaissance Neoplatonism and the Christian Platonism represented by e.g. 
Augustine and Bonaventure. Moreover, Wright selectively quotes Cranz in rejecting 
Luther’s Platonism in the Dictata, while Cranz actually explicitly agrees that the form of 
Luther’s thought in Dictata and the early writings may be described with qualifications as 
Platonist.
75
 The problem here lies partially in the definition of Platonism. Wright regards 
the idea of an ontological hierarchy and concept of the One as necessary components of 
Platonism, and does not consider e.g. the theology of Augustine as Platonist. For Wright, 
the spiritual nature of the Church has absolutely nothing to do with the Platonic 
intellectual world.
76
 Nevertheless, his description of the actual nature of the kingdom of 
God as spiritual and invisible is in general in agreement with the portrayal given in this 
dissertation, but the present study analyses more precisely the nature of Luther’s ontology 
and epistemology. Thus it remains unclear, what Wright thinks the spiritual and unseen 
things, that, though only understood by faith, nevertheless “really existed” and laid the 
foundation for Luther’s two-kingdom view, are in their ontological nature.77 The merit of 
Wright’s study thus lies in its demarcation between Luther and Renaissance Platonism, but 
its analysis of the actual content of Luther’s theology remains imprecise. 
The above survey highlights certain major points through which the views of 
Hunzinger, Cranz, Ebeling, Ozment and Wright can be compared. The major contribution 
of Hunzinger lies in showing the difference between the two worlds (the visible and the 
invisible) in Luther’s Psalm Commentary. Hunzinger’s thesis, however, is lacking in that 
these two are not brought together or reconciled (and in this way the Ozment’s criticism of 
Hunzinger appears justified). Moreover, Hunziger does not attempt to locate Luther’s 
                                                 
72
 On the way in which Luther (contrary to Ozment’s claim) actually utilizes this Christological analogy 
in his concept of the simul see chapter 2.4.2.3 
73
 Ozment 1969, 130-138. On Ozment’s rejection of the Christological understanding of the simul, see 
Ozment 1969, 138 footnote 1. 
74
 See Wright 2010, 71-77; 90-94.  
75
 Wright 2010, 101-106.  See also Wright 2010, 102 and Cranz 1959, 2-3.  
76
 Wright 2010, 13-14; 103-105, 110.  
77
 Wright 2010, 115-118. 
 29 
 
 
Platonism more precisely within the history of ideas. Cranz notices the Platonist 
tendencies in Luther’s thought, but also the development within Luther’s early works 
towards a more paradoxical concept of hiddenness under contraries. He raises question 
about the actual sources of Luther’s thought. For his part Ebeling offers a very subjectivist 
reading, locating the difference between the two worlds absolutely in the person of the 
believer, i.e., in his existential way of relating to the world. According to his interpretation 
there exist no objective points of reference on which these two are grounded. Ozment, 
although seemingly offering an objective alternative to Ebeling, still presents a non-realist, 
metaphorical reading of Luther’s texts regarding the opposition between the two worlds. 
Nevertheless, one can compliment Ozment for expressing the question of how these two 
worlds are brought together in Luther’s thought. Wright is successful in showing that 
Luther’s theology is not Platonist in the humanistic sense. However, he does not offer any 
precise alternative concerning how the nature of the spiritual and invisible things that exist 
really and not only as an orientation of the person should be understood. In my opinion, it 
seems that the realist starting point offered by Hunzinger, Cranz, Ozment and Wright 
needs to be taken seriously. The century-old position of Hunzinger is still valuable in the 
sense that it alone offers a developed ontological interpretation of how Luther’s text 
regarding the relations of the visible and invisible things is to be understood. Ozment’s 
remarks regarding the need also to reconcile and not only distinguish the opposites, 
however, shows the corrective which the view of Hunzinger requires. This corrective is 
implicitly offered by Cranz, who emphasized the development towards a more paradoxical 
hiddenness in Luther’s thought. The visible and invisible things do not remain 
irreconcilable ontological opposites, but are brought together in the doctrine about God’s 
presence under contraries. This principle, however, is not in conflict with Platonism, but 
rather in accord with some Platonist theologies which emphasize the coincidence of 
opposites in the divinity, as hinted already by Cranz.  
The question cannot therefore be reduced to whether Luther’s thought is simply 
“Platonist”, but rather one also needs to ask (as Wright does) what is meant by that 
Platonism. In their definition of Platonism Hunzinger and Cranz emphasize dualism and 
contrast between visible and invisible, Ebeling focuses on the concept of the subject as 
well as on the temporal perspective, Ozment on the question whether the soul is naturally 
endowed with soteriological faculties for grasping the invisible, and Wright on ontological 
hierarchy and the concept of the One. No single definition is therefore utilized by these 
scholars. Each approaches Platonism by means of different features. This problem, 
however, is in no way limited to the Platonism debate within Luther research, but it also 
concerns the definition of the relationship of Christian thought and Platonism in general.
78
 
No Christian author can be considered purely Platonist per se – unless, like some of the 
Fathers, one wishes to count Plato himself as a Christian author. Therefore, to pose the 
question about Luther’s Platonism is to ask whether Luther can be seen in continuity with 
and as part of the tradition of Christian Platonism, that is, a Christian theology which 
utilizes ideas and concepts from the Platonist tradition. Used in this way the Platonism of 
a particular Christian author is not be defined by means of a fixed set of criteria, but rather 
through the extent of his utilization of concepts and ideas of the Platonic tradition. As 
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stated in the introductory chapter, the reference point of this study is the Western 
theological tradition of Augustinianism, stemming from Augustine’s appropriation of 
Platonism, through the Victorines, who integrated Dionysian elements into that 
framework, to Bonaventure’s metaphysics of light and his realist epistemology of 
illumination. In short, the theologians representing this way of thought can be referred to 
as the Augustinian School, although one can raise the critical question of whether one can 
speak about such schools as one block.
79
 In the next chapters Luther’s views on the nature 
of God (chapter 2.2) , the universe (chapter 2.3) and the human being (chapter 2.4) are 
examined with this reference point in mind. 
2.2. God 
2.2.1. God as the Eternally Moving and Resting Trinity 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate Luther’s understanding of God, both in general, as 
well as specifically with regard to how Luther understands the divine nature. In Christian 
theology it is common to distinguish between the nature (ousia) of God and the divine 
persons (hypostateis), and also between God as in his nature (theology) and God as he acts 
in relation to the creation (economy). Furthermore, the term “nature” can be understood in 
a strict metaphysical sense as denoting substance, or in a more loose sense as meaning the 
general quality, character and habits of action of something. It is this more general 
meaning which is the primary sense of this chapter, but also the more strict meanings of 
the term will be touched upon insofar as something can be said about them. Therefore, the 
general purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on what Luther sees as the essential 
and defining (in the looser sense) characteristics of God, both in himself and his 
immediate action towards the created world. It is, however, not the objective of this 
chapter to provide a comprehensive picture of Luther’s view of the nature of God. Rather, 
the treatment will concentrate on such aspects of Luther’s doctrine concerning the 
Godhead and the Trinity which are significant for Luther’s understanding of faith as its 
preconditions. 
Luther’s understanding of the nature, being or essence of God is a very difficult subject 
to research. Despite the immense amount of text contained in the Dictata super Psalterium 
(13-15), Lectures on Romans (1515-16), Galatians (1516), Hebrews (1517-18) and 
Operationes in Psalmos (1519-21), one is usually forced to work with only a handful of 
quotations on each subtopic, as the questions related to the understanding of reality and 
the nature of God are not Luther’s main focus. Rather, they form preconditions of his 
thought, topics which are explicitly discussed only sporadically. Nevertheless, when one 
brings all the material together, a more precise picture does emerge.  
Perhaps one of the most subtle texts of Luther is his Christmas sermon of 1514 in 
which Luther discusses Christ as the Eternal Word of the Father with an emphasis on 
Trinitarian theology understood through an Aristotelian background. Tuomo Mannermaa 
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examines this sermon prominently in his article on the Trinitarian nature of Luther’s 
ontology.
80
 In this sermon Luther (among other things) examines the distinction, 
coeternity and divinity of the persons of Father and Son and the nature of the internal and 
external word, both in God and in human beings.
81
 In the last part of the sermon, Luther 
discusses general ontology with respect to different categories of created beings 
(inanimate, animal, sensual, rational, intellectual) and the nature of movement in the 
universe. Through this meditation, Luther arrives at the conclusion that natural movement 
reflects the movement of Father in producing Christ, the Word.
82
 He continues to discuss 
how it is common to all created things to move in a manner proper to their nature, and 
how in all movement the mover in a certain sense stays within itself while extending 
outside of itself.
83
 Luther quotes Aristotle, saying: “movement is the essence itself of God 
according to Aristotle”84. Based on the movement found in different creatures he then 
summarizes:  
Of all these the identity of the movement with the one that moves is easily understood, 
because all of these are a certain kind of movement, as it is said. Therefore also the Son of 
God is the essence of God itself and the divine essence is the Word itself, only in him in by 
an ineffable and superintelligible movement descending from him.
85
  
Luther further says that God, when he acts, “moves by an intelligible, no indeed by a 
superintelligible movement; remains the same and nevertheless multiplies himself”86. 
Luther does make a limiting statement, where he states (in accordance with orthodoxy) 
that “God does not multiply himself through his being (esse), but he multiplies himself 
through his giving birth (per producere suum). This is, that the essence does not give birth 
nor is born.”87 This remark establishes a distinction between divine nature as denoting the 
‘substantial’ divinity in the classical sense shared by the three persons (which does not 
give birth), and the divine nature as the Trinity that includes the relations between the 
persons.
88
 The divinity of the three persons includes in itself that which moves (Father), 
                                                 
80
 See Hat Luther eine trinitarische Ontologie? Mannermaa 1994. The article is summarized on p. 14 of 
the present study. This sermon is also analysed by Peura 1994, 86-101 and Dieter 2001, 260-269; 346-377. 
81
 WA 1, 20-25. 
82
 WA 1, 25, 39 – 27, 4. 
83
 WA 1, 26, 9 – 28, 24. 
84
 WA 1, 27, 22-23. “Sicut autem motus est ipsa essentia Dei secundum Aristotelem“. However note also 
the sentence’s continuation at WA 1, 27, 23-24: “qui dicit, quod sit actus [24] mobilis in quantum 
huiusmodi” (“who says, that movement is the actuality [actus] of the mobile insofar it is mobile”). 
According to Slenczka the intention of Luther’s quote is only to illustrate a certain aspect of the doctrine of 
Trinity, namely the processio of the Son from the Father, but not to build a general ontology in which 
movement and being are united. See Slenczka 1994, 61-65. 
85
 WA 1, 27, 35-39: “Quae omnia ex [36] identitate motus cum mobili facile intelliguntur, quia omnia 
illa quidam [37] motus sunt, ut dictum est. Ita ergo et Filius Dei est ipsa essentia Dei, et [38] esse divinum 
est ipsum verbum, solo scilicet illo ineffabili et superintelligibili [39] motu ab eo descendens.” 
86
 WA 1, 27, 9-12: “Ita ineffabiliter [10] Deus, dum se intelligit, dicit, sapit, sentit, profundit et agit ac 
[11] intelligibili, imo superintelligibili quodam motu movet, manet idem et tamen [12] seipsum multiplicat.” 
87
 WA 28, 3-4: “ita Deus non per esse, sed per producere suum sese multiplicat. [4] Hoc est, quod 
essentia nec generat nec generatur.” 
88
 In modern systematic theology a gap is often seen between a classical Greek understanding of 
substance (ousia) in the doctrine of the Trinity, in which the divine nature as a substance is given attributes 
not related to the relationship of the persons as Trinity, and modern Trinitarian thought, where nothing else 
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movement (Son) and rest (Holy Spirit).
89
 “So it happens in the divine, where God always 
moves and rests. [...] This movement there is eternal, as also the rest is eternal.”90 
In the last part of the sermon Luther discusses what can be called an ontology of 
participation.
91
 According to Luther, when the Word became flesh, God did not “leave 
himself”, i.e., the divinity, but he assumed flesh in the sense, that he not only “has flesh”, 
but that he “is flesh”. The reason for the Word becoming flesh and God becoming man 
was that the flesh could become Word and the human being could become God. 
Respectively then, in his or her union with the Word through faith a human being does not 
lose his or her humanity. He or she is not  transformed substantially into the Word, but he 
assumes and unites himself with the Word in the sense that he or she can be said to be the 
Word.
92
 One can see behind these formulations Luther’s ontology regarding the nature of 
movement.
93
 However, the precondition for assuming the Word is that one in a certain 
sense has to leave all that is one’s own. Luther provides an Aristotelian analogy to this 
action: As the potencies of the creatures have to be passive in order to be receptive to their 
proper forms and in this process become in a certain way like the form and assume it, also 
the human being has to become like nothing at all in order to receive God as the object of 
beatitude.
94
 Luther states: “Therefore for example God, the object of beautitude, is the 
                                                                                                                                                   
but the relations of the persons are seen to constitute the divine nature. The former view can be described as 
substantial and the latter relational. Luther seems to combine both of these aspects in his sermon. Though 
Mannermaa fails to make note of the distinction between the two ways Luther uses the term essentia  in the 
sermon (see also Slenczka 1994, 64) he nevertheless makes a comment related to it, according to which 
Luther’s ontology cannot be characterized as an essential ontology or ‘ontology of substance’ 
(“Substanzontologie”), because in it the relational and the essential (“seinshaft”) aspect are combined. 
Therefore relatio and esse are contained within each other in Luther’s ontology . This has implications for 
Luther’s conception of participation (Mannermaa 1994, 44-48). 
89
 WA 1, 28, 4-19. 
90
 WA 1, 28, 14-19: “Ita in divinis fit: ubi semper Deus movetur et quiescit [15] (parce, lector, verbis 
indignis tantae rei expressione), movendo filius, quiescendo [16] Spiritus Sanctus procedit. Quia Spiritus 
Sanctus finis est emanationis [17] Dei, imo dum semper ex Patre profluit motus, i. e. filius, semper ex 
utroque [18] provenit quies, in qua et mobile et motus finitur. Sed motus ille aeternus [19] est ibi, ita et quies 
aeterna.” 
91
 For Mannermaa’s thorough analysis of this part of the sermon see Mannermaa 1994, 48-53. 
92
 WA 1, 28, 25-41: “[25] Nunc ad mores veniendum est et discendum inprimis, quod sicut [26] verbum 
Dei caro factum est, ita certe oportet et quod caro fiat verbum. [27] Nam ideo verbum fit caro, ut caro fiat 
verbum. Ideo Deus fit homo, ut [28] homo fiat Deus. Ideo virtus fit infirma, ut infirmitas fiat virtuosa. Induit 
[29] formam et figuram nostram et imaginem et similitudinem, ut nos induat [30] imagine, forma, 
similitudine sua: ideo sapientia fit stulta, ut stultitia fiat [31] sapientia, et sic de omnibus aliis, quae sunt in 
Deo et nobis, in quibus [32] omnibus nostra assumsit ut conferret nobis sua. Efficimur autem verbum [33] 
vel verbo similes, i. e. veraces, sicut ipse homo vel homini similis, i. e. [34] peccatori et mendaci, sed non 
peccator et mendax, sicut nos non Deus [35] efficimur nec veritas, sed divini et veraces vel divinae consortes 
naturae, [36] quando assumimus verbum et per fidem ei adhaeremus. Nam nec verbum [37] ita factum est 
caro, quod se deseruerit et in carnem mutatum sit, sed quod [38] assumsit et sibi univit carnem, qua unione 
non tantum habere dicitur carnem, [39] sed etiam esse caro. Ita nec nos qui sumus caro sic efficimur verbum, 
quod [40] in verbum substantialiter mutemur, sed quod assumimus et per fidem ipsum [41] nobis unimus, 
qua unione non tantum habere verbum sed etiam esse dicimur.” 
93
 Likewise Mannermaa 1994, 48. 
94
 WA 1, 29, 6-30: “Oportet [7] autem, quando verbum assumimus, nos ipsos deserere et exinanire, nihil 
de [8] nostro sensu retinendo, sed totum abnegando, et sic sine dubio efficimur [9] illud, quod assumimus, et 
ita portat Dominus in hac vita omnes verbo [10] virtutis suae, nondum reipsa. Nulli enim credenti hic dantur 
quae credit, [11] sed verbum fides futurorum, et in hoc suspensi et captivi totum verbum [12] sumus, imo et 
in futuro portabit nos verbo, sed hoc erit verbum indivisibile [13] illud aut incarnatum, hoc sine voce, sono, 
literis erit. Interius illud autem [14] sono, voce, literis est involutum, sicut mel in favo, nucleus in testa, 
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essence itself of the blessed, without which the blessed would be nothing at all, but when 
they obtain that, it is like they become from potential to something.”95 Luther stresses, 
however, that it is not yet that those who believe have achieved this, but that they are still 
in the process in which the word leads them on to its fulfillment.
96
 Though Luther 
precisely deals here with only the nature of the believers’ and the blessed’s participation in 
the existence and essence of God, one can nevertheless surmise that in the light of 
Luther’s previously expressed conception about the nature of movement in the universe in 
general, one can also apply the described model (in certain measure) to all Creation. Thus 
one could postulate that all that exists exists to the extent that it participates to the 
existence of God.
97
 This view will receive further confirmation in the following chapters. 
Mannermaa also raises in his article the question of how much significance the 
thoughts expressed in the Christmas sermon have had for Luther’s later theology. 
However, Mannermaa’s emphasis is on whether Luther returns in his later writings to the 
Trinitarian structure of created reality (i.e., the movement in it), and whether the theme of 
faith as participation is continued in the later writings.
98
 On the other hand, the focus here 
is on asking, whether Luther’s idea of the nature of God as eternal begetter in which 
existence, movement and rest are combined continues into his later writings, and what 
significance it has for Luther’s overall understanding of the nature of God. Though the 
texts found within the major sources of this study are scarce, they nevertheless corroborate 
this picture. 
First, Luther also presents in his other writings (e.g., the Operationes in Psalmos) the 
same idea that Christ as the Son is eternally begotten of the Father in an eternal, constant 
and infinite movement.
99
 In itself this is no wonder, since Luther here simply presents the 
                                                                                                                                                   
medulla [15] in cortice, vita in carne et verbum in carne. Nec id mirum, quod nos [16] verbum fieri oportere 
dixi, cum et Philosophi dicant, quod intellectus sit [17] intelligibile per actualem intellectionem et sensus 
sensibile per actualem [18] sensationem, quanto magis id in spiritu et verbo verum est! Sic enim [19] 
Aristoteles ait: Intellectus impossibilis est nisi eorum, quae intelligit, sed [20] potentia est ipsa omnia, et ipse 
est quodammodo omnia. Sic etiam appetitus [21] et appetibile sunt unum, et amor et amatum, quae omnia 
substantialiter [22] intellecta falsissima sunt. Sed sic quia intellectus et affectus dum desiderant [23] sua 
Obiecta, in quantum sic desiderantes, habent se velut materia appetens [24] formam, et secundum hoc, i. e. 
in quantum desiderantes, non autem in [25] quantum subsistentes, sunt pura potentia, imo quoddam nihil et 
fiunt quoddam [26] ens, quando obiecta attingunt, et ita obiecta sunt eorum esse et actus, [27] sine quibus 
nihil essent, sicut materia sine forma nihil esset. Pulchra haec [28] Philosophia sed a paucis intellecta 
altissimae Theologiae utilis est. Sic v. g. [29] Deus Obiectum beatitudinis est ipsa essentia beatorum, sine 
qua beati nihil [30] essent omnino, sed dum attingunt ipsum fiunt velut ex potentia aliquid.” 
95
 WA 1, 29, 28-30. 
96
 WA 1, 29, 8-15. Luther seems to think that in this life the word which carries us is the promise, but the 
promise already contains as its kernel the eternal and indivisible Word, into which the faithful are assumed 
in the process. 
97
 Luther’s understanding of participation raises the question, however: in what sense do the creatures 
exist as themselves and on what basis do they retain their own existence and individuality when they leave 
all of their own as the requirement for the participation in the Word in the beautitude? Though the 
Aristotelian potencies are empty of form with regard to their object, they also do have an existence of their 
own as the specific potencies. 
98
 Mannermaa 1994, 53. 
99
 E.g. in Operationes in Psalmos, AWA 2, 92, 1-6: “Et illud quam vigilanter et digne sancti patres 
interpretati sunt: Hodie genui te, id est, in aeternitate. Aeternitas est, quod genitus est, gignitur, gignetur sine 
fine, cui hoc est esse filium, quod nasci ex patre; nec nasci cepit nec desinet, sed semper nascitur 
praesentissima nativitate. Recte hodie genitus dicitur, id est, nascens semper. Nam hoc hodie non habet 
hesternum nec crastinum, sed semper diurnum, sicut Ioh 8<,58>: ’Antequam am fieret, ego sum.’” See also 
AWA 2, 335, 5 – 338, 2; 448, 7-14. 
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orthodox, Augustinian understanding of the eternal birth of Christ. Second, the theme of 
assuming the Word as the Word assumed flesh, and relinquishing the form of human 
wisdom and assuming the form of the Word, is also encountered in the Lecture on 
Romans. There Luther emphasizes the idea of sharing in the properties of the Word, which 
has a bearing on the theology of justification.
100
 However, as in the Christmas sermon, 
Luther stresses that this participation in the Word is not yet complete, and will only be 
complete in the future. Somewhat akin to the distinction between internal and external 
words in the Christmas sermon, Luther recounts in the Dictata three different ways of 
God’s speech: in himself, for the blessed in glory; in spirit, for the saints in this life; and 
through the external word, for human ears. Only the “final word” in glory will provide 
ultimate satisfaction.
101
  
Third, Luther is also in agreement with the 1514 sermon when he states in the Dictata 
that one who believes (and thus becomes a son of God) must constantly be born, renewed 
and begotten as is the Son of God. As in the sermon, the eternal birth of Christ remains no 
                                                 
100
 WA 56, 61, 15 – 62, 1: “[15] Gratias autem sc. agimus deo Grec⌊us ‘Gratia autem Deo’ sc. sit [16] 
quod fuistis serui peccati: i. e. quod estis nunc, quales non fuistis, Sed [17] ‘fuistis serui peccati’ obedistis 
autem per credulitatem ex corde simpliciter [18] et sine fictione in eam formam doctrine i. e. secundum 
regulam euangelii [1] in qua traditi estis. 
1” 
WA 56, 62, 13-18 (gloss 1): “GLOSSA:1) [13] I. e. de forma erroris estis traducti in formam euangelii, 
Quia [14] ‘Ine  ternum, Domine, permanet verbum tuum’. Non enim verbum, Sed [15] nos mutamur et 
cedimus ei, Isaie 40.: ‘fenum exiccatum est, verbum [16] autem Domini manet ine  ternum.’ Matt. 7.: ‘Esto 
consentiens aduersario [17] tuo’, q. d. relinque formam tuam et Indue formam verbi. Quia [18] ‘Verbum 
caro factum est’, Vt nos verbum efficiamur.” 
WA 56, 227, 2-7: “Iustificat || Vincit || enim in [3] verbo suo, dum nos tales facit, quale est verbum suum, 
hoc est Iustum, [4] verum, Sapiens etc. Et ita nos in verbum suum, non autem verbum suum [5] in nos mutat. 
facit autem tales tunc, quando nos verbum suum tale [6] credimus esse, sc. Iustum, verum. Tunc enim Iam 
similis forma est in verbo [7] et in credente i. e. veritas et Iustitia“ 
WA 56, 329, 27 – 330, 5: “Quia Sapientia carnis aduersaria est verbo [28] Dei, Verbum autem Dei est 
immutabile et insuperabile. ideo necesse est [29] Sapientiam carnis mutari et suam formam relinquere ac 
formam verbi [30] suscipere. Quod fit, dum per fidem seipsam captiuat et destruit, conformat [1] se verbo, 
credens verbum esse verum, se vero falsam. Sic ‘Verbum caro [2] factum est’ et ‘assumpsit formam serui’, 
vt caro verbum fiat et homo [3] formam assumat verbi; tunc, vt c. 3. dictum est, homo fit Iustus, verax, [4] 
sapiens, bonus, mitis, castus, sicut est verbum ipsum, cui se per fidem [5] conformat.” 
101
 WA 55, II, 253, 370 – 254, 391: “[370] Sciendum Itaque, Quod verbum Dei triplici modo dicitur et 
reuelatur. Primo [371] a Deo patre in sanctis, in gloria et in seipso. Secundo in sanctis in hac [372] vita in 
spiritu. Tercio per verbum externum et linguam ad aures hominum. [373] Bl 59 Et sic est velut in tercium 
vas * transfusum. Et hoc est figuratum [374] per hoc, Quod olim ‘Deus locutus est in prophetis et patribus’, 
Et sic [375] mediante homine factum est velum litere  et paries medius. Postea ‘locutus [376] est in filio’; hoc 
adhuc est in velamento, Sed tamen secundum. Tandem [377] pater ipse in Ce  lo loquetur nobis in seipso, 
cum nobis verbum suum [378] ipse sine vllo medio reuelabit, vt audiamus et videamus et beati simus. [379] 
Atque sicut prima locutio multis figuris et vmbris fuit Inuoluta, [380] que omnia in vno Christo implentur et 
Inueniuntur, Quia quicquid in lege [381] tam multis verbis et factis agitur, totum vnus Christus habet in 
veritate, [382] Sic enim ‘verbum consummans et abbreuiatum fe  cit Dominus’, Vt que [383] ibi multis 
aguntur, hic vna fide scil. et Charitate expleantur et cesset [384] onerosa multitudo legum. Ita in futuro erit 
Deus idem vnusque omnia in [385] omnibus. Et tam multa, quibus nunc sub Christo etiam vtimur et egemus, 
[386] scil. gratiis et donis, que sunt per multa olim carnalia significata (Nunc [387] enim pauca sunt 
ceremonialia, immo nulla fere de necessitate Euangelii, [388] nisi 7 sacramenta, que olim erant plurima, Sed 
tamen spiritualiter ista remanent [389] et adhuc sunt multa), et tunc omnia ista pater vno nobis verbo [390] 
pre stabit, Quia ‘cum apparuerit gloria eius, tunc satiabimur’, Et tamen [391] vnico et simplicissimo verbo 
suo satiabit nos.”  
The three ways of God’s speech in the history of salvation follow the model: from multiplicity to 
simplicity, plurality to unity and material to immaterial, pointing to a possibly underlying Platonic idea. See 
chapter 2.3. 
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mere intratrinitarian characteristic, but becomes the model of the believers’ existence and 
relationship to God, which is furthermore reflected in the entire created order: 
If we namely are sons of God, we must always be in birth [in generatione]. Therefore it is 
said: ‘He who is born of God does not sin’, but the begetting of God [generatio Dei] 
preserves him. As in God, the Son is always from eternity born from the Father eternally, 
in the same manner also we must always be born, renewed and begotten. All change in the 
Creation signifies anagogically that birth, and this [birth, i.e., renewal] tropologically, and 
that of the Church allegorically. As in the Scripture it is said about us, that we are always 
like newborn children. [...] If we are compared to the flourishing of grass, we must not 
wither, but always flourish, always progress from virtue to virtue, from clarity to clarity, 
from faith to faith, that we would be those of whom it is said in Ps. 109: ‘From the womb 
of the sunrise to you the dew of your infancy’.102 
Luther also presents the same idea at the Lecture on Galatians. Here he emphasizes the 
life of the Christian as a crossing and passover in which a Christian is always made more 
and more like the Son of God: 
Because of those who are not yet educated sufficiently in Christ, I repeat what I have 
frequently said before, that is, that the words ‘redeems’, ‘we are adopted’, ‘you are sons’, 
‘he sends the Spirit’, ‘not a slave but a son and inheritor’ and similar are not to be 
understood as having been completed in us, but as that which Christ has fullfilled and 
which will be fullfilled in him and us. All of these have been begun so that they would be 
perfected more and more every day: therefore it is called passover and crossing of the 
Lord, and we are called Galileans, that is, migrators, because we constantly leave from 
Egypt through the desert, that is, through the way of the Cross and Passion, into the 
Promised Land; are redeemed and are constantly redeemed; have been adopted and are 
adopted; have been made sons of God and become such; the Spirit is sent, is being sent and 
will be sent; we know and we will know. Therefore do not think that a life of a Christian 
would is still and quiet. Rather, it is a crossing and progress from vices to virtue, from 
clarity to clarity, from virtue to virtue [...]
103
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 WA 55, II, 974, 2388 – 975, 2401: “Si enim filii Dei sumus, semper oportet esse [2389] in 
generatione. Vnde dicitur: ‘Qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat’, Sed generatio [2390] Dei conseruat eum. 
Sicut enim in Deo filius semper et abe  terno et [2391] ine  ternum nascitur, Ita et nos semper oportet nasci, 
nouari, generari. [2392] Illam enim generationem omnis mutatio Creature significat Anagogice, [2393] et 
hanc tropologice, et Ecclesie allegorice. Sic in scrip⌊tura dicitur de [2394] nobis, quod sumus infantes quasi 
modo geniti semper. Et Psal. 71.: ‘florebunt [2395] sicut fenum terre  ’. Impii et carnales etiam comparantur 
feno, Sed [2396] arescenti; Nos florenti et non arenti, Illi arenti et non florenti. Sed florere [2397] non potest, 
nisi continue nouum fiat et crescat. Ergo si florentia feni nobis [2398] comparatur, non oportet nos 
marcescere, Sed semper florere, Semper ire [2399] de virtute in virtutem, de claritate in claritatem, ex fide in 
fidem, Vt simus, [2400] de quibus dictum est Psal. 109.: ‘Ex Matrice Aurore tibi ros infantie  [2401] tue’” 
103
 WA 2, 535, 26 – 536, 5: “[26] Propter eos, qui nondum satis in Christo sunt eruditi, repeto, quae [27] 
supra saepius dixi, hoc est, verba illa ‘redimeret’, ‘adoptionem reciperemus’, [28] ‘estis filii’, ‘misit 
spiritum’, ‘non est servus sed filius et haeres’ et similia non [29] sunt intelligenda, quod completa in nobis 
sint, sed quod Christus hoc explevit, [30] quo in nobis et ipsa explerentur. Sic enim omnia incepta sunt, ut 
[31] de die in diem sint magis ac magis perficienda: ideo et phase domini, id [32] est transitus, dicitur et nos 
Gallilei, id est migrantes,
1
 vocamur, quod assidue [33] de Aegypto per desertum, id est per viam crucis et 
passionis, eximus ad [34] terram promissionis, redempti sumus et assidue redimimur, recepimus adoptionem 
[1] et adhuc recipimus, facti sumus filii dei et sumus et fiemus, missus [2] est spiritus, mittitur et mittetur, 
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Luther directly connects the progress named in the text with a Christian’s existence as 
participation in God: 
Thus also we are, move and live in God: we are on account of the Father who is the 
substance of divinity, we move by the image (movemur imagine) of the Son who is 
divinely and eternally born of the Father in a way as if a movement from movement, we 
live according to the Spirit in whom the Father and the Son rest and, in a way, live.
104
 
Therefore it is clear that Luther’s view of the birth and progress of a Christian as a 
Christian is closely connected to the way Luther understands the nature of the Trinity as 
the eternal generation of the Son from the Father. All progress in Christian life happens 
through participation in Christ as the Word that moves reality.
105
  
Fourth, Luther’s conception of the nature of God is of high importance for the way 
Luther conceives the rest of the blessed souls in eternity. According to the view Luther 
expresses in the Lecture on Hebrews, the final rest of the spiritual person is namely when 
a person is left by faith and external word in the essential act of God (opus essentiale Dei) 
and participates in the movement of the birth of the uncreated Word: 
Internally [the spiritual person] rests, when he rests privatively, namely when he is left by 
faith and word in the essential act of God, which is the nativity itself of the uncreated 
Word, as it is said: ‘This is eternal life, that they know you, the true God, and him whom 
you have sent, Jesus Christ’, i.e., the procession of the Son from the Father. And here is no 
internal disturbance, because this Seventh Day has no evening by which it could pass into 
another day.
106
 
The views expressed by Luther in his other writings therefore confirm a continuity 
with the major points of the Christmas sermon of 1514. For Luther the whole existence of 
created reality reflects the model of the eternal birth of the Son from the Father. In this 
process, God is dynamic being and movement, who possesses eternal beginning, eternal 
movement and eternal rest within himself. The movement and life of all creatures is a 
reflection of this movement of the Trinity. Through faith, a Christian begins to participate 
in the movement of God in a manner which is ontologically more profound that than 
which is participated in by his mere existence. In the temporal life this participation is 
growing, but remains imperfect. In the final beatitude the blessed will participate in the 
essential act of the Trinity, which is the birth of the Son from the Father. This act also 
contains within it its own rest in the unity of the Holy Spirit, which is the final rest of the 
blessed souls. 
                                                                                                                                                   
cognoscimus et cognoscemus. [3] Et ita vitam Christiani ne imagineris statum et quietem esse, sed transitum 
[4] et profectum de vitiis ad virtutem, de claritate in claritatem, de virtute [5] in virtutem” 
104
 WA 2, 536, 28-31: “Ita et nos in deo sumus, movemur et vivimus: sumus propter patrem qui [29] 
substantia divinitatis est, movemur imagine filii qui ex patre nascitur divino [30] et aeterno velut motu 
motus, vivimus secundum spiritum in quo pater et [31] filius quiescunt et velut vivunt.”  
105
 So also Mannermaa, who comments on the same text (Mannermaa 1994, 60). 
106
 WA 57, b159, 17-24. 
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2.2.2. God as the Highest Good and Giver 
In his book Two Kinds of Love Tuomo Mannermaa introduces a fundamental distinction in 
Luther’s thought between self-giving divine love and self-seeking human love. According 
to this distinction, it is characteristic for human love to always seek an object which is 
good and lovable. Divine love, on the other hand, is characterized by its creating its own 
object out of that which is empty and nothing, bestowing on it existence and goodness. 
The basis of the distinction is in God’s nature itself: It is God’s essence, or being, always 
to create something out of nothing.
107
 Mannermaa quotes Luther’s Magnificat in 
ascertaining, that 
Just as God in the beginning of creation made the world out of nothing, whence He is 
called the Creator and the Almighty, so His manner of working continues unchanged. Even 
now and to the end of the world, all His works are such that out of that which is nothing, 
worthless, despised, wretched, and dead, He makes that which is something, precious, 
honorable, blessed, and living. On the other hand, whatever is something, precious, 
honorable, blessed, and living, He makes to be nothing, worthless, despised, wretched, and 
dying. In this manner no creature can work; no creature can produce anything out of 
nothing.  Therefore His eyes look only into the depths, not to the heights; as it is said in 
Daniel 3:55 (Vulgate): “Thou sittest upon the cherubim and beholdest the depths”.108 
This distinction is then utilized by Mannermaa as the key to understanding Luther’s 
theology. In the second and third chapters of his book Mannermaa describes a state of 
confrontation that exists between two types of theology based on two different kinds of 
love. The basis of the criticism (on which Mannermaa seems to agree with Luther) is the 
accusation that in Thomistic theology (based on Aristotelian philosophy) the typos of 
human love (love seeking a good and lovable object) is applied to theology and taken as 
the model of the relationship between the human being and God.
109
 In the third chapter of 
his book, Mannermaa describes the idea Luther expressed in the Heidelberg disputation 
(1518) of the conflict between a theology of glory and a theology of the cross. Theology of 
glory, according to Mannermaa, is characterized by its taking the invisible, infinite 
attributes of God as its starting point, and by that God is loved as the “most real being” 
and the “highest good”.110 In contrast to this, in a theology of the cross, God is seen 
through suffering and the cross, which Mannermaa takes to mean both the suffering and 
cross of Christ and that of the individual Christian. According to Mannermaa, in contrast 
to the theology of glory God thus appears and is knowable to human beings only hidden in 
opposites (of his divine nature), as “negative essence and being”.111 Though Mannermaa 
readily admits that for Luther God in himself is also good, righteous, true and omnipotent, 
Mannermaa nevertheless sharply criticizes any theology in which the concept of desire 
                                                 
107
 Mannermaa 2010, 1-5. 
108
 WA 7, 547, 1-10. Translation here is from LW 21, 299, as the quote is taken from Mannermaa’s book. 
109
 Mannermaa 2010, 9-25. In this chapter in particular it is difficult to distinguish when Mannermaa is 
merely describing the background of Luther’s criticism and when he himself joins in the critique of 
Thomism. 
110
 Mannermaa 2010, 27-30. 
111
 Mannermaa 2010, 31-38; Luther uses the term “negative essence” at WA 56, 392, 33 – 393, 3. 
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towards God as the highest good plays any meaningful role. According to Mannermaa, a 
theology based on the idea of God as the supreme good and highest object of love 
inevitably tends to have a more or less negative attitude towards the world. As an example 
of this, in the fourth chapter of his book Mannermaa discusses the theology of Thomas à 
Kempis. There he attempts to demonstrate, that human beings’ appetitive love for God and 
their (expected) abandonment of the precious things of the creation belong inseparably 
together.
112
 According to Mannermaa, on the other hand Luther’s view of God as Giver 
allows one to see the creation as a good gift of God and so appreciate its value.
113
 
Keeping in mind Mannermaa’s criticism it is not difficult to understand why the 
concept of God as the highest good (summum bonum) traditionally has been viewed with 
great suspicion in Lutheran theology. Granted, the divine attributes have been ascribed to 
the Godhead in principle, but the use of such a metaphysical concept to explain more 
comprehensive principles of Luther’s theology has not been widespread. The concept of 
God as Giver, on the other hand, has offered a less metaphysical and more relational 
concept with which to approach the question of the essence of God. Therefore it may be 
surprising to discover that the concept of God as summum bonum actually carries 
considerable weight in Luther’s understanding of the nature of God. Unlike one might 
surmise from Mannermaa’s exposition in his Two Kinds of Love, the concepts of God as 
the highest good and as Giver are actually for Luther not at all mutually exclusive, but 
rather complimentary. 
Luther explicitly calls God  the highest good at least three times in his first psalm 
lectures, the Dicatata super Psalterium (1513-1515). He begins by pointing out that God 
(even when he is angry with the creatures) remains in himself most quiet, tranquil and 
undisturbed. Because he is God, his immediate action is nothing else than the highest joy 
and delight. When God punishes creatures, it happens by taking away his presence and 
using other creatures to inflict punishment.
114
 In the glosses on Ps. 44 he calls Christ the 
highest good, connecting the concept to the eternal procession of the Word from the 
Father.
115
 Later he again employs the concept of Christ, stating that he is “lovable over 
everything”.116 In yet another text Luther describes God as more than loveable 
(superamabilis).
117
 Moreover, in the Dictata Luther also names Christ, or union with him 
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 Mannermaa 2010, 51-55. 
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 WA 55, II, 45, 12 – 46, 2. “Non enim ira sic est sua, quia in ipso sit, Sed quia creatura, in qua est ira, 
est eius, et ipsius  nutu et imperio affligit impios, ipse autem in se manens quietissimus et  tranquillus, immo 
summe bonus et non turbatus. Nam tam est bonus  Deus, vt quicquid ipse immediate agit, non sit nisi 
summum gaudium  et delectatio, et non affligit, Sed magis reficit. Sed in Impiis ipse se subtrahens et in 
summa manens bonitate applicat creaturas, quarum vna alteram affligit, Sicut fit, cum ignis ligna comburit. 
Corol⌊larium: Non Deus proprie affligit approximando, Sed recedendo et in creaturas relinquendo.” 
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 WA 55, I, 366, 7-8: “ERuctauit produxit ab eterno cor meum ex se solo sine matre verbum filium 
equalem bonum summum.” 
116
 WA 55, I, 806, 21-24: “Custodiuit anima mea non tantum manus extra, Sed et intus cor meum 
testimonia tua promissiones de Christo et gratia eius: et dilexit ea vehementer quia summum bonum, scil. 
Christum, promittunt, quod est super omnia diligibile”.  
117
 WA 55, I, 137, 1 – 18. “Et Ascendit super Cherubin. Deus ‘Ascendit’ [3] non in natura, Sed in 
nostra cognitione et amore, quando cognoscitur [4] esse altissimus et incomprehensibilis et superamabilis. Et 
sic quanto magis [5] proficimus in cognitione eius, tanto magis ‘ascendit’, quia semper clarius [6] ac clarius 
cognoscitur eius altitudo. Sed hoc ‘ascendere’ non contingit, [7] nisi vbi prius ‘descenderit’, Sicut Christus 
prius descendit et postea [8] ascendit. Quia ‘nemo ascendit in ce  lum, nisi qui descendit’, i. e. nemo [9] 
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whom the Church intimately knows, as the maximum good (maximum bonum).
118
 And yet 
in one place Luther adds that God himself is the good and whole beatitude of the holy, not 
the gifts he gives. In addition in this same place Luther connects the giving of this good 
with participating in Christ.
119
 Luther also mentions the concept of the summum bonum in 
the Lecture on Romans (1515-1516) and in the Operationes in Psalmos (1519-1521). In 
the former, he states that original sin leads the human being to consider something else 
than God as the highest good.
120
 In the latter, he equates the highest good with the word of 
God (verbum dei), which has prompted the commentator of the AWA edition to claim that 
Luther’s identification of the word as the highest good, instead of God, marks his 
separation from Scholasticism.
121
 However Luther’s description of the word as “good, 
sweet, pure, holy and miraculous” as well as his comments on the notion that one is united 
with this word through love, whereby one is “elevated over all creation”, seriously calls 
into question whether this word can in any way be interpreted as anything other than the 
Word, Christ himself.
122
  
For Luther, the goodness of God therefore seems to be an inseparable property of the 
divine nature, as the above five direct and three indirect references to God as the highest 
good demonstrate. They can be understood even more precisely when we consider them in 
association with other things Luther has to say about the nature of God, the nature of the 
good and the nature of love. According to what Luther says both in the Dictata (citing 
Augustine) and in the Operationes, through love one becomes like the object of one’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
peruenit ad diuinitatis cognitionem, nisi qui prius humiliatus fuerit [10] et in sui cognitionem descenderit, 
simul enim ibi et Dei cognitionem [11] inuenit. Vnde ‘Cherubim’ significat hic cognitiuas potentias, [12] 
super qua omnes ‘ascendit’ Deus in humilibus. Penne [13] ventorum autem significat proprie affectiuas 
virtutes. Et sic ‘volat’. [14] Vnde super eas non dicitur ‘ascendere’, Sed ‘volare’, quia tantum manet [15] 
amabilis, quantum cognoscitur. Non enim altius ‘volat’, i. e. amatur, [16] quam ‘ascendit’, i. e. cognoscitur. 
Igitur ‘volatus’ eius est ipsum esse [17] obiectum Dilectionis, ‘Ascensus’ autem eius est ipsum esse 
obiectum [18] cognitionis.” 
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 WA 55, II, 243, 89-93: “Eructauit cor [90] meum verbum bonum, i. e. Nuncium bonum et 
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[92] super genus humanum. ‘Eructauit’ autem dicit, i. e. de plenitudine interiori [93] et ex corde intimo 
affectuosoque animo significaui vobis.” 
119
 WA 55, II, 284, 111-120: “[111] 53, 8 Confitebor nomini tuo, quoniam bonum est. Non ait: 
quoniam [112] bonum dat, Sed propter esse bonum, non propter dare bonum, q. d. propter [113] seipsum, 
non propter lucrum. Nam ‘Domini nomen bonum est in conspectu [114] sanctorum suorum’, Psal⌊mo 
precedenti 51. Hoc est: Nomen Domini [115] non dat sanctis bonum aliud quam est ipsummet, Sed 
ipsummet est bonum [116] eorum. Et sic dat seipsum, et ita non dat Sed est bonum et tota beatitudo [117] 
sanctorum. Nam sicut dicitur: ‘Deus dat sanctis seipsum’, quod valet: [118] ‘Deus est bonum sanctorum 
suorum’, Ita etiam Nomen eius dat seipsum illis, [119] i. e. est bonum eorum. Est autem nomen Dei ipse 
Christus filius Dei, [120] verbum quo se dicit, et nomen, quo se nominat, ipsum in e  ternitate.” 
120
 WA 56, 76, 24-27 gloss 1: “GLOSSA:1) [24]Vnde propheta: ‘Oculus meus depredatus est animam 
meam’ (i. e. [25] sapientia carnis). Denique Iob 3. Maledixit hunc diem sapientie  , Quia [26]Deo contraria est 
et facit bonum apparere aliud quam summum illud, [27]quod Deus est, et frui eo, quod est creatura.” 
121
 AWA 2, 44, footnote 41: “Indem L das Wort als ‘summum bonum’ bezeichnet, wird der Unterschied 
zur Scholastik deutlich, für die Gott in philosoph Definition das ‚summum bonum‘ ist …“ 
122
 AWA 2, 43, 21 – 44, 3: “Dicit ergo: Beato huic viro erit volunta sua in lege domini; prorsus nihil 
videbit, amabit, odiet bonorum malorumve, sed hac voluntate prorsus super omnia creata elevabitur. Quid 
igitur mirum, si beatus sit, qui caelesti hac voluntate praeditus nihil eorum sapit, in quibus colliduntur stulti 
beatitudinis aestimatores? Tum quia per hanc voluntatem iam unum cum verbo dei factus (siquidem amor 
unit amantem et amatum), necesse est, ut gustet, quam bonum, suave, purum, sanctum, mirabile sit verbum 
dei, summum scilicet bonum, quod illi gustare non possunt, qui vel manu vel lingua tantum sunt in lege, 
voluntate autem in sordibus rerum mersi.” 
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love; one is united with the object. If the object of love is empty (vanus) and transitory, 
one becomes empty and transitory. If the object of love is God, one becomes in a certain 
way like God.
123
 This does not, however, mean that love assumes the primary place in the 
order of salvation, because Luther also writes that God can be loved only to the degree he 
is known.
124
 This knowledge comes from faith, as the present study will demonstrate. But 
when one by faith possesses Christ as the highest good and begins to love God, one’s soul 
is consequently filled with the ampleness (largitas) of divinity.
125
 The way Luther 
understands the nature of this ampleness and goodness of divine nature has a profound 
significance for understanding the place of the distinction of the two kinds of love in 
Luther’s theology.  
Luther seems to subscribe to the Platonic principle of the good: bonum est diffusivum 
sui (good is self-diffusing; it is in the nature of the good to spread itself).
126
 According to 
Luther, God is “infinite goodness, who can never be exhausted”.127 As such, God is the 
source and fountain of all good things, especially spiritual things. They are by their nature 
eternal and non-temporal, true and simple, gathering up the person divided into many 
things into one true good,
128
 yet still leading to the process of renewal and growth.
129
 They 
constantly flow from God, are sustained by him,
130
 and in a certain sense are God 
                                                 
123
 WA 55, II, 879, 161-171: “[161] 113b, 8 Similes fiant illis. Prophetice dicit primo, quia non natura, 
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AWA 2, 43, 25 – 44, 3: “Tum quia per hanc voluntatem iam unum cum verbo dei factus (siquidem amor 
unit amantem et amatum), necesse est, ut gustet, quam bonum, suave, purum, sanctum, mirabile sit verbum 
dei, summum scilicet bonum, quod illi gustare non possunt, qui vel manu vel lingua tantum sunt in lege, 
voluntate autem in sordibus rerum mersi.” 
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 See WA 55, I, 137, 1 – 18 (text in footnote 117). 
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 WA 55, II, 637, 225-227: “At quia deus ine  ternum est laudabilis, [226] quia bonum infinitum, nec 
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128
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 WA 55, I, 676-678; 716-718. 
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himself.
131
 Therefore, for Luther, true goodness is not static. It is dynamic action that 
shares itself while remaining with itself. The above instances in which Luther calls Christ 
the highest good are no coincidence, but a reflection of this concept. The divine character 
of good to extend outside itself is portrayed most particularly in Christ, who is eternally 
born of the Father while staying consubstantial with him. For Luther, participation in the 
spiritual good is in the ultimate sense nothing else than participation in Christ and in the 
divine nature itself. Therefore we see in Luther’s understanding of Christ as the highest 
good and the divine nature as a kind of ‘fountain’ of goodness the same basic idea that the 
Trinitarian meditations of Luther’s Christmas sermon portrayed, now only described in a 
more Platonic manner.
132
   
With regard to the question of the nature of Luther’s understanding of reality, one 
should note that the manner in which Luther combines the so-called Platonic principle of 
the good (bonum est diffusivum sui) stemming from Pseudo-Dionysius, with the eternal 
birth of the Christ, is not his own innovation. Rather, here Luther seems to be related to 
the strand of Western Trinitarian theology introduced by Richard of St. Victor on the basis 
of the Pseudo-Dionysian axiom, in which the concept of self-giving good is applied to the 
doctrine of the Trinity. The idea finds its most famous expression in the theology of 
Bonaventure, who discusses the nature of God as the Highest Good  in the sixth chapter of 
his Itinerarium mentis in Deum. According to Bonaventure, it follows from the Platonic 
principle that the highest good must share itself in the highest manner: that is, in way that 
is actual, intrinsic, substantial and hypostatic. Therefore, God shares himself in the 
substantial and hypostatic procession of the Son from the Father. In this way the apparent 
opposites of being and action, rest and procession are united in God, and the birth of the 
Son is contemplated through the idea of the highest good. Luther’s way of speaking about 
God as the highest good especially in connection with the eternal birth of the Son clearly 
represents this line of thought.
133
 Moreover, one should note that the Thomistic 
understanding of the highest good differs significantly from that of Bonaventure. Thomas 
defines the nature of God as the highest good as a reference to God as the end towards 
which creatures strain and which as the final cause is the cause of their existence. He thus 
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rejects the Trinitarian application as well as the idea of the divine plenitude as the 
principle of creation. Mannermaa’s criticism of the application of the idea of the highest 
good in theology seems justified in relation to the Thomistic understanding. However, 
Luther does not understand the nature of God’s goodness in a Thomistic, but rather in a 
Platonic manner, as exemplified in Bonaventure and the preceding early medieval 
Augustinian tradition of the Victorines. Luther rejects Thomas’s Aristotelian idea 
(whether this rejection of Thomas is conscious is unclear) and joins Bonaventure’s 
interpretation, which clearly points to the Platonist and Augustinian understanding of 
reality as a basis here for Luther’s thought. 134  
In the light of the discovery that the divine goodness is not understood by Luther as the 
final end (as it is by Thomas), but as the motivating principle of God’s action, it is 
moreover quite natural to relate the texts where Luther speaks about God as the highest 
good to those where he speaks about God as the ultimate Giver. Luther explicitly states: 
“this is to be God: not to receive good, but to give; indeed, to retribute good for evil”.135 It 
is in the nature of God as the true good to share and bestow his goodness upon others.
136
 
Luther writes: 
By this he proves to be not a false, but the true and living God, that he does not take from 
us any good or merit, but bestows everything for free. It is after all according to all 
judgement proper and fitting for the divinity to suffice for itself, to require nothing from 
anyone, and to do good to others without reward.
137
 
How then is Luther’s insistence that God only looks into the depths, not to the heights, 
to be understood?
138
 Luther considers only God to be good in the sense that only he is the 
real, absolute good. All other goodness is dependent on him and received from him. In 
relation to the goodness of God, all else is evil. However in relation to themselves there is 
something good in all creatures, at least their existence (natura) itself. Luther thus agrees 
with the idea of existence as participation in the being of God. Were a person though to 
call him- or herself good in an absolute sense, he or she would rob God of God’s 
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goodness, thereby making oneself a liar.
139
 Therefore, it is necessary to consider oneself 
evil and confess one’s dependence on the divine good.140 True faith confesses that one 
lacks and needs goodness, and acknowledges God as the one who is good: the true 
Creator, who makes all things out of nothing. For the one who makes such a confession, 
God also gives his goodness in a manner exceeding the goodness shared through being 
created. The gift of this exceeding goodness is participation in God himself as good.
141
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ad eam bonitatem, quam nondum habet, dicitur malus, licet [1244] ad eam quam habet, sit bonus. Nam 
nullus, etiam pessimus, est, quin [1245] aliquid in se habeat boni, saltem nature  . Et nullus, licet optimus, est, 
quin [1246] aliquid habeat mali. Vnde merito potest coram Deo dici malus. Sic [1247] etiam de omnibus 
similibus, scil. Iustus, sapiens, verax etc. Vt Apoc. 22.: [1248] ‘Qui Iustus est, Iustificetur adhuc’, Sic qui 
bonus est, bonificetur adhuc. [1249] Quare cum sit talis apud nos mixtio, si dixerimus, quoniam boni sumus 
et [1250] peccatum non habemus, veritas in nobis non est, Cum solus Deus bonus, [1251] Iustus, verax sit. 
Nullus autem solus malus, Iniustus, mendax est, quia [1252] pure malus esse non potest vllo modo. Igitur 
semper medii sumus inter bonitatem, [1253] quam ex Deo habemus, et malitiam, quam ex nobis habemus, 
donec [1254] in futuro absorbeantur omnia mala et sit solus Deus omnia in omnibus, [1255] Vt iam nec nos 
nostri simus, Sed Dei et Deus noster.” See also AWA 2, 291, 11 – 292, 17; 340, 16 – 341, 5. 
140
 WA 55, II, 889, 29-40: “Sed non potest noster [29] Deus esse et sua nobis dare, nisi primo doceat se 
nostra nolle et nostra [30] nihil esse apud eum, ⌈Isaie 1.⌉, vt sic humiliati capaces efficiamur et appetentes 
[31] ⌈eorum⌉, que eius sunt. Et hoc est Iustum. Sic psalmus ait: ‘Iustus [32] es Domine et rectum Iudicium 
tuum’, Et iterum: ‘Cognoui Domine, quia [33] e  quitas Iudicia tua, et in veritate tua humiliasti me’. Si enim 
aliquid nostri [34] susciperet et non penitus reprobaret, iam nec verus Deus nec solus [35] Bonus esset, Quia 
et nos beneficiis cum eo certaremus. Nunc autem vult, [36] quod nos tantummodo accipiamus, et ipse solus 
det, et ita sit vere Deus. [37] Vnde Nisi quis se confiteatur malum, non potest confiteri Domino, quoniam 
[38] bonus. Vbi enim Deum bonum dicis, te bonum esse neges oportet et [39] 4, 279 omnino | malum 
confitearis. Non simul se et te communiter bonum patietur [40] nominari, quia Deum se, te autem creaturam 
vult haberi.” 
141
 WA 55, II, 800, 40 – 801, 47: “Secundo trop⌊ologice, [41] Quando nos confessionem huiusmodi et 
laudem et honorem ei exhibemus; [42] tunc enim iam in nobis etiam talis est, qualis in persona est. Et fides 
eius Est [43] 4, 173 tunc enim confessio et decor, quem ipse spiritualiter | induit. Quia per [44] fidem eum 
confitemur et honoramus atque decoramus. Sed hoc non fit, [45] nisi nos negemus, confundamus et 
defe  demus. Non enim simul illum decorabimus [46] et nos, Non simul illum confitebimur et nos, Sed nos 
abnegantes [47] eum confitebimur Et nos polluentes eum decorabimus.” 
WA 55, II, 872, 39 – 873, 67: “[39] 4, 256 112, 6 Secunda, Quod humilia respicit in ce  lo et in terra. 
Ad quid [40] autem respiciat, patet, quia vt suscitet et collocet cum principibus populi [41] sui, i. e. in altis, 
vt et in ipsis habitet. [...] [55] Bl 228v 112, 7 Tercia, Quod suscitat a terra inopem et de stercore etc. Non 
[56] enim quiescit respiciendo, Sed respicit, vt suscitet. Et hec est Natura veri [57] Creatoris, Ex nihilo 
omnia facere. Idcirco Nullum suscitat, nisi qui sit non [58] suscitatus, Sed iacens et deiectus. Nec erigit 
vllum nisi depressum, Ita vt, [59] nisi sit nihil erectionis et suscitationis in ipso, Sed tota deiectio et 
depressio, [60] non suscitat nec erigit. Quamuis autem omnes in veritate simus [61] deiecti et depressi, 
tamen non omnes erigit et suscitat, Sed tantum eos, [62] qui agnoscunt se deiectos et depressos. Qui enim 
sibi videntur erecti et [63] stantes, coram mundo reputantur et sunt erecti et stantes, Licet in veritate [64] 
miserrime sint deiecti et depressi. ‘Beatus itaque qui intelligit [65] super egenum et pauperem’, scil. etiam 
super seipsum talem intelligens [66] est. Et hanc nouam regulam Christus attulit humilitatis, que  prius erat 
[67] ignota.” 
WA 55, II, 284: “[111] 53, 8 Confitebor nomini tuo, quoniam bonum est. Non ait: quoniam [112] 
bonum dat, Sed propter esse bonum, non propter dare bonum, q. d. propter [113] seipsum, non propter 
lucrum. Nam ‘Domini nomen bonum est in conspectu [114] sanctorum suorum’, Psal⌊mo precedenti 51. Hoc 
est: Nomen Domini [115] non dat sanctis bonum aliud quam est ipsummet, Sed ipsummet est bonum [116] 
eorum. Et sic dat seipsum, et ita non dat Sed est bonum et tota beatitudo [117] sanctorum. Nam sicut dicitur: 
‘Deus dat sanctis seipsum’, quod valet: [118] ‘Deus est bonum sanctorum suorum’, Ita etiam Nomen eius 
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Furthermore, Luther states that the goodness of God permeates all creation: All creatures 
exist to serve others, not themselves. Even their “whole substance” (tota substantia) is in 
God’s law of love. The only exceptions are the human beings and the devil, who seek 
good for themselves.
142
 However, when the human will is transformed through union with 
God (the highest good), the human person also becomes a part of this outflow of God’s 
love in the world.
143
 In this union the empty human will is “satisfied” and “filled” with 
spiritual goods (i.e., God himself) in a way by means of which carnal greed and human 
love seeking good for itself is extinguished.
144
  
Therefore, Mannermaa is certainly correct in arguing that the division of the two 
opposite kinds of love holds an important place in Luther’s theology. Furthermore, he is 
right in that Luther thinks that the Aristotelian concept of love seeking its own proper 
good has infiltrated theology in Scholasticism and perverted the understanding of love.
145
 
However, as has been argued above, Mannermaa is wrong in portraying the idea of God as 
the highest good as something opposite to Luther’s thought.146 This is because Luther 
understands the nature of goodness according to the Platonic principle of the good and its 
Trinitarian application: as the fountain from which good springs forth freely. The action of 
the will does not therefore end when it grasps the summum bonum, but it rather becomes a 
participant in the dynamic overflow of that good, which is analogical to Luther’s 
understanding of the Trinity as movement. Likewise, Mannermaa misses the mark when 
he attempts to present Luther’s distinction of two kinds of love as an antithesis to 
theologies which have a negative attitude “toward the world” and where “love for God … 
stands fundamentally in competition with any kind of love for any transitory good in 
God’s creation.”147 The brief review above of sections from Dictata to Operationes in 
                                                                                                                                                   
dat seipsum illis, [119] i. e. est bonum eorum. Est autem nomen Dei ipse Christus filius Dei, [120] verbum 
quo se dicit, et nomen, quo se nominat, ipsum in e  ternitate.” 
142
 AWA 2, 48, 13-21. “Et ’dare fructum’ indicat hunc beatum virum caritate (quam in omni lege domini 
videmus praecipi) servire non sibi, sed promixis. Non est enim arbor ulla, quae sibi fructificet, sed dat 
fructus suos alteri, immo nulla creatura sibi vivit aut servit (praeter hominem et diabolum). Sol non sibi 
lucet, aqua non sibi fluit etc. Ita omnis creatura servat legem caritatis, et tota substantia sua est in lege 
domini; sed et humani corporis membra non sibiipsis serviunt. Solus affectus animi impius est. Hic enim 
non solum sua nemini dat, nemini servit, nemini benevult, sed omnium omnia sibi rapit, in omnibus, in deo 
ipso quarens, quae sua sunt […]” 
143
 WA 55, II, 22, 7-17; 23, 14 – 24, 2; AWA 2, 40, 3 – 41, 15; 43, 21 – 44, 17. 
144
 WA 55, I, 676: “102, 4] Qui redimit de interitu mortis spiritualis et corporalis vitam tuam nunc 
anime, tunc etiam corporis :
4
 qui coronat ‘circundat’ et ornat te in misericordia gratia et miserationibus 
quibus sustinet nostras quotidianas negligentias. [102, 5] Qui replet in bonis scil. veris et spiritualibus
4
 
desyderium tuum hoc enim necessarium est, Bl 81        4, 163 alioquin non est capax
5”
 
WA 55, I, 676 gloss 4, 1-5: “GLOSSA:4) [1] Bona autem temporalia secundum Hugo⌊nem tantum 
afficiunt, [2] Sed non satiant; titillant, non replent. ‘Quo plus potantur, plus sitiuntur [3] aque ’. Eadem 
ratione dicit ‘Coronat’, Quia spiritualis misericordia complectitur [4] miserum et suscipit, Sed temporalis 
tantummodo tangit ex vno [5] latere, scil. temporis.” 
WA 55, I, 718: “[106, 9] Quia satiauit sic in viam rectam 4, 207 deductam | animam inanem ‘vacuam’ 
cupiditatibus temporalium
6
: et sic animam esurientem spiritualia satiauit bonis spiritualibus.” 
WA 55, I, 718 gloss 6: “GLOSSA:6) quia prius est ‘animam vacuam’ fieri quam esurire. Et bis dicit 
‘satiauit’ ad expressionem promptitudinis et largitatis diuine  .” 
145
 E.g. AWA 2, 40, 3-7. 
146
 So also Juntunen 1998, 132. Though Juntunen still follows the two-kinds-of-love scheme in his 
interpretation, he recognizes that the problem for Luther lies in the inability of the capacities of the human 
being to understand the goodness of God in a manner that could work for their benefit. 
147
 Mannermaa 2010, 46. 
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Psalmos, in which Luther deals with the nature of spiritual goods, already reveals that the 
spiritual goods stand fundamentally in opposition to “vain” and “transient” earthly goods, 
which fail to satisfy the soul. On the contrary, Luther seems to share a view of the nature 
of true good with regard to the human will which is quite consonant with early medieval 
Augustianism. It is exactly because of the infinite and dynamic nature of the spiritual good 
in opposition to earthly good, that the union with the spiritual good captivates the human 
being into becoming a participant in the movement of God’s outflowing love. Therefore 
the distinction criticized by Mannermaa between two kind of good things (static and 
perishable vs. infinite and eternal) rather seems to form the basis for Luther’s distinction 
between the two kinds of love. This is because as we saw above, according to Luther it is 
the nature of the object that is loved which determines the nature of the loving subject. 
However, in the following chapters I will argue that Luther’s conception of faith as the 
requirement for grasping spiritual goods holds a higher importance than the distinction of 
the two kinds of love in understanding the human person’s relation to visible and invisible 
things and to the hiddenness of God in Luther’s theology of cross. This is so, because for 
Luther love and will turn toward the objects of knowledge. Only that which is known can 
be loved, and with regard to God, this knowledge comes from faith.  
2.2.3. God as Light and Wisdom 
Light is another one of the images Luther uses to illustrate the nature of God. Alluding to 
1. Timothy 6:16, Luther describes God as he who “dwells in inaccessible light”, with 
reference to the tradition of negative and mystical theology.
148
 Though one might first lay 
emphasis on the inaccessibility of this light, on the other hand, for Luther God is “not only 
light but Sun, source and inextinguishable origin of light”.149 “Light is divinity, Sun 
burning through the day”.150 Thus, though God in his divine essence is inaccessible light, 
                                                 
148
 With reference to “summa divinitate” earlier at WA 55, I, 134, 9-10 Luther writes at WA 55, I, 138, 
5-7: “[17, 12] Et posuit tenebras latibulum suum i. e. [6] factus est incomprehensibilis ⌈ita quod attingi 
non potest, ‘habitans [7] lucem inaccessibilem’⌉, vel in fide latet et videtur per tenebras intellectus [8] ⌈per 
negationes⌉.” 
WA 55, I, 138 gloss 15, 13-17: “Exprimitur enim in hiis [14] incomprehensibilitas diuinitatis, quam 
vident exstatici et contemplatiui, [15] vt apostolus Ro. XI.: ‘o altitudo’ etc. Quia sicut Volantes nos 
nequimus [16] consequi, apprehendere, Sic Deus supereminet et incomprehensibilis fit [17]omni 
contemplanti et sursum spectanti in celum diuinitatis.” 
WA 55, II, 138, 5-10: “[5] 17, 12 Latibulum Dei Est tenebre, primo quia in fidei enygmate et caligine 
[6] habitat. Secundo Quia ‘habitat lucem inaccessibilem’, ita quod [7] Bl 36 nullus intellectus ad eum 
pertingere potest, nisi suo lumine * omisso [8] altiore leuatus fuerit. Ideo b. Dionysius docet Ingredi in 
tenebras anagogicas [9] et per negationem ascendere. Quia sic est Deus absconditus et [10] 
incomprehensibilis.” 
WA 57, b53, 3-6: “sed in ipsum [4] coelum ad ipsam divinitatem, quae in aliis tenebris quam illa sancta 
[5] i. e. in luce inaccessa habitat ut appareat sicut optimus et fidelis sacerdos [6] nunc vultui Dei scilicet 
clarissima pre  sentia sine medio velaminis” 
149
 WA 55, II, 644, 394-395: “Sed [395] nunc Dominus non tantum lux, Sed sol, fons et indeficiens origo 
lucis” 
150
 WA 55, II, 371, 420-423: “Quia Vmbra constat ex lumine [421] et corpore: Lumen est diuinitas, Sol 
vrens per diem, Quia inimicitia [422] inter nos et Deum. Accessit corpus humanitatis, et facta est nubes et 
[423] vmbra refrigeriumque nobis.” 
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this light spreads itself outside of itself. The Son, Christ, in accordance with the Nicene 
Creed, is the “light from light” who makes the Father known: 
Because with you, Father, as ‘the Word was with God’ and ‘he was in beginning with 
God’, is the fountain Son of life of all: and in your light in your Son, who is ‘light from 
light’ we see light you, Father.151 
Luther describes Christ as the image of glory, the brilliance (splendor) and reflection 
(relucentia) of God. According to Luther, it is through Christ as the consubstantial image 
of the Father that God knows himself. Christ is the true, substantial image and reflection 
(relucentia) of God, but also the created beings are his image, only not to God himself but 
to themselves.
152
 Therefore of special interest for Luther’s understanding of reality is the 
way in which Luther not only describes the Son but also the created world as a relucentia 
(“refulgence”, “reflection”): 
The very best Creator created all visible things in Wisdom, so that they would not only 
minister in so innumerable uses and ways to the body, which nevertheless cannot grasp the 
Wisdom in which they were created and which they reflect [que in illis relucet], but also to 
the soul, which by the means of its intellect and affect is capable [capax] of that 
Wisdom.
153
 
The divine Wisdom (i.e., Christ), Word of God and light from light is therefore 
reflected in the creation. In this sense all creatures are ‘words of God’, participating in the 
Wisdom of God.
154
 Nevertheless, only the soul with its intellect and affect can grasp that 
                                                 
151
 WA 55, I, 316: “[35, 10] Quoniam apud te patrem, sicut ‘verbum erat apud Deum’, Et ‘hoc erat in 
principio apud Deum’ est fons filius vitae omnis : et in lumine tuo filio tuo, qui est ‘lumen de lumine’ 
videbimus lumen te patrem.”  
In the translation of Luther’s interlinear glosses the Latin word order is more or less preserved. The 
Psalm text taken from the Vulgate is written in bold, and the linear glosses that are Luther’s additions are in 
plain type. 
152
 WA 57, b99, 12 – 101, 2: “[12] Hoc idem ad Colossen. 1. dicit: ‘Qui est imago Dei invisibilis’ i. e. 
eius [13] Dei, qui non videtur. Et Sapiencie 7.: ‘Candor enim est lucis eterne et [14] speculum sine macula 
Dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius.’ Splendor [15] enim seu relucencia Dei dicitur imago glorie Dei, 
quia similitudo glorie [16] Dei, in qua se ipsum pater cognoscit, non nobis, sed Deo sibique ipsi [1] relucet. 
[…] non quod nobis sit figura [9] substancie Dei, sed ipsimet Deo, ita quod solus Deus suam formam [10] in 
ipso cognoscit. Unde non simpliciter dixit: ‘splendor eius et figura [11] eius’ — nam et angeli et homines 
sunt imagines splendoris, signacula [12] maiestatis Dei — sed dicit: ‘splendor glorie et figura substancie 
eius’, [13] ut intimam et propriam figuram intelligamus Dei per eam. Nos enim [1] sumus imagines Dei 
nobis pocius quam Deo, quia non Deus se per nos, [2] sed nos Deum per nos cognoscimus.” 
153
 WA 55, II, 511, 150-154: “[150] Sic enim optimus creator omnia visibilia in sapientia creauit, vt non 
[151] tantum corpori ministrent in tam innumerabilibus vsibus et ministeriis, [152] quod tamen sapientie  , in 
qua creata sunt et que  in illis relucet, non est [153] Bl 122 v capax, Sed etiam anime quo ad intellectum et 
affectum, * que sapientie [154] capax est.” 
154
 WA 55, II, 512, 176-180: “Quanto enim res creata profundius agnoscitur, tanto plus [177] mirabilium 
in ea videtur, scil. quomodo plena sit sapientia Dei. Vnde in [178] eadem re multa videt spiritualis homo et 
mirabilem sapientiam Dei, Insensati [179] autem Iuxta psal⌊mum non intellexerunt opera Domini, Sed 
tantummodo [180] senserunt.” 
WA 55, II, 535, 33 – 536, 40: “[33] Plus philosophie et sapientie est in isto versu: ‘Aperiam in parabolis 
[34] os meum’, quam si mille metaphysicas Scripsisset Aristoteles. Quia hinc [35] discitur, quod omnis 
creatura visibilis est parabola et plena mystica eruditione, [36] secundum quod sapientia Dei disponit omnia 
suauiter et omnia [37] 3, 561 in | sapientia facta sunt, Omnisque creatura Dei verbum Dei est: ‘Quia [38] 
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reflection.
155
 That Wisdom is therefore only perceptible to the spiritual person, as the true 
intellect has been blinded by original sin.
156
 It is the wisdom from which “the invisible 
things of God” should have been known as in Romans 1:18-20,157 but to which human 
beings have become blind by their turning towards creatures alone: not as perceived in 
God and pointing to God, but apart from God.
158
 Because of this turning away from God it 
has become hidden wisdom, only accessible in Christ.
159
 However, Luther does not mean 
by the light which the Creation reflects only the intellectual light, but that all beings by 
virtue of their existence share in the divine light and reflect it, though this reflected light is 
not as bright as the full divine light who is Christ: 
For the knowledge by which an angel knows God through another angel and the 
knowledge by which it knows God face-to-face differ as much as the knowledge of the Sun 
through a cloud from its proper brightness, because a creature is not pure light, but is rather 
full of light from light [lucida a luce]. So also are the angels covered by superior waters, 
                                                                                                                                                   
ipse dixit, et facta sunt.’ Ergo Creaturas inspicere oportet tanquam locutiones [39] Dei. Atque ideo ponere 
cor in res creatas Est in signum et non rem [40] ponere, que est Deus solus. ‘Ex operibus enim istis 
Inuisibilia Dei intellecta [41] conspiciuntur’, Ro. 1.” 
155
 WA 55, I, 850: “[135, 5] Qui fe  cit ce  los visibiles et Inuisibiles in intellectu i. e. ‘in sapientia’, vt psal. 
103.: ‘omnia in sapientia fecisti’5       Et 32.: ‘Verbo Domini ce  li firmati sunt’ etc.” 
WA 55, I, 850 gloss 5, 1-2: “GLOSSA: 5) [1] seu per sapientiam et intellectum, qui est filius, verbum 
patris, per [2] quem omnia facta sunt.” 
156
 WA 55, II, 511, 154– 512, 161: “Vnde Psal. 31. Spiritus sanctus hortatur nos, ne efficiamur ‘sicut 
[155] equus et mulus’, quibus non est intellectus. Nam creaturis tantum secundum [156] corpus vti et in illis 
non affectum et intellectum in Deum dirigere [157] Est ea tantum sensu percipere ‘sicut e  quus et mulus’, que  
non diutius [158] vident, quam cum presentia sunt. Sic et illi obliuiscuntur operum Domini [159] et non 
memorantur. Quod vt psalmus iste indicaret, Non ait: videbo, [160] audiam aut sentiam opera tua, quod 
faciunt omnes insensati, Sed ‘memor [161] ero et meditabor’, sic intellectualis et spiritualis homo.” 
157
 WA 56, 11-12: “[1, 18] Reuelatur1 enim [2] sc. in eodem euangelio ira dei quod Deus sit iratus, licet 
adhuc differat [3] penam de caelo super omnem impietatem propter auersionem a vero [4] Deo et 
iniustitiam propter conuersionem cultus ad Idola hominum. precipue [5] Gentium eorum qui veritatem 
dei i. e. verum Deum cognitum [6] seu veram notitiam de Deo in iniusticia aliis sc. honorem tribuendo [7] 
detinent: sc. non glorificando et gratias agendo et colendo Deum, vt [8] infra quod autem veritatem Dei 
habuerint et sic detinuerint, probat, [9] quia [1, 19] quia
2
 quod notum est dei / i. e. notitia Dei Vel de Deo 
manifestum [10] est in illis. i. e. manifestam habent eam de ipso in se Deus enim illis [11] manifestauit. i. 
e. satis ostendit eis, vnde ab eis poterat cognosci, sc. vt [12] sequitur [1, 20] Inuisibilia enim sc. bonitas, 
sapientia, Iustitia etc. ipsius [13] a creatura mundi i. e. a creatione mundi per ea quae facta sunt / i. e. 
[14] ex operibus, hoc est, cum Videant, quod sint opera, ergo et factorem [15] necesse est esse intellecta 
conspiciuntur: non quidem per sensum, Sed per [16] intellectum cognita sempiterna quoque eius virtus 
potestas hoc enim [17] arguunt opera et diuinitas / i. e. quod sit vere Deus ita ut sint inexcusabiles
3
. [18] 
tam ii, qui primo sic scienter peccauerunt, quam quos tali ignorantia [1] suos posteros fecerunt [1, 21] Quia
1
 
ideo sunt inexcusabiles cum cognouissent [2] deum / sicut Iam probatum est Sed hanc cognitionem 
detinuerunt [3] in iniustitia” 
WA 56, 11, gloss 3: “GLOSSA:3) [24] I. e. a principio mundi vsque ad finem semper tanta fecit et facit 
[25] opera, vt si vltra sensum intellectus tantum adhibeatur, facile et manifeste [26] Deus possit cognosci. 
Quod et factum fuit in principio mundi, [27] licet paulatim proficiendo magis ac magis obscurarentur impii 
propter [14] ingratitudinem vsque ad Idolatriam, ita vt nec ipsi nec posteri eorum [15] per eos decepti sint 
excusabiles, sicut et Iude  is contingit.” 
158
 WA 55, II, 822, 628-641; 824, 698-708; 825, 723-739. 
159
 WA 56, 237, 20-28; WA 55, II, 500, 19-22. 
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when they look at themselves through each other, because they see God in a more obscure 
way in each other than God in God.
160
 
In the quotation above we can see how Luther utilizes the Augustinian idea of morning 
and evening knowledge. The immediate and direct knowledge of God face-to-face is 
brighter, because it is knowledge of God derived directly from the divine light. The 
knowledge received through other beings (which corresponds to Augustine’s evening 
knowledge) is dimmer, because here the divine light is not direct, but reflected through 
created beings.
161
 Nevertheless, it is light: Luther writes that no creature, even an evil one, 
is wholly without the divine light. But God only “walks” in the evil creatures, whereas he 
“dwells” in the blessed ones: 
Although the souls of sinners and evil angels are ‘high’ according to their nature, yet 
because they involve themselves in the lowest and earthly things, they are deservedly 
called ‘low’. Granted, God is also in them and they are, move and live in God, but he does 
not steadily dwell in them. None namely, however evil they be, lack all light of divine 
illustration. But because they do not have him inhabiting and abiding constantly in them or 
universally in everything because of the darkness mixed in them, he is properly said to not 
dwell in them. However what if by ‘high’ we also understand the blessed, because all 
transitory and restless things are rather a way of God, in which he moves when they move? 
But the blessed are his mansion, in which he dwells permanently as a Lord who temporally 
walks in them like a pilgrim. As Jeremiah 14: ‘Because you have come to the land as a 
settler and as traveller declining to stay.’ Therefore those who receive God according to the 
flesh and the letter have him as a traveller, but he does not make his mansion among them, 
because they are not on high or the high, but the low. They are flesh and not spirit, letter 
but not truth, shadow and not fullness. Therefore it is proper to God alone to dwell on high, 
as it is to God alone to slide down intimately and be present and dwell in the spirit. And 
therefore he did not say: ‘who dwells above the high’. For even though he is infinitely 
above everything, still his dwelling place is in the blessed rational creature, and in a certain 
way he stays in them.
162
 
                                                 
160
 WA 55, II, 805, 161-167: “Quia tantum differt cognitio, qua [162] angelus Deum in altero angelo 
cognoscit, et cognitio, qua Deum facie ad [163] faciem cognoscit, quantum differt cognitio solis in nube 
opposita et qua in [164] 4, 176 propria claritate, Cum creatura non sit pura lux, | Sed potius lucida a luce. 
[165] Sic enim et in angelis teguntur aquis superiora, quando sese Inuicem inspiciunt, [166] quia obscurius 
Deum in alterutris cognoscunt, quam Deum in [167] Deo.” 
161
 On morning and evening knowledge in Augustine, see De Gen. ad lit. IV, 21-31; De Civ. Dei XI, 7; 9; 
29. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae  I, q58 a 6-7; Bonaventure distinguishes between three 
types: morning, midday and evening knowledge, see Itinerarium I, 3. 
162
 WA 55, II, 871, 19 – 872, 38: “Licet [20] enim Anime peccatrices et angeli mali sint ‘alte’ secundum 
naturam, [21] tamen quia se infimis inuoluunt et terrenis, merito inferiora dicuntur. In [22] quibus licet sit 
Deus et ipsi in Deo sint, moueantur et viuant, non tamen [23] stabiliter habitat in eis. Nulli enim, quantumuis 
mali sint, carent omni [24] lucis diuine illustratione. Sed quia domesticam et manentem perpetue atque [25] 
vniuersaliter in omnibus ⌈non⌉ habent, propter tenebras admixtas in [26] illis, recte non habitare in illis 
dicitur. Quid si per ‘alta’ intelliguntur [27] etiam Beati, ideo Quia omnia transitoria et inquie  ta sunt potius 
via Dei, [28] in quibus vadit, dum illa vadunt? Sed beati sunt domus eius, in qua permanenter [29] vt 
Dominus habitat, qui in illis temporaliter velut peregrinus [30] ambulat. Sicut Ierem. 14.: ‘Quare futurus es 
in terra sicut colonus et quasi [31] viator declinans ad manendum.’ Sic qui Deum recipiunt secundum 
carnem [32] et literam, habent eum vt viatorem, Sed non facit apud eos mansionem, [33] quia sunt non in 
altis seu alta, Sed inferna; Sunt Caro et non spiritus, [34] Sunt litera et non veritas, Vmbra et non plenitudo. 
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To place the above quotation in context, it comes immediately before a passage in 
which Luther describes God as the one who looks down upon the humble and creates 
everything out of nothing.
163
 This context confirms that participation in the divine light is 
linked not only to understanding, but to existence. All of the above texts point to an 
ontology of participation: creatures exist as participating in the divine light. With regard to 
this light they are “full of light” (lucida) “from light” (a luce), (i.e., from Christ) receiving 
their being and existence from him. In and of themselves they are shadow and darkness. 
However, only a creature which recognizes its dependence on the divine light is able to 
see this light. A creature turning to itself or other creatures is not able to discern this light, 
but because of this turning away it becomes an obstacle (obex) to the light and blind to 
it.
164
 Furthermore, there are different stages of participation in the divine light, which 
themselves are reminiscent of the categories of created beings listed in the 1514 Christmas 
sermon. Though all creatures seem to share in the light by the virtue of their being created, 
according to Luther it is properly the rational creature (vivum rationale) which is capable 
(capax) of discerning the light. Yet, of the rational creatures only those who are blessed 
(beatus) are the ones in whom God ‘dwells’ and ‘stays’. The other creatures merely “move 
and live” in God and God “walks” in them, which again brings to mind Luther’s 
understanding of movement in the created world.
165
  
                                                                                                                                                   
Igitur solius [35] Dei proprium est in altis habitare, sicut solius est Dei intime labi et in spiritu [36] 
presentem esse et manere. Vnde et non dixit ‘qui super alta habitat’. [37] Quia licet sit super omnia infinite, 
tamen habitaculum eius est viuum rationale [38] beatum, et in ipsis quoque manet.” 
163
 WA 55, II, 872, 39-57. 
164
 WA 55, II, 500, 18-21: “‘Illuminat’ autem ‘mirabiliter’, [19] Quia per fidem intus, ita vt nullus homo 
lucem eorum videat. ‘Lux enim [20] in tenebris lucet, et tenebre eam non comprehenderunt.’ Sapientia enim 
[21] Dei stultitia est carnalibus, et non possunt eam lucem videre.” 
WA 56, 238, 17-20: “Igitur Sinistrales Impii non [18] intelligunt, quia visibilibus in vanitate 
concupiscentie  obce cantur. Dextrales [19] vero non intelligunt, quia in sensu proprio de sapientia et Iustitia 
[20] sua impediuntur. Et sic sibiipsis sunt obex Lucis diuine  .” 
165
 On the ontology of participation, see also Hunzinger 1905, 7-11. Hunzinger, however, misses the 
point that in such an ontology all creatures already share in some regard in the divine light due to their 
existence. Thus even creaturely existence turned away from God is not the complete opposite of existence as 
participation in the divine, but also it participates in the divine existence. Thus the temporal is not in this 
sense the complete opposite of the spiritual. 
The way Luther speaks about the movement of God in creatures is analogous to the way in which Luther 
speaks about the action of God in De Servo Arbitrio, WA 18, 709, 10 – 710, 6: “Primum, etiam Ratio et 
Diatribe concedit, Deum omnia in omnibus [11] operari ac sine ipso nihil fieri nec efficax esse. Est enim 
omnipotens, pertinetque [12] [Eph. 1, 19] id ad omnipotentiam suam, ut Paulus ait ad Ephesios. Iam Satan 
[13] et homo lapsi et deserti a Deo non possunt velle bonum, hoc est ea quae [14] Deo placent aut quae Deus 
vult. Sed sunt in sua desideria conversi perpetuo, [15] ut non possint non quaerere quae sua sunt. Haec igitur 
eorum [16] voluntas et natura sic a Deo aversa non est nihil. Neque enim Satan et [17] impius homo nihil est 
aut nullam naturam aut voluntatem habent, licet [18] corruptam et aversam naturam habeant. Illud igitur 
reliquum quod dicimus [19] naturae in impio et Satana ut creatura et opus Dei non est minus subiectum [20] 
omnipotentiae et actioni divinae quam omnes aliae creaturae et opera [21] Dei. Quando ergo Deus omnia 
movet et agit, necessario movet etiam et [22] agit in Satana et impio. Agit autem in illis taliter, quales illi 
sunt et [23] quales invenit, hoc est, cum illi sint aversi et mali et rapiantur motu illo [24] divinae 
omnipotentiae, non nisi aversa et mala faciunt, tanquam si eques [25] agat equum tripedem vel bipedem, agit 
quidem taliter, qualis equus est, [26] hoc est equus male incedit. Sed quid faciat eques? equum talem simul 
[27] agit cum equis sanis, illo male, istis bene, aliter non potest, nisi equus [28] sanetur. Hic vides Deum, 
cum in malis et per malos operatur, mala quidem [29] fieri, Deum tamen non posse male facere, licet mala 
per malos faciat, quia [30] ipse bonus male facere non potest, malis tamen instrumentis utitur, quae [31] 
raptum et motum potentiae suae non possunt evadere. Vitium ergo est [32] in instrumentis, quae ociosa Deus 
esse non sinit, quod mala fiunt, movente [33] ipso Deo. Non aliter quam si faber securi serrata et dentata 
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Though Luther does not define in exact philosophical terms the nature of the light he 
speaks of, Luther’s ideas again appear to reflect notions very similar to Bonaventure, who 
among the scholastics builds the most extensive metaphysics of light. In the thought of 
Bonaventure light is a form which conserves the forms of all other forms and gives them 
their extension and activity. Light is a principle of creation and the first form that enters 
into union with matter, through which the other forms are brought from passivity into 
being and raised above the level of sheer privation. The real (vs. formal or ideal) being of 
the other forms depends on the degree of their participation in that light. In themselves, 
created things are darkness and nothingness. Bonaventure also associates the idea of self-
diffusion and self-multiplication with the concept of light. Reality can thus be seen as an 
effluence of light, which multiplicates itself when it sheds itself further from its source and 
gives existence to other forms. This idea also connects the concept of light to 
Bonaventure’s idea of the self-giving or self-diffusing nature of the highest good. Thus for 
Bonaventure God is the Highest Light (summa lux) and the only true Light (lux), from 
which other lights (lumen) flow. As this pure light (pure actuality and source of light), he 
is the highest good whose goodness flows into the creation. Furthermore, Bonaventure 
also calls Christ the first fount of illumination, who diffuses his light into the Creation.
166
   
Luther’s ideas concerning God as the true light, Christ as the source of light, and the 
reality of existence being dependent on its participation in the divine light, seem to reflect 
this Bonaventurean line of thought. Although a lack of exact definitions in Luther’s texts 
makes it difficult to pinpoint the influences in a more exact manner, Luther again seems to 
share in the tradition building upon Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and Bonaventure. In 
Neoplatonic cosmology God is portrayed as conceptual light, from which divine ideas 
emanate and which form the invisible substructure of the material world. In Bonaventure 
the light is the concept which grants the actuality to the created forms, and God is the 
source of this light. Luther’s idea of creation on the one hand as sharing in the divine light 
and on the other hand as pointing to God as its origin shares the same basic structure and 
is undoubtedly related to the Platonic tradition in Western theology, especially through 
Augustinian and Bonaventurean influences. At the same time, however, there is a distinct 
lack of defined metaphysical thinking in Luther. Luther does in one instance mention 
“divine ideas”167 while also criticizing concepts that are too Platonic,168 but the aim of 
these passages is simply to argue for creatio ex nihilo, not to shed light on how exactly 
creatures subsist in the divine Wisdom. This is characteristic of Luther. He receives 
                                                                                                                                                   
male secaret. [34] Hinc fit, quod impius non possit non semper errare et peccare, quod raptu [35] divinae 
potentiae motus ociari non sinitur, sed velit, cupiat, faciat taliter, [36] qualis ipse est. [1] Haec rata et certa 
sunt, si credimus omnipotentem esse Deum, Deinde [2] impium esse creaturam Dei, aversam vero 
relictamque sibi sine spiritu Dei [3] non posse velle aut facere bonum. Omnipotentia Dei facit, ut impius non 
[4] possit motum et actionem Dei evadere, sed necessario illi subiectus paret. [5] Corruptio vero seu aversio 
sui a Deo facit, ut bene moveri et rapi non [6] possit. Deus suam omnipotentiam non potest omittere propter 
illius aversionem.”  
166
 On Bonaventure’s metaphysics of light and its origins, see Guardini 1964, 18-24; 70-73; 79-84; 
Detloff 1989, 180-183; Cullen 2006, 48. Bonaventure distinguishes between lux, the source of light and light 
as a self-existing substantial form; and lumen, the light which proceeds from lux and illumines other things.  
167
 WA 57, b62, 4-7: “[11, 3] Fide i. e. per fidem, non [5] rationem intelligimus cognoscimus aptata 
perfecta esse secula verbo Dei, [6] per verbum Dei ut ex invisibilibus ex ideis divinis, quia ex nihilo factus 
[7] est mundus visibilia fierent.” 
168
 WA 57, b229, 8-22. 
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philosophical ideas through theology and sometimes uses them for theological 
argumentation, but his focus of interest is on theological lines of thought.  
2.2.4. God as Incomprehensible and Hidden 
2.2.4.1 The Different Aspects of God’s Incomprehensibility and Hiddenness 
The general trend in Lutheranism has been to see Luther as positively utilizing the concept 
of the hidden God (deus absconditus), whereas Luther has been interpreted as already 
rejecting the concept of divine incomprehensibility (especially linked to the tradition of 
negative theology) early on.
169
 But as was seen in the previous two chapters, Luther’s 
view of the nature of God includes both the aspect of God as incomprehensible, and God 
as hidden, as well as (of course)  God as making himself comprehensible and accessible to 
others. Luther’s view of God as the highest good exhibits the idea of God as 
superamabilis, both exceeding the capacity of human love, yet at the same time most 
lovable and sharing of his goodness. Likewise Luther’s view of God as light includes both 
the notion of inaccessible light as well as the light sharing itself with others.   
In the following three subchapters I will examine Luther’s notion of God as 
incomprehensible and of God as hidden, first in general (this chapter 2.2.4.1), then with 
special attention to the aspect of incomprehensibility (chapter 2.2.4.2) and finally with 
attention to the aspect of hiddenness (2.2.4.3). The earliest comments on God as hidden 
and incomprehensible already appear in the Dictata super Psalterium. There, in his 
explanation of Ps. 17, Luther lists five different interpretations of the term “darkness” as 
the hiding place of God: 
The hiding place of God is darkness, first because he dwells in the obscurity and cloud of 
faith. Second, because he ‘dwells in inaccessible light’, so that no intellect can reach to 
him, unless leaving behind its own light it is elevated by higher light. Therefore blessed 
Dionysius teaches to enter the anagogical darkness and ascend by negation, for God is thus 
hidden and incomprehensible. Third, it can mean the mystery of the Incarnation, because 
he is hidden in humanity, which is his darkness, in which he cannot be seen, only heard. 
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 See Bandt 1958, especially pages 9-18. According to Bandt, the altprotestantische tradition had a 
positive attitude toward the concept of divine incomprehensibility. T. Harnack and A. Ritschl, followed by 
later German scholars, were the first to interpret Luther according to the distinction deus absconditus – deus 
revelatus, where God as the Creator extra Christum was identified as the glorious, majestic, free and 
formidable being, set up against the gracious revelation of God in Christ. The distinction is built upon the 
neuprotestantische rejection of all metaphysical concepts. It was made possible by the removal of the 
distinction between the two ways to approach God: as the Creator per viam affirmationis / eminentiae (i.e. 
analogy), and God as the divine being in himself per viam negationis, as the resulting confusion does not 
make a distinction between these two different metaphysical approaches. Nilsson 1966, 62-63 emphasizes 
that Luther’s concept of the hidden God contains two aspects: 1) the view of God (Gottesbild), which 
includes a metaphysical, non-religious and naturalistic concept of God, and 2) hiddenness, which is a result 
of sin. A critical review of the speculations surrounding the meaning of the concept of the deus absconditus 
is given by Leppin 2005, according to whom the concept in de Servo arbitrio is practical pastoral theology 
addressing a spiritual question, rather than one intended to be a serious theological framework concerning 
the relationship of God and reality or as introducing a division within the divine nature.  
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Fourth is the Church or the blessed Virgin, in both of whom he was hidden; and is still 
hidden in the Church, which is obscure to the World but manifest to God. Fifth, the 
sacrament of the Eucharist, where he is most hiddenly.
170
  
The first and second senses of darkness concern the divine nature itself and its 
presence in faith. The third through the fifth, on the other hand, concern the presence of 
Christ as it relates to humanity in the incarnation, in the Church, its proclamation and the 
sacraments.
171
 In the latter the divinity is hidden, but the union of the two natures is 
incomprehensible, thus pointing to the need to distinguish between these two aspects.
172
 
Furthermore, for Luther the divinity and humanity can be said in their different aspects to 
be either light or darkness. The divinity is darkness with regard to its incomprehensible 
essence; light, at least with regard to its power, splendor and being. The humanity is light, 
in that regard it makes God hidden under it accessible (in Christ, Church and preached 
word); darkness in that it obscures the divinity and in a certain sense protects from its 
brilliance.
173
 Therefore God is at the same time both hidden and revealed. Furthermore, he 
is on the one hand hidden in himself or in his nature, and on the other hand he is hidden in 
Christ and the Church in order that he can be revealed; and thirdly, also hidden from 
human beings due to sin.
174
 Both the concept of incomprehensibility and the concept of 
hiddenness therefore contain more than one aspect. Luther often speaks about both of 
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 WA 55, II, 138, 5 – 139, 2: “[5] 17, 12 Latibulum Dei Est tenebre, primo quia in fidei enygmate et 
caligine [6] habitat. Secundo Quia ‘habitat lucem inaccessibilem’, ita quod [7] Bl 36 nullus intellectus ad 
eum pertingere potest, nisi suo lumine * omisso [8] altiore leuatus fuerit. Ideo b. Dionysius docet Ingredi in 
tenebras anagogicas [9] et per negationem ascendere. Quia sic est Deus absconditus et [10] 
incomprehensibilis.Tercio potest intelligi mysterium Incarnationis. [11] Quia in humanitate absconditus 
latet, que est tenebre eius, in quibus [12] videri non potuit, Sed tantum audiri. Quarto Est Ecclesia vel b. [13] 
virgo, quia in vtraque latuit et latet in Ecclesia adhuc, que est obscura [1] mundo, Deo autem manifesta. 
Quinto Sacramentum Eucharistie, vbi [2] est occultissimus.” 
171
 See Bandt 1958, 25-27 on the background of Luther’s exegesis here. 
172
 See WA 55, II, 139, 3-9; 145, 14-16. So also Bandt 1958, 29-30. 
173
 WA 55, II, 145, 10 – 146, 10: “[10] 17, 29 Lucerna primo Est ipsa humanitas Christi secundum 
Magistrum [11] li. 3. dis. 1., que est accensa per incarnationem diuinitatis et sparsit [12] radios bonorum 
operum et virtutum per totum mundum, qui erat in [13] tenebris. Et sic hanc lucernam Deus pater 
illuminauit, quando filium [14] misit in carnem et eum glorificauit per opera mirabilia. Quia eadem [15] 
humanitas est latibulum Deitatis et tenebre, quia incomprehensibiliter [16] ibi inest diuinitas. Sunt tamen 
illuminate  iste tenebre, Sicut lucerna, [17] scil. per opera testantia presentem diuinitatem. Secundo Lucerna 
Est [18] Corpus nostrum, per quod similiter relucet tanquam radiis virtus lucis, [1] que est in anima. Tercio 
Est ipsa ratio vel conscientia, vt ait Dominus: [2] ‘lucerna corporis tui oculus tuus est’, i. e. intentio, etc. 
Quarto tota [3] Ecclesia est lucerna in hoc mundo lucens impiis, vt Apost⌊olus Coloss.: [4] ‘Inter quos 
lucetis sicut luminaria celi in medio nationis prave et perverse.’ [5] Quinto Est ipsum verbum Euangelii, 
quod per vocem predicantis [6] sicut lux in testa lucet et illuminat mentes hominum; vnde Iohannes, [7] qui 
erat figura huius vocis, Dicitur ‘lucerna lucens et ardens’ et [8] Psal. 118.: ‘lucerna pedibus meis verbum 
tuum’. quamlibet autem [9] lucernam Deus pater illuminat. Quia Christus secundum hominem hic [10] 
loquitur.” 
WA 55, II, 371, 419-426: “[419] 67, 15 Nota autem, Quod Supra dictum est Zelmon (quod vmbra vel 
vmbraculum [420] virtutis dicitur), hoc habet mysterium, Quia Vmbra constat ex lumine [421] et corpore: 
Lumen est diuinitas, Sol vrens per diem, Quia inimicitia [422] inter nos et Deum. Accessit corpus 
humanitatis, et facta est nubes et [423] vmbra refrigeriumque nobis. Sic ‘in protectione Dei ce  li 
commoramur.’ Et [424] Isaie 4.: ‘Erit vmbraculum diei et estus et Absconsum a turbine et pluuia.’ [425] Sic 
Isaie 61.: ‘Solem nube tegam.’ Hec est fides, de qua Luce 1.: ‘Spiritus [426] sanctus obumbrabit tibi’ etc.” 
See also WA 55, II, 805, 153-159. 
174
 See Nilsson 1966, 58-61. 
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these concepts by utilizing various metaphors connected with the figures of darkness, 
cloud and shadow. The following excerpt from the Operationes in Psalmos shows one 
example of how they are intertwined: 
‘Now’ I say, after Christ has been made the King of everything, there are two things which 
hinder you most so that you do not think/know right (ne recta cognoscatis). 
First, that this Christ – who was crucified, killed and condemned by you, and on God’s 
authority was even cursed according to the Law of Moses – is proclaimed the Lord of 
Lords. It will be most difficult of all to recognize as a King one who died such a desperate 
and shameful death. The senses oppose fiercely, reason is horrified, experience denies it, 
there is no precedent. This will be complete foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling 
block to the Jews, unless you raise the mind over all this. 
Second, that this king reigns in a manner that he teaches that all in which you hoped for in 
the law should be condemned and all which you feared be loved. He sets before you the 
Cross and death. He urges that visible good and evil should be despised and a far different 
good, ‘which the eye has not seen nor the ear has heard’ be conferred to you. You must 
die, if you wish to live under this king. [...] 
How will anyone endure this, who leans on the senses, measures things with reason and 
‘stands on the doorway of his tent’; who is unable to look at the face of Moses? Therefore 
intellect (intellectus) and education are necessary, through which you will transcend these, 
and despising the visible, be elevated to the invisible; not minding those which are upon 
earth, but those which are above, where Christ is, etc. [...] 
This intellect is not that of which the philosophers opine, but it is faith itself which can see 
both in prosperous and adverse things that which is not visible. Therefore, not saying what 
it is that should be understood, he says in an absolute way: Understand, that is, make it so, 
that you would be intelligent, take care, that you would be believing. For that which faith 
understands has no name or form (speciem). Prosperity or adversity in present things 
completely subverts everyone who does not understand the invisible by faith. For this 
intellect comes from faith, according to this: ‘If you will not believe, you will not 
understand’, and it is entrance into that cloud in which everything that the human senses, 
reason, mind or intellect can comprehend is overwhelmed. For faith unites the soul with 
the invisible, ineffable, innominable, eternal, incogitable Word of God and at the same 
time separates it from all that is visible. This is the Cross and ‘passover’ of the Lord, in 
which he predicates this necessary intellect.
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 AWA 2, 106, 18 – 108, 5: “’Nunc’, inquam, postquam Christus constitutus est rex omnium <v 6>; in 
quo tempore duo sunt, quae vos maxime remorabuntur, ne recta cognoscatis. 
Pr imum, quod Christus ille a vobis crucifixus, mortuus, damnatus, etiam auctore deo maledictus 
secundum legem Mosi, praedicatur dominus dominantium <1Tim 6,15b; Apc 19,16>. Difficillimum 
omnium erit agnoscere eum regem, qui tam desperata et ignominiosa morte interiit. Sensus fortiter repugnat, 
ratio abhorret, usus negat, exemplum deest, plane stultitia haec gentibus et Iudaeis scandalum erit <1Cor 
1,23>, nisi super haec omnia mentem elevaveritis. 
Secundum, quod rex iste sic regnat, ut omnia, quae in lege sperastis, contemnenda, omnia, quae 
timuistis, amanda doceat; crucem mortemque proponit; bona, quae videntur, et mala iuxta vilipendenda esse 
suadet, longe in alia vos bona eaque, ”quae nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis 
ascenderunt” <1Cor 2,9>, vos transpositurus. Moriendum est vobis, si sub hoc rege vivere vultis; crux et 
odium totius mundi feranda, ignominia, pauperitas, fames, sitis, breviter: mala omnium fluctuum mundi non 
fugienda. Hic est enim rex, qui et ipse stultus factus est mundo et mortuus, deinde conterit suos virga ferrea 
et tamquam vas figuli confringit eos <v 9>. 
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The above quotation illustrates in a fitting manner multiple aspects of God’s 
hiddenness and incomprehensibility in Luther’s thought. According to Luther, the first 
difficulty in having the right cognition or knowledge of Christ is that his rule is hidden 
under the shamefulness of crucifixion. Senses oppose it, reason denies it, experience is 
lacking: the natural capacities of the human being do not recognize it. It is hidden under 
contraries. But this is not all: The second difficulty is that the nature of the good which 
Christ confers is not only in opposition to all natural and visible good, but that it is also 
qualitatively far different: it is the union with the eternal, ineffable, incogitable Word. It 
goes against both the senses and reason as well as above them: it is incomprehensible in 
its very essence. The only access to this incomprehensible Word, which God is in his very 
being, is faith, which separates from all the common objects of experience. 
Therefore one can say in general that God is incomprehensible for Luther in at least 
two different aspects, and also hidden, again in at least two different aspects. First, God is 
incomprehensible in his essence, but also is so in his union with human nature. Second, 
God is hidden in his union with human nature, but also is under all lowliness and contrary 
form (sub contraria specie). As demonstrated by Luther’s use of the metaphors of 
darkness and light, Luther can even speak of God as both hidden and knowable at the 
same time by the means of the same aspect: when considered from different points of view 
humanity is both a hiding place of God as well as a light which makes God accessible. 
Therefore the Incarnation and sacramentality at the same time both conceal the divinity, 
yet also make it accessible. There is an element of simultaneous concealment and 
revelation, which highlights a certain paradoxical quality of Luther’s theology. The next 
subchapter will discuss the aspect of the incomprehensibility of God in his essence; the 
subchapter after that will examine the hiddenness of God under contraries. It will be 
argued there, that divine incomprehensibility is not an alien concept to Luther. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that the Lutheran concept of God as hidden under contraries 
is grounded on Luther’s view of the divine nature. The concept of sub contraria does not 
therefore represent an antimetaphysical doctrine, but rather is founded on Luther’s view of 
the divine nature, which itself is built on the Platonic tradition of Christianity. As such, the 
concept of God as incomprehensible and God as hidden are not contraries, but rather are 
related to each other. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Quomodo hunc sustinebit, qui sensu nititur, qui rem ratione metitur, qui stat ’in ostio papilionis sui’ <Ex 
33,8>, qui faciem sui Mosi videre nequit? Ideo intellectu opus est et eruditione, quibus haec transcendatis et 
visibilibus contemptis in invisibilia rapiamini non sapientes ea, quae super terram, sed quae sursum sunt, ubi 
Christus est etc <Col 3,1s>. 
Proinde verbum intelligite in Hebraeo sonat hascilu, quod absoluto statu significat: intelligites facite, 
scilicet vosmetipsos - ut Hieronymus exponit - vel alios, hoc est: sic agite, hoc contendite, ut sitis 
intelligentes et spiritualia ac caelestia sapiatis, quod nostra vernacula dicimus: ’Seynd vveys und 
vorstendig’, simili sententia, qua Ps 31<,9>: ’Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus’. 
Est autem haec intelligentia, non de qua philosophi opinantur, sed fides ipsa, quae in rebus prosperis et 
adversis potest est ea videre, quae non videntur. Ideo non exprimens, quae intelligant, absolute dicit 
intelligite, id est, facite, ut sitis intelligentes, curate, ut sitis creduli. Non enim habent nomen nequem 
speciem ea, qua fides intelligit. Nam praesentium rerum prosperitas vel adversitas penitus subvertit omnem 
hominem, qui fide non intelligit invisibilia. Hic enim intellectus ex fide venit, iuxta illud <Is 7,9>: ’Nisi 
credideritis, non intelligetis’, et est ingressus ille caliginis, in qua absorbetur, quicquid sensus, ratio, mens 
intellectusque hominis comprehendere potest. Coniungit enim fides animam cum invisibili, ineffabili, 
innominabili, aeterno, incogitabili verbo dei simulque separat ab omnibus visibilibus, et haec est crux et 
’phase’ domini, in quo necessarium praedicat hunc intellectum.” 
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2.2.4.2 God as Incomprehensible 
In Luther’s exposition of the different meanings of darkness as God’s hiding place in Ps. 
17, examined in the previous subchapter, the first and second meanings of darkness 
postulated by Luther concern the incomprehensibility of the divine nature and union with 
it by faith. It is often claimed that Luther expresses the Pseudo-Dionysian idea of God’s 
incomprehensibility in the Dictata super Psalterium, a locus classicus being the said 
Psalm 17, but that he gradually distances himself from it. A quite similar image of 
transition from cautious positive stance to full denial is embraced by most researchers. 
First it is noted that Luther mentions Dionysius in a positive or neutral light in two 
statements in the Dictata which discuss the nature of the darkness in which God is hidden 
according to the Psalms.
176
 Second, it is noted that in the Lectures on Romans Luther 
reminds his hearers about the importance of the suffering of Christ and the purification of 
the eyes and the heart through the incarnate Word, before one attempts to contemplate the 
uncreated Word.
177
 At this point Luther is now viewed by most researchers as departing 
from his initial positive estimation. Finally, Luther’s references in Operationes in Psalmos 
to “cross alone” as “our theology”178 and his emphasis on living, dying and being damned 
as the way of becoming a theologian, as opposed to speculation,
179
 are taken as a proof of 
his rejection of Dionysius’ negative theology. This view may then be corroborated by 
Luther’s expressed suspicions about the true personality of Dionysius, and finally his 
criticism of the Angelic and Ecclesiastical hierarchies and Dionysius’ Platonism are 
applied to lead the bull to the slaughter.
180
 In this light it may be surprising that some of 
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 WA 3, 124, 30-35 = WA 55, II, 138, 6-10; WA 3, 372, 16-21 = WA 55, II, 343, 10 - 344, 16. 
177
 WA 56, 299, 27 – 300, 3. 
178
 AWA 2, 318, 20 – 319, 3. 
179
 AWA 2, 294, 19 – 295, 11. 
180
 See Vogelsang 1937, 33-37; Bandt 1958, 40-43; Oberman 1967, 24-28; Zur Mühlen 1972, 51-54, 
101-104, 198-205; Peters 1985, 75-76; Blaumeiser 1995, 67; Rorem 1997; Cranz 2000, 165-167; McGinn 
2002, 96-100; Hoffman 2003, 214; Rorem 2008; Cleve 2008. Loewenich 1982, 92-95 rejects the idea of 
Luther’s mysticism without mentioning Dionysius by name. There seems to be a discrepancy in the 
interpretation of the nature of the difference between negative theology and the theology of the cross. 
Whereas the English-speaking researchers (especially Rorem, Hoffman and McGinn) tend to think that the 
content of the theology of the cross is the idea of knowing God in Christ the Crucified (stressing the 
Incarnation and history of Christ), German researchers (especially Vogelsang, Zur Mühlen, Loewenich and 
Blaumeiser) tend to understand the cross as signifying the way God works by means of suffering, realised in 
the (existential struggles of) Christian life. Both stress the concrete and the historical as the focus of 
Reformation theology.  
Somewhat different approaches appear in Laats, Cranz and Alvsvåg. Laats 1999 attempts to 
systematically analyse the relationship of Luther’s deus absconditus and Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical 
Theology, but bases his examination of Luther only on the Heidelberg disputation and the De servo arbitrio, 
thus omitting Luther’s writings which deal explicitly with Dionysius and which exhibit the most influence of 
negative theology. Cranz 2000, 165-167 agrees that Luther’s concept of the deus absconditus is ultimately 
inspired by Dionysius. Alfsvåg 2010, 177-259 presents a careful textual analysis of the Heidelberg 
disputation and Operationes  as well as the later Anti-Latomus disputation and De servo arbitrio. He does 
not, however, take a stance on the question of Luther’s ontology (relational vs. real-ontic, see p. 200-201), 
which means that he does not analyse thoroughly the nature of the objects of faith. And yet it is exactly here, 
in the definition of the divine nature, where Luther’s closest conformity with negative theology can be seen. 
For example Alfsvåg describes faith with reference to AWA 2, 107, 24-25 “non enim habet nomen neque 
speciem ea, quae fides intelligit” “as void of any content” (p. 206-207), because he does not notice that the 
object of faith is God in his divine nature, not “void of any content”, but void of conceptual content. Its 
object is divine presence, not “an absence without name and form”, as Alfsvåg claims. 
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the lengthiest texts describing the incomprehensibility of the divine nature in terms of 
negative theology are actually found precisely in the Operationes in Psalmos, the work 
which, according to the repeated narrative, cements Luther’s break with mystical theology.  
When we consider Luther’s view of the divine nature, it is noteworthy that Luther 
connects the concept of incomprehensibility especially with what he calls “the highest 
divinity” or “the summit of divinity” (summa divinitate), a term which refers to the divine 
nature itself. The concept is used first in the Dictata in connection with Ps. 17:7: 
And he heard me from his holy temple from the highest divinity or the dwelling place of 
angels [...] and fire i.e., zeal and anger from his face cognition the present God flared 
against sin: coals were set burning by him i.e., dead, black and frigid sinners, before they 
are set on fire by charity and made alive. He bent set down or humiliated the skies 
apostles and disciples and descended by effect, ‘giving to humble his grace’ and 
knowledge: and cloud blindness was under his feet in impious Jews and other 
unbelievers ‘who mind earthly things’ and ⌈they who are not his seat, as the skies⌉ are set 
as a footstool of his feet. And then he ascended is recognized to be superior over the 
Cherubim over all intellect and fullness of knowledge and flew i.e., is made more and 
more high: he flew over wings all virtues of winds spirits, heavenly and human. And he 
made darkness his hiding place i.e., he is made incomprehensible ⌈so that he cannot be 
reached, ‘dwelling in inaccessible light’⌉, or is hidden in faith and is seen through the 
darkness of the intellect ⌈through negations⌉181 
Luther’s exegesis of the text takes as its starting point the concept of “highest divinity” 
(summa divinitate). From there God descends in effect, giving to the humble his grace. 
However, unbelievers turned towards earthly things remain in blindness. But after God 
has descended in the believers (i.e., given them grace and knowledge of him), according to 
Luther he then ascends, as he is recognized as “superior over the Cherubim”: by this 
Luther means that he is above all intellect and fullness of knowledge (which the Cherubim 
represent), and the ascent refers to this act of recognition itself. Therefore Luther 
concludes (citing the Psalm), that “he made darkness his hiding place”, that is, God is 
made incomprehensible: either unreachable as in accordance with 1. Tim. 6:16, “dwelling 
in the inaccessible light”; or hidden in faith, only seen through the darkness of the intellect 
or negations. 
Luther’s emphasis in the text is on the divine infinity. When through grace God 
becomes the object of knowledge, the more he is known, the higher he always becomes, so 
that he never is fully reached. Luther describes this infinite “ascent” of God in two texts of 
                                                 
181
 WA 55, I, 134, 9 – 138, 8: “[9] Et exaudiuit de templo sancto suo8 de summa diuinitate vel de [10] 
angelorum habitaculo […] / et ignis i. e. zelus et [8] indignatio a facie eius cognitione Dei presentis12 
exarsit contra peccatum: [9] carbones succensi sunt ab eo i. e. mortui, nigri et frigidi peccatores prius [10] 
iam inflammati sunt charitate et viuificati. [17, 10] Inclinauit demisit vel [11] humiliauit cœlos apostolos et 
discipulos
13
 et descendit per effectum, ‘dando [12] humilibus gratiam’ et cognitionem sui: et caligo cecitas 
sub pedibus eius [13] in Impiis Iudeis et aliis incredulis, ‘qui terrena sapiunt’ et ⌈non sunt sedes [1] eius vt 
celi⌉ positi sunt Scabellum pedum eius14. [17, 11] Et tunc ascendit [2] agnitus est esse superior super 
Cherubin super omnem intelligentiam et [3] scientie plenitudinem et volauit
15
 i. e. magis ac magis sublimis 
[factus] [4] est: volauit super pennas omnes virtutes ventorum spirituum tam celestium [5] quam 
humanorum. [17, 12] Et posuit tenebras latibulum suum i. e. [6] factus est incomprehensibilis ⌈ita quod 
attingi non potest, ‘habitans [7] lucem inaccessibilem’⌉, vel in fide latet et videtur per tenebras intellectus [8] 
⌈per negationes⌉.” 
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the Dictata. The first is a gloss on the word “he flew” (volavit) of the above text, which 
reads: 
Gloss 15) ‘Ascends’, ‘flies’, ‘to descend’, ‘to ascend’, ‘to fly’ are all said of God not 
regarding the form/substance, but of the effect (non formaliter, sed effectiue). Through 
these namely the incomprehensibility of the divinity is expressed, which the ecstatic and 
contemplative see, as the Apostle says Rom. 11: ‘O highness’ etc. Because as flying we 
cannot be caught by pursuit, so God is above and become incomprehensible to everyone 
who contemplates and looks up to the sky of the divinity.
182
 
Another text with practically the same content can be found in the Dictata in 
connection with verse 11 of the same Psalm (Ps. 17:11), which contains also the term 
superamabilis that was already referred to in the discussion above: 
He ascends over the Cherubim. God ‘ascends’ not in his nature but in our cognition and 
love, when he is known to be the most high, most incomprehensible and lovable over 
everything [superamabilis]. And the more we progress in knowing him, the more he 
‘ascends’, because his highness is always known more and more clearly. [...] Therefore 
‘Cherubim’ signify these cognitive powers, over all which God ‘ascends’ in the humble. 
Wings of winds on the other hand properly signify the affective virtues. And so he ‘flies’. 
Therefore he is not said to ‘ascend’ over them but to ‘fly’, because he is loved only to that 
degree as to which he is known. He does not ‘fly’, i.e., is not loved higher that he 
‘ascends’, i.e., is known. Therefore ‘flight’ means that he is the object of love, ‘ascent’ 
means that he is the object of knowing. But he does not ascend in his nature, but in our 
knowledge of him, does not fly in his nature, but in our affect and love of him. […] And 
so, when [the Psalmist] said ‘flies’, he advisedly added ‘flies over wings’, so that you 
would understand that God does not fly or ascend absolutely, but that those who love him 
fly, and he nevertheless is always above them [and is more than can be comprehended].
183
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 WA 55, I, 138 gloss 15, 12-17: “GLOSSA:15) [12]‘Ascendit’, ‘volat’, ‘Descendere’, ‘Ascendere’, 
‘volare’ omnia de [13] Deo dicuntur non formaliter, Sed effectiue. Exprimitur enim in hiis [14] 
incomprehensibilitas diuinitatis, quam vident exstatici et contemplatiui, [15] vt apostolus Ro. XI.: ‘o 
altitudo’ etc. Quia sicut Volantes nos nequimus [16] consequi, apprehendere, Sic Deus supereminet et 
incomprehensibilis fit [17] omni contemplanti et sursum spectanti in celum diuinitatis.” 
183
 WA 55, II, 137, 2 – 138, 4: “Et Ascendit super Cherubin. Deus ‘Ascendit’ [3] non in natura, Sed in 
nostra cognitione et amore, quando cognoscitur [4] esse altissimus et incomprehensibilis et superamabilis. Et 
sic quanto magis [5] proficimus in cognitione eius, tanto magis ‘ascendit’, quia semper clarius [6] ac clarius 
cognoscitur eius altitudo. Sed hoc ‘ascendere’ non contingit, [7] nisi vbi prius ‘descenderit’, Sicut Christus 
prius descendit et postea [8] ascendit. Quia ‘nemo ascendit in c lum, nisi qui descendit’, i. e. nemo [9] 
peruenit ad diuinitatis cognitionem, nisi qui prius humiliatus fuerit [10] et in sui cognitionem descenderit, 
simul enim ibi et Dei cognitionem [11] inuenit. Vnde ‘Cherubim’ significat hic cognitiuas potentias, [12] 
super qua omnes ‘ascendit’ Deus in humilibus. Penne [13] ventorum autem significat proprie affectiuas 
virtutes. Et sic ‘volat’. [14] Vnde super eas non dicitur ‘ascendere’, Sed ‘volare’, quia tantum manet [15] 
amabilis, quantum cognoscitur. Non enim altius ‘volat’, i. e. amatur, [16] quam ‘ascendit’, i. e. cognoscitur. 
Igitur ‘volatus’ eius est ipsum esse [17] obiectum Dilectionis, ‘Ascensus’ autem eius est ipsum esse 
obiectum [18] cognitionis. Ascendit non natura, Sed cognitione sui nostra, volat non [19] natura, Sed affectu 
et amore sui nostro. ⌈⌈‘Volat’, i. e. in volatu sanctorum [20] est et amatur. ‘Ascendit’, i. e. in proficiscenti 
cognitione ipse est [21] vel ... Volatus enim significat raptus, Iubilos et affectus diligentium et [1] deuotorum 
spirituum. Vel est o ...⌉⌉ Et notanter cum dixisset ‘Volauit’, [2] addit ‘volauit super pennas’, vt intelligas, 
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Both texts express very clearly the idea, that even when God becomes the object of 
knowledge or love, he nevertheless remains above the cognitive capacities (i.e., intellect 
and affect), is touched by them, but is “more than can be comprehended”. On the one 
hand, this expresses Luther’s idea that Christian perfection is never attained in this life, 
only in the future.
184
 On the other hand, it is related to the nature of God as something that 
exceeds human cognitive capacities. The image of the two Cherubim, which Luther uses 
in both passages, is used in the mystical tradition by Richard of St. Victor as the image of 
the contemplation of the paradoxical Trinitarian doctrines and of the contemplation of the 
similitude and the dissimilitude of God to rational concepts. Bonaventure uses the image 
of the Cherubim as an image of the contemplation of the incomprehensible union of 
humanity and divinity in Christ. For both teachers, the Cherubim thus represent the 
contemplation of the incomprehensible aspects of God.
185
 Therefore Luther’s exegesis of 
the Psalm 17 in the Dictata is clearly related to the tradition of mystical theology. This can 
also be seen in the sections of the texts which concern the means of knowing God. On the 
one hand, Luther refers to the hiddenness of God in faith, on the other hand, to the 
darkness of the intellect and negations.
186
 Speaking of the “ecstatic and contemplative”, 
who look up to the sky of the divinity, Luther even hints here of the speculative method of 
negative theology, which strives to grasp the divine experientially by the means of 
negations in the intellect. The more familiar idea of God being present in faith in a hidden 
manner is contained in the text as well. Both of these themes are united, however, by the 
consideration that when God becomes the object of knowledge, he remains 
incomprehensible, above the cognitive capacities of the human person. 
The concept of divine incomprehensibility is also connected to the concept of 
tribulations or afflictions (tentationes, Anfechtungen).
187
 Luther gives one of his most 
profound treatments of the incomprehensibility of the divine nature in his explanation of 
Ps 3:5 in the Operationes in Psalmos, precisely the work which purportedly marks 
Luther’s departure from the idea. Here again it is linked with the same concept of the 
“highest divinity” or the “summit of divinity” (summae divinitatis). The context of the text 
is the tribulations of Christ. Luther interprets the verse of the Psalm as Christ’s cry to the 
Father in the midst of his Passion: 
He says from his holy mountain. I see that this mountain is understood in different ways. 
Some think it means Christ receiving help from himself, others from the highest divinity. 
I’m pleased with ‘the mountain of the highest divinity’, because – as I imagine – you can 
see this mountain has no name. For Ps. 2, ‘On Zion, my holy Mountain’, says that someone 
constituted over someone is a king. Therefore that mountain had to be named, because he 
could not rule it if it were not known. But here that from which he is ruled and heard 
cannot be named, having no name or form. 
                                                                                                                                                   
quia non absolute [3] in se volat, nec ascendit, Sed quia amantes eum volant, et super eos [4] tamen adhuc 
est semper ⌈et plus quam comprehendere possint⌉.” 
184
 See WA 57, b214, 13 – b215, 1, especially lines b214, 29 – b215, 1. 
185
 See Benjamin major, book IV chapters I; III; VIII; XVII-XX; Itinerarium mentis in Deum VI, 4-6. 
The background of Luther’s use of the image of the Cherubim in Richard and Bonaventure is also examined 
on pp. 69-70 of the present study. 
186
 On Luther’s use of the image of the Cherubim in connection with the presence of Christ in faith, see 
p. 197-198. 
187
 On the difficulty of translating this term, see Scaer 1983, 15-13. 
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This seems to me to teach us all to hope in the time of tribulation for a divine help from 
above, the mode, time and kind of which should be unknown to us, so that there would be 
place for faith and hope, which depend on that which is not seen, not heard and has not 
entered the heart of man. So the eye of faith looks up to the interior darkness and the cloud 
on the mountain but does not see anything, except that it is weakened while gazing on high 
and waiting, whence its help shall come. It looks to the heights and expects a helper from 
the heights, but what these heights and the forthcoming help is, it does not know. Even if 
Christ knew everything, he was still tested in all things like us for our sake, so that even for 
him this mountain was according to his humanity in some way unknown and 
incomprehensible in the hour of his Passion. This is what Ps. 21 means when it says: ”But 
you dwell in holiness”, that is, in hiddenness and in inaccessible seclusion. As God is 
ineffable, incomprehensible and inaccessible, so is his will and help, especially in the time 
of abandonment. 
Therefore if faith tested by tribulation does not give this by experience, no words can relate 
what this holy mountain of God is. It is the same thing when he said ‘He heard me from his 
holy mountain’ which is said in everyday language: He heard me in an ineffable and 
incomprehensible way that I would never have imagined. I know I have been heard from 
above, but I don’t know how. He grasped me from above and took me to the heights (as is 
said elsewhere), but I do not know what this height, this summit, this mountain is. […] 
This is what the word ‘holy’ means, that it is above expression, separate and secret, 
distinctly that which cannot be reached by senses or by mind; who is carried off there is 
carried off to the invisible God, purified, separated and sanctified perfectly. This is truly 
hard and intolerable to human nature, if the Spirit of Lord does not carry over these waters 
and kindle the darknesses of this abyss, so that there be light.
188
 
In the text Luther uses a number of different expressions in his discussion of the 
reasons for the incomprehensibility of the nature of God. Here he converges even more 
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 AWA 2, 139, 7 - 140, 26: “De monte sancto suo inquit. Hunc montem varie intelligi video. Aliis ipse 
Christus de seipso exauditus intelligitur, aliis de summa divinitate. Placet mihi mons summae divinitatis, 
modo id - quantum somnio - observes monti huic non esse nomen. Nam Ps. 2<,6> ”Montem sanctum Zion” 
dixit, super quem tamquam inferiorem constitutus esset rex. Ideo nominandus erat illic mons, ut quem regere 
non posset, nisi nosset. Hic vero, a quo regitur et de quo exauditur, innominabilis est, nec speciem nec 
nomen habens. Quo mihi videor erudiri nos omnes in tempore tentationis auxilium divinum sperare quidem 
debere desursum, sed modum, tempus et genus auxilii nobis esse incognitum, ut fidei et spei locus sit, quae 
nituntur in ea, quae nec videntur nec audiuntur nec in cor hominis ascendunt <1Cor 2,9>. Atque ita oculus 
fidei in tenebras interiores et caliginem montis suspicit, nihilque videt, nisi quod attenuatur suspiciens in 
excelso exspectansque, unde veniat auxilium ei. In sublime videt et de sublimi exspectat adiutorem; sed 
quale sit hoc sublime, et quale auditorium futurum, ignorat. Etsi enim Christus omnia sciebat, tamen tentatus 
est in similitudine in omnia pro nobis <Hebr 4,15>, ut et ipse hunc montem quammodo iuxta humanitatem 
habuerit ignotum et incomprehensibilem pro hora passionis, quod et alio Ps. 21<,4> significat dicens: ”Tu 
autem in sancto habitas”, id est, in abscondito et inaccesso secreto. Sicut enim / deus est ineffabilis, 
incomprehensibilis, inaccessibilis, ita euis voluntas et auxilium praesertim in tempore derelictionis. 
Ideo nisi fides hic expertum reddat et tentatio probatum, nullis verbis tradi potest, quid sit mons iste 
sanctus dei. Idem ergo est, ac si diceret: Exaudivit me de monte sancto suo, quod vulgo dicitur: Exaudivit me 
ineffabili incomprehensibilique modo, quam nunquam cogitassem. Desursum scio me exauditum, sed quo 
modo, ignoro. Eripuit me de alto et de summo accepit me (ut alibi dicet), sed non cognosco, quid sit hoc 
altum, hoc summum, hic mons. […] 
Hoc est, quod vocabulum illud sancto indicat, quod, ut supra dictum est, separatum et secretum significat 
planeque id, quod attingi nec sensu nec mente potest; in quod qui rapitur, in deum invisibilem rapitur ac 
perfectissime purificatur, separatur, sanctificatur. Verum dura haec res humanae naturae et intolerabilis, nisi 
spiritus domini feratur super haes aquas et tenebras huius abyssi foveat, donec lux fiat <Gen 1,2s>.” 
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closely with the tradition of Negative theology. The text contains numerous thematic and 
verbal affinities with Pseudo-Dionysius’ famous treatise De mystica theologia and with 
the extensive mystical tradition based upon it. First, there are the general images of the 
mountain, the cloud and darkness in which God is hidden. Dionysius uses the image of the 
summit and the cloud in his treatise as images of the divine nature.
189
 Gerson also uses the 
same image, combining it with Dionysian themes and connecting it with the concept of an 
eye that is obscured by a cloud. However, for Gerson the onlooker is not beneath the 
mountain, but on top of it – in a similar manner as in Dionysius. The cloud describes in 
both their work the experience of a person who has left behind created things (which 
Gerson refers to as lower darknesses), but to whom God is veiled in the superior darkness 
of incomprehensibility.
190
 Thus Luther’s use of the image contains elements from the 
tradition of apophatic mysticism. It is, however, also modified to correspond to his 
understanding of divine monergy. Luther does not present a way to ascend to the 
mountain, like Dionysius does. For Luther this is possible only when God first 
descends.
191
 Likewise, Luther speaks of the eye of faith looking to the heights and 
awaiting help from above, not standing on top of the mountain and looking to the cloud 
above. But the overall picture (the mountain as the divine nature, the cloud as the divine 
incomprehensibility, the eye of faith) is taken from the tradition. To continue the analysis 
of Luther’s discussion: when looking to the cloud and heights of the mountain the person 
sees nothing but is himself being weakened (nisi quod attenuatur suspiciens in excelso). 
Dionysius for his part speaks in his tractate “of the most high places above which God is 
present”, and about the ascent to this mountain as “decreasing” or “reduction” before 
complete silence.
192
According to Luther the person in tribulations does not see anything 
nor knows what the help will be (quale sit hoc sublime, et quale auditorium futurum, 
ignorat). Its mode, time and kind is unknown (incognitum). Dionysius in turn speaks 
about the cloud of unknowing (caliginem … incognoscibilitatis) which surrounds God and 
has to be entered to reach God.
193
 And just as for Dionysius the experiential knowledge of 
God is grasped in mystical union, as well for Luther the help is the raptus and accessus to 
the Godhead itself. The person grasped by God will know and experience that he is 
helped, but cannot know or express what the help and the divine nature is (Scio me 
axauditum, sed quo modo, ignoro). He does not know what the divine summit and height 
is (non cognosco… quid sit hoc altum). Dionysius for his part speaks about knowing by 
not-knowing (nihil cognoscit, supra mentem cognoscens).
194
 Therefore we can see in 
Luther a combination of a variety of mystical themes taken from the tradition of negative 
theology, probably appropriated through Bonaventure, Gerson, and possibly Tauler. 
Also noteworthy are Luther’s terms for and his notions  of the divinity. According to 
Luther the mountain in the Psalm should be interpreted as a figure of the highest divinity 
precisely because it has no name. In accordance with this notion of negative theology 
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 Pseudo-Dionysius: De mystica theologia  I, 1; 3 (PG 3, 998-1002). The latin translations of Dionysius 
used here are from Patrologia Graeca. 
190
 See Gerson: Tractatus septimus super Magnificat, De experimentali unione Veritates (DP IV, 343-
344). 
191
 See WA 55, I, 138, gloss 15 17-18; WA 55, II, 804, 144 – 805, 153; AWA 2, 27-30. 
192
 De mystica theologia I, 3; III  (PG 3, 999; 1034). 
193
 De mystica theologia I, 1 (PG 3, 998). 
194
 De mystica theologia I, 6 (PG 3, 1002). 
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Luther writes that the divine nature cannot be named, and has no species (innominabilis, 
nec speciem nec nomen habens). For Luther, God is above expression (supra dictum), 
ineffable, incomprehensible and inaccessible. He cannot be reached by either the senses or 
the mind (attingi nec sensu nec mente potest). For Luther the human folly in the face of 
the tribulations lies precisely in that the human being wishes to give a name to this 
mountain and desecrate it with human thoughts instead of waiting for divine help. In doing 
so, the human being expresses that he or she does not have faith and trust in God, but only 
follows God up to the point where reason can lead.
195
 Luther’s reflections on the 
unnameability of the divine nature echo Dionysius’ De divininis nominibus, a work with 
which Luther also demonstrates familiarity.
196
 However, one must note that for Luther it is 
precisely the divine essence that has no name: God as Triunity as well as the divine 
persons can be named.
197
 Similar attributions can also be found in other texts. In relation 
to Ps. 2:10, which we examined above, Luther described the object of faith as something 
that has neither name nor species.
198
 The union with the “invisible, ineffable, innominable, 
eternal, incogitable Word of God” is described as “entering into that cloud, in which 
everything that the human senses, reason, mind or intellect can comprehend is 
overwhelmed”.199 The concept of the cloud which the senses and reason cannot penetrate 
is the same figure originating from Dionysius and used by Bonaventure, Gerson and 
others. Even Luther himself states in the Operationes in Psalmos that he is aware of 
Dionysius’ use of the cloud figure. Luther’s use of the image, however, does not 
necessarily mean that he understands its content in exactly the same way as Dionysius. 
Rather, Luther expresses both familiarity with as well as criticism of Dionysius’ 
interpretation.
200
 
How then are Luther’s texts concerning divine incomprehensibility to be understood? 
When one examines Luther’s texts dealing with the tribulations, two different aspects of 
divine incomprehensibility come to the fore. The first of these is what one could call the 
metaphysical essence or nature of God, whereby God differs from all created things. In 
this respect, God is incomprehensible by virtue of being invisible, ungraspable by the 
                                                 
195
 AWA 2, 140, 27-32: “Proinde tota stultitia est in hac re, quod homo non sustinet consilium dei, sed 
adiuvari petit modo et tempore a se electo et sibi placito, quo ex innominabili monte nominatum sibi facit et 
sanctum dei montem suae cogitationis tactu prophanat, quantum in eo est. Hic est sicut equus et mulus, qui 
eo usque dominum sustinet, quousque sentit aut capit, ultra captum suum non sequitur, quia fide non vivit, 
sed ratione sua.” 
196
 AWA 2, 340, 3-6: “Et quid, si totum huc Dionysium de divinis nominibus advehamus? Et eundem 
rursus de mystica theologia, donec nullum nomen deo relinquamus? Siquidem qui cogitatu 
incomprehensibilis est, quo nomine effabilis esse queat?” 
197
 See e.g. Luther’s excursus on de nomine dei, AWA 2, 333-345. 
198
 AWA 2, 107, 23-24: “Non enim habent nomen neque speciem ea, quae fides intelligit.” See the longer 
quote and its analysis on p. 58. 
199
 AWA 2, 108, 1-4: “et est ingressus ille caliginis, in qua absorbetur, quicquid sensus, ratio, mens 
intellectusque hominis comprehendere potest. Coniungit enim fides animam cum invisibili, ineffabili, 
innominabili, aeterno, incogitabili verbo dei simulque separat ab omnibus visibilibus” 
200
 See WA 5, 503, 4-34 where Luther expresses his familiarity with Dionysius’ use of the cloud image 
while at the same time rejecting its application to the verse discussed in that text. In it Luther rather 
interprets the cloud as signifying God’s hidden work under contraries. However, with regard to the fact that 
Luther uses the cloud also to signify the human inability to grasp the action of God, Luther’s interpretation is 
not  completely different from the original Dionysian idea of incomprehensibility. 
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senses and reason as well as “most high” (altissimus).201 This is connected to God being 
unnameable and having no species: There is no real (as opposite to nominal) concept for 
God by which God in his essence can be grasped and understood. The incomprehensibility 
of the Godhead might also be connected to the idea of the divine plenitude: the divine 
nature as the unity which includes in itself the plurality of all concepts (Lat. species) and 
transcends them. However, Luther nowhere explicitly states this idea. A hint that might 
point to a more philosophical conception of the essence of God on Luther’s part are some 
mentions of the via negationis in the Dictata, but the issue is not further elaborated.
202
 On 
the contrary, Luther later in the Operationes rejects the speculative interpretation of 
negative theology, replacing it with a focus on spiritual experience. True negation is 
experienced in spiritual tribulation.
203
 Therefore the sentence “nec ... speciem habens”, the 
point that God has no species seems to refer to the invisibility of God rather than to God 
as the unity surpassing concepts: God simply has no species visibilis, i.e., visible form or 
                                                 
201
 WA 57, b144, 4-12: “Ipse enim est altissimus, ideo et altissimum opus eius, [5] ut patet per singula 
exempla exitus filiorum Israel. Et ex hoc nunc [6] intelliguntur, qui sint exacerbatores, irritatores, 
exasperatores, contradictores, [7] sicut Scriptura sepius vocat, scil. increduli verbo Dei et impacientes [8] 
operis Dei, dum sicut equus et mulus tam diu sequuntur [9] dominum, quamdiu senciant apparentes res, 
quibus nitantur, que si [10] ruant, ruunt et ipsi. Ideo arduissima res est fides Christi, quia est raptus et [11] 
translacio ab omnibus, que sentit intus et foris, in ea, que nec intus nec [12] foris sentit, scil. in invisibilem, 
altissimum, incomprehensibilem Deum.” 
WA 57, b214, 23 – b215, 7: “Haec autem bona divina cum sint invisibilia, incompraehensibilia [24] et 
penitus abscondita, ideo natura non potest ea attingere aut diligere, [25] nisi per gratiam Dei elevetur. Eadem 
ratione etiam fit, ut spiritualis [26] homo a nemine iudicari, cognosci, videri, nec a se ipso quidem [27] 
possit, quia haeret in tenebris altissimis Dei. Quod David edoctus [28] testatur dicens 30. ps.: ‘Abscondes 
eos in abscondito faciei tuae’ (id est [29] in abscondito, quod est coram te). Hoc incipit quidem in hac vita, 
sed [1] perficietur in futura. Magna itaque res est esse Christianum et vitam [2] suam habere absconditam 
non in loco aliquo, ut eremitae, nec in corde [3] suo, quod est profundissimum, sed in ipso invisibili Deo, 
scilicet inter res [4] mundi vivere et pasci eo, quod nusquam apparet nisi modico verbi [5] indicio soloque 
auditu, ut Christus Matth. 4. dicit: ‘Non in solo pane vivit [6] homo, sed in omni verbo.’ Sic sponsus in 
Cant.: ‘Ego dormio’ (quia [7] res visibiles non advertit), ‘et cor meum vigilat’.” 
AWA 2, 140, 10-13: “Exaudivit me ineffabili incomprehensibilique modo, quam nunquam cogitassem. 
Desursum scio me exauditum, sed quo modo, ignoro. Eripuit me de alto et de summo accepit me (ut alibi 
dicet), sed non cognosco, quid sit hoc altum, hoc summum, hic mons.” 
AWA 2, 318, 5 – 319, 1: “Denique ceterae virtutes versantur circa res crassas et corporales externe, illae 
vero circa purum verbum dei interne, quo capitur et non capit anima, hoc est, exuitur tunica et calciamentis 
suis, ab omnibus tam rebus quam phantasmatibus [V 4] rapirturque per verbum (cui adhaeret, immo quod 
eam apprehendit et ducit mirabiliter) ’in solitudinem’ (ut Oseae 2<,14> dicit), in invisibilia, in cubiculum 
suum, ”in cellam vinariam” <Cant 2,4>. At hic ductus, hic raptus, hic expolitio misere eam discruciat. 
Arduum est enim et angusta via relinquere omnia visibilia, exui omnibus sensibus, educi ex consuetis, 
denique hoc mori est et ad inferos descendere. Videtur enim ipsa sibi funditus perire, dum subtractis 
omnibus, in quibus stetit, versabatur, haerebat, nec terram tangit nec caelum, nec se sentit nec deum dicens 
<Cant 5,8>: Nuntiate dilecto meo, ’quia amore langueo’, quasi dicat: Redacta sum in nihilum et nescivi, in 
tenebras et caliginem ingressa nihil video; fide, spe et caritate sola vivo et infirmor (id est, patior), ’cum 
enim infirmor, tunc fortior sum’ <2Cor 12,10b>. Hunc ductum theologi mystici vocant ‘un tenebras ire’, 
‘ascendere super ens et non ens’.” 
202
 WA 55, I, 138: “Et posuit tenebras latibulum suum i. e. [6] factus est incomprehensibilis ⌈ita quod 
attingi non potest, ‘habitans [7] lucem inaccessibilem’⌉, vel in fide latet et videtur per tenebras intellectus [8] 
⌈per negationes⌉.” 
WA 55, II, 138, 5-10: “[5] 17, 12 Latibulum Dei Est tenebre, primo quia in fidei enygmate et caligine [6] 
habitat. Secundo Quia ‘habitat lucem inaccessibilem’, ita quod [7] Bl 36 nullus intellectus ad eum pertingere 
potest, nisi suo lumine * omisso [8] altiore leuatus fuerit. Ideo b. Dionysius docet Ingredi in tenebras 
anagogicas [9] et per negationem ascendere. Quia sic est Deus absconditus et [10] incomprehensibilis.” 
203
 AWA 2, 294, 19 – 300, 11. 
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concept derived from sensual experience, and therefore cannot be grasped by the senses or 
reason.
204
 Furthermore, the idea that God has no species may be related to the idea of God 
as infinite being, whereas mental concepts and the capacity of the intellect are finite. Thus 
Luther’s focus would lie not on the superconceptual unity of God (as in the Dionysian 
tradition), but rather on the infinity of the divine nature, which the intellect cannot grasp in 
its entirety. Luther’s statements about God flying above the fullness of knowledge and 
always rising higher when he is known more seem to corroborate this interpretation.
205
 
One should note, however, that Luther’s view is that the abstract (that is, non-empirical) 
concept of God (notitia or notio divinitatis) as well as God’s individual attributes, such as 
the invisibility, immortality, power, goodness and righteousness, are in principle knowable 
to human beings even naturally. This remaining natural cognition of God is contained in 
the human heart. The fallen person, nevertheless, cannot attribute it to the right ‘subject’, 
i.e., to the true God as he is in his concrete (empirical) nature. This concrete knowledge of 
God (vera notitia de vera essentia), i.e., the specific knowledge of who God is and where 
he can be found, has been lost and perverted in the Fall. Luther states that this loss has 
taken place because human beings have ascribed the notion of divinity to objects of their 
choice, thus falling into idolatry, instead of having left the divinity “naked” (that is, 
incomprehensible and unexplainable except by God’s self-revelation) and worshipping 
him as such.
206
 The focus in Luther’s reception of negative theology is therefore 
unquestionably on the experiential nature of mystical theology, not on the speculative. 
Especially in the latter texts of the researched period, Luther seems to discard those 
aspects of negative theology upon which a way to ascend to cognition of God through 
negations or speculations of conceptual nature could be built. Luther’s criticism of 
Pseudo-Dionysian Platonism should be understood in this sense: as a rejection of 
contemplation of God by the means of conceptual negation or affirmation. For Luther, it is 
central that God cannot be reached by any normal human means of cognition, only 
through faith. The rejection does not, however, include the rejection of an ontological 
concept of God which can be theologically described in terms of negative theology, 
though not actually grasped through them, or a rejection of the experiential nature of 
mystical theology.
207
 It is rather that these are the two aspects Luther retains, demonstrated 
                                                 
204
 AWA 2, 294, 1-9. 
205
 See WA 55, I 134, 9 – 138, 8; 138 gloss 15; WA 55, II, 137, 2 – 138, 4. See also chapters 2.2.2 and 
3.3.1.2. 
206
 WA 56, 11, 1 -15, 4; 176, 15 – 177, 18. Luther’s teaching here seems to be follow the same format as 
his instructions to those in tribulation: The error and idolatry lies in replacing divinity with self-conceived 
images of God, instead of waiting for divine help and giving glory to God regardless of subjective 
experience. On the natural knowledge of God as a component of practical syllogism on Luther see also 
Raunio 2001, 167-170. On natural knowledge of God and natural law in general as well as their limitations 
see Wright 2010, 126-131. 
207
 This rejection seems to imply the rejection of the Platonic idea of God as the unity of ideas 
(concepts). This does not, however, mean the rejection of an ontological concept of God, as we can observe 
from Luther’s texts regarding the divine nature. It rather seems that Luther understands the 
incomprehensibility of God in a more radical manner than Pseudo-Dionysian Neoplatonism. To clarify 
Luther’s position on this issue one would have to be able to define the metaphysical relationship between 
divine nature and concepts in Luther’s thought: Are they equal with it, or distinct from it? Are there any real 
concepts? Behind Luther’s distinction between the abstract concept (notio divinitatis) and the concrete 
essence (notitia de vera essentia) of God may lie the nominalist distinction between abstractive and intuitive 
knowledge. An abstractive concept of God could therefore be conceptually accurate, but could not serve a 
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by his numerous allusions to mystical writings in texts concerning the union with God. 
God as the invisible highest good is in his nature such that the spiritual experience of 
rapture and union with him cannot be sensed, comprehended, expressed or even 
experienced in a any normal manner.
208
 However, the union still seems to be an 
‘experience’ of its own quality, of which one who has had such spiritual experience can 
speak afterwards.
209
 Luther’s reception of negative theology therefore seems to be a re-
interpretation rather than a rejection, which is illustrated by the frequent appearances of 
mystical terminology and images in Luther’s writings of the period. 
But there is also a second aspect of incomprehensibility which appears in Luther’s 
texts on the tribulations: the will of God. Not only is God incomprehensible in his essence, 
but his will as well is hidden and secret and should remain so. According to Luther, to 
seek to know the will of God, especially concerning predestination, is to seek to be like 
God. The incomprehensibility of the will is connected to the absence of visible and 
sensible good and consolation in the tribulations, and with the resulting temptation to call 
God evil and injust. Luther stresses that in the middle of suffering one should conform to 
the will of God whether one knows it or not.
210
 The emphasis on the hidden will of God 
                                                                                                                                                   
conceptual ascent to the knowledge of God, as, unlike in the Platonic system, there is not an ontological link 
between the concepts and the essence of God. Luther’s rejection of the idea of speculative ascent might, 
however, also be due to his understanding of the limitations of the natural cognitive capacities of the human 
being (see chapter 2.4.1). Luther’s position might be thus, that the concepts derived from sense experience 
are simply not suitable for understanding God, whereas the concepts derived from illumination by faith are 
concepts ontologically subsisting in the divine nature. This would mean that Luther would not reject the 
Platonic idea of the nature of God per se, but that for him the access to real concepts would only be attained 
in the illumination of faith, which would also render the idea of an ascent by natural means impossible. The 
texts considered here do not allow for a definite conclusion.  
208
 WA 56, 307, 4-11: “[4] ‘Charitas Dei’ dicitur, Quia per eam solum Deum diligimus, [5] Vbi Nihil 
visibile, nihil experimentale nec intus nec foris est, in quod [6] confidatur aut quod ametur aut timeatur, Sed 
super omnia In Inuisibilem [7] Deum et inexperimentalem, incomprehensibilem, scil. in medias [8] tenebras 
interiores rapitur, nesciens, quid amet, Sciens autem, [9] quid non amet, et omne cognitum et expertum 
fastidiens [10] Et id, quod nondum cognoscit, tantum desiderans, dicens: ‘Quia amore [11] Langueo’, i. e. 
quod habeo, nolo, et quod volo, non habeo.” 
AWA 2, 107, 23 – 108, 4: “Non enim habent nomen nequem speciem ea, qua fides intelligit. Nam 
praesentium rerum prosperitas vel adversitas penitus subvertit omnem hominem, qui fide non intelligit 
invisibilia. Hic enim intellectus ex fide venit, iuxta illud <Is 7,9>: ’Nisi crediderits, non intelligetis’, et est 
ingressus ille caliginis, in qua absorbetur, quicquid sensus, ratio, mens intellectusque hominis 
comprehendere potest. Coniungit enim fides animam cum invisibili, ineffabili, innominabili, aeterno, 
incogitabili verbo dei simulque separat ab omnibus visibilibus” 
AWA 2, 140, 21-26: “Hoc est, quod vocabulum illud sancto indicat, quod, ut supra dictum est, 
separatum et secretum significat planeque id, quod attingi nec sensu nec mente potest; in quod qui rapitur, in 
deum invisibilem rapitur ac perfectissime purificatur, separatur, sanctificatur. Verum dura haec res humanae 
naturae et intolerabilis, nisi spiritus domini feratur super haes aquas et tenebras huius abyssi foveat, donec 
lux fiat <Gen 1,2s>.” 
AWA 2, 141, 4-10: “Quare optime dicitur: De monte sancto suo, id est, de summa divinitate. Sed non 
omnes id intelligunt, quod dicunt. Nam de divinitate summa exaudiri est (ut dixi) in desperato et incogitabili 
modo exaudiri, ita ut nihil minus ibi sentiatur quam divinitatis auxilium seu exauditio. Fides enim et spes hic 
loquitur, seu de fide et spe exaudita recitatur historia. At fides et spes exaudita nihil sentit, nihil experitur, 
nihil intelligit de exauditione, cum sint rerum non apparentium <Hebr. 11,1>.” 
209
 AWA 2, 300, 18 – 302, 8. 
210
 WA 5, 623, 17: “Cum enim fides sit rerum non [18] apparentium et substantia sperandarum, 
vehementer repugnat, immo fidem [19] expugnat curiositas ista scrutandae maiestatis, posse et nosse salvare 
deum, [20] non est fides in hac hora, id enim experimento evidentissime sentit. Item [21] S. Petrum salvum 
fieri deo volente et omnes sanctos et electos aeque iam [22] non credit, sed scit. Verum te et me velle salvum 
facere, hoc non apparet [23] nec apparere debet. Haec voluntas incomprehensibilis est et esse debet. [24] 
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and the necessity of conforming to that will seem to reflect the voluntarist influences of 
the via moderna on Luther’s view of God.211 This is especially visible in the passages of 
the later De servo arbitrio where the will is taken as the essential defining characteristic of 
divinity.
212
 These two aspects of God’s incomprehensibility (will and essence) often 
appear together and alongside each other in Luther’s writings.213 They are joined together 
by the common principle expressed by Luther that no reason (ratio) or cause (causa) can 
be given for God. There is no superior rule or concept by which God could be explained or 
understood and his action foretold.
214
 The incomprehensibility of the essence and the will 
of God thus belong together. The incomprehensibility of God in Luther’s thought cannot 
be understood in a merely voluntarist manner, but it contains as well a strong essentialist 
element. Furthermore, it seems that the voluntarist aspect comes more to the fore in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Ideo sola fide hic opus est, et ea fide, quae non dubitet, deum facere et [25] facturum esse secum, quod 
iustissimum fuerit, sive servet sive perdat. Hic [26] enim manet gloria et laus dei in ore nostro, cum deo non 
nisi iustitiam [27] tribuimus in omni voluntate eius, etiam si hanc ipsam iustitiam non videamus, [28] sed 
tantum credamus, tam potenter contrarium suadente humano affectu [29] et daemonum persuasione. 
Impossibile autem est eum perire, qui deo gloriam [30] [1. Sam. 2, 30.] tribuit et eum iustificat in omni 
opere et voluntate sua, sicut dicit 1. Reg. 2. [31] ‘Quicunque honorificaverit me, glorificabo eum’. Manifeste 
ergo patet, nequitiam [32] Satanae esse hanc tentationem de praedestinatione, tantum ut fidem [33] [Eph. 6, 
16.] extinguat, cui consilio Apostoli scuto fidei occurrendum, et tela huius iniqui [34] ignita in eo 
extinguenda. Vere iniquus, idest versutus est, et ignita sunt [35] eius iacula in hac hora novissima, quia 
astutissime hominem retrahit ab iis, [36] quae non apparent, ut statuat eum in iis, quae apparent. Vult enim 
hominem [37] facere et iudicare secundum quod sentit, non secundum id, quod non sentit. [38] Sentit autem, 
sese derelinqui, et non sentit, sese praedestinari. Si ergo secundum [39] [Ps. 32, 9.] sensum agat, ‘sicut equus 
et mulus, quibus non est intellectus’, non [40] potest fieri, ut servetur. Agat ergo secundum fidem, idest 
insensibilitatem, [1] et fiat truncus immobilis ad has blasphemias, quas in corde suo suscitat [2] Satanas. 
Non enim sua sunt, sed satanae eiusmodi obiecta et sensa cordis. [3] De hoc satis.” 
See also WA 55, I, 860, 6-8; AWA 2, 313, 6-29. 
211
 See the analysis of the need for trust in the tribulations in chapter 3.5.2. 
212
 WA 18, 712, 29-38: “Reliqua [20] igitur sunt, ut quaerat quispiam, cur Deus non cesset ab ipso motu 
omnipotentiae, [21] quo voluntas impiorum movetur, ut pergat mala esse et peior [22] fieri? Respondetur: 
hoc est optare, ut Deus propter impios desinat esse [23] Deus, dum eius virtutem et actionem optas cessare, 
scilicet ut desinat esse [24] bonus, ne illi fiant peiores. At cur non simul mutat voluntates malas, quas [25] 
[Röm. 11, 33] movet? Hoc pertinet ad secreta maiestatis, ubi incomprehensibilia sunt [26] iudicia eius. Nec 
nostrum hoc est quaerere, sed adorare mysteria haec. [27] Quod si caro et sanguis hic offensa murmuret, 
Murmuret sane, sed nihil [28] [Joh. 6, 66] efficiet, Deus ideo non mutabitur. Et si scandalisati impii 
discedant quam [29] plurimi, Electi tamen manebunt. Idem dicetur illis, qui quaerunt: Cur permisit [30] 
Adam ruere, et cur nos omnes eodem peccato infectos condit, cum [31] potuisset illum servare et nos aliunde 
vel primum purgato semine creare. [32] Deus est, cuius voluntatis nulla est caussa nec ratio, quae illi ceu 
regula [33] et mensura praescribatur, cum nihil sit illi aequale aut superius, sed ipsa [34] est regula omnium. 
Si enim esset illi aliqua regula vel mensura aut caussa [35] aut ratio, iam nec Dei voluntas esse posset. Non 
enim quia sic debet vel [36] debuit velle, ideo rectum est, quod vult. Sed contra: Quia ipse sic vult, [37] ideo 
debet rectum esse, quod fit. Creaturae voluntati caussa et ratio praescribitur [38] sed non Creatoris voluntati, 
nisi alium illi praefeceris creatorem.” 
213
 WA 57, b214, 2 – 25; AWA 2, 140, 4-7: “’Tu autem in sancto habitas’, id est, in abscondito et 
inaccesso secreto. Sicut enim / deus est ineffabilis, incomprehensibilis, inaccessibilis, ita euis voluntas et 
auxilium praesertim in tempore derelictionis.” 
214
 WA 56, 115, 11 – 116, 3: “O altitudo4 o profunditas seu abyssus diuitiarum sapientiae qua [12] 
cuncta dispensat ac gubernat et scientiae i. e. cognitionis, quia omnia [1] nouit seu videt dei: quam 
incomprehensibilia sunt quia non est ratio [2] reddibilis super iis, que videmus fieri ab eo iudicia eius et 
inuestigabiles [3] i. e. inscrutabiles
1
 viae eius.
2” 
WA 56, 116 gloss 2: “GLOSSA:2) [17] Et ideo eo ipso omnes stulti sunt, qui scientiam rerum querunt 
[18] per causas, vt Aristoteles, cum sint ‘incomprehensibiles’.” 
See also Heckel 2010, 43-44. 
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later writings, culminating in the De servo arbitrio, which falls outside the period of this 
study. 
In conclusion, one can note that the incomprehensibility and incogitability of God have 
to do above all with the divine essence or the “highest divinity” (summa divinitate / 
summae divinitatis). By this concept Luther seems to refer to the concrete Godhead shared 
by the divine persons: that which God is in himself. The term also seems to stand for the 
Father as the source of divinity, at least in the respect that he is unknown to the Son during 
his suffering. In any case, from the texts examined it does seem that the essence of God 
cannot be reduced in Luther to the relations between the persons (i.e., it is not merely 
relational). Luther has an essentialist concept of the divine nature, which includes the 
notion that the divine nature is incomprehensible, incogitable and described in terms of 
negative theology.  
2.2.4.3 God as Hidden 
Rather than speaking about God as incomprehensible and ineffable, Lutheran theologians 
have usually preferred the notion of the deus absconditus, the hidden God. As mentioned 
above, this idea carries antimetaphysical connotations, against which I will present 
criticism in the following discussion.
215
 The idea that God hides under contraries is indeed 
expressed at multiple points in Luther’s texts, for example in the Dictata in connection 
with Ps. 91:6: 
Therefore note, that as blessed divinity, i.e., wisdom, light, virtue, glory, truth, goodness, 
salvation, life and every good thing was hidden under the flesh, when nevertheless in the 
flesh all evil appeared, such as confusion, death, Cross, infirmity, weakness, darkness and 
worthlessness, (for thus a different and most dissimilar thing appeared to outward eyes, 
ears, touch and to all powers of the whole man, not what was hidden inside), so it is in the 
same way always up to the present day.
216
  
Luther also expresses the same idea in the Lecture on Romans: 
It is necessary that the work of God (opus Dei) is hidden and not understood when it 
happens. It is however not hidden in another way than under a contrary appearance (sub 
contraria specie) to our imagination or thought. Therefore Gabriel said to the Virgin: ‘The 
Holy Spirit will come over you’, i.e., will come over that which you think, ‘and the power 
of the Most High will overshadow you’, i.e., you will not understand, therefore do not ask, 
                                                 
215
 See the introduction at chapter 2.2.4 and footnote 169. 
216
 WA 55, II, 720, 69-75: “Vnde Nota, [70] Quod sicut sub carne abscondita fuit benedicta diuinitas, i. e. 
sapientia, [71] lux, virtus, gloria, veritas, bonitas, salus, vita et omne bonum, cum tamen [72] in carne 
apparuerit omne malum vt confusio, mors, crux, infirmitas, [73] languor, tenebre et vilitas (Sic enim aliud et 
dissimillimum apparuit foris [74] oculis, auribus, tactui, immo omnibus viribus totius hominis ei quod intus 
[75] latuit), Ita vsque modo semper.” 
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how it will happen. This is how he acted in the work most proper to him, which is the first 
and the exemplar of all of his works, i.e., in Christ.
217
 
The principal example of God’s works is Christ. The divinity was hidden under its 
opposite in the Incarnation and the entire life of Christ, especially on the Cross. According 
to Luther this is also the mode God performs his work in all believers. Blessings are 
hidden under sufferings. But why is God hidden under contraries?  
The first reason seems to be to humble the proud and humiliate human wisdom, which 
did not wish to recognise God through the natural knowledge of God (in principle 
perceivable in the Creation), but instead bestowed the abstract divine attributes to 
creations of its own choosing.
218
 Therefore, God has hidden his true wisdom and 
knowledge by detaching the sign from the signified. Although the natural knowledge of 
the abstract attributes of God (such as wisdom and goodness) remains, concrete 
knowledge of God and his nature (vera notitia de vera essentia) can no longer be obtained 
through the metaphysically apparent (i.e., great, beautiful etc.) works of God, but rather 
precisely through those works that stand in contradiction to them. That is, the faith which 
grants understanding of the invisible works of God can only be obtained under the 
opposites of those invisible works: under the concrete humanity of Christ and the materia 
of the sacraments. Luther therefore calls the works of God not only profound, but 
exceedingly profound: they are not merely spiritual (and profound as such), but in them 
spiritual goods are hidden under their contraries (ie., hidden in an exceedingly profound 
manner).
219
 This hiding can therefore be seen as God’s ‘response’ to human idolatry. 
Spiritual goods are no longer attainable through earthly goods, but through the opposite of 
earthly goods. By this means human wisdom focused on sensible and apparent things is 
brought to folly and its defects in grasping the invisible become apparent. Therefore, 
humility and confessing the limits of one’s own wisdom are necessary for attaining the 
wisdom of God.
220
 However, this confession cannot happen unless God leads the human 
person into suffering (passio), destroying in the process the cherished human wisdom, so 
that God can give to the human being his spiritual wisdom. Luther calls this most 
contradictory work of God miraculous (mirabilis).
221
 Because the action of God 
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 WA 56, 376, 31 – 377, 5. “Necesse est enim opus Dei abscondi et non intelligi tunc, [32] quando fit. 
Non autem absconditur aliter quam sub contraria specie [1] nostri conceptus seu cogitationis. Vnde dixit 
Gabriel ad Virginem: [2] ‘Spiritus sanctus superueniet in te’, i. e. supra quam tu cogitas, veniet, [3] ‘et virtus 
altissimi obumbrabit tibi’, i. e. non intelliges, ideo ne queras, [4] quomodo fiat. Sic enim egit in opere suo 
proprio, quod est primum [5] et exemplar omnium operum suorum, i. e. in Christo.” 
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 Luther seems to think that the loss of the natural knowledge of the Creator perceivable in his works 
(cf. Rom. 1:18-23) was a gradual process. In the beginning the human race would have recognized God with 
the intellect through God’s works, but because of the conscious commitment of the sin of idolatry, 
knowledge of the true God waned and the wicked became more and more mentally obscured. It would 
appear that according to Luther the human race has now become obscured and ignorant to such a degree that 
the intellectual perception of God through his works is no longer naturally possible. This nevertheless does 
not relieve an individual from the responsibility, because in the beginning such knowledge was accessible 
(WA 56, 11, 1 – 12, 3; WA 56, 12 gloss 3). The creation itself still testifies to the wisdom of God and is a 
sign of God, but the understanding or intellect required to comprehend this testimony can now only be 
restored through faith, not through natural abilities (WA 55, II, 824, 698-701; 825, 723-728). 
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 WA 55, II, 719, 52 – 720, 80; WA 56, 15, 1-4; 176, 14 – 178, 17; 380, 31 – 381, 11. 
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 WA 55, II, 720, 81 – 721, 94. 
221
 WA 56, 375, 1 – 377, 9. 
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contradicts everything natural human wisdom considers good and proper to God, Luther 
can even call God “negative essence” (negativa essentia).222 
However, there seems to be also a second reason for God’s hiddenness under 
contraries, which is connected to the nature of God. According to Luther, God has 
“become great” (magnificatus), just because he has “become small” (parvificatus) in the 
Incarnation, suffering, Cross and death: 
He is called “he who has become great” (magnificatus) […] because he has become small 
and humiliated; small when he left from the Father and came into the World, was made 
man and suffered in all ways, was crucified, and died. But then he again went to the Father 
and was shown to be God. In that way he first appeared as man and after that as God, first 
was made small and after that great. He became exceedingly great, because he became 
exceedingly small. ‘For he emptied himself’ etc.223  
For Luther God is miraculous (mirabilis) especially because he who is most high 
works through things that are most low and contradictory to his proper majesty. In this 
sense God is “most common” (communissimus), present in everything and over, under, 
inside, outside, before and after everything; both being present in all the differences and 
surpassing them.
224
 It belongs to the essence of God to be in all places and in all times: in 
highness, lowness, broadness, present, past, future, over, under and inside.
225
 Luther 
summarizes this by stating that God is all in all (omnia in omnibus): 
God is truly all in all, equal and the same, but at the same time most unequal and diverse. 
For he is the one who is simple in multiplicity; multiple in simplicity; in inequality equal; 
in equality unequal; in sublimity low; in highness deep; in the innermost the outermost; 
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 WA 56, 392, 17 – 393, 20. 
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 WA 55, II, 799, 3-9: “[3] Magnificatus dicitur ⌈⌈[mora]liter vide infra ... magnificata⌉⌉, quia [4] 
paruus factus est et humiliatus; paruus, cum Exiuit a patre et venit [5] 4, 172 in | mundum, factus homo et 
omnino passus, crucifixus et mortuus. Sed [6] rursus vasit ad patrem et manifestatus est esse Deus. Igitur 
prius apparuit [7] homo et postea Deus, prius paruificatus et postea magnificatus. [8] Magnificatus 
vehementer, quia paruificatus vehementer. ‘Exinaniuit enim [9] seipsum’ etc.” 
224
 WA 55, II, 379, 669 – 380, 682: “[669] Secundo ‘Mirabilis in sanctis’, quos maxime diligit et tamen 
ita percutit [670] et humiliat. Hoc enim proprie bonitatem, sicut primum potentiam vel [671] maiestatem 
respicit, licet vbique sit potentia, Sapientia et bonitas. Sed [672] Mirabilis est bonitas, que in mala mittit et 
affligit. Et mirabilis altitudo [673] maiestatis, que etiam in infimis presens est et operatur et loquitur cum 
illis. [674] Cum sit altissimus, omnium fere videtur esse communissimus et omnibus [675] obsequi et 
benefacere. Sunt enim Multe differentie rerum, [676] Et in his omnibus Deus est super et subter, intra et 
extra, [677] ante et retro. Vt Mole est omni superior, inferior, interior, [678] exterior, prior, posterior, Sic 
etiam vita qualibet [679] et Sensu et intellectu. Ad omnes enim omnium illorum [680] differentias et limites 
Deus adest et superest. Et in his [681] omnibus stupendus, metuendus, terribilis et ‘mirabilis’, [682] Scil. ‘in 
sanctis suis’.” 
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 WA 55, I, 860: “[138, 6] Mirabilis superior et incomprehensibilis facta est scientia tua diuina 
predestinatio, que est essentia tua ex me i. e. mihi, quia tibi soli est comprehensibilis
12
: confortata est super 
me et non potero ad eam vt eam comprehendam, cum sit ipsa Dei essentia. [138, 7] Quo ibo Vere omnia 
cognouisti presentia, Vbicunque sunt a spiritu tuo qui vbique videt et scit : et quo a facie tua Bl 104v 
presentia tua fugiam? [138, 8] *Si
13
 ·
14
 ascendero si ascenderem        et ita nec in altitudine latere vllus 
potest in caelum tu illic es“ 
WA 55, I, 860 gloss 13: “GLOSSA:13) Probat primo prouidentiam Dei omnia nosse quoad loca, quia in 
altitudine, in profunditate et latitudine Vbique est. Sicut supra probauit eam extendi ad omnia tempora, 
presentia, preterita, futura, ita hic ad omnia loca, sursum, deorsum et in latus.” 
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and vice versa. So in the infirm he is powerful; in the powerful infirm; in the stupid wise; 
in the wise, stupid; in brief: he is all in all.
226
 
Luther appears to think that this coincidence of opposites belongs to the nature of God. 
For God to be truly miraculous, omnipresent and all in all, his highness needs to be 
present in the most low things and his essence needs to surpass the the differences of the 
created order. That the incarnation of Christ is the most proper work of God is an 
expression of this character of the divine nature, because especially in Christ the mutual 
opposites come together and are dissolved by divine wisdom.
227
  
There have been attempts to trace statements of this kind found in Luther to the 
tradition of Nicholas of Cusa. This however, seems to be a mistake.
228
 It rather appears 
that one should seek the roots of these paradoxical statements of Luther regarding the 
nature of God as reconciling in himself the mutual opposites again from the Victorines 
and Franciscan Augustinianism, which appropriated Dionysian thought. One particular 
example of this, as noted earlier, is Luther’s use of the image of the two Cherubim to 
illustrate the nature of divine wisdom which transcends contraries. The same Cherubim 
stand in Richard of St. Victor’s Benjamin major as an image of the contemplation of the 
similitude and the dissimilitude of God with respect to rational concepts, and as an image 
of how opposite and contrary sentences regarding God (e.g. divine unity and trinity) are 
reconciled with each other.
229
 Bonaventure uses the image of the Cherubim precisely as an 
image of the contemplation of the union of the divine and human attributes in Christ, 
attributes which are in contradiction with each other.
230
 Furthermore, Bonaventure’s 
expressions in his Itinererium mentis in Deum about the divine essence as something that 
(because it is most perfect) is inside (intra), outside (extra), over (supra) and below (infra) 
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 WA 55, II, 73, 11-18; WA 57, b189, 7-19; b201, 10 – b202, 8. See also Nilsson 1966, 202-205; 250-
252. According to Nilsson Christ is the most proper work of God, because in him the opus proprium and 
opus alienum come together. 
228
 See Weier 1967, 171-174 with reference to Augustine, Faber Stapulensis and Cusanus. See also Cranz 
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 WA 57, b201, 10 – b202; 8; WA 2, 497, 13-15. See also WA 55, I, 138, 1-8; WA 55, II, 137, 1-12. In 
the first passage, which is the most central for the topic, Luther refers to Gregory the Great’s definition in 
Moralium sive Expositio in Job (PL 76, 29A-29B; 666B) that the Cherubim signify contemplation, a point 
noted as well in the footnotes of WA 57. According to Gregory, the Cherubim stand for the fullness of 
knowledge (plenitudo scientiae) and their flight, rising above that knowledge. However, Gregory does not 
mention the idea that the Cherubs unite contradictions. The latter idea, however, is central to Richard of St. 
Victor’s Benjamin major, an allegorical treatise on the Ark of the Covenant. See especially book IV chapters 
I; III; VIII (the two cherubs representing similitude and dissimilitude, the latter including things that are 
agaist reason) and XVII-XX (unity of rational and suprarational things in Trinity and Incarnation) as well as 
the appendix Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, (PL 196, 198C-199B). See also McGinn 1994, 406-
411. Luther’s other uses of the figures of the Tabernacle also show striking similarities to Richard, about 
which see p. 113 ff. 
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 See Itinerarium mentis in Deum VI, 4-6. 
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everything, and as such all in all (omnia in omnibus), come so close to Luther’s statements 
about the divine nature that they seem to be textually related.
231
 As it has been shown that 
Luther read Bonaventure’s Itinerarium during his monastery years at Erfurt, it seems 
probable that indeed Luther is here indebted to Bonaventure.
232
 The same proximity to 
Bonaventure was already noted in Luther’s ideas concerning the divine nature as the 
highest good, as well as in Luther’s statements regarding the metaphysics of light. 
Luther’s teaching concerning the nature of God, as well when it comes to God as hidden 
(deus absconditus), therefore does not stand at a great distance from the tradition of 
negative and metaphysical theology, as was claimed by the Neo-Lutherans of the early 
20
th
 century. It rather incorporates ideas from the Augustinian Platonist tradition 
represented by Richard of St. Victor, Bonaventure and Jean Gerson, against which 
Luther’s thoughts are often made represented. Both are based on the same basic idea that 
divinity transcends and reconciles categorical differences which exist in the created world, 
in a way which surpasses human reason. Luther’s idea of the hidden God does not 
therefore constitute a general rejection of ontological thinking, but only a rejection of 
certain kind of ontology based on a simplistic idea of analogia entis or an ascent to God 
by means of speculative conceptual negation. God’s hiddenness under opposites rather 
reflects Luther’s view of the essential characteristics of the divine nature as extending 
beyond itself and uniting contrary things within itself. 
2.3. Universe 
2.3.1. The Creation as a Sign 
This chapter examines Luther’s understanding of the nature of the universe (i.e., the 
created cosmos). The objects of our examination are not natural cosmological and physical 
elements, but certain theologically central features of the composition of the universe and 
their ontological or metaphysical nature. The themes we will examine are: the nature of 
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 Itinerarium mentis in Deum V, 8: “Rursus reverentes dicamus: quia igitur esse purissimum et 
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communicabilitas; ac per hoc, ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia, et hoc, quia omnipotens, 
omnisciens et omnimode bonum, quod perfecte videre est esse beatum, sicut dictum est Moysi: Ego 
ostendam tibi omne bonum.” 
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 See AWA 9, LXXII-LXXIII; CXXVI-CXXVII; Rühl 1960, 81-82; Leppin 2014, 50-52. In addition, 
in the Table Talk Luther confirms that he read Bonaventure’s writings in his monastery years. His estimation 
of their value is contradictory, however, as Luther states both that Bonaventure is best of the Scholastics and 
a man full of the Holy Spirit, as well as that his mystical writings nearly made him mad. See WA Tr. 1, 72, 
26-36 (153); 302, 30 – 303, 3 (644); 330, 1-6 (683); 435, 18 – 32, 3 (871 and 872). 
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the visible creation as sign of the invisible; the different types of acts and works of God in 
the universe; and the transformation the universe is undergoing from the state of the old 
visible creation to the state of invisible, New Creation. These themes form central ideas of 
Luther’s understanding of reality with regard to the created world as a whole. 
When dealing with Luther, the term ‘metaphysical’ itself can only be used with care 
and some qualification. In his article Luther and Metaphysics: What Is the Structure of 
Being according to Luther Sammeli Juntunen points to the general anti-metaphysical and 
anti-ontological tendencies both in much of Luther research and in Luther himself.
233
 
Luther’s theology is laced with the criticism of Aristotelian-Thomistic substance 
metaphysics, which has often led to the claim that Luther’s thought is inherently anti-
ontological. However, Luther’s criticism of Aristotle has a reverse side. In precisely the 
same passages in which Luther unleashes his most harsh criticism of Aristotle, one can 
also discern central principles of his own metaphysical thought.
234
 Luther writes in the 
Dictata super Psalterium: 
There is more philosophy and wisdom in this verse ‘I will open my mouth in parables’ 
than if Aristotle had written a thousand Metaphysics. This is because through it it is 
learned that every visible creature is a parable and full of mystical instruction, according to 
how the Wisdom of God arranges all things beautifully and all things are made in wisdom. 
Every creature of God is a word of God ‘For he spoke, and they were made’. Therefore 
creatures are to be beheld as utterances of God. Therefore to fix the heart in created things 
is to fix it in the sign instead of the reality, which is God alone. ‘The invisible things of 
God are understood from these works’, Romans 1.235  
Luther’s text contains important points regarding his perception of the structure of 
reality. First, all things are made through the Wisdom of God and are his ‘words’ (verba) 
or ‘utterances’ (locutiones). Thus they reflect and in some way also exist in the wisdom of 
God. Second, because of this, visible things are signs, signs “full of mystical instruction”. 
The visible world reflects the invisible and points to it. Therefore it is not the ultimate 
reality but a sign pointing to a reality outside of itself. That reality to which it points is 
God.
236
 Luther writes: 
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 On the definition of metaphysics, see van Inwagen 2010. While Luther does not seem to be especially 
interested in definite substances and quiddities or the qualities, relations and predicates thereof (and indeed 
seems to understand ‘metaphysics’ as a term mostly pertaining to these), he deals in his writings with other 
questions that are commonly considered metaphysical both in classical and in modern sense, such as: first 
and final causes, the relationships of changing and unchanging things and the nature of certain other 
categories of being (espc. acts and works, acta et facta). 
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 WA 55, II, 535, 33 – 536, 41: “[33] Plus philosophie et sapientie est in isto versu: ‘Aperiam in 
parabolis [34] os meum’, quam si mille metaphysicas Scripsisset Aristoteles. Quia hinc [35] discitur, quod 
omnis creatura visibilis est parabola et plena mystica eruditione, [36] secundum quod sapientia Dei disponit 
omnia suauiter et omnia [37] 3, 561 in | sapientia facta sunt, Omnisque creatura Dei verbum Dei est: ‘Quia 
[38] ipse dixit, et facta sunt.’ Ergo Creaturas inspicere oportet tanquam locutiones [39] Dei. Atque ideo 
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 See also WA 55, II, 511, 148-154; 825, 723-729. On the manner in which the creation reflects the 
“Wisdom of God” as an expression of an ontology of participation, see chapter 2.2.3. 
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Therefore from the literal sense you have the fruit that it teaches that creatures are not to be 
beheld absolutely, but with respect to the Creator. Like a finger, while it shows you the 
creature it at the same time leads you to its creator, saying: ‘you have made them, you send 
them away watering them’ etc. ⌈⌈So that you would praise God in all things and not thank 
luck.⌉⌉ No human philosophy or wisdom does this, they only seek the quiddities, as it is 
said.
237
  
The ultimate problem in what Luther calls “human wisdom” and “human philosophy” 
is that Luther sees it as only interested in this-worldly things, the quiddities and qualities 
of the present creatures. It lacks the perspective of God, considering the created things 
only in themselves, not as signs pointing to God. Luther deals with this problematic 
character of philosophy in length at his Lecture on Romans: 
The expectation of the Creation [8,19] 
The Apostle thinks and philosophizes in a different way about things than the philosophers 
and metaphysicians, for the philosophers submerge their eyes in such manner into present 
things, that only their quiddities and qualities are speculated on, whereas the Apostole 
recalls our eyes from the looking at present things, their essence and accidents, and directs 
them to those according to which they are future things. He does not say ‘essence’ or 
‘working’ of the creature, or ‘act’ or ‘passion’ or ‘movement’, but in a new and marvelous 
vocabulary and theology says: ‘the expectation of the Creation’, so that when the mind 
hears the expectation of the creature it would not most in all stretch out to and seek the 
creature, but that which the creature expects. But woe!, so deeply and harmfully do we 
remain in predicaments and quiddities, that we are enveloped by stupid opinions in 
metaphysics. When do we understand and see that in doing so we lose precious time and 
are lost in futile studies and neglect the better things? Always we act so that what Seneca 
says pertains to us: ‘We ignore the necessary when we study the superfluous, even ignore 
the helpful when we study the damnable.’ 
I believe that I owe to the Lord the service to bark against philosophy and advocate the 
Holy Scripture. Should someone who has not seen it do so, he might fear to act so or he 
might not be believed. But I have consumed many years in such things and having 
experienced and heard much of it, I see how it is a study in futility and perdition. Therefore 
I admonish you all as far as I can that you would do its studies quickly, and only seek it in 
order not to establish it and defend it, but rather as we study evil arts in order to destroy 
them, and errors in order to disprove them. Let us then [also study] this so that we might 
reject it, or undertake it in order that we could apply its manner of speech when discussing 
with them with whom it is necessary. For the time has namely come when we should 
surrender other studies and only study Jesus Christ, and ‘him crucified’. 
Therefore you become the best philosophers, the best speculators of things, if you learn 
from the Apostle to see the Creation as expecting, groaning, being in labour, i.e., loathing 
that which it is, and desiring that, which in the future | not yet | is, then | for | soon 
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 WA 55, II, 822, 637-642: “[637] Vnde et ex litera hunc habes fructum, Quod Creaturas non absolute, 
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diminishes the science of quiddities, accidents and differences of things. Therefore the 
stupidity of the philosophers is similar to one who helps the tentmaker and admires the 
cutting of the trunks and poles and contently settles to their chopping and pruning, having 
no curiosity as to what the tentmaker is going to make out of all these. That man is 
pointless and the work of such a worker only serves futility. So also the Creation of God, 
which is continually prepared for future glory, is by the fools only examined with regard to 
how it appears, but never with respect to its end. Do we not therefore clearly speak 
deliriously when we ponder the praise and fame of philosophy? We keep the science of the 
essences, workings and passions of the things in high value, but the things themselves 
disdain their essences, workings and passions and groan! We rejoice and take pride in such 
science which they themselves grieve and disdain. Or has not he who, when he sees one 
who cries and laments, laughs and boasts to have seen the same as joyful become himself 
laughable? Such a person is deservedly called mad and a maniac. It would be at least 
tolerable if the rough masses would foolishly esteem this as worthwhile and not aspire to 
understand the sighs of created things, but now even the wise and the theologians infected 
by this ‘wisdom of the flesh’ imbibe joyful science from miserable things and, ridiculing 
the things that sigh, gather together most extraordinary thoughts. 
Therefore the Apostle rightly speaks against philosophy in Col. 3: ‘Make sure, that no one 
would deceive you by philosophy and empty fallacy which follow human traditions.’ 
Certainly the Apostle would not have condemned philosophy so absolutely, if he had 
wished it to be understood as something useful and good. Therefore, we conclude that 
whoever rather examines the essences and workings of the creatures rather than | their | 
sighs and expectations is without a doubt stupid and blind and does not know, that 
creatures are creatures. This is sufficiently clear from the text.
238
 
                                                 
238
 WA 56, 371, 1 – 372, 25: “[1] Nam Expectatio Creature  [8, 19]. [2] Aliter Apostolus de rebus 
philosophatur et sapit quam philosophi [3] et metaphysici. Quia philosophi oculum ita in presentiam rerum 
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quibus conuersari necesse est, accipiamus. Tempus est enim, vt aliis [27] studiis mancipemur et Ihesum 
Christum discamus, ‘et hunc crucifixum’. 
[28] Igitur optimi philosophi, optimi rerum speculatores fueritis, Si ex [29] Apostolo didiceritis 
Creaturam intueri expectantem, gementem, parturientem [30] i. e. fastidientem id, quod est, et cupientem id, 
quod futura [31] | nondum | est. tunc | enim | cito vilescet Scientia quidditatis rerum [32] et accidentium ac 
differentiarum. Vnde philosophorum stultitia similis [33] est ei, Qui Scenofactori assistens miratur lignorum 
et asserum sectiones, [1] dolationes et putationes iisque stulte contentus quiescit, nihil curans, [2] quid 
Scenofactor tandem iis omnibus operibus suis facere disponat. [3] Vanus iste est et vanitati seruit opus huius 
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Luther’s text illustrates how Luther sees philosophy and metaphysics. They deal with 
the nature of created things as present things, only as the things themselves, and only as 
they exist in their present but not in their future state in the grand scheme of the works of 
God. Therefore these disciplines have some limited use in disproving errors and enabling 
one to participate in academic philosophical discussion, but according to Luther no great 
time and effort should be devoted to their study. According to Luther, the joyful science of 
theology should not be derived from the results of the examinations that concern creatures 
in their present sorrowful state. (The target of Luther’s criticism here seems to be the use 
of Aristotelian concepts in solving theological questions, as the Scholastics did). Rather, 
Luther stresses that the eyes should be directed to the “expectation” (expectatio) of the 
creatures, to that with respect to which they (already in some way) are future things. The 
creatures should be observed with respect to their end, beheld as creatures – which 
implies the Creator.  
The question arises, however: what is the exact relation between the creatures in their 
present state and the invisible reality they point to? What is the exact relation between the 
expectation and its fulfillment, between the sign and the signified? This question can be 
answered in detail only after we have discussed the distinctions Luther makes between 
different kinds of works and deeds of God. For now, it is sufficient to outline the principle 
that Luther considers all created things (as well as the works of God during the Old 
Covenant) as transitory signs. Luther summarizes his view in his scholia to Ps. 63: 
Because all the works of creation and of the old law are signs of the works of God, which 
he does and will do in Christ and his saints, therefore those in the past are all signs which 
are fulfilled in Christ. For all of them are transitory, signifying those, which are eternal and 
permanent. These are works of truth while the others are all shadows and figurative works. 
Therefore Christ is the end and center of them all, to which they all look and point, as if 
they were saying: Look, he is the one who is, we are not, we merely signify. Therefore the 
Jews are accused in Ps. 27 of that they did not understand the works and did not have 
understanding in them, that is, they did not behold the works of the old law intellectually, 
but only carnally, not as signs and arguments of things, but as things themselves. But what 
is understood is invisible, wholly different from that which is seen. Therefore, the Apostles 
proclaimed the works of God (namely as realized in Christ) and from them understood his 
deeds, that is, things which were in the past and in the creation, namely understanding that 
                                                                                                                                                   
operarii. Sic et Creatura [4] Dei, que  paratur assidue ad futuram gloriam, ab insipientibus solum [5] aspicitur 
in apparatu eiusmodi et nequaquam in fine. Nonne ergo [6] insigniter delyramus, Quando philosophie  , 
Laudes et preconia meditamur? [7] Ecce nos Scientiam de essentiis et operationibus et passionibus rerum [8] 
pretiose estimamus, et res ipse essentias suas et operationes et passiones [9] fastidiunt et gemunt! Nos de 
scientia illius gaudemus et gloriamur, [10] Quod de seipso tristatur et sibiipsi displicet! An non furit, queso, 
[11] qui flentem et lamentantem videns ridet et gloriatur se videre velut [12] Iucundum et ridentem? 
Phreneticus vtique ac Maniacus hic merito [13] vocatur. Et quidem Si rudis populus he  c ita stulte aliquid 
esse e  stimaret [14] Et nesciret rerum suspiria intelligere, tolerabile esset. Nunc vero Sapientes [15] et 
theologi eadem ‘prudentia Carnis’ infecti in rebus | tristantibus | iucundam [16] scientiam hauriunt Et de 
suspirantibus ridentes congerunt cognitiones [17] Mira potentia. 
[18] Igitur Recte Colos. 3. Apostolus contra philosophiam loquitur dicens: [19] ‘Videte, ne quis vos 
decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam [20] secundum traditionem hominum.’ Sane Si aliquam 
Apostolus vtilem et [21] bonam voluisset intelligi philosophiam, non vtique absolute eam damnasset. [22] 
Concludamus Itaque, Quod Qui Creaturarum essentias et [23] operationes potius scrutatur quam suspiria et 
expectationes [24] | earum |, sine dubio stultus et ce  cus est, Nesciens etiam [25] Creaturas esse creaturas. 
Patet satis ex textu.” 
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the works of Christ were prefigured and signified in those ancient works. For the sign is 
then understood perfectly, when the reality itself is seen.
239
 
According to Luther all the works of the Creation and the old law point as signs to 
Christ, who is the reality behind them. They are transitory things, shadow and figure, 
whereas Christ is the truth, their center and their end. In relation to Christ, the created 
things merely signify. They do not exist in a permanent manner (‘nos autem non sumus, 
sed significamus tantum’).240 Therefore they are not to be taken as “things themselves” 
(res ipsas), which is exactly the point Luther criticizes in philosophy. Luther’s text, 
although it follows the reasoning behind his rejection of metaphysics, is in fact thoroughly 
metaphysical and quite Platonic. This becomes obvious by the stark contrast between the 
visible creation and the invisible divine reality. According to Luther, the reality which the 
created things as signs point to is “invisible, wholly different from that which is seen”. It 
is described as being eternal and permanent, in contrast to the transitory nature of created 
things. Therefore it is clear that the signification of the created things does not primarily 
point to the incarnate Christ (though also that aspect is included as will be seen later), but 
its focus is on Christ as the Wisdom of God, the center and end signified and reflected by 
all creation.
241
 This signification can however only be seen by the intellectual light, which 
itself has been lost in the Fall. After the Fall, human beings have become stupid and blind, 
focusing only on the creatures themselves, not on them as pointing to God.
242
 Thus 
Luther’s metaphysical ideas concerning the relation of the visible and invisible reality 
seem to follow the basic idea of Platonic Logos Christology, in which Christ is seen as the 
instrument and end of creation, and the creation is understood to be ordered after and 
reflecting the wisdom and logic of Christ as the eternal Word and Logos.
243
 One can find 
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 WA 55, II, 342, 126-140: “Quia omnia opera Creationis et veteris legis signa sunt [127] operum Dei, 
que  in Christo et suis sanctis facit et faciet, et ideo in Christo [128] illa preterita tanquam signa omnia 
implentur. Nam omnia illa sunt transitoria, [129] significantia ea, que sunt e  terna et permanentia. Et hec sunt 
opera [130] veritatis, illa autem omnia vmbra et opera figurationis. Ideo Christus finis [131] omnium et 
centrum, in quem omnia respiciunt et monstrant, ac si dicerent: [132] Ecce iste est, qui est, nos autem non 
sumus, Sed significamus tantum. [133] Vnde Iude  i arguuntur Psal. 27. quod non intellexerunt opera et in 
[134] opera, i. e. opera in veteri lege non intellectualiter aspiciebant, Sed tantum [135] carnaliter, non vt 
signa et argumenta rerum, Sed res ipsas. Quia [136] quod intelligitur, Inuisibile est ab eo, quod videtur, aliud 
longe. Vnde [137] Apostoli Annunciauerunt opera Dei (scil. in Christo facta) et exinde Intellexerunt [138] 
facta eius, i. e. res preteritas in gestis et creationis, scil. intelligentes, [139] quoniam ista opera Christi in illis 
olim sint figurata et significata. [140] Quia tunc perfecte intelligitur signum, quando res ipsa signi videtur.” 
240
 On Christ as the content of all external things see also Nilsson 1966, 159-161. Nilsson does not, 
however, connect the idea to Platonist ontology. 
241
 See also WA 55, I, 486 gloss 7, 4-10: “Et sic iterum [5] hic distinctio oritur inter opera et opera Dei. 
Quia opera significatiua sunt [6] creatio totius mundi et omnia figuralia veteris legis, ‘facta’ autem sunt [7] 
impletiones eorundem, quod in Christo inceptum est impleri et nunc [8] Impletur et in fine implebitur.        
Et ideo dixit Dominus: ‘Cum exaltatus [9] fuero, omnia traham ad me’. Quia ipse finis omnium et res 
significata per [10]omnes res.” 
WA 55, I, 546, gloss 5: “GLOSSA:5) Creatio rerum corporalium Est initium et figura et vmbra 
redemptionis et spiritualium rerum, que sunt finis illarum, sine quibus sunt vane  ille; ideo assumantur pro 
parabolis spiritualium.” 
242
 In addition to the text in footnote 238, see WA 55, II, 801, 51-60; 825, 723-729; WA 56, 11, 12 – 12, 
15. 
243
 One can ask, however, if there is a tension between Luther’s rejection of the idea of analogia entis 
(see chapter 2.2.4.3) and his idea of the creation as a sign of God. It would seem that this tension can be 
resolved by recourse to Luther’s statement that the sign is only understood perfectly when the reality it 
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remarks quite similar to those of Luther about the nature of created things as signs and 
criticism of focus on natural philosophy from other medieval writers representing the 
tradition of Augustinian Christian Platonism.
244
 
2.3.2. The Works of God 
The basic difference between visible things and invisible spiritual things rests on Luther’s 
distinction between the Old Creation and the New Creation. In Dictata super Psalterium 
in the course of his exposition of Ps. 27 Luther first makes a fundamental distinction 
between two types of works (opera) of God: acta (i.e., deeds, things done, actions), and 
facta (i.e., things made, products).
245
 This distinction between products (facta) and deeds 
(acta) of God resembles the Aristotelian distinction between poiesis and praxis, where the 
former is action that produces something external, and the latter action that has an end in 
itself – e.g. making an artefact vs. moving the feet to walk.246 What is important here is 
that Luther argues that God works in two different manners: by creating external works 
from nothing, and by acting through those works. The deeds of God (acta) are events that 
pass and have no existence; the products (facta) on the other hand persist for a duration of 
time and have at least some degree of existence in themselves as agents in their own right. 
God (and his action in creation and preservation of these external works) is the primary 
cause of everything, and the works themselves are secondary causes of that which 
happens.
247
 However, with respect to the topic at hand the most important feature of 
Luther’s ontology is the idea that not only the works of the first creation are facturae or 
                                                                                                                                                   
points to is seen. Thus, while the visible creation is a sign of God, its signification cannot be properly 
understood without some kind of grasp of the thing signified by it. Because the divine intellectual light has 
waned in humanity after the Fall (see footnote 218), the signification of the Creation can no longer be 
understood, although the Creation still remains a sign objectively. This would seem to imply that Luther 
understands the relation between the sign and the signified causally and not cognitively (as a vestigium or 
imprint), independent of the ability of the observer to notice it. See also Grane 1997, 171-173. 
244
 On signs, see Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis  I, 5-6 (PL 176, 185A-185D) and Augustine’s De 
doctrina Christiana, I, 2. Simlar critical remarks regarding the ill-fated curiosity of natural philosophy can 
be found in Hugh. See De arca noe morali IV, 6 (PL 176, 672B-627C). 
245
 WA 55, 158, 26 – 159, 17: “[26] 27, 4.5 ⌈Primo⌉ Et recte dicit opera et opera manuum. Quia ‘opera 
manuum’ [27] sunt, que manu fieri solent, vt figuralia et artificiata et effecta [1] seu facta. ‘Opera’ autem 
etiam aliorum organorum sunt vt oculorum, [2] 3, 156 pedum. Quare sola | ‘manuum opera’ exprimunt 
factibilia. Alia autem [3] sunt agibilia. Sic similiter ad Deum eodem modo: ‘opera Dei’ sunt [4] agibilia vel 
acta ipsa, ‘opera’ autem ‘manuum’ sunt factilia seu facta [5] ⌈⌈infra Psal. 63⌉⌉. Quia Deus omnia facit et cum 
omnibus agit, et opera [6] eius sunt vsus factorum, quia illis vtitur in operibus suis, in factis autem [7] nullo 
vtitur. Sicut et homo factis vtitur ad operandum. Et aliud est [8] agere et facere in homine. ⌈⌈Ideo facta 
dicuntur ‘opera manuum’ eius [9] et alia tantum ‘opera’ eius, quia ibi manus nostra ei cooperatur.⌉⌉ 
Corol⌊larium. [10] ‘Manus’ in scripturis frequentius significat facta quam [11] acta, vtraque tamen opera 
sunt, ‘pedes’ autem significant acta, vt ‘pes [12] enim meus stetit in via recta.’ Et ‘in factis manuum tuarum 
meditabar.’[13] ⌈Secundo⌉ Est et alia differentia illorum, Quia acta transeunt et [14] sunt nullius existentie, 
facta autem perstant; vnde Recte Ecclesia et [15] Incarnatio Christi sunt facta Dei, et opera eorum Seu acta 
eius sunt [16, 17] opera Dei. Vt supra: ‘Annunciauerunt opera Dei et facta eius intellexerunt.’” 
It is somewhat difficult to distinguish among these three in English, but I have opted to use the above 
translations in this chapter. 
246
 See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (EN) VI, 4 (1140a). 
247
 WA 55, II, 156, 3-6; 342, 122-124; 823, 671-673. See also Juntunen 1996, 158-160; Juntunen 1998, 
142-143. 
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products (having semi-permanent existence), but also that the works of the New Creation 
(i.e., the Church) are as well. This distinction is fundamental for Luther’s division between 
the visible and invisible world: 
Man will go forth to his work etc. It has often been said about the works (opera) of God 
that they are twofold, namely, things made (facta) and things done (acta). But through acts 
(acta) products (facta) come into existence. First of all about Christ, whose action (opus 
actionis) was evangelizing, but the product (opus factionis) was the Church, which he 
constituted through his action. What was said above can however be applied to both: 
‘From the fruits of your works (opera)’, that is, of those two, ‘the Earth is filled’, because 
the Earth is filled with believers of Christ through the fruit of his action (actionis) and 
product (factionis). And Ps. 27: ‘Because they did not have understanding in the works 
(opera) of the Lord and in the works (opera) of his hands’. Therefore because it is said in 
the future tense: ‘Man will go forth’ and Is. 66 says: ‘these things are made (facta)’, it is 
obvious that it is said of invisible things. So also Ps. 76: ’I will remember the work 
(operum) of the Lord’ i.e., action (actionum), ‘and will meditate in all of your works 
(operibus)’, i.e., products (factorum). Therefore it is to be noted, that the world or creation 
is twofold:  
1. Visible, which he first made and then acts and works with. Here the product (factura) is 
before working (operatio). For he who made them acts (agit) with every creature. 
Therefore also these works (opera) of the creatures are rightly called ‘works (opera) of the 
Lord’ just as the creature itself is a work (opus) of his hands.  
2. Invisible, intelligible through faith is the Church, which is called new Heaven and New 
Earth. And here the products (factura) of God are the Apostles, prophets, teachers as in 1. 
Cor. 12 as the integral elements of this world and the works (opera) of his hands, or 
products (facta) he makes. But the works (opera) or acts (acta), with which he has made 
(fecit) these are the works (opera) of virtues and especially preaching. This is because the 
Word of God is the instrument, working through which he made this work (facturam), as it 
is said: ‘The Heavens are made firm with the Word of the Lord’ etc. just as the first 
creation is made (facta) with the Word of God as the medium of action.
248
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 WA 55, II, 823, 671 – 824, 697: “[671] 103, 23 4, 189 Exibit homo ad opus suum et etc. Sepissime 
dictum est de operibus [672] Dei, quomodo sint duplicia, scil. facta et acta. Sed per acta proueniunt [673] 
facta. Et primum de Christo, Cuius opus actionis fuit Euangelisare, Sed [674] opus factionis fuit Ecclesia, 
quam constituit per opus actionis sue  . De vtroque [675] autem intelligi potest supradictum ‘De fructu 
operum tuorum’, scil. [676] istorum duorum, ‘satiabitur terra’, Quia terra repleta est fidelibus Christi [677] 
per fructum actionis et factionis eius. Et Psal. 27.: ‘Quoniam non intellexerunt [678] opera Domini et in 
opera manuum eius’. Igitur cum hic per futurum [679] dicat: ‘Exibit’, et Isaie 66. dicat: ‘facta sunt he  c’, 
patet, quod de inuisibilibus [680] loquitur. Sicut et Psal. 76.: ‘Memor fui operum Domini’, i. e. [681] 
actionum, ‘Et meditabor in omnibus operibus tuis’, scil. factorum. Quare [682] notandum, Quod duplex est 
mundus  
[683]              { Visibilis, quem prius fe  cit et deinde cum illo egit et operatur.  
[684]              { Hic enim prius est factura quam operatio. Nam cum  
[685]              { omni creatura agit, qui fe  cit eam. Nam et he  c opera  
[686]              { creature recte ‘opera Domini’ dicuntur, sicut ipsa quoque  
[687]              { est opus manuum eius. 
 
[688]              { Inuisibilis, intelligibilis per fidem Est Ecclesia, que vocatur  
[689]              { nouum celum et noua terra. Et hic sunt facture Dei  
[690] seu Creatura: { Apostoli, prophete, doctores, 1. Corin. 12., sicut partes integrales  
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In Luther’s view there are two creations: the visible world and the invisible. Both are 
made by the Word of God. But Luther understands the nature of the invisible world in a 
quite peculiar manner: It is the Church and its believers which are the “New Creation”. 
The Church is the invisible and intellectual World, in which the faithful already participate 
by faith. This view is not mere allegory for Luther, but the Church in its proper nature is 
invisible, and as is the case with the other works of God, the invisible is more properly 
real than the visible, which is passing away. In the Church Militant the Church’s proper 
nature is still hidden, and its invisible nature is concealed by its visible form. However, in 
the future glory that which is hidden will become manifest. Luther thus perceives the 
works of God as a continuous process which began in the first creation and leads towards 
the New Creation.
249
 Luther’s distinction between the two creations resembles somewhat 
the distinction, important for Hugh of St. Victor, between opera conditionis or the works 
of creation and opera restaurationis, the works of salvation. In Hugh’s theology the two 
also stand in close relation to the distinction between the visible and invisible world.
250
 
                                                                                                                                                   
[691]              { huius mundi Et opera manuum eius seu facta,  
[692]              { que fecit. Sed opera seu acta, quibus ista fe  cit, Sunt  
[693]              { opera virtutum et maxime predicationis. Quia verbum  
[694]              { Dei est Instrumentum, quo operans effecit istam facturam,  
[695]              { sicut ait: ‘Verbo Domini ce  li firmati sunt’ etc. Sicut  
[696]              { et prima creatio verbo Dei facta est velut medio  
[697]              { actionis.” 
249
 WA 55, I, 880-882 gloss 8, 1-6: “GLOSSA:8 [1]Opera dei sunt duplicia: primo, facta seu creata; 
Secundo, operationes [2]in illis factis. Sicut differunt agere et facere, agibilia et factibilia, acta [3]et facta, 
actus et facture  . Et si versus loquitur de primo et visibili mundo, [4]tunc sensus est, Quod in illis Actis et 
factis mystice intellexerit acta et [5]facta noui et spiritualis mundi, que est Ecclesia. Cuius facture sunt  [6] 
singuli fideles creati in Christo, Eph. 2. et Iaco. 1.” 
WA 55, II, 156, 18-23: “[18] Arguit ergo eos hic propheta, Quod Intelligentiam ‘operum Dei’ [19] non 
habent, i. e. ignorant et ignorare volunt Iustitiam Dei et suam [20] statuere querunt. Similiter ‘opera manuum 
eius’, Ecclesiam, que est [21] ‘noua creatura’ Dei, ‘non intelligunt’, i. e. non credunt. Sed nec opera [22] 
prioris creature Intelligunt, Sicut Isaie  66.: ‘Que  est ista Domus’ etc. [23] ‘facta sunt hec, dicit Dominus.” 
WA 55, II, 401, 516-518: “Secundo in gratuitis perceptis, scil. sacramentis et bonis [517] Ecclesie, Que  
non minus tibi ministrat, quam totus mundus, cum ipsa sit [518] mundus quidam intellectualis.” 
WA 55, II, 718, 2-17: “[2] Licet autem de operibus creationis possit exponi, Aptius tamen exponitur [3] 
de noua creatione, que  est Ecclesia in Christo. Eph. 2.: ‘Ipsius enim [4] factura sumus creati in operibus 
bonis’ etc. Et Galat. 6.: ‘In Christo enim [5] Ihesu neque circuncisio aliquid valet neque preputium, Sed noua 
creatura.’ [6] Et Iacob. 1.: ‘Vt simus initium aliquod creature  eius.’ Apoc. 21.: ‘Ecce [7] noua facio omnia.’ 
Et quod hec sit intentio psalmi, patet ex hoc:[8] 91, 3 Primo Quia misericordiam et veritatem dicit opera 
ista esse, que [9] nuncianda et laudanda sunt. Sed misericordia et veritas sunt de noua [10] creatura. [11] 91, 
7 Secundo Quia dicit, quod Insipiens ipsa non cognoscet. Quod exinde [12] fit, Quia opera et factura 
Christi Ecclesia non apparet aliquid esse foris, [13] Sed omnis structura eius est intus coram Deo Inuisibilis. 
Et ita non [14] oculis carnalibus, Sed spiritualibus in intellectu et fide cognoscuntur. Insipientes [15] autem 
eam contemnunt, Quia sapiunt tantummodo speciosa foris, [16] vt sequitur: Cum exorti fuerint, q. d. factura 
tua non apparet ita et floret, [17] sicut illi volunt florere. ⌈Et ideo Schandalisantur et offenduntur in il[la].⌉” 
WA 57, b197, 20-23: “Tertio alii cum Apostolo hoc loco [21] tabernaculum intelligunt mundum 
quendam spiritualem, quae est Ecclesia [22] sancta Dei. Et ita [sanctum] sanctorum est Ecclesia triumphans, 
sanctum [23] Ecclesia militans, atrium Synagoga” 
See also WA 55, I, 684 gloss 5; WA 55, II, 510, 103-111; WA 2, 614, 28-36. 
250
 See especially De arca noe morali IV, 7 (PL 176, 672D): “Sicut duo opera, id est opera conditionis, et 
opera restaurationis distinximus, ita duos mundos esse intelligamus visibilem, et invisibilem. Visibilem 
quidem hanc machinam universitatis, quam corporeis oculis cernimus, invisibilem vero cor hominis, quod 
videre non possumus.” See also De sacramentis I, 2; 28. Luther might refor to Hugh by name in the Dictata 
at WA 55, I, 676 gloss 4 when discussing the difference between temporal and spiritual goods, so there may 
be some relationship. It is however ambiguous which Hugh Luther is referring to. The editor of WA 55, I 
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According to Luther’s explanation of Ps. 76 in Dictata the works of God during the phases 
of this history of salvation can be arranged in the following way: 
However let us note what this psalm cuts open before it cuts off: ‘The works of God are 
threefold’. 
The general works are all the works of the creatures. And these have been shown to all 
people so that they should remember them, give thanks and think of God and so serve their 
Creator. For thus the Apostle argues in Romans 1 especially regarding the Gentiles. And 
also in the Old Law the holy people recount them and bless the Lord in them. 
Spiritually wonderful works are those shown to the people of Israel in Egypt, because the 
Lord wished that these would particularly be remembered, though after them he did more, 
different things. And this concerns especially the Jews, so that they would give thanks to 
God in them for the sake of the figure of future things. 
The properly spiritual works are the works of redemption and justification, because these 
are most highly designated to all Christians. The works of the glorification are contained 
under these (sub hiis comprehensa), because they have not yet taken place so that they 
could be remembered, except in Christ the Head. These namely will be the most 
wonderous of all.
251
 
Note that here Luther actually lists four different kinds of works of God. First, there 
are the works of the creation. Second, there are the spiritually wonderful works in the 
liberation of Israel, which are figures of future things. Third, there are the spiritual works 
of redemption and justification in Christ. Fourth, there are the works of glorification, 
contained and comprehended (comprehensa) under the former. These works have not yet 
come to be, except in Christ.  
The distinctions Luther makes here are connected with Luther’s method of Biblical 
interpretation and the medieval theory of the four senses of Scripture (Quadriga).
252
 In his 
interpretation of the same Psalm Luther also outlines the following distinctions concerning 
the works of God:  
1. Works of Creation;  
2. Spiritual works of the people of Israel;  
3. Works of Redemption 
                                                                                                                                                   
suggests the postill of Hugh of Saint Cher (Hugo Cardinalis), but the quotation does not contain the idea that 
the temporal things would only touch one side. 
251
 WA 55, II, 506, 3 – 507, 18: “[3] Veruntamen, Vt notemus, quod incidit, antequam excidat: Triplicia 
[4] 76, 12 sunt ‘opera Dei’. 
[5] Generalia sunt omnia opera creature. Et hec ostensa sunt [6] omnibus hominibus, vt illorum memores 
sint, gratias agant et cognoscant [7] Deum ac sic seruiant creatori earum. Sic enim Apostolus Ro. 1. disputat, 
[8] precipue tamen gentibus. Vnde et in vet⌊eri lege sancti sepius ea allegant [9] et benedicunt in illis 
Dominum. 
[10] Spiritualiter sunt opera mirabilia populo Israel ostensa in [11] Egypto. Quia illa voluit Dominus 
singulariter memorari, licet postea plura [12] alia fe  cerit. Et he  c proprie pertinent ad Iude  os, vt in illis Deo 
gratias [13] agant propter figuram futurorum. 
[14] Propriissime Sunt opera spiritualia redemptionis et Iustificationis. [15] Quia he  c summe 
commendata sunt omnibus Christianis. Opera [16] autem glorificationis sunt sub hiis comprehensa, Quia 
nondum facta, vt [17] possint memorari, nisi in capite Christo. He  c enim erunt omnium mirabilissima.” 
252
 On the Quadriga in general, see Lubac 1959-64. 
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As seen before, the works of redemption contain more than merely their historical 
fulfillment in Christ. Therefore in his view they can be understood in four senses, which 
correspond to the medieval senses of Scripture: 
1. Literally, as having been realized in the person of Christ 
2. Tropologically, as taking place in the soul against the flesh 
3. Allegorically, in the world against evil 
4. Anagogically, in Heaven and Hell
253
 
 
In the same Psalm Luther lists yet a third scheme for distinguishing the works of God 
from each other: 
The works of the Lord can be distinguished in yet another way so, that the first category 
are all the ancient works of the visible creatures, whether realized naturally or through 
miracles. Second, the works of Christ done for our sake and all the works of the New 
Creation i.e., the Church ⌈or the whole New Creation, the Church⌉ which is a spiritual and 
intellectual world. Third, the works of morals and faith in accordance with God. Fourth, 
the works of the future resurrection. So the first are literal, second allegorical, third 
tropological but the fourth anagogical. All these three can be read and seen in the first, 
namely the literal ⌈by one who is spiritual⌉.254 
This third scheme resembles the second scheme summarized above, but the difference 
between them is that whereas Luther in the second scheme interprets the literal sense as 
pointing to Christ, here he refers to the visible creation and miracles as the literal sense. 
The difference between them seems to be accounted for by the consideration that Luther 
uses the term “literal” (litera, literalis) in two ways. It can first point to the letter as 
opposed to the spirit, in which case the literal and historical works are the Creation and the 
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 WA 55, II, 509, 61-73:  
“{Primo opera Creationis 
  
{Secundo opera 
  
{spiritualia populi 
  
{Israel 
  
{Tercio opera 
 
{Primo literaliter in Christo personaliter 
{redemptionis, 
 
{facta 
 
Et hec {Secundo Tropolo⌊gice eadem in 
 
quadrupliciter {anima contra carnem 
  
{Tercio Allegorice in mundo contra 
  
{malos 
  
{Quarto Anagogice in celo et et 
  
{inferno.” 
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 WA 55, II, 510, 103-111: “[103] Bl 122 Possunt et aliter distingui opera Domini, Vt primum 
membrum [104] sint omnia opera creature visibilia siue in natura siue miraculo olim facta. [105] 3, 533 | 
Secundum opera Christi pro nobis facta et totius creature  noue  [106] i. e. Ecclesie ⌈Vel tota noua creatura 
Ecclesia⌉, que est mundus Spiritualis [107] et intellectualis.        Tercium opera Moralia et fidei secundum 
Deum facienda. [108] Quartum opera future  resurrectionis. Et ita prima sunt litera, [109] Secunda allegoria, 
Tercia Tropolo⌊gia, Quarta autem Anagogia. [110] Vnde et in primis, scil. literalibus, omnia ista tria legere 
[111] et videre potest ⌈qui spiritualis est⌉.” 
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Law which do not contain the spirit. Second, it can point to the literal as historical, in 
which case the properly spiritual (but at the same time historical) works of Christ in 
redemption constitute the first spiritual sense of Scripture.
255
 Thus Luther in the 
Commentary on Galatians (1516/17) reduces the four senses to two – the letter and the 
spirit – while still intermittently continuing to distinguish among the four different 
senses.
256
  
Returning to the works of God, the above three schemes of Luther can be summarized 
into one as follows: First all three include the works of the visible creation. Then Luther 
names the miraculous spiritual works accomplished during the liberation from Egypt, 
which are figures of future things. Third, there are the properly spiritual works of 
redemption begun in Christ, which constitute the beginning of the New Creation. Under 
these works of redemption are hidden the works of the fourth kind, the future glory. In 
addition we can note two principles of interpretation. First, for Luther the visible creation 
and the Old Testament bear witness to the spiritual works of redemption in Christ. Second, 
this relationship can however only be understood by the spiritual person in Christ, because 
the spiritual senses of the scripture open only through Christ. The defining criterion 
among these stages of the Creation and the New Creation is that the creation and miracles 
performed on behalf of Israel point to Christ as signs of absent things. They do not contain 
the reality to which they point, but are empty and transitory.
257
 Of these signs the created 
world is a general sign, known to all. The miracles of Israel, on the other hand, are a 
specific sign of promised future things, a sign known only to Israel. This latter sign can be 
called spiritual because it refers to specific spiritual things and is an image of them, but it 
is not properly spiritual because it does not yet grant the things to which it points.
258
 
Therefore both are visible signs pointing to the invisible, but neither one gives that which 
they point to. Thus they can also be considered as one single stage, separate from the New 
Creation by being a sign the content of which is absent. The New Creation of the invisible 
world begins in Christ and the works of the Apostles and is actualized in the Church. 
Therefore, the things of the Church are properly spiritual effective signs or means of grace 
which participate in and communicate the reality to which they point. However, in the 
Church Militant this invisible reality is still hidden.
259
 In the works of Glory (in the 
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 The same basic idea is expressed by Grane 1997, 176-178. According to Steinmetz 1980 Nicholas of 
Lyra, whom Luther often refers to, used a double literal sense: literal-historical and literal-prohetic. 
According to the latter also the Christological reading of the Psalm can be called the historical sense. 
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 See WA 55, I, 2-4; 343, 145-155; WA 55, II, 904, 375-382; WA 57, a95, 22 – a96, 25; WA 2, 550, 17 
– 552, 19.  
257
 WA 55, I, 468-469 gloss 7; 547 glosses  5-6; WA 55, II, 342, 126-140; 822, 628-641. 
258
 WA 57, a69, 1-6; a96, 15-20. 
259
 WA 55, II, 247, 201-208: “Quia illud est officium legis, hoc [202] gratie  . Lex enim non habet opera 
salutis, Sed tantum verba et signa operum [203] futurorum. Que  cum Iude  i nolint esse signa, remanent in 
lege et peccatis [204] et dicunt solum signa et vacua verba Deo; Christiani autem faciunt [205] Deo et 
implent opera legis Deo. Propheta autem, medius inter vtrosque, [206] dicit opera sua Deo. Igitur omnia 
dicta et facta legis sunt velut verba et signa [207] tantum, verba autem et facta Euangelii sunt opera et res 
ipsa significata.” 
WA 55, II, 524, 509 – 525, 524: “Necesse enim est, vt omnia opera, que in sanctis [510] operatur, sint 
magna et mirabilia, Quia sunt figurata [511] per mirabilia et magna. Quod si litera et moritura ac [512] 
transitoria fuerunt mirabilia, quanto magis eorum veritas [513] et res significate erunt mirabilis et magne  ! 
Sed Quia [514] ista fuerunt sensibilia, ideo putabantur et ore carnis [515] laudabantur. Hic autem dicit, quod 
intus de illis tractabit, scil. in spiritu, [516] spiritualia eorum intuendo, Vbi oculi carnis ea videre nequeunt. 
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Church Triumphant) the invisible reality will no longer be hidden but will be present and 
manifest.
260
 All the stages moreover share the same signatum (Christ), but the manner of 
signification differs. In the first stage, the signatum was wrapped under the deepest 
amount of figures and shadows. In the stage of the Church, the signatum is still partially 
veiled but also partially known, and the number of the signs is smaller. In the coming 
Glory the signatum is known immediately in union with the one divine Word, Christ.
261
 
Thus the relation of the stages to each other can be understood by means of a Platonist 
ontological hierarchy. All existing things contain a causal connection to their source, 
which makes them signs, but the plurality of created things increases the more 
ontologically distinct they are from their source, and their expressive power is respectively 
weakened. 
2.3.3. The Relationship of the Visible and Invisible World 
2.3.3.1 Their General Nature 
Luther’s slightly different portrayals of the works of God fall into one scheme, when one 
takes the fundamental distinction between the visible and the invisible (the Creation and 
the New Creation) as the starting point. Between these two lies the Church, in which the 
visible creation becomes a participant of the invisible. For Luther, the whole creation is a 
                                                                                                                                                   
Et [517] quid moramur? Omnia olim facta mirabilia Vsque hodie fiunt per fidem; [518] fides enim cecos 
illuminat, claudos stabilit, surdos audire facit. Sicut Dominus [519] minus In Euangelio nunquam fecit 
mirabile, nisi prius fidem illorum [520] haberet, vt scil. non solum vmbratile, Sed et verum mirabile faceret. 
[521] Sic enim Marci vlt⌊imo: ‘Signa autem eos, qui credunt in me’ Et Matt. XI.: [522] ‘Ceci vident.’ Et 
vere magnum est animam sanare et Iustificare, vt omnia [523] visibilia contemnat et celestia speret. Magna 
magnalia! Sed quia hec [524] virtus occulta est in spiritu [...]” 
See also WA 55, I, 468-469 gloss 7; WA 55, II, 341, 94 – 342, 121; 531, 686 – 532, 709; 718, 11-17; 
855, 88-96; WA 2, 530, 1-17. 
260
 WA 55, II, 1019, 121-127. 
261
 WA 55, II, 253, 370 – 254, 393: “[370] Sciendum Itaque, Quod verbum Dei triplici modo dicitur et 
reuelatur. Primo [371] a Deo patre in sanctis, in gloria et in seipso. Secundo in sanctis in hac [372] vita in 
spiritu. Tercio per verbum externum et linguam ad aures hominum. [373] Bl 59 Et sic est velut in tercium 
vas * transfusum. Et hoc est figuratum [374] per hoc, Quod olim ‘Deus locutus est in prophetis et patribus’, 
Et sic [375] mediante homine factum est velum litere  et paries medius. Postea ‘locutus [376] est in filio’; hoc 
adhuc est in velamento, Sed tamen secundum. Tandem [377] pater ipse in Ce  lo loquetur nobis in seipso, 
cum nobis verbum suum [378] ipse sine vllo medio reuelabit, vt audiamus et videamus et beati simus. [379] 
Atque sicut prima locutio multis figuris et vmbris fuit Inuoluta, [380] que omnia in vno Christo implentur et 
Inueniuntur, Quia quicquid in lege [381] tam multis verbis et factis agitur, totum vnus Christus habet in 
veritate, [382] Sic enim ‘verbum consummans et abbreuiatum fe  cit Dominus’, Vt que [383] ibi multis 
aguntur, hic vna fide scil. et Charitate expleantur et cesset [384] onerosa multitudo legum. Ita in futuro erit 
Deus idem vnusque omnia in [385] omnibus. Et tam multa, quibus nunc sub Christo etiam vtimur et egemus, 
[386] scil. gratiis et donis, que sunt per multa olim carnalia significata (Nunc [387] enim pauca sunt 
ceremonialia, immo nulla fere de necessitate Euangelii, [388] nisi 7 sacramenta, que olim erant plurima, Sed 
tamen spiritualiter ista remanent [389] et adhuc sunt multa), et tunc omnia ista pater vno nobis verbo [390] 
pre stabit, Quia ‘cum apparuerit gloria eius, tunc satiabimur’, Et tamen [391] vnico et simplicissimo verbo 
suo satiabit nos. Sicut modo in spiritu vnica [392] ceremonia, scil. sacramento, omnia tribuit, que olim 
multis carnalibus et [393] imperfecte, i. e. signo, dedit.” 
See also WA 55, I, 486 gloss 7, 4-10; WA 55, II, 119, 20 – 120, 2. 
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general sign of the invisible. However, the nature of the Church as the beginning of the 
invisible creation and as the nexus where the invisible and the visible world meet makes 
the Church a special kind of sign. For Luther, the Church is a theological sign which 
participates in the reality it signifies. Thus only at this point of the discussion, can one 
return to the question of the exact relation between the creaturely signs and the invisible 
reality signified by them. The determination of the location of the Church between the 
invisible and the visible world was necessary for the next step of the argument of this 
study. 
The fundamental distinction for Luther is between visible and invisible things. Luther 
describes their opposing nature in a very platonic fashion, but also using terms derived 
from biblical language. For Luther, the visible world and its sensible, apparent and present 
things are flowing, fluctuating and transitory, offering no solid ground (as in the parable of 
the two men who built their houses on the rock and on the sand in Matthews 7:24-27). 
They are finite; thus the one who loves them will find no permanent satisfaction in them. 
They are empty and vain by their nature, because they are not the actual reality. They are 
only a sign of that reality and its covering. As such, they cannot fill and embrace the soul. 
They merely touch the surface, and respectively the one who loves them only touches the 
surface of things, not their core. Visible and sensible goods titillate the soul and offer the 
illusion of pleasure, but provide more sorrow than enjoyment when they are consumed. 
Because they are vain and empty instead of solid, loving them is a heavy and endless 
burden. One who loves them becomes fluctuating and vain. They scatter the soul, whereas 
the spiritual and invisible goods gather and unite the soul. Thus a love of the visible things 
is analogous to a crooked path, whereas the spiritual goods offer the soul steady direction. 
Visible and sensible things are opposed to intelligible and invisible things such, that the 
former are letter and the latter, spirit. Thus visible things can only be used in a good 
manner when they are not taken for and sought as the ultimate reality. They are a figure 
and shadow of things to come, a changeable and fleeting shadow which offers no 
permanent protection. Invisible things, on the other hand, are stable and solid, immutable 
and unfailing. They are infinite and eternal, and thus offer permanent enjoyment and 
satisfaction. They are the actual reality, prefigured in many signs and hidden under visible 
things as their true content and core. They are subtle but broad, present everywhere but 
graspable only internally and spiritually. They dilate the soul, whereas the visible and 
present things contract it. They seem less tempting than the visible, but offer more 
pleasure when they are enjoyed. They offer pleasure which never ends, because they are 
not consumed when they are loved. They are solid and fill the soul with permanent 
satisfaction, gathering it into one. They are the direct way, which instructs the soul 
morally. They are spirit instead of letter, the ultimate reality instead of a sign and figure. 
They offer permanent protection and cover instead of a fleeting shadow. These invisible 
things are, in their nature, properly spiritual goods (as is also in some sense the human 
being insofar he or she is spiritual). That is, they flow from God and in their essence are 
participation in Christ the divine Word and Wisdom. Through them, the Lord himself is 
grasped and embraced.
262
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 See WA 55, I, 274 gloss 6; 520 gloss 20; 547 gloss 5; 555 gloss 29; 676 gloss 4; 680, 3-22; 681 
glosses 18-21; 684 gloss 5; WA 55, II, 66, 15 – 67, 19; 115, 16 – 116, 11; 119, 20-23; 152, 13-22; 154, 7-12; 
206, 47 – 207, 67; 213, 124 – 214, 151; 218, 98-101; 247, 223 – 248, 230; 305, 124 – 306, 137; 341, 94-100; 
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There appears to be some development, however, in Luther’s interest in the 
relationship of the visible and invisible things. Most of the discussion of their nature 
occurs in the Dictata, though the basic idea continues in Luther’s later writings.263 There 
also seems to be a change of emphasis in how Luther views this relationship. That is, 
visible things come to be contrasted by Luther to the invisible things from two slightly 
differing viewpoints. On the one hand, the visible things stand in contrast to the invisible 
things through their general nature as described above (i.e., fleeting vs. eternal, empty vs. 
solid, finite vs. infinite). On the other hand Luther often furthermore opposes the visible 
bad with the invisible good (and vice versa). Thus it is not only the general nature of 
visible things (which is in contrast to the nature of invisible, spiritual goods) that prevents 
the human being from recognizing the spiritual good. In addition the spiritual good is even 
more deeply hidden under its contraries, that is, under the visible bad (as the basic idea of 
the Theology of the Cross), so that God hiding under his contraries in the visible badness 
and suffering could be exceedingly profound and miraculous.
264
 Luther discusses the first, 
metaphysical opposition in most length at the Dictata,
265
 but the second one also occurs 
there frequently.
266
 In the later writings the latter opposition (e.g. hiddenness under 
contraries) comes to the forefront,
267
 but also the first one also remains.
268
 At the same 
time, Luther’s use of the idea of the Creation and Old Covenant as prefigurations occurs 
less, though also it continues to be used by him intermittently. This trend is connected 
with Luther’s growing suspicion, over time, towards allegory in general.269 Therefore, 
Luther’s starting position seems to be more Augustinian, but his ideas (or at least their 
treatment in the texts) develop in the direction of a more traditionally ‘Lutheran’ 
understanding.
270
 It is important to note, however, that at the same time this development 
takes place the fundamental distinction between  the spiritual and carnal and the invisible 
and visible goods, persists. The spiritual things are continuously portrayed as invisible, 
infinitely good, inexhaustible, solid, directing the soul, offering permanent joy. Now, 
however, Luther ascribes their nature  even more fundamentally only to the spiritual goods 
accessed through faith in Christ. 
                                                                                                                                                   
342, 126 – 343, 144; 427, 53-57; 495, 149-164; 622, 268-273; 626, 402 – 627, 412; 628, 430-445; 654, 306 
– 655, 323; 682, 75 – 683, 78; 687, 36 – 688, 69; 825, 723-729; 848, 225 – 849, 235; 862, 296 – 863, 310; 
879, 161-171; 949, 1650 – 950, 1682; 955, 1844 – 956, 1865; 983, 2641 – 984, 2667; 995, 2989-2999; WA 
56, 75, 9-15; 406, 16 – 407, 32; 445, 2-5; 461, 3-9; WA 57, b85, 3-7; b214, 2 – b215, 13; b228 – b229, 5; 
AWA 2, 79, 1-11; 106, 18 – 107, 13; 181, 16 – 182, 4; 206, 7 – 208, 18; WA 5, 417, 9 – 419, 21; 445, 27-38; 
541, 6-12. 
See also Hunzinger 1905, 5-8. However Hunzinger is certainly wrong when he suggests that the invisible 
reality would also have a ‘personal’ existence, except when human beings and angels are considered. 
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 As evidenced by the previous footnote. Also Joest 1967, 89-91; 100 agrees with that the use of 
terminology continues through the whole period. 
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 On God hiding under contraries see also chapter 2.2.4.3. 
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 E.g. WA 55, II, 66, 15 – 67, 19; 342, 126 – 343, 144; 628, 430-445; 654, 306 – 655, 323; 687, 36 – 
688, 69; 955, 1844 – 956, 1865. 
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 E.g. WA 55, II, 247, 223 – 248, 230; 258, 26-36; 282, 62 – 283, 83; 341, 94-111; 718, 20 – 719, 43; 
943, 1469-1480. 
267
 E.g. WA 56, 392, 17 – 393, 20; 461, 3-9; WA 2, 456, 29 – 457, 29; AWA 2, 61, 6-16; 106, 18 – 108, 
5; 178, 17 – 181, 15; WA 5, 417, 9 – 419, 21. 
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 E.g. WA 56, 406, 16 – 407, 32; AWA 2, 206, 7 – 207, 18; WA 5, 557, 19-32. 
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 E.g. WA 56, 406, 24 – 407, 2; AWA 2, 360, 8 – 361, 9; WA 5, 541, 6-17; 583, 11-21. 
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 The same development towards a more paradoxical hiddenness is noticed by Cranz 1959, 5-6; 19-21. 
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With regard to the discussion of Luther and ontology, it is also very important to note 
that Luther does not use only one category of pairs of opposites: the different opposites are 
not commensurate. He uses different pairs of opposites for different purposes. The first 
pair of opposites discussed here is properly metaphysical. They concern the composition 
of the universe: transitory and temporal vs. eternal; visible vs. invisible; stabile vs. 
fluctuating; image, shadow, sign and figure vs. truth; contracting vs. dilating; dividing vs. 
uniting. At the same time, they are theological (instead of the philosophical interest which 
Luther condemns), because the reality they describe is spiritual and divine. The second 
pair (invisible good vs. visible bad) builds upon the first. Only the contrast between the 
opposites is strengthened: The invisible reality stands not only in opposition to the visible, 
but it is dually or exceedingly hidden under contraries. 
2.3.3.2  Can they be Interpreted Non-Ontologically? 
A third pair of the opposites also exists in Luther’s thought, however. This pair is not 
metaphysical, although it is based on the distinctions of the first pair. In the case of this 
pair, the quality of the person and his or her love becomes the defining criterion. Here the 
basic concept is emptiness or vanity (vanitas): The one who loves other things instead of 
God becomes vain and empty.
271
 In his analysis of Luther’s ontology, the prominent 
scholar Gerhard Ebeling, takes this third pair of opposites as the key of interpretation and 
examines the others through it. Ebeling claims that the metaphysical attributes discussed 
above do not actually speak about the nature of things, but rather about the quality of the 
person who loves them. As such they are not ontological but, as Ebeling states, 
“existential”. Thus, in Ebeling’s view Luther does not speak about the nature of things in 
the analysed texts, but rather about the nature of the person. Luther’s criticism of 
quiddities is adduced in support this interpretation.
272
 The “metaphysical” attributes of 
things would therefore carry only a metaphorical meaning: everything outside of Christ is 
“vanity” in the sense that it has no significance for the salvation of the person.273  
An analysis of Luther’s use of ontological terms, however, suggests that Ebeling is 
mistaken in his interpretation. One can interpret Luther’s use of the idea of participation as 
Ebeling does if one does not distinguish between the first, second and third groups. 
Ebeling’s interpretation might be at least partially applicable to the terms which describe 
the quality of things, such as the concept of vanitas (the primary term Luther uses in this 
manner). It may also be valid for the adjectives fluctiating and solid. However, it cannot 
be applied to all of the aforementioned terms in the first and second groups. Most 
importantly the distinctions between sign and reality, prefiguration and its fullfillment, and 
shadow and truth do not appear to fall under Ebeling’s scheme. Luther does not use these 
terms to refer to people, but rather to created things and events of the biblical narrative, so 
that earlier events point to latter events as their sign. This fact shows that Luther’s 
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 E.g. WA 55, I, 274 gloss 6; 520 gloss 20; WA 55, II, 66, 15 – 67, 19; 305, 114 – 306, 137; 865, 13 – 
866, 28; WA 56, 12, 3-13; 178, 24 – 179, 25; 241, 1-25; 445, 1-5; AWA 2, 177, 8 – 178, 12; 291, 11 – 292, 
3; WA 5, 650, 36 – 651, 14. 
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 On this criticism in Luther’s texts, see chapter 2.3.1 
273
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terminology is more than simply personalist and existential: this category of events does 
not refer to persons at all. Rather, this category is defined by essential and temporal or 
eschatological distinctions between the empty historical sign, present hiddenness under 
contraries, and the future New Creation in which the thing signified is manifest.
274
 
Second, with regard to the third group of opposites it is true that Luther states that the 
created things are not vanitas in themselves, but are so because of the emptiness of the 
person living in them.
275
 However, Ebeling’s interpretation of the text does not take into 
account the fact that behind it lies Luther’s application of the Augustinian doctrine of love 
(i.e., the distinction between usus and fruitio). In several analogous passages Luther 
clarifies, that it is the perverse fruitio of created things as the ultimate end which is the 
problem. Created things are good in their own right when they are not taken as the 
ultimate reality (i.e., enjoyed in the sense of fruitio). They should be taken as signs and 
viewed and used with respect to the God as the ultimate end to which they point, not in 
place of him.
276
 When they are loved as if they were an ultimate end in themselves, the 
one that loves them becomes like them. Luther states that love conforms one to its object. 
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 So also Grane 1997, 170-171; 183-190. 
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 WA 55, II, 214, 98-101: “[98] Omnia vanitas. Sensus: Quod ‘omnia sunt vanitas’, non ipsorum est, 
[99] Sed hominis vane vtentis. Igitur esse vanitatis in illis est esse hominis [100] vani et vti eiusdem. Et sic 
vere omnia existentia ‘vanitas’, in quantum [101] ‘vanitas’ sunt ipse homo viuens et non ipsa.” 
Cf. Ebeling 1951, 190-191. 
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 WA 55, I, 520 gloss 20: “GLOSSA:20) [1]Mira sententia: ‘Deiecisti, dum eleuarentur’. Quia Eleuari 
hocipsum [2]est deiici. Et ‘propter dolos [3]posuisti eis’. Vel vt Hiero⌊nymus: ‘In lubrico posuisti eos’. 
Burg⌊ensis: ‘In dolis posuisti eos’. Quomodo simul stant [4]‘poni’ et ‘in lubrico’? Sensus ergo est: 
‘positionem’ eorum, qua putant se [5]firmiter stare, facis, vt sit ‘lubricum’, dolus et infida positio; ponuntur 
[6]enim secundum carnem. Sed hoc ipsum est in lubrico eos esse secundum [7]spiritum. Quare ‘propter 
dolos’, scil. falsam prosperitatem, quam sibi [8]eligunt spreta tua felicitate; ‘posuisti eis’, i. e. positionem 
dedisti ad [9]voluntatem eorum. Quia faciunt creaturam, que bona est, sibi vanam et [10]dolosam, dum eam 
sibi statuunt finem vltimum, cum sit species et figura [11]vltimi finis. Qui enim speciem pro re, picturam pro 
natura, signum pro [12]significato voluntarie aliis offert, dolum facit eis. Quod si idem sibi [13]fe  cerit, in 
seipsum quoque dolosus erit. Aug⌊ustinus: ‘fraudem patiuntur, [14]dum eligunt terrena et propter ea e terna 
relinquunt’.” 
WA 56, 178, 24 – 179, 1: “[24] Vide ergo ordinem et gradus perditionis. Primus est Ingratitudo [25] seu 
omissio gratitudinis. Sic enim Lucifer ingratus fuit Creatori suo, [26] antequam caderet. Quod facit ipsa 
complacentia sui, qua in acceptis non [27] vt acceptis delectatur pretermisso eo, qui dedit. Secundus Vanitas, 
[28] Quia scil. in seipso et in creatura pascitur et fruitur vtibili et ita necessario [29] vanus fit ‘in 
cogitationibus suis’ i. e. omnibus consiliis, studiis et Industriis. [30] Quia quicquid in iis et per he  c querit, 
totum vanum est, cum non nisi seipsum [1] Bl. 36. querat i. e. gloriam, delectationem et vtilitatem suam.” 
WA 56, 373, 27 – 374, 12: “[26] Vanitati enim subiecta est [8, 20]. [27] ‘Creature  ’ nomine hoc loco 
plurimi intelligunt hominem, Quod scil. [28] ipse cum omni creatura participat. Sed melius per ‘vanitatem’ 
intelligitur [29] homo, quemadmodum et proprie et verissime dicit psalmo 38.: [30] ‘Veruntamen Vniuersa 
vanitas omnis homo viuens.’ Verissimum enim [31] est, Quod si homo | vetus | non esset, nulla vanitas esset. 
Quia omnia, [32] que  fe  cit Deus, ‘erant valde bona’, et sunt vsque modo bona, vt Apostolus [1] 1. Timot. 4.: 
‘omnis Creatura Dei bona est.’ Et Tit. 2.: ‘Omnia munda [2] mundis.’ Fit ergo sine suo vitio et extrinsece 
vana, mala, noxia etc. Sic [3] scil., Quod opinione et erronea e  stimatione seu amore et fruitione peruersa [4] 
ab homine reputatur altius, quam est in veritate, dum homo, [5] qui Dei capax est et solo Deo saturari potest, 
| quoad mentem, spiritum, | [6] presumit in rebus hanc quietem et sufficientem habere. Huic ergo vanitati [7] 
subiecta est creatura (i. e. peruerse fruitioni), Sicut fenum in se res bona [8] Bl. 97b. et non vana est, 
Iumentis * bonum, necessarium et vtile, Sed homini [9] ad cibum est vanum et inutile, Et si in cibum 
hominis sumeretur, altius [10] et dignius haberetur, quam est sua natura. Sic faciunt omnes, qui Deum [11] 
non purissime diligunt et feruenter sitiunt. Quod facit omnis homo, [12] qui ex Adam natus est et sine spiritu 
sancto viuit.” See also AWA 2, 172, 9 – 174, 13; 177, 1 – 178, 12. 
Thus, unlike Hunzinger 1905, 10-13 claims, the temporal is not the complete opposite of the spiritual. 
When taken in the correct light they point to Christ and spiritual reality. So also Grane 1997, 171-175. 
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Therefore the person becomes empty, vain, fluctuating and divided into many. The quality 
of the object that is loved as fruitio determines the nature of the person in Luther’s 
thought, not vice versa.
277
 Thus it seems clear that Luther’s use of these concepts has an 
underlying ontological framework from which the objects’ qualities, participated in 
through love, are derived. The derived qualities such as emptiness, fluctuousity and 
plurality (vs. truth, solidity and unity) are best understood in the framework of an 
Augustinian concept of the will as movement which can find rest only when it participates 
in the eternal movement of God, from which spiritual goods flow and to whom as the 
ultimate end they direct the will.
278
 
2.3.3.3 The Three Stages as the Key: Visible Creation, Church, Heavenly Glory 
In addition to Ebeling’s personalist interpretation, Wilfrid Joest emphasizes the idea that 
the opposite pairs of concepts in Luther’s though are to be interpreted through the 
distinction of present and future things, but only in a temporal, not ontological, manner. 
Thus the invisible world that faith looks into is the future and the promises of God, not 
any spiritual ‘overworld’ (Überwelt). In such cases where Luther speaks about the 
participation of the invisible in the visible, he means that that faith already sees the present 
condition of the actual world as oriented towards the future, existentially open to the 
action of God.
279
 This reading can be supported by numerous passages in which Luther 
speaks about spes and res, spes futurorum, contemptus presentium and about faith as 
testimonium, signum and argumentum rerum non apparentium; substantia rerum 
                                                 
277
 WA 55, II, 866, 23-28: “Quia principiis et primis affectibus [24] peruersis sequitur et sequentes 
peruerti. Et hec est tota vanitas, Quod [25] amorem et timorem ponunt in temporalia, que amari et timeri non 
[26] debent. Ideo vani, immo miseri sunt; Vani quidem propter amorem, quo [27] delectantur false, Et miseri 
propter timorem, quo vexantur false.” 
WA 55, II, 879, 161-171: “[161] 113b, 8 Similes fiant illis. Prophetice dicit primo, quia non natura, Sed 
similitudine [162] fiunt et ipsi Simulachra et Idola, Zach. XIII.: ‘O pastor et Idolum’, [163] Quia vani sunt. 
He  c autem omnia facit Amor mirabilis in viribus suis, qui [164] transmutat amantem in amatum, sicut b. 
Aug⌊ustinus d⌊icit: ‘terram diligis, [165] terra es; aurum diligis, Aurum es; Deum diligis, Deus es’. [166] 4, 
264 Inde fit, Vt qui fluentia diligit, fluat, et quocunque it res, amor sequens [167] cum eo vadit. Vnde fit, vt 
cum alicui aufertur pecunia, simul capitur [168] voluntas diligentis aurum. Quia se captiuum putat et 
perditum, quando [169] aurum perditur, Seque repertum, dum aurum reperitur. Quare? Nisi [170] quia 
aurum facta est voluntas per amorem auri. Si enim non diligeret [171] aurum, potius se liberari putaret, dum 
aufertur. Sic in aliis simili modo.” 
WA 56, 240, 31 – 241, 5: “[31] Istud ‘Simul’ collectiue capitur, ac si diceret: Omnes inutiles facti [1] 
sunt i. e. Vani et inutilia sectantes. Merito enim, qui inutilia querunt, [2] et ipsi ‘inutiles’ fiunt, Vani a vanis, 
sicut diuites a diuitiis, sic illi inutiles [3] ab inutilibus possessiue dicuntur. Quia qualia diligimus, tales 
efficimur. [4] Bl. 57. ‘Deum diligis, Deus es; terram *diligis, terra es’, Ait b. Aug⌊ustinus. [5] Amor enim 
vis est vnitiua ex amante et amato vnum quid constituens.” 
278
 As shown in chapters  2.2.1.-2.2.2. Ebeling 1951, 192-194, Joest 1967, 238-250 as well as Ozment 
1969, 105-111 base their criticism on Luther’s understanding of the concept of substance, especially the 
passages WA 55, II, 388, 137 – 389, 165 and WA 55, II, 416, 971-986. However, one should note that 
Luther’s statement does not constitute a rejection of any substance-ontological or non-relational 
metaphysical system whatsoever, but is a grammatical treatment of what is meant in the Holy Scriptures by 
the term “substance”. To draw general metaphysical conclusions based on these sections is too far-fetched 
and requires ignoring most of Luther’s treatment of ontological questions, as argued in this chapter. So also 
Juntunen 1996, 416-426. On faith as the substantia sperandorum, see also chapter 3.4.1. 
279
 So especially Joest 1967, 100-102. See also Ebeling 1951, 189-193; 226-227. 
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futurarum and so on.
280
 Such texts could in theory be interpreted in a relational and anti-
ontological manner so that the invisible world to which faith is directed only means the 
temporal future. But if this interpretation were true, it would be difficult to reconcile it 
with numerous contrary passages of Luther’s texts, in which Luther (in a starkly different) 
manner speaks about faith and the gospel already having the res instead of the species: the 
reality instead of the sign and truth instead of shadow.
281
  
Can these texts therefore be reconciled? How are they related to each other? The 
present study argues, that these texts are to be interpreted through the three (or four) stages 
of God’s works in the world. Luther writes in comments on Psalm 44:2: 
It must be known, that the Word of God is spoken and revealed in a threefold manner. 
First, by God the Father in the saints, in glory and in himself. Second, in the saints in this 
life in spirit. Third, through the external word and language for human ears. And thus it is 
as if it were poured into a third vessel. This is imaged through it that ‘in the ancient times 
God has spoken in the prophets and the fathers’, and so by human mediation the veil of the 
letter [velum litere ] and intermediate wall is created. After that ‘he has spoken in the Son’; 
this also is behind a veil [in velamento], but the second [veil]. Finally, the Father himself in 
Heaven will speak to us in himself, when he will reveal us his Word itself without any 
intermediary, so that we will hear it and be blessed. And as the first speaking was wrapped 
in many figures and shadows which were all fulfilled and discovered in one Christ, so 
whatever happens in the Law with so many words and actions, has one Christ as its whole 
truth. In this way ‘the Lord summed up and abbreviated the word’, so that what then 
happened through many things, now is fulfilled through one faith and love, so that the 
burdensome multitude of laws came to an end. And likewise in the future the same and 
only God will be all in all. And so the multiple things which we under Christ now use and 
need, namely graces and gifts, which were in the ancient times signified by many carnal 
things (but now the ceremonies are few, almost none except  through the necessity of the 
Gospel the seven sacraments, while they in the ancient times were most numerous, but also 
in the spiritual sense those remain and are still many), the Father will then supply all these 
to us with one Word, since ‘when his glory will appear we will be satisfied’ and so he will 
with his one sole and simple Word satisfy us. In the same way he gives in spirit under one 
sole ceremony, the sacrament, everything which he in ancient times gave under many 
carnal ceremonies imperfectly, that is, in sign.
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 WA 55, I, 392 gloss 16; 574, 13-15; 695, gloss 12; 752, 4-5; 768, 25-26; 816 gloss 7; WA 55, II, 80, 
29-32; 309, 8-10; 315, 151-157; 473, 262-270; 428, 99 – 429, 107; 600, 142-145; 652, 215-219; 692, 174-
193; 780, 38-41; 887, 214 – 888, 251; 898, 217 – 225; 915, 692-699; 919, 836-839; 967, 2169-2191; 979, 
2505-2508; 985, 2706-2709; 994, 2960-2962; 995, 2989-2999; 995, 3018-3022; WA 56, 43, 2-3; 49, 12-15; 
371, 1 – 372, 25; 521, 14-20; 424, 27 – 425, 5; 445, 1-8; 522, 8-13; 523, 22-23; WA 57, b61, 8 – b62, 2; 
b138, 22 – b139, 10; AWA 2, 45, 31 – 46, 1; 425, 13-15; 617, 7-15; WA 5, 487, 12-14; 623, 17-23. 
See also Bandt 1958, 49-50; Ebeling 1951, 199-201; Flogaus 1997, 347-348; Joest 1967, 244; Lohse 
1995, 73-74; Schwarz 1962, 229-240. 
281
 WA 55, I, 404 gloss 10; 520 gloss 20; WA 55, II, 67, 12-17; 247, 199-207; 342, 126-140; 495, 149-
164; 524, 506-513; 535, 33 – 536, 40; 994, 2970-2973; WA 56, 43, 2-6; AWA 2, 294, 1-5; 455, 13-20. 
282
 WA 55, II, 253, 370 – 254, 393: “[370] Sciendum Itaque, Quod verbum Dei triplici modo dicitur et 
reuelatur. Primo [371] a Deo patre in sanctis, in gloria et in seipso. Secundo in sanctis in hac [372] vita in 
spiritu. Tercio per verbum externum et linguam ad aures hominum. [373] Bl 59 Et sic est velut in tercium 
vas * transfusum. Et hoc est figuratum [374] per hoc, Quod olim ‘Deus locutus est in prophetis et patribus’, 
Et sic [375] mediante homine factum est velum litere  et paries medius. Postea ‘locutus [376] est in filio’; hoc 
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Thus in Luther’s texts one can see three different stages of the history of salvation, 
which correspond to the works of God discussed in chapter 2.3.2. The first contains the 
visible creation and the Law (which can also be distinguished as two different stages). It is 
the nature of this stage that creation and the Law point to the final glory as signs of absent 
things. Furthermore, these signs are many and they are remote from the reality they 
signify. Thus Luther calls them the “first veil”, the “veil of the letter” (with reference to 
the two veils of the Tabernacle). The second stage is that of the Church (Militant). In this 
stage invisible reality already breaks into and becomes enwrapped in visible reality. This 
action most profoundly occurs in the Incarnation. Through this change the first veil (the 
veil of the letter) is removed and the Spirit is given. But as in the Incarnation, so also in 
the Church invisible reality is still veiled and hidden as it was by the second veil of the 
Tabernacle. The humanity of Christ is the second veil, and the glory of God is therefore 
not yet seen, but heard and pointed to. At the same time, it is present. Thus the signs and 
testimonies of this stage already participate in the reality they give. They do not only point 
to it, as the signs of the Old Covenant did. However, the reality participated in is not yet 
apparent but concealed, not visible but invisible, and this participation is not yet full but 
partial and growing. The plurality of the signs in the first stage is now reduced to the 
sacraments, which perfectly demonstrate the ontological nature of this stage. If Luther’s 
ontology were to be understood only in a relational manner as referring to future salvation, 
the distinction would be rendered meaningless between the signs of the Old Covenant 
(which merely point to the future) and the sacramental signs of the Church (which 
participate in their signatum). However, the sacraments in particular express the nature of 
the Church’s participation in invisible reality, which is participation hidden under 
contraries. The third and last one of the stages is that of glory. There God is known 
without an intermediary, through his divine nature by the one essential Word, Christ. Here 
the second veil is removed, the divinity is no longer hidden and one can speak of vision 
instead of hearing and showing, and present things instead of absent things (or things only 
present in faith and hope).
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adhuc est in velamento, Sed tamen secundum. Tandem [377] pater ipse in Ce  lo loquetur nobis in seipso, 
cum nobis verbum suum [378] ipse sine vllo medio reuelabit, vt audiamus et videamus et beati simus. [379] 
Atque sicut prima locutio multis figuris et vmbris fuit Inuoluta, [380] que omnia in vno Christo implentur et 
Inueniuntur, Quia quicquid in lege [381] tam multis verbis et factis agitur, totum vnus Christus habet in 
veritate, [382] Sic enim ‘verbum consummans et abbreuiatum fe  cit Dominus’, Vt que [383] ibi multis 
aguntur, hic vna fide scil. et Charitate expleantur et cesset [384] onerosa multitudo legum. Ita in futuro erit 
Deus idem vnusque omnia in [385] omnibus. Et tam multa, quibus nunc sub Christo etiam vtimur et egemus, 
[386] scil. gratiis et donis, que sunt per multa olim carnalia significata (Nunc [387] enim pauca sunt 
ceremonialia, immo nulla fere de necessitate Euangelii, [388] nisi 7 sacramenta, que olim erant plurima, Sed 
tamen spiritualiter ista remanent [389] et adhuc sunt multa), et tunc omnia ista pater vno nobis verbo [390] 
pre stabit, Quia ‘cum apparuerit gloria eius, tunc satiabimur’, Et tamen [391] vnico et simplicissimo verbo 
suo satiabit nos. Sicut modo in spiritu vnica [392] ceremonia, scil. sacramento, omnia tribuit, que olim 
multis carnalibus et [393] imperfecte, i. e. signo, dedit.” 
283
 See also WA 55, II, 1019, 121 – 1020, 136: “Et aptissime dicit: ‘Testimonium [122] Israel’, Quia 
Ecclesia militans nondum est, quod futura est [123] triumphans, Sed est signum, figura, absconditum et 
omnino fidele testimonium [124] sui ipsius. Quia in enygmate est, quod futura est in specie; in [125] signo 
est, quod futura est in re; in absconso est, quod futura est in manifesto; [126] in fide est, quod futura est in 
visione; In testimonio est, quod futura [127] est in exhibitione; In promisso est, quod futura est in 
impletione. Sic enim [128] in omni artis opere, Si quid ab artifice paratur, videlicet Mensa, vestis, [129] 
domus, optime dici potest: Nondum hoc est Mensa, vestis, domus, etc., Sed [130] certissimum signum et 
testimonium, quod fiet mensa, vestis, domus, cum [131] iam sit partim tale, Sed nondum perfectum. Ac sic 
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The concepts of res and presentia can therefore be understood in light of Luther’s 
distinction between the two worlds, the visible and the invisible. Both worlds have their 
own proper res
284
 as well as their own visio and presentia.
285
 What is present and which is 
                                                                                                                                                   
non alieno signo et [132] testimonio picto vel dicto testatur, quid sit futurum, Sed seipso. Ita Ecclesia [133] 
4, 403 paratur modo, quia edificatur vt ciuitas. Et nondum | quidem est Ciuitas, [134] Sed pars et 
testimonium, quod sit futura ciuitas. Ita quidem nondum [135] est Israel, Sed fidele signum, quod erit Israel, 
quia paratur ad visionem [136] Dei et partim, scil. per fidem, eum videt.” 
WA 55, II, 1020, 161 – 192: “[161] Bl 271v 121, 5 Quia illic sederunt sedes in Iudicio, sedes super 
domum [162] Dauid. [163] Pulcherrimus Versus et pulcherrime exprimens proprietatem Ecclesie  [164] 
militantis, si possem consequi explanando. Sed age, Dominus in nobis et [165] audeamus tentare. He  c 
Vtique est differentia etiam alia a predictis Ecclesie [166] militantis a triumphante, Quod Sedes sunt in ipsa 
et manifeste sunt [167] (i. e. potestates et principatus Episcopatuum, sacerdocii etc.), Sed sessor [168] ipse 
Christus non apparet estque absconditus per fidem et in fide, et [169] tamen in ipsis sedet et presens est, 
immo presentissimus, cum sint isti sedes [170] eius.  [...]  Idcirco tanquam coram Christo sedente [189] 
super suum thronum humiliari ex vero corde debere, non propter sedem, [190] Sed propter sedem Christi 
sine dubio Inuisibiliter ibi sedentis. Sicut figura [191] habet olim in propitiatorio, Vbi erat sedes Dei, et 
tamen Inuisibiliter [192] ibi erat; Ita et modo in Ecclesia sua sedet, que est sedes eius.” 
WA 55, II, 1024, 279-293: “Vocatur autem Ecclesia militans [280] domus Dauid propter humanitatem 
Christi. Quia nunc regnat Christus inquantum [281] homo et per fidem humanitatis sue  , quam habet ex 
Dauid. Sed [282] in futuro tradet hanc domum Deo patri, Et ipse quoque subiectus erit [283] ei, qui subiecit 
ei omnia, Et erit domus Dei et regnum Dei, Vt iam non tantum [284] Christus homo in nobis, Sed et Christus 
Deus in nobis sit. Ideo enim [285] nunc participamus eum tantummodo, quia in humanitatis eius regno 
sumus, [286] que est pars Christi. Sed tunc totus Christus in nobis erit clare sine [287] Inuolucro 
humanitatis. Non quod nunc non sit Deus in nobis, Sed quod est [288] in nobis Inuolutus et incarnatus in 
humanitate. Tunc autem erit reuelatus [289] sicuti est. Nunc cognoscimus ex parte, tunc autem sicut et 
cognitus sum. [290] Nec quod humanitatem dimittet, Sed quod etiam diuinitatem suam ibi [291] latentem, 
quam nunc confuse et in enygmate humanitatis eius videmus, [292] ostendet clare. Interim itaque sumus 
domus Dauid, Et Sedes sedent. Non [293] tantum autem, Sed et stant.” 
WA 57, b202, 8-18: “Velum primum, quod [9] erat ante sanctum, significabat absconsionem et fidem 
futurae Ecclesiae, [10] futuri evangelii et futurorum sacramentorum, non enim Synagoga [11] cernebat haec 
praesentia. Ideo in passione Christi hoc ipsum fuit ‘scissum [12] a summo usque deorsum’, quia tunc 
Ecclesia prodiit et Sinagoga desiit. [13] Secundum vero, quod fuit ante [sanctum] sanctorum, hanc nostrae 
[14] fidei absconsionem significat, in qua Christus homo regnat, quod similiter [15] auferetur, cum 
apparuerit in gloria. Sic cognoscimus Christum [16] P Bl. 114b (*)secundum carnem et divinitatem, sed non 
nisi per fidem, ut 2. Cor. 4.: [17] ‘Nos autem revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes’ (scilicet per fidem) 
[18] ‘transformamur in eandem imaginem a claritate in claritatem.’” 
AWA 1, 511, 11-14: “Et pulchre in isto versu definitio fidei describitur, quia est lumen signatum super 
nos. Quod ait signatum, indicat, quod sit signum et clausum adhuc novissimo velamen, licet sit lumen ad 
primum velamen.” 
284
 WA 55, II, 256, 463-475: “Veritas Est duplex: Scil. Operis contra Vmbram, vt figure  legis erant 
verissime  res, et tamen simul vmbre  veritatis future et diuine  , scil. Christi, Et adhuc sunt vmbre  eterne  glorie  
omnia temporalia.” 
WA 55, II, 692, 177-196: “Nam vt supra in [178] quodam loco dixi: Sicut res significata transit, ita et 
verba eam significantia [179] transire dicuntur. Verbum autem Christi non transit ineternum, quia [180] rem 
significat non transeuntem ine  ternum. Dupliciter ergo verba dicuntur [181] transitoria. Primo in seipsis, quia 
citissime abeunt et nihil remanet ex [182] illis. Sic est omnis homo carnalis, qui dies habet transitorios, ex 
quibus [183] nihil sibi remanet, postquam transierint. Et hec est ira in populum [184] Iude  orum, quam plorat 
propheta. Secundo Quia transitoria signant. Et [185] ita licet iteretur verbum idem sepius; tamen quia 
significatum transit, [186] ideo et ipsum quoque transit. Sic iterum carnalis transit velut verbum [187] 
transitorium, quia in transitoriis heret. Et nihil relinquit sibi, Sed tamen [188] aliis, scil. qui intelligunt res 
significatas per verbum alias res, scil. futuras, [189] significare; hii enim ex vsu rerum temporalium, quem in 
malis [190] vident, discurrunt et audiunt futuras res, quas isti surdi non audiunt. [191] Quare litera et omnis 
figura totius legis est velut sermo quidam [192] transitorius. Spiritus autem in illa latens et per eam 
significatus est velut [193] sensus illius sermonis. Sed illi tantum sermonem, alii autem sensum [194] tenent; 
illi literam, isti spiritum; ideo illi transeunt cum litera transeunte, [195] isti permanent cum spiritu manente; 
illorum dies consumuntur sicut [196] sermo, istorum autem conseruantur sicut sensus post sermonem.” 
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the res in both worlds is that which is immediately perceptible in that world: visible and 
sensual things for those who are sensual people, divine things for the saints enjoying the 
beatific vision. But at the same time both worlds find their opposite in each other: The 
divine reality seems like nothing to those who are carnal and sensual, and likewise visible 
and sensible things seem like mere shadow to those who understand their true signatum in 
Christ.
286
 Moreover, the Church (Militant) already possesses the eternal res in faith but not 
in vision. It is present as a real sign and testimony participating in its signatum, but not yet 
apparently and visibly. Therefore Luther can say that faith already possesses (habet) the 
eternal res, but that it is not yet present. This apparent contradiction is solved by 
understanding that by “present” things Luther means visibly perceptible things. Luther 
means the same as when he says that the Church already possesses its res, but in a hidden 
way, not apparently. Luther emphasizes that he does not mean the future Church, but that 
the Church possesses the res already now.
287
 Thus for Luther the Church is suspended 
between both worlds. It has left behind (or is in the process of leaving) the visible, and it 
already grasps the invisible, but in a hidden and internal manner.
288
 It has not yet arrived at 
the heavenly vision, but this does not mean that its participation in the heavenly things 
would only be relational. Rather than being relational, it follows the incarnational 
principle, according to which the divine is present but hidden under contraries.
289
 Luther’s 
view of the Church (Militant) specifically as the medium stage also means that he does not 
view the distinctions between the stages in too static a manner. It belongs to his concept of 
faith, that the believer is always in motion towards the future, from the letter to the spirit. 
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On the earthly goods see footnote 280. On the beatific vision see WA 55, I, 821 gloss 8; WA 55, II, 
651, 213 – 652, 219; 1020, 148-157; WA 56, 182, 14-18; AWA 2, 470, 7-22. 
286
 See e.g. WA 55, II, 495, 149-159 vs. WA 55, II, 995, 2991-2998. 
287
 WA 55, II, 886, 184-193: “[184] 115, 10 Credidi. Intentio psalmi Est docere tantum spiritualia bona 
in [185] Christo expectare, et promissa in lege de spiritu et fide intelligenda esse, [186] non de re temporali, 
contra Insipientiam carnalium Iude  orum, Qui fidem [187] respuunt et rem expectant. Rem inquam 
temporalium; Nam fides habet [188] rem e  ternam. Dicit ergo: [189] Credidi, i. e. fidem habui, et he  c tota 
mea possessio, que est substantia, [190] i. e. possessio rerum sperandarum, non autem substantia rerum 
[191] presentium. Non ait ‘diues sum, potens sum et delicatus sum’. Quia vltra [192] he  c omnia querit aliud 
et id allegat, quod presens non est, quod fide tantum [193] tenetur.” 
WA 55, II, 961, 2005 – 962, 2015: “Vt [2006] psal⌊mo: ‘Quam magna multitudo dulcedinis tue  , quam 
abscondisti timentibus [2007] te! Perfecisti eis, qui sperant in te in conspectu filiorum hominum.’ Sed [2008] 
per contrarium: iis qui non sperant in te in conspectu hominum (i. e. sola [2009] Bl 255 spe viuunt coram 
hominibus, Sed re ipsa volunt viuere * coram eis), destruxisti [2010] potius, vt nihil Inueniant omnes viri 
diuitiarum. Sancti enim in conspectu [2011] hominum nihil habent nisi spem; ideo despiciuntur ab illis, qui 
habent [2012] rem in conspectu hominum. Sed dum sic sperant et spe viuunt coram hominibus, [2013] 
habent perfectam rem coram Deo. Quia Non ait ‘perficies eis qui sperant’, [2014] Sed qui presenter sperant, 
iis tu iam ab initio mundi preparasti regnum [2015] et perfecisti.” 
WA 55, II, 989, 2831 – 990, 2842: “Sed fidelis populus [2831] spiritualia querit, que  sunt in fide et 
euangelio nobis donata maxima, [2832] Ergo vt eloquia eius (in quibus omne bonum nobis contulit) non 
tantum [2833] audiat, Sed etiam meditetur et per incrementum sibi incorporet. Mira [2834] est enim he  c 
petitio, Non nisi verba peti a Deo, non res, Sed signa rerum. [2835] Quis enim pro verbis tam anxie vnquam 
clamauit? Sed Quia in verbis per [2836] fidem abscondite sunt res non apparentes, Ideo habens Verba per 
fidem [2837] habet omnia, licet abscondite. Et ita patet, quod iste Versus petit literaliter,  
[2838] non futuram Ecclesiam nec eius bona, Sed presentem et eius bona, [2839] que non sunt nisi ipsum 
Euangelium gratie, quod est signum et verbum [2840] sperandarum rerum et non apparentium. Et tali cibo 
nos alit Christus.” 
288
 WA 55, I, 315 gloss 7; WA 55, II, 654, 282 – 655, 316; 918, 787-794; 1006, 3315-3334; WA 57, 
b185, 1-8; b214, 2 – b215, 12; AWA 2, 106, 28 – 107, 13. 
289
 So also Peura 2005, 199. See also Grane 1997, 185-189. 
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He can be always made more perfect (and thus never becomes completely holy in this 
life).
290
 Luther calls this passage from this life to the invisible world a crossing (transitus) 
and passover (phase).
291
 However, this process concerns not only the believer, but in a 
certain sense the entire universe.
292
 To illustrate this cosmological model Luther uses the 
figure of the Tabernacle (which also functions for him as an illustration of the composition 
of the human being). The whole cosmological structure can thus be summarized by means 
of the image of the Tabernacle: 
The Tabernacle of Moses has been explained in different ways by different commentators. 
Others use it to signify the universe, so that the ‘Holy of Holies’ would be the heavenly 
and invisible things themselves and ‘the Cherubim’ the angelic choirs themselves – 
wherefore it is frequently said in the Scripture of God: ‘You who sit above the Cherubim’. 
‘The Holy’ would signify the visible world, and the ‘second veil’ would be the starry 
heaven, ‘the seven candlesticks’ the seven planets, ‘the table of the showbread’ the four 
elements, etc. But this exposition, either more or less true, is still somewhat twisted and 
violent to the text.  
Others rather wish to understand the Tabernacle tropologically as the minor world, that is, 
the human being [...]  
                                                 
290
 WA 55, II, 866, 47 – 867, 77; II, 909, 544 – 913, 673; 946, 1576 – 947, 1609; 973, 2349-2360; 974, 
2376 – 975, 2403.  Luther’s views in these passages touch also doctrinal developement in a rather surprising 
manner. Luther namely argues for the acceptance of the Immaculate Conception and the primacy of the 
bishop of Rome as well as against the ‘Bohemians’ (Hussites), on the basis of the principle that those who 
refuse to accept internal doctrinal development stick to the letter (!). He also applies the same idea to the 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity against the Arians. Thus according to Luther’s reasoning 
expressed in these passages, a doctrine can be clarified in such a manner, that a previously acceptable 
position can become heresy. 
291
 WA 55, II, 971, 2287-2300: “[2287] 118, 121 Fe ci Iudicium et Iust⌊itiam; non trad⌊as me 
Calum⌊niantibus [2288] me. [2289] Licet non perfecerim, Sum tamen in opere, fe  ci et facio. Quis enim 
[2290] perfectus est aut se apprehendisse putat? Igitur Que  fecisti, perficienda [2291] sunt. Vt Ecclesiastes: 
‘Quid est quod fuit? id quod faciendum.’ ‘Homo enim [2292] cum Consummauerit, tunc incipiet.’Non enim 
fecisse satis est et quiescere, [2293] Sed secundum philosophiam Motus est Actus imperfectus, semper 
partim [2294] acquisitus et partim acquirendus, Semper in medio contrariorum et simul [2295] in termino a 
quo et ad quem consistens. Quod si in vno fuerit tantum, iam [2296] 4, 363 nec Motus | est. Vita autem 
presens Est Motus quidam et phase, i. e. transitus [2297] et Gallilea, i. e. Migratio ex hoc mundo ad futuram, 
que est quies [2298] e  terna. Ergo partim illam habemus in conscientia, partim tribulationes in [2299] carne. 
Et sic inter Mala peccatorum et bona meritorum assidue mouemur [2300] Velut in termino a quo et ad quem. 
Sed he  c latius alibi tractanda.” 
WA 57, b111, 2-8: “[1] Et mutabuntur [1, 12]. [2] Proprie dicit ‘mutabuntur’, non autem ‘peribunt’, sed 
sicut vestis [3] ‘mutabuntur’. Inde enim vocantur vestes mutatorie, ut 4. Regum 5. dedit [4] Naaman puero 
Helisei vestes mutatorias duplices. Item Zacharie 3.: [5] ‘Ecce indui te mutatoriis.’ Unde et Christus Math. 
24. non dixit: ‘Celum [6] et terra peribunt’ sed ‘transibunt’, hoc est, de veteri et presenti forma [7] ad novam 
et meliorem migrabunt seu mutabuntur ac quodammodo suum [8] phase et ipsa habebunt.” 
292
 WA 55, I, 468 gloss 7: “GLOSSA: 7) [1] Quia prophetice loquitur et non historice, Ideo hic non opera 
[2] creationis vel que  pro Iude  is in Egypto et vet⌊eri lege fecit, Sed que [3] futura erant in Christo intelligi 
debent. In quo omnia consummata sunt, [4] que in illis omnibus significata sunt, non autem impleta. Et sic 
iterum [5] hic distinctio oritur inter opera et opera Dei. Quia opera significatiua sunt [6] creatio totius mundi 
et omnia figuralia veteris legis, ‘facta’ autem sunt [7] impletiones eorundem, quod in Christo inceptum est 
impleri et nunc [8] Impletur et in fine implebitur.        Et ideo dixit Dominus: ‘Cum exaltatus [9] fuero, 
omnia traham ad me’. Quia ipse finis omnium et res significata per [10] omnes res. Vnde quia vtrunque 
Iude  i non intellexerunt, dicit supra [11] psal. 27.: ‘Non intellexerunt opera Domini et in opera manuum 
eius’. [12] Et psal. 63. de Apostolis econtra: ‘Et facta eius intellexerunt’. Quod est [13] ‘opera Domini in 
opera Domini’, nisi quia omnia alia in opera Christi [14] respicere et intendere non intelligunt. Sic psal. 91.: 
‘Stultus non intelliget’, [15] i. e. intellectualiter de eis non sapiet, licet sentiat ea.” 
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The third ones however, together with the Apostle, understand by the Tabernacle at this 
place the spiritual world, that is, the Holy Church of God. And so the Holy of Holies is the 
Church Triumphant, the Holy the Church Militant, and the atrium the Synagogue, which is 
consonant with the five-cubit height of the atrium, because the Synagogue is restricted to 
the five books of Moses.
293
 
Although here Luther considers the first interpretation somewhat forced (probably 
because it is too concerned with the natural world), he carries over the distinction between 
the visible and invisible world to the second and third interpretations as well. This is 
illustrated by the two veils, of which the first means the letter concealing the spirit, and its 
removal entrance into the Church. The second veil signifies the faith hiding the divinity of 
Christ (as it is not yet an object of direct perception). Its removal signifies the entering of 
the invisible world and the heavenly glory: first by Christ and then by us.
294
 This process 
                                                 
293
 WA 57, b196, 22 – b197, 24: “[22] Tabernaculum Moysi diverse a diversis est expositum. Alii enim 
[23] significatum per ipsum volunt universum, ut sit ‘sanctum sanctorum’ [1] ipsa coelestia et invisibilia, 
‘Cherubin’ ipsi angelorum chori, unde frequenter [2] in Scripturis dicitur Deo: ‘Qui sedes super Cherubin’, 
‘sanctum’ [3] autem significet mundum visibilem, et ‘velum’ ipsum ‘secundum’ sit [4] coelum syderum, 
‘septem candelabra’ septem planetae, ‘mensa panum’ [5] 4 elementa etc. Verum haec expositio, sive sit vera 
sive minus, satis [6] tamen extorta et violenta est.        Alii magis tropologice per ‘tabernaculum’ [7] 
intelligunt minorem mundum id est ipsum hominem, […] Tertio alii cum Apostolo hoc loco [21] 
tabernaculum intelligunt mundum quendam spiritualem, quae est Ecclesia [22] sancta Dei. Et ita [sanctum] 
sanctorum est Ecclesia triumphans, sanctum [23] Ecclesia militans, atrium Synagoga, cui consonat iterum 
quinarius altitudinis [24] atrii, quia quinque libris Moysi literalibus continebatur Synagoga.” 
294
 WA 55, I, 240, 3-8: “[26, 5] Quoniam abscondit me quia ‘vita nostra abscondita [4] est cum Christo 
in Deo’ secundum Apostolum in tabernaculo suo [5] i. e. humanitate sua vel fide humanitatis eius6 in die 
tempore malorum [6] potestatis malorum: protexit me in abscondito fide
7
, que est velamentum [7] 
secundum in tabernaculo, Sicut litera fuit primum, i. e. Sanctum sanctorum [8] velatur isto ‘abscondito’ 
tabernaculi sui
8
 Ecclesie.” 
WA 55, II, 335, 75-77: “[75] Bl 80 Sanctum spiritualiter Est Ipsa Ecclesia allegorice, Tropologice autem 
[76] Ipsa sanctitas fidei et Iustitie  Spiritualis. Sanctum autem sanctorum est [77] Beatitudo future  glorie  , 
Sicut in tabernaculo Mosi fuit figuratum.” 
WA 57, b202, 8-18: “Velum primum, quod [9] erat ante sanctum, significabat absconsionem et fidem 
futurae Ecclesiae, [10] futuri evangelii et futurorum sacramentorum, non enim Synagoga [11] cernebat haec 
praesentia. Ideo in passione Christi hoc ipsum fuit ‘scissum [12] a summo usque deorsum’, quia tunc 
Ecclesia prodiit et Sinagoga desiit. [13] Secundum vero, quod fuit ante [sanctum] sanctorum, hanc nostrae 
[14] fidei absconsionem significat, in qua Christus homo regnat, quod similiter [15] auferetur, cum 
apparuerit in gloria. Sic cognoscimus Christum [16] P Bl. 114b (*)secundum carnem et divinitatem, sed non 
nisi per fidem, ut 2. Cor. 4.: [17] ‘Nos autem revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes’ (scilicet per fidem) 
[18] ‘transformamur in eandem imaginem a claritate in claritatem.’” 
WA 57, b222, 10-23: “[10] Habentes itaque, fratres, fiduciam in [11] introitu sanctorum in sanguine 
Christi etc. [10, 19]. [12] Isto verborum textu paulo obscuriore, imo ornatissimo et fecundissimo, [13] id 
scilicet vult Apostolus, ut Christum passum et moriendo transeuntem [14] ad gloriam patris imitemur. 
Sententia quidem brevis et aperta est, [15] nempe ea, quae ad Col. 3. scribitur: ‘Mortui estis cum Christo, et 
vita [16] vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo.’ Sed qua dicendi gratia et vi [17] eam tractet Apostolus, 
videndum est. Primum velum illud figurale [18] templi signum fuit carnis Christi, ut hic plane ostendit 
Apostolus. Amotio [19] autem veli per introeuntem, scilicet pontificem, mortem significat carnis [20] 
Christi, qua ipse a nobis sublatus et in invisibilia sancta ingressus est. [21] Et via illa seu introitus vetusti 
sacerdotis vetus erat et mortua, significans [22] viam hanc et introitum Christi novum et vivum. Et sic 
implevit [23] figuram et sustulit umbram.” 
AWA 1, 511, 11-14: “Et pulchre in isto versu definitio fidei describitur, quia est lumen signatum super 
nos. Quod ait signatum, indicat, quod sit signum et clausum adhuc novissimo velamen, licet sit lumen ad 
primum velamen.” 
 94 
 
 
of entering (transitus) has already begun, and is ongoing in the Christians who are passing 
through the Tabernacle and who in faith and hope (though not manifestly) live in the 
heavenly glory.
295
 
One should also note that the concept of transitus, which Luther frequently uses to 
illustrate this passage, is associated with mystical theology. It is central in Bonaventure’s 
theology, where it is connected both with the concrete passage from this life to the other, 
as well as with the mystical passage through the different stages of contemplation.
296
 
Bonaventure also utilizes the parts of the Tabernacle as an image of contemplation which 
proceeds from the external into the internal, and then to divine things.
297
 Once again 
Luther uses typologies and concepts from the tradition of Victorine and Bonaventurean 
mysticism in his own cosmological system.  
2.4. The Human Being 
2.4.1. Composition 
2.4.1.1 The Natural Constituents (Body, Soul, Spirit) 
This chapter (2.4) discusses the constitution of the human being in Luther’s theological 
anthropology. The first subchapter (2.4.1) focuses on the general composition of the 
human being in Luther’s theology. Of greatest significance here is the so-called tripartite 
anthropology (anthropological trichotomy, triplex homo: body – soul – spirit) examined in 
chapter 2.4.1.1 and its relationship to so-called bipartite anthropology (anthropological 
                                                                                                                                                   
Sometimes Luther also restricts the meaning of the word ‘Tabernacle’ to the Synagogue, because there 
the truth was veiled in figures. In contrast the Church is then called “doors”, because through the Church the 
soul enters Heaven. See WA 55, I, 597 gloss 2; WA 55, II, 668, 24-33. 
295
 WA 55, II, 629, 2-10: “[2] Psalmus iste de Ecclesia Christi loquitur, ad quam suspirat populus [3] vel 
potius propheta pro populo et humana natura. Veruntamen, quia Qui [4] in Ecclesia Christi est, iam per spem 
est in celesti gloria et e  terna domo, [5] ideo mixtim secundum vtrunque possunt verba accipi. ⌈⌈Et secundum 
[6] Aug⌊ustinum totus psalmus debet de eadem materia expo[ni spiritua]li et [7] non carptim.⌉⌉ Quod autem 
de Ecclesia magis militante loquatur, patet, [8] Quia nominat ‘tabernacula’ et ‘atria’, que proprio sensu 
adhuc huius temporis [9] Ecclesiam significant, que est atrium celestis Ierusalem et tabernaculum, [10] in 
quo per fidem abscondimur, et nondum omnia reuelata.” 
WA 57, b223, 1-14: “Introitus autem coeli per mortem Christi sacramentum [2] est nostrae quoque novae 
vitae et viae, qua coelestia tantum quaeramus [3] et amemus toto prorsus affectu ingressi in coelestia, ut sit 
‘conversatio [4] nostra’ iuxta Apostolum ‘in coelis’. Huius mysticae et exemplaris passionis [5] Christi 
Paulus ferme per omnes epistolas plenus est, ut ad Rom. 6. [6] et 8., Eph. 4., Col. 3., Philip., et ubicunque 
docet de mortificando vetere [7] homine et renovando interiore. Igitur quod Christus egit secundum [8] 
carnem tantum (non enim aliquando transiit a vitiis sicut nos, sed [9] semper fuit et est in coelis, sicut Iohan. 
3.: ‘Nemo ascendit in coelum [10] nisi filius hominis, qui in coelis est’), per hoc simplo suo concinit duplo 
[11] nostro. Ut ait Augustinus lib. 3. de trinitate cap. 4.: Nos enim carne et [12] spiritu transimus, Christus 
autem carne solum transiit. Ideo transitus [13] carnis nostrae exemplum est (quia similes ei erimus), transitu 
autem [14] carnis Christi significatur tamen velut sacramento transitus spiritus.” 
296
 See Itinerarium mentis in Deum VII, 1-6. See also Hülbusch 1974; Menard 1974; Menard 2000. On 
Luther’s use of the concept, see also Brecht 2004, 286-287. 
297
 Itinerarium mentis in Deum III, 1; V, 1. 
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dichotomy, duplex homo: flesh – spirit). The role of the spirit as the determining part of 
the person and the link between the two anthropological structures is examined in chapter 
2.4.1.2. Chapter 2.4.1.3 discusses the bipartite anthropology as qualitative distinction. The 
second subchapter (2.4.2) will investigate how the framework formed by these two 
anthropologies operates in Luther’s understanding of the Christian. It will focus on the 
following three topics: the transformation of the person from carnal to spiritual through 
the infusion of faith (chapter 2.4.2.1); the conflict between the spirit and the flesh in the 
Christian (chapter 2.4.2.2); and the interpenetrating relationship of the spirit and the flesh 
as the two natures of the Christian person in the context of Luther’s doctrine of simul 
iustus et peccator (chapter 2.4.2.3). 
Luther’s theological anthropology revolves around certain central concepts, which can 
be separated into two different ways of dividing the human being into his or her 
constituents. These divisions overlap to some extent, both in terminology and content. The 
first way of dividing the human being is the natural division, which concerns the natural 
parts or constituents of the human being and reaches its mature form as the  tripartite 
division between body (corpus/caro), soul (anima) and spirit (spiritus). It is illustrated 
frequently by Luther by the means of the image of the human being as a tripartite 
tabernacle.
298
 Luther often refers to these parts also using the classical anthropological 
terms of: carnal man (homo carnalis), animal man or man with soul (homo animalis), and 
spiritual man (homo spiritualis). Second, there is the bipartite division between flesh 
(caro) and spirit (spiritus), or the old man (homo vetus) and the new (homo novus), a way 
of dividing the human being which concerns the quality of the person.
299
 Central for this 
division are the two affects, flesh and spirit. Both affects (flesh and spirit), however, may 
exist within the same Christian person (persona). The term person can encompass the 
both previous structures (human being’s natural composition and affects). The tripartite 
and bipartite divisions are, moreover, related to each other, although they exist on different 
‘levels’. Navigating Luther’s anthropology requires emphasizing terminological clarity. 
Therefore the present discussion adheres to a high degree to Luther’s use of 
anthropological terms, though from a modern perspective terms referring to a human 
being as “man” may sound problematic. However, one should note, that these terms 
usually refer to some part or aspect of the person, not to the person as a whole. 
Historically there are two trends in Luther studies relating to these divisions. First, 
there are two schools of thought in the previous studies on the question of the relationship 
between the two anthropologies. Some studies (i.a. Hägglund and Joest) tend to fuse them 
with each other so that only the bipartite anthropology remains. The studies of Lauri 
Haikola, Herbert Olsson and Eero Huovinen (which follow the pre-Mannermaa Finnish-
Swedish research) keep the anthropologies separate. The present study will argue, that 
these studies are largely correct, and will follow their argumentation in the discussion 
below. Second, especially the German studies on Luther’s theological anthropology 
                                                 
298
 Some authors also call this the philosophical division, as it concerns the objective parts of the human 
being and is connected with the anthropological distinctions in natural philosophy. 
299
 This division is often called also the theological division as it is more apparently connected with the 
relationship of the person to God than the former one. To call only one of the anthropological divisions 
theological is, however, problematic because the spirit is also connected to God in the tripartite division (see 
chapter 2.4.1.2). 
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understand the terms “flesh” and “spirit” more or less relationally: as conditions in which 
the human being turns towards  God (in which case he is “spirit”) or away from God (in 
which case he is “flesh”). The aspect of turning exists in Luther’s thought, so the idea is in 
itself correct. However, it is not just the relation of the person that constitutes these two. 
The present study argues that the terms flesh and spirit also have an ontological 
connection to their objects. The flesh is connected to corporeality even when understood 
as a theological concept and within the bipartite qualitative anthropology. Likewise, the 
human being can be properly called “spirit” or “spiritual” only because of an ontological 
participation (through faith) in God who is spirit, and who in faith dwells in the human 
spirit. Without this participation the human being cannot “turn” relationally towards God. 
The relational aspect presupposes the ontological aspect as its condition.
300
 The following 
discussion of Luther’s ways of dividing the human is comprised of three sections. First 
will be an analysis of  the texts discussing the natural division. Following this will be a 
discussion of how the spirit functions as the determining part of the person, and of its 
function as the nexus between the two divisions. The final section will analyse the nature 
of the qualitative division between the spirit and the flesh. Both divisions, as well as the 
singular terms, appear frequently in Luther’s texts between 1513-1521, although some 
development also takes place during this period. The following discussion will examine 
the texts first in chronological order (except when there seems to be no temporal 
development), and then by means of forming a systematized synthesis of Luther’s thought. 
In the Dictata (1513-15) the most fundamental distinction for Luther’s anthropology is 
that between the flesh and the spirit. For Luther the spirit (spiritus), often identical with 
the mind (mens), is the highest and most noble part of the human being. It is that part 
which is (or at least should be) directed towards invisible, eternal and divine things. Its 
opposite is the flesh (caro), which means the body, the sensual capacity and love directed 
by these two.
301
 Thus in the Dictata the spirit and the flesh are closely connected with the 
                                                 
300
 One of the major weaknesses of many previous studies on Luther’s anthropology lies in the relation of 
these two anthropologies. Bengt Hägglund’s comprehesive work (in Swedish) De homine: 
Människouppfattningen i äldre luthersk tradition is plagued by its disregard of the triparite anthropology 
(see Hägglund 1959, 58-67; 321-327). This leads to confusion, as terms used in different senses are mixed 
together. Joest’s famous volume Ontologie der Person bei Luther suffers from the same problem. Whereas 
Hägglund fuses together the soul and the spirit, Joest attempts to present the soul as intermediate part of the 
human being. For Joest, the soul is the person proper, which then is called spirit or flesh based on the 
person’s relationality: i.e., the nature of the life of the person and the objects towards which he turns (see 
Joest 1967, 163-202). A more adequate grasp of Luther’s anthropology is offered by Haikola, Olsson and 
Huovinen, who correctly distinguish between what Haikola and Huovinen call philosophical and theological 
anthropology. The former concerns the nature of the human being, the latter the qualities. Haikola and 
Olsson, however, make the mistake of positing the existence of the spirit in the carnal person as well, which 
leads to some problems in their interpretation. See Haikola 1958, 24-31; Olsson 1971, 454-462; Huovinen 
1981, 42-44. It is also to be noted with regret that Olsson's posthumously published study lacks footnotes in 
the fifth chapter, which is focused on anthropology.  The discussion in this chapter of the persen study 
largely omits Gerhard Ebeling’s important work Lutherstudien II: Disputatio de Homine (Ebeling 1982; 
Ebeling 1989). This study discusses Luther's anthropology primarily as it appears in the late Disputatio de 
homine (1536), which falls outside the period of my research. 
301
 See e.g. WA 55, I, 276 gloss 6; WA 55, II, 67, 11-15; 804, 138-139. The place of the soul is discussed 
later in this chapter. Another important term for Luther is the heart (cor), which is usually essentially 
synonymous with the spirit, but refers to the affective capacities instead of the cognitive  (e.g. WA 55, I, 96 
gloss 2; WA 55, II, 66, 15 – 67, 1; 96, 17-22; 216, 42-47; 297, 24-29; 894, 101 – 895, 114). As this study 
focuses on the cognitive capacities of the human being, this term will not be examined in detail here. There 
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distinction of the two worlds (the invisible and the visible) and with the way the Scriptures 
are interpreted (carnally/literally vs. spiritually).
302
 The basic distinction between these 
two realities, these two ways of interpreting the Scripture and these two anthropological 
concepts is so strong and pervasive that one could say it forms the central structuring 
principle of the Dictata. Therefore in the Dictata it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
categorically between the natural division of the human being and the qualitative division 
(where the terms refer to the whole man and not his parts). Nevertheless in this chapter it 
will be argued that these two divisions can be distinguished even in the Dictata. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Luther frequently uses the image of the Old 
Testament Tabernacle or Tent of Meeting as an image of the human being. This image 
already appears in the Dictata, where Luther calls human being a tent or a tabernacle. As a 
tent was made from leather, Luther says, so also a human being is made of the body 
covered with skin, and orifices (eyes, ears, mouth etc.) through which sense information 
can enter.
303
 However, Luther draws a significant distinction between the idea of a human 
being as a tabernacle, and that of his being in a tabernacle. For Luther, a carnal person 
without a spirit is wholly flesh, and thus he is a tabernacle. A person with a spirit, 
however, dwells inside his tabernacle: He has a tabernacle (i.e., a body) but he is distinct 
from and not identical with the body.
304
 In addition, for Luther a spiritual person is not just 
any tent or tabernacle, but a Sanctuary of God, within which God dwells with the spirit.
305
 
Thus already here Luther establishes the innermost part of the human being as the 
dwelling place of God. 
Already in the earliest parts of the Dictata one can also notice other central 
anthropological distinctions alongside the flesh – spirit terminology. One of these is the 
distinction between the external and internal man (exterior vs. interior homo).
306
 
According to Luther the frontside, or face, of the person is his spirit, or mind, his backside 
is the body, or the senses. On the one hand, the terms “internal man” and “external man” 
refer to these, and in this case they stand for the natural parts of the human being. The face 
(i.e., the internal man) should be turned towards God, and the senses (i.e., the external 
                                                                                                                                                   
are, however, some instances in which Luther uses cor (in this instances opposed to renes) to denote the 
intellectual capacities (WA 55, I, 230, 12-13; WA 55, II, 97, 6-10; AWA 2, 420, 5 – 421, 16). 
302
 As an example of this see WA 55, II, 802, 78 – 803, 105. 
303
 WA 55, II, 327, 473-478: “[473] Sed vide, quam apte Corpus nostrum ‘tabernaculum’ dicatur, [474] 
teu⌊tonice lauberhütten, Buden, Scena etc. Quia sicut tabernaculum ex ramis [475] construitur et preter 
portam et fenestras vndique est peruium et perlustrabile, [476] Ita corpus nostrum sensibus et lingua (que est 
maxima porta) et [477] Bl 78 ipso tactu, *qui per totum corpus est foraminosus sicut tabernaculum, totum 
[478] est patulum, et varia percipit per ista foramina. Sed et cibi et potus [479, 480] per os ingeruntur, et 
ingreditur et egreditur omne per os, malum et bonum.”  
The senses as the vestibule of the soul are also mentioned in WA 55, I, 516 gloss 8, 1-3. The image of 
leather tent is connected to the idea that grace divides the flesh (i.e., the external man) from the skin, killing 
the animal (i.e., the old man), and fills the skins separated from the flesh with grace (i.e., the internal man 
turned towards God), see WA 55, II, 189, 139 – 190, 150; 802, 78 – 803, 105. 
304
 WA 55, II, 326, 466 – 327, 472: “[466] Conuallis itaque tabernaculorum primum Iude  us et Gre  cus, ac 
inde [467] omnis, qui solum est homo. Quia Tentoria Ethiopie vidit Abacuk. Quando [468] enim homo sine 
spiritu est, caro est Et sic non in tabernaculo corporis sui, [469] Sed est ipsum tabernaculum. Sara enim olim 
intus in tabernaculo erat, [470] Genes. Et Iacob vir simplex habitans in tabernaculis. Hi sunt qui intus secum 
[471] habitant et non foris erumpunt et vagantur Sicut Esau, Qui in rebus [472] herent exterioribus et 
vagantur cum tabernaculis suis sicut aucupes et pastores.” 
305
 WA 55, I, 520, 4-8; 520 gloss 18; WA 55, II, 371, 429-433; 452, 102 – 453, 129. 
306
 On this distinction see also Olsson 1971, 472-475. 
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man) towards the visible world.
307
 On the other hand, however, the terms “external man” 
and “internal man” often refer in Luther’s thought to the orientation of the person. If a 
person turns his face (i.e., spirit, internal man) towards the creatures, he at the same time 
turns his back to God. In this way the internal man (i.e., spirit) is deserted (desertum) and, 
in a way,  migrated (migrat) and changes into the external man, so that the person 
becomes wholly a carnal and external man. Luther can therefore say that a person totally 
turned towards and submerged in external things loses his internal man.
308
 This statement 
of Luther’s already shows how the ontological and relational aspects come together in his 
anthropology.
309
 
Thus in the Dictata one can already notice, how Luther distinguishes between the 
human beings natural parts and the qualitative constituents, or between the composition of 
the person and the orientation of the person. Luther also calls the internal man the “new 
man” and “spiritual man” (novus homo, homo spiritualis), and the external man the “old 
man” and “carnal man” (vetus homo, homo carnalis). The old, external and carnal man is 
the man of sin; the new, internal and spiritual man is the man of grace.
310
 The existence of 
the internal man is not dependent, therefore, on the natural qualities of the person. The 
spiritual man is not derived from the flesh, but is received from Christ in faith as 
                                                 
307
 WA 55, I, 244 gloss 11, 21-24: “GLOSSA:11) [21]Mens nostra Est ‘facies’ nostra, Sensus autem est 
dorsum nostrum. [22]Quia per sensum vertimur ad creaturas, per mentem ad Deum. Si autem [23]mentem 
etiam ad creaturas vertimus, tunc auertimus ‘faciem’ a Deo [24]et dorsum ei vertimus.” 
WA 55, I, 830: “Supra4 dorsum meum exteriorem hominem, secundum quem presens viuo inter eos5 
fabricauerunt peccatores Iude  i” 
WA 55, I, 831 gloss 5: “GLOSSA:5) Non secundum ‘interiorem hominem’, qui est facies mea versa ad 
Deum et futura.” 
WA 55, II, 225, 28-32: “Sed quare dicit vultus mei? Quia tota merces Est [29] visio, Et quoniam Deus 
non est ‘salutaris’ nisi iis, qui faciem ad eum vertunt [30] et dorsum ad temporalia. Qui autem in 
temporalibus querunt salutem, [31] volunt Deum sibi facere salutare dorsi sui, Quia faciem ad temporalia 
[32] et dorsum ad Deum vertunt, cum ‘duobus dominis seruiri non possit’.” 
WA 55, II, 364, 229-231: “Notandum itaque, Quod Corpus nostrum est [230] ‘dorsum’, quod ad 
mundum et temporalia vertimus, Spiritus autem est ‘facies’, [231] que sursum ad Deum tendit et festinat 
semper.” 
WA 55, II, 583, 1438-1443: “[1438] ‘Percussit’ igitur eos ‘in posteriora’ Dominus, Quando in 
temporalibus [1439] eos afflixit et fecit sperare in illis, que tamen velut stercora reputanda docet [1440] 
Apostolus. Sane ‘posteriora’ in spiritu sunt ipsum corpus Sicut anteriora [1441] ipse anime  . Vnde ad Mosen: 
‘posteriora mea videbis’.        Secundo sunt [1442] ipsa temporalia, ad que  versatur posterius nostrum, scil. 
corpus, et anteriora [1443] sunt ipsa e  terna, ad que  versatur anterius nostrum, scil. Spiritus.” 
See also WA 55, II, 152, 23 – 153, 5; 452, 102 – 453, 156; 930, 1139-1149.  
308WA 55, I, 467 gloss 17: “GLOSSA:17) ‘Homo enim exterior’ est desertum in sanctis. Et ‘speciosum’ in 
illo Est anima latens in tali homine. Sicut econtra ‘homo exterior’ in hominibus mundi est valde cultus ⌈et 
speciosus⌉, Sed ‘interior’ est ‘desertum’, quia illum non colunt sicut illi.” 
WA 55, I, 888: “Et erue me de | manu potestate filiorum Iude  orum alienorum non spiritualium Sed 
carnalium
19
 / quorum os locutum est docuit et iactat vanitatem i. e. de vanis et transitoriis : et dextera 
eorum dextera iniquitatis vt supra, i. e. eorum ‘interior homo’ totus est factus exterior et sapit externa 
tantum, quod est iniquum.” 
WA 55, II, 803, 89-90: “Carni [90] autem adherere Est hominem interiorem in veterem et exteriorem 
nimis [91] migrasse, sicut plorat psalmus idem.” 
309
 Cf. Schwarz 1962, 118-122, for whom the term signifies only the actual orientation. 
310
 WA 55, II, 187, 62-66: “[63] 32, 3 Bl 43 Canticum nouum non potest cantare nisi homo nouus. Est 
autem [64] homo nouus homo gratie  , homo spiritualis et interior coram Deo. Homo [65] autem vetus Est 
‘homo peccati’, homo carnalis et exterior coram mundo. [66] Nouitas enim gratia est, vetustas peccatum.” 
See also WA 55, II, 452, 102 – 453, 156; 873, 5-9 on a person being turned and drawn away from the 
world towards spiritual things and God. 
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participation in the spiritual reality.
311
 Thus even though the internal man signifies the 
spirit as a part of the person, to have a proper internal man and a spirit is only possible 
through the work of grace dwelling in a person. This understanding is analogous to 
Luther’s distinction between being a tabernacle and having a tabernacle. While the carnal 
and properly external person simply is flesh (or the spirit is so deserted that it can be 
discounted), a person who lives an internal and spiritual life can be said to have a spirit in 
the proper sense. He cannot be wholly reduced to either spirit or flesh, but rather he has 
both an external man and an internal man: flesh and spirit. Therefore, the spiritual person 
is in fuller sense a proper composite of flesh and spirit than the carnal person, who has an 
“empty” or “deserted” spirit, which the grace of God has vacated.312 
From the above we can see how the flesh – spirit distinction plays a very significant 
role in the Dictata. The role of the tripartite division (flesh, soul and spirit) in the Dictata, 
however, remains more vague and not fully developed. This pertains especially to the 
nature and place of the soul (anima) in the human person. In the Dictata, Luther often uses 
this term in a positive sense, interchangeable with mind, spirit and internal man.
313
 But in 
other places the term is used in a more negative sense of the sensual or corporeal part of 
the human being and the force animating it. Even in the same section Luther is capable of 
using the term in both senses. He can first distinguish between the “eye” (oculus) as the 
spirit or intellect, and “soul” (anima) as the sensuality (and “stomach” (venter) as the 
memory), following Augustine and Cassiodorus. He can then immediately follow such a 
statement with a different division distinguishing the “eye” (oculus), the higher part of the 
soul, from the “soul” (anima), the lower part of the soul and the “stomach” (venter), the 
vegetable and sensitive flesh.
314
 This labile nature of the soul may be explained by its 
being the intermediate part between the spiritual and the sensual, such that it can be turned 
towards either one. However, Luther already in the Dictata also connects the soul and 
reason to each other. The human being is homo rationalis on account of his soul. Echoing 
the distinctions of his later works, Luther commenting on Psalm 48 divides the fallen 
human being into a corporal and a rational nature. He insists that through sin the rational, 
and not only corporeal, nature has become desperate, forgetful and oblivious to celestial 
                                                 
311
 WA I, 684 gloss 5; 886, 21-27; 886 glosses 13-15. 
312
 One should note here how for Luther the spirit plays the role of a principle in which divinity and 
humanity are connected. This idea seems comparable to Luther’s statement in the Genesis lectures that in the 
state before the Fall the human being  had the image of God in his own substance (in sua substantia 
habuerit), through which he participated in the life of God. The spirit therefore does seem to be for Luther 
something, which in one sense is a part of the human being, but in another sense is not, because it is 
participation in the divine. This duality also explains, why from one perspective the fallen person cannot 
have a spirit in the proper sense, but in another sense has the spirit as a kind of dead and empty possibility. 
See WA 42, 47, 8-17. See also Huovinen 1984, 133-135. 
313
 E.g. WA 55, I, 230, 12-13; 520 gloss 18; WA 55, II, 310, 16-19; 346, 79-80; 371, 431-433; 452, 103-
118.  
314
 WA 55, I, 278, 2-4: “oculus meus intellectus vel [3] spiritus: anima mea et per eam tota sensualitas 
et venter meus
11
 memoria [4] mea secundum August⌊inum et Cassi⌊odorum.” 
WA 55, I, 278 gloss 11, 12-17: “GLOSSA:11) [12]Psal. 6.: ‘Turbatus est a furore oculus meus.’ Quia non 
solum ira, [13]Sed omnis passio excecat oculum mentis in malis et turbat saltem in [14]bonis. Oculo autem 
mentis turbato etiam anima fit tediosa et totum [15]corpus, quod ipsa viuificat et sensificat. Vnde hic 
‘Oculus’ pro superiore [16]parte anime, ‘Anima’ autem pro inferiore, ‘Venter’ pro ipsa carne vegetabili 
[17]et sensitiua.” 
WA 55, II, 170, 17-18: “[17] ‘Et anima mea turbata est valde. Sed tu, Domine, vsquequo?’ [18] Anima 
est, prout viuificat corpus. Et sic conturbato oculo fidei tota [19] sensualitas etiam turbatur et omnes sensus.” 
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things.
315
 Used in this sense, the soul and reason have limited capacities for understanding 
the superior spiritual things, which are concealed from them. These statements in the 
Dictata already contain the seeds of the division of human nature into three parts, a 
summary of which can be observed in the following passage: 
For the spirit is the superior, the flesh the inferior part of the human being in this life. And 
therefore exactly the rational man or the man according to his soul is the “firmament 
between the waters”, i.e., between the wisdom of the flesh and of the spirit. But if he turns 
himself to the wisdom of the spirit, then his superior parts are covered with waters, because 
⌈God did not cover the inferior parts, but the superior, with water⌉.316  
The same line of thought seems to have been more fully developed in the Lectures on 
Romans (1515-16), where the same distinctions between the external and internal, carnal 
and spiritual man persist. The carnal man is the man of sin, without spirit. In the New 
Creation through the work of grace, the person becomes an internal man or, more 
precisely, acquires an internal man. The struggle between the two begins and persists, 
because in this life the internal man cannot be without the external.
317
 The Lectures on 
Romans strongly emphasizes the simultaneous existence of the two.
318
 In addition, the 
nature of the soul as the intermediate part between the two is expressed there even more 
clearly: 
                                                 
315
 WA 55, II, 257, 4-12: “[4] Primum est ‘Adam’. Et hoc proprie exprimit hominis naturam corporalem 
[5] et hominem exteriorem, secundum quam ‘de limo terre  ’ formatus est. [6] ‘Adam’ enim terram proprie 
significat, maxime rubram. Et sic aptissime [7] Apost⌊olus Ro. 5. dicit, Quod Adam fuerit ‘forma futuri’, 
Quia terrenus et [8] corporalis homo figura est ce  lestis i. e. spiritualis. Vnde dicit ‘Si portauimus [9] 
Imaginem terreni’ etc. Alterum Est ‘Enos’, Quod interpretatur [10] ‘obliuiscens’ seu ‘desperatus.’ Et proprie 
exprimit hominis rationalem naturam, [11] secundum quam corpori peccati immersus est et desperatus ac 
obliuiosus [12] factus.” 
See also WA 55, I, 520 gloss 18. 
316
 WA 55, II, 804, 138-143: “[138] Spiritus enim Est Superius, Caro autem inferius hominis [139] in hac 
vita. Et sic homo prout rationalis vel secundum animam est [140] ‘firmamentum inter aquas et aquas’ i. e. 
inter sapientiam carnis et [141] spiritus. Si autem sese vertit ad sapientiam spiritus, iam superiora eius [142] 
teguntur aquis, quia ⌈[non] inferiora, sed su[peri]ora eius tegit [143] [a]quis⌉.” 
Joest 1967, 167-169 interprets the quotation as referring to two ways of life (Lebensbestimmung) and 
rejecting the idea that it speaks about the constituent parts of the person. According to Joest, the human 
being proper is only the “soul,” and the “spirit” and “flesh” signify the two ways of life he can turn to. The 
waters, according to Joest, signify the Gospel towards which the spiritual person then turns. He sees the 
waters, but not the future things beyond them, whereas the carnal person turns toward the Earth. However, 
according to Luther, the rational person or soul is not below the waters, but the firmament between the 
waters, i.e. the intermediate part, and can turn towards both. The soul has the capacity to become spiritual 
through the Gospel, and gaze into the heavenly glory hidden by the superior clouds. It can also become 
completely carnal, when the internal man, i.e. spirit, is completely submerged unto the external man as the 
water sinks into the Earth (see the complete text in context, WA 55, II, 802, 74 – 804, 143). 
317
 WA 56, 8, 1-2; 8 gloss 1; 65 gloss 2; 66, 4 – 65, 2;  75, 9-15; 75 gloss 2; 117 gloss 6; 123 gloss 3, 11-
14; 324, 5-15; 340, 30 – 341, 8; 345, 29 – 346, 1; 461, 3-9. At certain points Luther states, however, that the 
old man did not exist before the Law. However, he proceeds to clarify that by this he means the old man was 
not known or recognized (WA 56, 64 gloss 3; 65 gloss 2). 
318
 See chapter 2.4.2.3. 
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Therefore I have said: There are three [parts] in man: Body, soul, spirit. Soul is in the 
middle of both. The body is placed under subservience, but with the consent of the soul 
and commanding of the spirit, which is free above everything.
319
 
In the thirteenth chapter of the Lectures on Romans Luther also gives an illustrative 
summary of his anthropology, which is strongly reminiscent of his ideas in On the 
Freedom of a Christian (1520)
320
: 
Is there a mystery behind why he does not say “every man” but rather, “every soul”? 
Perhaps because of a sincere submission that must be from the heart. Second, because the 
soul is the medium between the body and the spirit; so that he thus may show that the 
believer is at the same time exalted once and for all above all things and yet subject to 
them, and so he is a twin who has two forms in him, just like Christ. For according to the 
spirit he is above all things. […] 
Thus the spirit of the believers cannot be or become subject to anyone, but is exalted with 
Christ in God, having all things under its feet. This is illustrated by the woman of Rev. 12, 
who is depicted as having the moon, i.e., all temporal powers under her feet. The “soul”, 
which is the same spirit of man, insofar it lives and works, is occupied by the senses and 
temporal things and should be “subject to all, also human creatures because of God”. 
Through this submission it is obedient to God and wills the same with God; and through 
this submission it overcomes these things.
321
 
It is noteworthy that the nature of the soul is here also defined as being “the same spirit 
of man” (“‘Anima’, Que est idem spiritus hominis”). Ontologically the soul and spirit are 
the same, but the word “soul” acquires its meaning from its acts, effects and objects: to 
live and to be occupied with the senses and temporal things.
322
 In addition, the text stands 
otherwise in continuity with the previously analysed texts, except that it emphasizes the 
similarity of the twofold composition of the believer to the two natures of Christ, which is 
a central idea in the Lectures on Romans. 
                                                 
319
 WA 56, 480, 18-20: “[18] Vt Ergo dixi: Tria sunt in homine, Corpus, Anima, spiritus; Anima [19] 
medium vtriusque. Corpus subiectum est potestati, Sed consentiente et [20] volente anima ac Iubente spiritu, 
qui est Liber super omnia.“ 
320
 See WA 7, 21, 1-17. 
321
 WA 56, 476, 3-26: “[3] An Mysterium habeat, Quod non dicit: Omnis homo, Sed ‘omnis [4] Anima’? 
Forte propter Synceram subiectionem et ex animo prestandam. [5] Secundo, Quia Anima est medium inter 
corpus et Spiritum; Vt ergo [6] ostendat, Quod fidelis simul et semel est exaltatus super omnia et tamen [7] 
subiectus, Et sic Gemellus duas in se formas habens, sicut et Christus. [8] Nam secundum spiritum est super 
omnia. […] 
[20] Igitur Spiritus fidelium Nulli est aut esse potest subiectus, Sed est [21] cum Christo in Deo 
Exaltatus, omnia he  c sub pedibus suis habens, Vt [22] Apoc. 12. In Muliere figuratur habente sub pedibus 
Lunam i. e. temporalia. [23] ‘Anima’, Que est idem spiritus hominis, Sed inquantum viuit [24] et operatur, 
in sensibus ac temporalibus occupatur, debet esse ‘subiecta [25] omni etiam Creature  humane  propter 
Deum’. Qua subiectione Deo [26] obedit et idem cum Deo vult; ideo iam per eam subiectionem superat illa.” 
322
 In this sense some credit can be given to Joest’s relational interpretation (Joest 1967, 170-172), but 
the relational aspect of the soul does not exclude its real participation in its objects. Joest also fails to pay 
sufficient attention to the difference between the tripartite and bipartite anthropologies when he attempts to 
convert the former into the latter. Here Joest takes the “soul” to mean the whole person, and the “flesh” and 
the “spirit” to mean the two areas of life, though this interpretation contradicts the latter text of Luther’s 
Magnificat, with which Joest is familiar. (See p. 109 and the following discussion).  
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In the Lectures on Galatians (1516/17) Luther further discusses the nature of the soul. 
The lectures contain quite a lot of deliberations regarding the relationship of the various 
anthropological terms used by the Apostle Paul to each other. Luther also illustrates his 
anthropology in these lectures by means of several allegorical images: 
Some who ponder Paul with great attention say that they see a threefold man in him, that 
is: animal, carnal, spiritual. The distinction is very good, but the Apostle Paul seems to call 
the animal and the carnal man by confusing names: the old, external, earthly etc. as in 1. 
Cor 2: ‘The animal man [or man with a soul (homo animalis)] does not perceive those 
things which are God’s’, But against that 1. Cor 15: ‘The animal body is sown and the 
spiritual will rise.’ And again later in chapter 5: ‘The works of the flesh are’ etc., with 
carnal as ‘in evil’. But contrary to this in 1. Cor. 3 he calls them carnal, when they were 
faithful. Therefore ‘animal man’ is the sensual man himself, bound to the senses because 
he is driven by the five of them like a beast. ‘Carnal’, however, is the rational man, or the 
man according to his soul. Also in the Scriptures a dual vocabulary is used: First, man is 
called ‘Adam’, i.e., earth, on account of the body and animality, second on account of the 
soul aenos, i.e., miserable or weakened, as in Ps. 8: ‘Who is aenos, what is his memory, or 
the son of Adam, that you visit him.’ The spiritual man himself is hidden to us, the new 
and internal image and glory of God, called ‘man’ [(vir)] by the Apostle. He is the one who 
is empty alone for God, rather in a passive than in an active sense, because he does nothing 
else except receive God in himself. He is the one whose life is in faith, hope and love; 
namely, wholly dependent on the invisible. 
According to blessed Augustine in De Trinitate 12, these three men are represented in 
Paradise by means of the serpent, Eve and Adam. There he says that Adam is the spiritual 
man, Eve the carnal man and serpent the animal man, rejecting those who have interpreted 
Eve as sensuality or animality. Accordingly, theologians call the superior part of reason 
spiritual, the carnal part of reason inferior, and the sensuality animal. They are also 
represented by the Tabernacle of Moses. The atrium, which was five cubits high and 
illuminated by the corporeal sun, signifies the sensual or animal part, possessing namely 
the five senses and visible light; the Holy, however, which was not illuminated by Sun but 
by the candelabrum, signifies the carnal or rational, or the rational part illuminated by 
other lights, namely the sciences and arts; the Holy of Holies, however, which was wholly 
in darkness and without light and where the Ark and mercy seat were, signifies the 
spiritual man who possesses God in interior darkness, i.e., in faith.
323
  
                                                 
323
 WA 57, a77, 25 – a79, 2: “Quidam [26] sane intentissime Paulum trutinantes triplicem hominem 
videri in ipso [27] dicunt, sc. animalem, carnalem, spiritualem. Distinctio optime placet, [1] sed videtur 
apostolus Paulus carnalem et animalem confuse nominare, nunc [2] veterem, exteriorem, terrenum etc., ut 1. 
Corinthios 2.: ‘Animalis homo [3] non percipit ea, que Dei sunt.’ Sed contra 1. Corin. 15.: ‘Seminatur 
corpus [4] animale, et resurget spirituale.’ Item infra 5.: ‘Carnis opera sunt’ etc., [5] ubi ‘carnalis’ in malum. 
Sed contra 1. Corin. 3. vocat eos ‘carnales’, cum [6] essent fideles. Igitur ‘animalis homo’ est ipse sensualis 
homo, tanquam [7] addictus, quia sicut bestia 5 sensibus agitur. ‘Carnalis’ autem est homo [8] rationalis seu 
secundum animam. Nam et in Scripturis duplici vocabulo, [9] uno propter corpus et animalitatem, quod est 
‘Adam’ i. e. terra, vocatur, [10] alio propter animam, quod est αενος i. e. miser seu afflictus, ut psal. 8.: [11] 
‘Quid est αενος, quod memor es eius, aut filius Adam, quia visitas eum.’ [12] Spiritualis homo est ipse 
absconditus nobis, novus et interior, imago et [13] gloria Dei et vir apud Apostolum vocatus. Hic est, qui 
soli proprie Deo [14] vacat pociusque passivus quam activus, cum nihil aliud faciat, quam [15] quod Deum 
in se recipiat; cuius vita est in fide, spe et charitate, totus sc. [16] pendens ex invisibilibus.        Hos tres 
homines beatus Au⌊gustinus 12. de [17] trinitate dicit figuratos in paradiso per serpentem, per Evam, per 
 103 
 
 
Luther’s exposition of the meaning of the soul (anima) and animal man (homo 
animalis) here follows the ideas expressed in the Dictata’s exposition of Ps. 48.324 
Animality is connected with the body and the senses: the “animal man” refers to the 
sensual and corporeal nature of the human being, However, further developing the idea 
expressed in the Dictata of the fallen status of human rationality, Luther states that the 
carnal man does not mean the corporeal man, but the rational man or man according to his 
soul. Therefore carnality is not principally connected to the body, but to the fallen reason, 
which is oriented towards the arts and sciences but forgetful of God. Note how here Luther 
uses the term “soul” no longer for the spiritual man (as in the Dictata), but in connection 
with the faculties directed towards created things. Nevertheless, the distinction Luther 
draws here between the superior and inferior parts of reason (borrowed from Augustine)
325
 
is in harmony with the idea that the soul and the spirit are still ontologically parts of the 
same whole, but directed towards different objects. Furthermore, the spiritual man is here 
defined as the hidden, internal image of God, and as the capacity to receive God and 
depend on the invisible (Hic est, qui soli proprie Deo vacat pociusque passivus quam 
activus, cum nihil aliud faciat, quam quod Deum in se recipiat). This act of reception 
happens in the interior darkness of faith, as is prefigured by the Holy of Holies of the 
Tabernacle in which God was present.
326
 Luther emphasizes the themes of passivity, 
emptiness and darkness, as well as turning to interior things, which is comparable to the 
Dictata’s themes of turning away from created and visible things towards the interior of 
the Tent. In addition, the idea of receiving the image and glory is connected with the idea 
that Christ is the substantial image and reflection of God which shines on the rational soul 
(i.e., on its superior part), which alone is capax dei, capable of receiving this divine image 
and reflection. Behind this idea lies a Christological application of the metaphysics of 
light.
327
 
A very similar picture can be had from the Lectures on Hebrews (1517), in which 
appear two passages containing a lengthy treatment of anthropology. The first passage 
closely resembles the formerly treated text of the Lectures on Romans. This text has 
already been discussed in part at the end of chapter 2.3.3.3. In it Luther discusses the 
symbolic meanings of the Tabernacle. There he gives the Tabernacle a cosmological, an 
                                                                                                                                                   
Adam, [18] ut sit Adam spiritualis, Eva carnalis, serpens animalis, reprobans ibidem [19] eos, qui Evam sunt 
interpretati sensualem seu animalem. Hinc theologi [20] vocant spiritualem superiorem porcionem rationis, 
inferiorem carnalem [21] porcionem rationis, animalem autem sensualitatem. Item figurati eciam [22] sunt 
per tabernaculum Moisi. Atrium enim, quod erat 5 cubitorum [23] altitudinis et corporali sole illustre, 
sensualem seu animalem significat 5 [24] sc. sensibus et visibili luce potientem; sanctum autem non sole, 
sed candelabro [25] illuminatum significat carnalem seu rationalem seu rationalem aliis luminibus, sc. [26] 
scientiis et artibus illuminatum; sanctum sanctorum autem prorsus in [1] tenebris et sine lumine, ubi arca et 
propiciatorium, spiritualem hominem [2] significat, in tenebris interioribus i. e. in fide habentem Deum.” 
324
 See WA 55, II, 257, 4-12, text at footnote 315. 
325
 De Trin. XII, 17. On the concept in Augustine see Nash 2003, 7-8; 64-66. Luther uses the same 
distinction with reference to Augustine also in the glosses to Tauler’s sermons (WA 9, 97, 1-5). On the 
Scholastic background and Luther’s early use of the distinction see Ebeling 1982, 227-240; Mulligan 1955. 
326
 Here there is an analogy to Gerson’s definition of mind: “Mens ab eminentia nominatur et in supremo 
cordis triclinio collocatur, quia proprium habet officium spiritualibus intendere. Non qualibuscunque, quia 
ratio communiter circa sui cognitionem et spiritualium occupatur. Sed mens vacat soli Deo.” See Tractatus 
septimus super magnificat, De mente veritates duodecim (DP IV, 332D-333A). See also Metzger 1964, 76 
footnote 36. 
327
 See chapters 2.2.3 and 3.3. 
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anthropological and an ecclesiological meaning. Luther explicates the anthropological 
meaning of the Tabernacle: 
Others rather wish to understand the Tabernacle tropologically as the minor world, that is, 
the human being, who according to the highest part of his reason moves among the 
invisible and divine things. So only God alone, as Augustine declares in numerous places,  
dwells in and fills man’s higher mind, and it is exactly through this that the human being is 
the Ark of the Lord which has the mercy seat, the Cherubim, manna and the rod of Aaron. 
But the Holy signifies the lower reason, which is illuminated by the light, as is said, of the 
natural reason. This is signified by the candelabrum. Finally, the forecourt means the 
carnal sensibility, as a figure of which it is five cubits high, because there are five senses. 
In short, accordingly, the senses are the forecourt, the reason is the Holy and the intellect is 
the Holy of Holies, which are the three men frequently mentioned by Paul: the animal, the 
carnal and the spiritual. And each one of these has its own rite, its own theology and its 
own worship of God, to which the following three types of theology correspond: symbolic, 
to the senses; proper, to the reason; and mystical, to the intellect.
328
 
As can be seen, the above text closely follows the distinctions drawn in the Lectures on 
Romans. On the one hand, the spiritual man (symbolized by the Holy of Holies) is equal to 
the higher part of the reason or the higher mind, filled by God who alone dwells in it. The 
carnal man is associated with the lower reason illuminated by its own natural light. On the 
other hand, Luther calls the higher part “intellect” and the lower part “reason”, also 
drawing a terminological distinction between these two. The forecourt of the Tabernacle 
represents the senses. An interesting feature here is also how Luther, closely following 
classical distinctions on mystical theology, associates mystical theology with the highest 
part, proper theology with the reason and symbolic theology with the senses.
329
  
In the second important anthropological passage in the Lectures on Hebrews Luther 
discusses the nature of the rest God will give to his people. This passage also sheds light 
on how Luther at this point in time understands the distinctions between the three kinds of 
theology. The final rest is acquired only in union with the essential work of God: 
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 WA 57, b197, 6-20: “Alii magis tropologice per ‘tabernaculum’ [7] intelligunt minorem mundum id 
est ipsum hominem, qui secundum portionem [8] superiorem rationis versatur in invisibilibus et in his, quae 
Dei [9] sunt. Sic enim Deus solus, ut in multis locis Augustinus asserit, habitat [10] et replet mentem 
superiorem hominis, ac per hoc talis homo vere est [11] archa Domini habens propitiatorium, Cherubin, 
manna et virgam Aaron. [12] ‘Sanctum’ autem significat rationem inferiorem, quae illuminatur lumine, [13] 
ut dicunt, naturalis rationis, quod per candelabrum significetur, sensus [14] P Bl. 112b vero carnis *tandem 
intelligatur per atrium, in cuius figuram atrium [15] habuit quinque cubitos altitudinis, quia 5 tantum sensus. 
Et breviter [16] ad istum modum sensus est atrium, ratio est sanctum, intellectus sanctum [17] sanctorum, 
qui sunt tres illi homines a Paulo celebrati, scilicet animalis, [18] carnalis, spiritualis. Et in singulis suus est 
ritus et sua theologia, suus [19] cultus Dei, quibus respondet triplex illa theologia: simbolica sensui, [20] 
propria rationi, mystica intellectui.” 
329
 Luther’s division between sensus, ratio superior, ratio inferior appears to be borrowed from 
Augustine and Gerson (the latter employs the triad  sensus, ratio, mens vel apex mentis sive syntheresis). 
Luther replaces Gerson’s highest part, the “apex mentis” with intellect/faith. See Luther’s glosses to Tauler’s 
sermons, WA 9, 97, 1-5; 99, 36-40; 103, 39-41. Luther also refers in the same glosses to the distinction 
between proper and mystical theology, WA 9, 98, 14-34. On the history of the concepts of ratio superior 
and inferior see footnote 325. 
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In order that we may grasp in some measure the nature of that rest, it is necessary to note 
that man, like Noah’s ark, “has three chambers” and is divided into three men, namely, the 
sensual, the rational, and the spiritual. || Man is called a microcosm, that is, a smaller 
world. || Every one of those men rests and is disturbed or troubled in a twofold way: 
namely, either from within [ab intra] or from without [ab extra].  
In the first place, the sensual man is brought to rest from without when he receives 
pleasure from a sensible object, which is to rest positively. On the other hand, he is 
disturbed and troubled when the sensible object is disturbed or removed. But he truly is 
brought to rest from within when he rests in a privative sense, i.e., when he ceases from 
work or sensible objects on account of the work of the rational man, as is seen in people 
who think or speculate. On the other hand, he is disturbed from within when, because of 
the disturbance of the rational man, he is confused, as is clear in the case of those who are 
sad and melancholy.  
In the second place, the rational man is brought to rest from without and positively in his 
rational and speculable objects, if they are pleasant. But he is disturbed from without if 
they are sad. He is brought to rest from within and in a privative sense when the spiritual 
man, ceasing the work of the rational man, is turned over to faith and the Word. But he is 
disturbed from within when he is disturbed alongside the disturbance of the spiritual man, 
namely, when the spiritual man is in peril of losing faith and the Word. For this 
disturbance is the most horrible of all, since it is innermost and next to hell.  
In the third place, the spiritual man is brought to rest from without in the Word and in 
faith, namely positively, as long as the object of faith, i.e., the Word, remains fixed in him. 
But he is disturbed from without in the peril of faith (as has been said) and when the Word 
is taken away, as happens when faith, hope, and love are tested. This is namely the man 
who “lives in the Word of God”. He truly is brought to rest from within, however, when he 
rests privatively, namely, when he is withdrawn from faith and the Word into the essential 
work of God, which is the very birth of the uncreated Word, as he says: “This is eternal 
life, that they know Thee, the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent”, that is, 
the procession of the Son from the Father. And here there is no disturbance from within, 
for this seventh day has no evening by which it could pass over into another day. And from 
what has been stated one gets, in a way, a brief exposition of both kinds of theology, 
namely, the affirmative and the negative.
330
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 WA 57, b158,18 – b160, 1: “[18] D Bl. 31b. Ut aliquatenus apprehendamus illius requiei modum, 
notandum, [19] quod homo sicut arca Noë est ‘tricameratus’ et in tres homines divisus, [20] scil. sensualem, 
racionalem et spiritualem. || homo dicitur microcosmos [21] i. e. minor mundus || Quilibet illorum dupliciter 
quiescit et inquietatur [1] seu laborat, videlicet vel ab intra vel ab extra.        Primum sensualis ab [2] extra 
quiescit, quando in sensibili obiecto delectatur, quod est positive [3] quiescere; rursum turbatur et laborat, 
quando sensibile obiectum turbatur [4] vel auffertur. Ab intra vero quiescit, quando privative quiescit, i. e. 
[5] dum cessat ab opere vel obiectis sensibilibus propter opus racionalis [6] hominis, ut patet in cogitabundis 
et speculativis hominibus; rursum [7] turbatur ab intra, quando ad turbacionem hominis racionalis 
confunditur, [8] ut patet in tristibus et melancolicis.        Secundo racionalis homo quiescit [9] ab extra et 
positive in obiectis suis racionalibus et speculabilibus, si [10] fuerint iocunda; turbatur autem ab extra, si 
fuerint tristia. Ab intra [11] vero quiescit et privative, quando cessante opere eius spiritualis homo in [12] 
fide et verbo versatur; turbatur autem ab intra, quando ad turbacionem [13] spiritualis hominis, scil. in fide et 
verbo periclitantis, et ipse turbatur, [14] hec enim turbacio est omnium horribilissima, quia intima et 
proxima [15] inferno.        Tercio spiritualis homo ab extra requiescit in verbo et fide, [16] scil. positive, dum 
obiectum fidei i. e. verbum ei infixum manserit. [17] Turbatur autem ab extra in periculo fidei (ut dictum 
est) et verbi subtraccione, [18] ut fit in temptacionibus fidei, spei et charitatis; hic est enim [19] homo, qui 
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These three men (at this place called sensual, rational and spiritual) form a hierarchy, 
which Luther here compares to the three chambers of the Noah’s ark, a figure found in the 
Victorine mystical texts.
331
 Each man has its proper object as well as an external and an 
internal rest. The external rest is found in each man’s turning towards its own external 
object. Internal rest is received when the man who holds the higher place in the hierarchy 
receives his rest, which results in the lower man withdrawing from its proper object. The 
theme of passivity, connected with turning inwards, is clear here as well. Finally, the 
supreme rest of the spiritual man, lies in direct and essential union with God, in which the 
word and faith are left behind. Because this rest has no end, it can be properly understood 
only as referring to the heavenly reality, as also Luther’s allegory of the seventh day, when 
God rested, shows. The external rest of the spiritual man, described as word and faith, 
should however not be understood as rest in an external, separated and merely sensible 
object in the sense that it excludes an internal union with God through word and faith. 
Rather, this external rest should be understood in the light of the reality of the Incarnation 
and the theology of the three stages of God’s works, where God is already really 
participated into hiddenly via the external means of grace in the stage of the Church. This 
participation happens through the external means of grace, which when received are 
grasped internally by the spirit in faith, but which still hide the divine reality within 
themselves and within the cloud of faith. Thus the word can be said to remain fixed in the 
believer (verbum ei infixum manserit), presupposing an internal relation. Christ is already 
present in the spiritual man through faith, but the divinity is still hidden by the humanity 
and the veil of faith.
332
 
Luther’s writings also contain examination of the development of theological 
anthropology, especially with regard to Origen’s Jerome’s and Augustine’s reading of 
Paul. The Lectures on Hebrews contain the following comment on Hebr. 4:12: 
From philosophy it is said that substantial form is indivisible, especially the human form. 
Hence come those thickets of opinions on whether the powers of the soul differ actually 
[realiter], substantially [substancialiter], or formally [formaliter]. || A habit results from 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘vivit in verbo Dei’. Ab intra vero quiescit, quando privative [20] quiescit, scil. a fide et verbo sublatus in 
opus essenciale Dei, quod est [21] ipsa nativitas Verbi increati, sicut dicit: ‘Hec est vita eterna, ut cognoscant 
[22] te, Deum verum, et quem misisti Ihesum Christum’ i. e. processionem [23] filii a patre. Et hic non est 
turbacio ab intra, quia hic septimus [24] dies non habet vesperam, qua possit transire in alium diem. Et ex 
his [1] patet aliquo modo utriusque theologie scil. affirmative et negative brevis [2] declaracio.” 
331
 Exampes of this are Hugh of St. Victor’s De arca Noe mystica and De arca Noe morali, but the 
distinctions Luther draws are simple compared to Hugh’s multi-faceted allegories. Nevertheless, there are 
common features: The progress of the meditation from the external to the internal proceeds through the 
chambers of the Ark, with the goal being the rest in God in which the human being is elevated above 
himself. See McGinn 1994, 376-381. 
332
 See chapters 2.3.3.3, 2.4.2.1, 3.3.1 and 3.4. Cf. Joest 1967, 178-183, whose relational interpretation 
which excludes the internal relation and participation in the reality behind the word makes him state 
explicitly, that he does not understand the passage. Furthermore Joest’s interpretation, which makes it seem 
that there is a break between the Dictata and the Lectures on Romans, and again a return to the scheme of 
the Dictata in the Lectures on Hebrews, shows the untenability of Joest’s readings of Luther’s 
anthropological passages, especially his disregard for the hierarchy between the spiritual and the temporal in 
Luther’s (tripartite) anthropological scheme. Stoellger 2010, 223-225 does not understand the text either. He 
does not notice that the final seven day rest is related to eternal life (vita eterna). Stoellger reads 
participation in the procession of the uncreated word as a reference to faith, though Luther in the text clearly 
states that the human being is raised from faith to that final rest. 
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frequently repeated acts. || Proceeding simply in faith we follow the apostle, who, in 1 
Thessalonians last [chapter 5] divides man into three parts, saying: “May your spirit and 
soul and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of the Lord.” On the other hand, 
in 1 Cor. chapter 14 he divides man into mind and spirit, saying: “I will sing with the spirit, 
and I will sing with the mind.” But the Blessed Virgin Mary also says: “He has scattered 
the proud in the mind of their hearts”. Indeed, Christ himself makes distinctions in various 
ways when He says: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your 
mind, with all your soul”, with all your strength, or “with all your powers.” Above others, 
Origen labored with this matter; and after him St. Jerome says with reference to Gal. 5:17 
that the body or the flesh is our lowest part, known to all; the spirit on the other hand is the 
highest part by which we are capable of divine things; the soul however is the middle part 
between the two. If they are understood in the way St. Augustine, too, divides man into a 
higher and a lower part and the senses, they are clear and have been satisfactorily stated 
above.
333
 
The passage illustrates how the previously discussed differences in the scheme 
regarding the nature of the soul can be understood. On the one hand Luther refers here to 
the question discussed particularly by the Nominalists (foremost of all by Ockham), of 
regarding whether there can be multiple forms in the human being, and regarding how the 
powers of the soul differ from each other (in an ontological sense).
334
 The point of 
Luther’s introducing this issue here may lie the question; if there is one indivisible form, 
how can there be contradictory affects in the human being, as is the case between the spirit 
and the flesh? The text is not explicit on Luther’s reasoning, however. Without really 
answering the philosophical question, Luther (after reviewing a number of biblical 
passages) harmonizes the views of Origen and Jerome with that of St. Augustine regarding 
the idea of the soul as the intermediate part of the person.
335
 However, Luther returns to 
the same question later in his early Commentary on Galatians (WA 2) when he comments 
on Gal. 5:17 “The flesh lusts against the spirit, the spirit against the flesh”.336 The first 
edition of the work, printed in 1519, contains the following passage: 
Just as “spirit” in this passage does not signify chastity alone, so it follows necessarily that 
“flesh” does not signify lust alone. I have had to say this because it has become an 
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 WA 57, b162, 24 – b163, 17: “[24] Ex philosophia dicitur formam substancialem esse indivisibilem, 
[1] maxime vero humanam. Hinc illa opinionum spineta, utrum realiter [an] [2] substancialiter an formaliter 
differant vires animae. || ex actibus sepe [3] repetitis fit habitus || Verum simpliciter in fide ambulantes 
Apostolum [4] sequemur, qui 1. Thes. ultimo distinguit hominem in tres porciones [5] dicens: ‘Ut integer 
spiritus vester et anima et corpus sine querela in adventum [6] Domini servetur.’ Rursum 1. ad Co. cap. 14. 
distinguit hominem [7] in mentem et spiritum dicens: ‘Psallam spiritu, psallam et mente.’ Sed [8] et b. virgo 
Maria dicit: ‘Dispersit superbos mente cordis sui.’ Imo [9] Christus ipse varie distinguit dicens: ‘Diliges 
dominum Deum tuum ex [10] toto corde tuo, ex tota mente tua, ex tota anima tua’, ex tota fortitudine [11] 
tua sive ‘ex omnibus viribus tuis’. In hac igitur re laboravit pre ceteris [12] Origenes et post eum b. 
Hiero⌊nimus ad Gal. 5., ut sit corpus seu caro [13] infima porcio nostra nota omnibus, spiritus vero suprema 
porcio, qua [14] divinorum capaces sumus, anima vero media porcio inter utramque. [15] Que si 
intelligantur quomodo et b. Aug⌊ustinus distribuit hominem in [16] porcionem superiorem et inferiorem ac 
sensum, plana sunt ac satis dicta [17] superius.” 
334
 See Hirvonen 2004, 47-74; Kärkkäinen 2007, 264-270. 
335
 On this background see Joest 1967, 142-148. 
336
 WA 2, 585, 8-9: “[8] [Gal. 5, 17.] Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem [9] 
adversus carnem.” 
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established usage almost among all to understand “desires of the flesh” only in the sense of 
“lust.” According to this usage, it would be impossible for the apostle to be understood. In 
his excellent treatment of this thought in Rom. 7 he explains it at greater length and says: 
“For I delight in the Law of God according to the internal man, but I see in my members 
another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin which 
is in my members.” For Paul did not say this in the role of others, as St. Augustine, in the 
eleventh chapter of the sixth book of his Against Julian, states that he had once understood 
or rather misunderstood him; but that, he says, is how the Manichaeans and the Pelagians 
understood Paul. Thus St. Peter, in his first epistle chapter 2 says: “I beseech you as aliens 
and exiles to abstain from the carnal desires that wage war against the soul.” 
Here St. Jerome involves himself deeply in the question how to find a neutral ground and 
neutral works between the flesh and the spirit. Following his Origen, he distinguishes 
spirit, soul, and flesh and distributes them into spiritual, animal and carnal man. And 
although this threeness seems to be established from 1 Thess. last [5th] chapter, where we 
read: “May your spirit and soul and body be kept, etc.”, still I do not venture to agree or 
disagree, both because in the passage quoted Peter obviously takes spirit and soul as 
being the same, since he calls it the soul that the desires make war against, whereas 
Paul says that the desires of the flesh lust against the spirit, and also because to me 
the Apostle seems to take carnal and animal man as being the same.
337
 
The section exhibits a similar uncertainty as that appearing in the previously discussed 
works regarding the status of the soul: whether or not it can be conceived of as a neutral 
medium, or a part of the fallen carnality. In this passage, Luther expresses his hesitations 
explicitly (part in bold).
338
 However at the same location on the second printed edition of 
the same commentary, revised by Luther and published in 1523 (marked H in WA 2), 
Luther replaces the part of the above quote appearing in bold with the following passage: 
still he appears in 1. Cor. 2 to sufficiently condemn also the animal man, when he says: 
The animal man does not perceive those things that are of God’s spirit. Thus because the 
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 WA 2, 585, 10-30: “[10] Sicut ‘spiritus’ hoc loco non significat solam castitatem, ita necesse [11] est, 
ut ‘caro’ non solam significet libidinem. hoc pro necessitate dixi, quia [12] inveteravit usus fere apud omnes, 
carnis concupiscentiam pro libidine tantum [13] [Röm. 7, 22 f.] accipi, quo usu Apostolus intelligi non 
posset. Hanc sententiam Rho. vij. [14] egregie tractans et copiosius declarans dicit: Condelector enim legi 
dei [15] secundum interiorem hominem, video autem aliam legem in membris meis [16] repugnantem legi 
mentis meae, captivantem me in legem peccati, quae est [17] in membris meis &c. Non enim haec in 
persona aliorum locutus est Paulus, [18] sicut beatus Augustinus lib. vi. contra Iul. c. xi. dicit se aliquando 
intellexisse, [19] immo non intellexisse, Manicheos autem dicit et Pelagianos sic intellexisse. [20] [1. Petr. 2, 
11.] Sic beatus Petrus c. ij. Epist. i. Obsecro vos tanquam advenas et peregrinos [21] abstinere vos a 
carnalibus desyderiis, quae militant adversus animam. [22] D. Hieronymus hoc loco profunde se quaestioni 
involvit, quomodo inter [23] spiritum et carnem medium inveniat et media opera, et suum Origenem [24] 
secutus spiritum, animam, carnem distinguit, inde spiritualem, animalem et [25] carnalem hominem 
distribuit. Et quanquam ista trinitas videatur statui ex [26] [1. Thess. 5, 23.] illo i. Thess. ult. ut integer 
spiritus vester et anima et corpus servetur &c., [27] tamen nec accedere nec recedere audeo, tum quod 
spiritum et animam manifeste [28] pro eodem accipit Petrus in dicto loco, appellans animam, contra quam 
[29] militent desyderia, ubi contra spiritum concupiscere carnem dicit Paulus, et [30] hominem carnalem ac 
animalem mihi pro eodem Apostolus videtur accipere.” 
338
 Luther continues the discussion in this text by stating that he does not separate between the flesh, soul 
and spirit. Rather, he says, he means by them the whole man – especially the soul – with regard to whether 
the person seeks “those things that are of God” and follows God’s law, or battles against God. (WA 2, 585, 
31 – 586, 18). The question of the relationship of the bipartite anthropology to the tripartite anthropology 
will be addressed in the following subchapters. 
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animal man does not live a spiritual life nor is moved spiritually, it is not to be doubted that 
the Apostle wished the animal and carnal man to be the same. Therefore no one has been 
right who has adopted neutral works from Origen’s sentences. We see already at Gen. 2 
that the animal man is called the one who is provided with natural life and movement.
339
 
Thus at the latest in the 1523 revision of the early Commentary on Galatians Luther 
comes to a definite and express conclusion that the animal man and animal life constitute 
the opposite of the spiritual man and spiritual life. In addition the “carnal man”, by which 
Luther means the soul and the rational capacities of the fallen human being, also form a 
part of the sinful animal life directed by the soul and opposed to the spirit. The animal 
man is not receptive to spiritual things nor can he be affected by them. The place of the 
soul is thus confirmed as being related to the natural life and natural movement of the 
human being. This position seems to be connected to the Aristotelian idea of the soul as 
the mover and animator of the body. Luther’s conclusion seems to focus, however, on 
removing any doubt that there might be a neutral intermediate part in the natural 
constitution of the human being, a part of the human being which could (without grace) 
merit justification or turn towards spiritual things. The only part or constituent of the 
human being capable of being turned towards God  is the spiritual man or the spirit, the 
imago Dei received in the soul ab extra in faith. 
The final text
340
 on the threefold anthropology to be considered is Luther’s explanation 
of Luke 1:46: “My soul magnifies God, the Lord” in his 1521 Commentary on the 
Magnificat (WA 7, 538-604). Here Luther once again illustrates his anthropology with the 
image of the Tabernacle: 
We wish to observe the words one by one. The first is “my soul.” Scripture divides man 
into three parts, as St. Paul says in 1 Thessalonians last [5. chapter]: “May the God of 
peace Himself sanctify you wholly; and may your whole spirit and soul and body be kept 
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” And each of these three as well as 
the whole man is also divided in another way into two parts, which are the spirit and the 
flesh. This latter division is not a division of the nature, but of the qualities. That is: the 
nature has three parts: spirit, soul and body, and all of these together may either be good or 
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 WA 585, comment on lines 27-30: “H 27-30 Statt der Worte tamen nee accedere bis videtur 
accipere steht in H: tamen satis apparet ex 1. Cor. 2. et animalem hominem damnari, cum ait: Animalis 
homo non percipit ea, quae sunt spiritus dei. Itaque cum animalis homo non vivat vita spiritus nec moveatur 
spiritualiter, non dubium est, quin animalem et carnalem hominem Apostolus eundem esse velit. Quare 
nemo recte collegerit ex Origenis sententia media quedam opera. Iam et Gen. 2. videmus, animalem 
hominem dici, qui naturali vita et motu praeditus est” 
340
 Operationes in Psalmos (1519-21), Luther’s second major work on the Psalms does not contain 
detailed discussion on the natural constitution of the person. However, it does contain a few sections related 
to the image of the human being as Tabernacle. One section uses the figure of standing at the doorway of the 
tent in referring to people who are led only by their reason and senses (AWA 2, 106, 9-13); the other speaks 
about Christ dwelling in the darkness of the Holy of Holies, i.e., the Church and the human heart (WA 5, 
506, 6 -30). The entire work, however, is to a large extent dominated by the qualitative distinction between 
flesh and spirit, connected to the basic affect of the person. Sometimes Luther in the commentary uses also 
the terms (human) nature and grace to refer to these two (see e.g.  AWA 2, 40, 6-10; 74, 60-10; 185, 7 – 186, 
5; 261, 23 -262, 5; 550, 17-24; WA 5, 564, 35 – 565, 13). Nevertheless, the distinctions between the old man 
of the Old Creation and the new man of the New Creation appear in this work (WA 5, 543, 35 – 544, 14). In 
addition, Luther employs the distinction between animal life and spiritual life. He connects spiritual life to 
invisible things and animal life to sensual and rational things (AWA 2, 108, 6-14; WA 5, 669, 37 – 671, 17). 
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evil – that is, they may be spirit or flesh – but this is not the issue under discussion at the 
moment.  
The first part, the spirit, is the highest, deepest and most noble part of man, by which he is 
able to grasp non-concrete [or: incomprehensible], invisible and eternal things. And it is, in 
brief, the house where faith and the word of God dwell inside. David says of it in Psalm 51 
[Vulg: 50]: “Lord, create in my innermost parts a right spirit,” that is, a straight and upright 
faith. But of the unbelieving he says in Psalm 78 [Vulg: 77]: “Their heart was not right 
towards God, nor was their spirit in faith to Him.” 
The second part, the soul, is also of the same spirit in its nature, but it has a different task, 
namely, that it makes the body alive and works through it and is therefore often called in 
the Scriptures ‘life’. The spirit may well live without the body, but the body does not live 
without the spirit. We see this part in how it works and lives also in sleep and without 
ceasing. And its ability is not to understand the non-concrete [incomprehensible] things, 
but those which the reason can know and measure. The reason is namely the light in this 
house, and if the spirit illuminated with faith as if by a higher light does not rule this lower 
light of reason, it cannot ever be without error. It is namely too feeble to deal with divine 
things. To these two parts the Scriptures attribute many things such as sapientia and 
scientia: wisdom to the spirit, knowledge to the soul and likewise hatred, love, sorrow and 
the like. 
The third part is the body with its members, the job of which is the practise and application 
of that which the soul knows and the spirit believes. An illustration from Scripture will 
show this: Moses made a tabernacle with three separate compartments. The first one was 
called the sanctum sanctorum. It was the dwelling place of God and there was no light 
inside it. The second was called the sanctum. There stood a candelabrum with seven arms 
and lamps. The third was called the atrium, the court, and it was publicly under the sky in 
the light of the sun. In the same figure a Christian man is portrayed. His spirit is the 
sanctum sanctorum, the dwelling place of God in gloomy faith without light because he 
believes in that which he does not see, feel or comprehend [or: grasp]. His soul is the 
sanctum. There are the seven lights, that is, all kind of understanding, discrimination, 
knowing and knowledge of bodily and visible things. His body is the atrium. It is visible to 
everyone so that it can be seen what he does and how he lives.  
Now Paul prays God, who is the God of peace, to sanctify us not in one part only, but 
wholly, through and through, so that spirit, soul, body, and all may be holy. We might 
mention many reasons why he prays in this manner, but let the following suffice. When the 
spirit is no longer holy, then nothing is holy anymore.  
The greatest battle and the greatest danger is in the holiness of the spirit, which depends 
wholly upon pure faith, because the spirit has nothing to do with concrete [or: 
comprehensible] things, as is said. Then come false teachers and lure the spirit outside. 
One gives this work, another that method of becoming godly, and if the spirit is not 
protected and wise, it will turn outwards and follow. As soon as it comes to external works 
and ways and seeks them to become godly, faith is lost and the spirit is dead before God.
341
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 WA 7, 550, 19 – 552, 4: “[19] Wollen ein wort nach dem andernn bewiegen: das erst ‘Meyn seele’. 
[20] Die schrifft teilet den menschen ynn drey teil, da S. Paulus 1. Thessal. ult. [21] [1. Thess. 5, 23.] sagt: 
‘Got der ein got des frids ist, der mache euch heilig durch und durch, [22] alszo das ewer gantzer geist und 
seele und leip unstreflich erhalten auff die [23] zukunfft unszers herrnn Ihesu Christi’. Und ein iglichs 
dieszer dreier sampt [24] dem gantzen menschen wirt auch geteylet auff ein ander weisz ynn zwey stuck, 
[25] die da heissen geist und fleisch, wilch teilung nit der natur, szondernn der [26] eygenschaff ist, das ist, 
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The passage from the Commentary on the Magnificat both continues as well as 
summarizes the themes of the many previously analysed passages. Therefore one can 
consider this passage as presenting a mature and developed overall summary of Luther’s 
anthropology.
342
 Here Luther defines both tripartite and bipartite anthropologies, their 
mutual relation, and the function of their individual constituents. The three natural parts of 
the human being are defined in the passage as the spirit (geist / Geist), soul (seele / Seele) 
and body (leip / Leib).  
The spirit is the highest, noblest and innermost part of man, with which he is able to 
grasp non-concrete, incomprehensible, invisible, eternal and divine things.
343
 It is of the 
same nature as the soul (and in this sense Luther retains the distinction found in the 
previous texts between the higher and the lower part), but is distinguished by its object, in 
                                                                                                                                                   
die natur hat drey stuck: geist, seel, leip, und mugen [27] alle sampt gut oder bosz sein, das heist denn geist 
und fleysch sein, davon itzt [28] nit zu reden ist. Das erst stuck, der geist, ist das hohste, tieffiste, edliste teil 
[29] des menschen, damit er geschickt ist, unbegreiflich, unsichtige, ewige ding zu [30] fassen. Und ist 
kurtzlich das hausz, da der glawbe und gottis wort innen [31] [Ps. 51, 12.] wonet. Davon David psal. l. sagt: 
‘Her mach ynn meinem ynnewendigisten [32] ein richtigen geyst’, das ist einen auffgerichten stracken 
glawben. Widderumb [33] [Ps. 78, 37.] von den unglewbigen psal. lxxvij. ‘Ihr hertz war nit richtig zu got, 
und yhr [34] geyst war nit ym glawben zu got’. 
[35] Das ander, die seele, ist eben derselbe geist nach der natur, aber doch [36] inn einem andernn werck. 
Nemlich ynn dem, alsz er den leyp lebendig macht [1] und durch ynn wircket, und wirt offt ynn der schrifft 
fur ‘das leben’ genummen; [2] denn der geyst mag wol on den leyp leben, aber der leyp lebet nit on den [3] 
geyst. Disz stuck sehen wir, wie es auch ym schlaff unnd on unterlasz lebet [4] unnd wurckt. Unnd ist sein 
art nit die unbegriflichen ding zu fassen, szondernn [5] was die vornunfft erkennen unnd ermessen kan. Und 
ist nemlich die vornunfft [6] hie das liecht ynn dieszem hausze, unnd wa der geyst nit mit dem [7] glawben, 
als mit eynem hohern liecht erleucht, disz liecht der vornunfft regiert, [8] so mag sie nimmer on yrthum sein. 
Denn sie ist zu geringe ynn gotlichen [9] dingen zu handelln. Dieszen zweien stucken eygent die schrifft viel 
dings, als [10] sapientiam und scientiam: die weiszheit dem geist, die erkenntnisz der seelen, [11] darnach 
auch hasz, liebe, lust, grewel und des gleichenn. 
[12] Das dritte ist der leip mit seinen gelidernn, wilchs werck sein nur [13] ubungen und prauch, nach 
dem die seel erkennet und der geist glawbt. Unnd [14] [2. Mos. 26, 33f. u. 40, 1 ff.] das wir des eyn 
gleichnisz antzeigen ausz der schrifft: Moses macht eyn Tabernakell [15] mit dreyen underschiedlichen 
gepewen. Das erst hiesz sanctum sanctorum, [16] da wonet got ynnen, unnd war kein liecht drinnen. Das 
ander, sanctum, [17] da ynnen stund ein leuchter mit sieben rohren und lampen. Das drit hiesz [18] atrium, 
der hoff, das war unter dem hymel offentlich, fur der sunnen liecht. [19] Inn der selben figur ist ein Christen 
mensch abgemalet. Sein geist ist sanctum [20] sanctorum, gottis wonung ym finsternn glawben on liecht, 
denn er glewbt, [21] das er nit sihet, noch fulet, noch begreiffet. Sein seel ist sanctum; da sein [22] sieben 
liecht, das ist, allerley vorstannt, underscheid, wissen unnd erkentnisz der [23] leiplichen, sichtlichen dinger. 
Sein corper ist atrium; der ist yderman offenbar, [24] das man sehen kan, was er thut, und wie er lebt. 
[25] [1. Thess. 5, 23.] Nu bittet Paulus: Got, der ein got des frids ist, wolte unsz heilig [26] machen, nit 
ynn einem stuck allein szondernn gantz und gar, durch und durch, [27] das geyst, seel und leib und allisz 
heilig sey. Von ursachen solch gepettis [28] were viel zu sagen, kurtzlich: Wenn der geist nit mehr heilig ist, 
szo ist nichts [29] mehr heilig. Nu ist der groste streit unnd die groste far ynn des geistis [30] heilickeit, 
wilche nur ynn dem blossen lautternn glawben steet, die weil der [31] geyst nit mit begreiflichen dingen 
umbgaht, wie gesagt ist. Szo kommen denn [32] falsche lerer unnd locken den geist erausz, einer gibt fur das 
werck, der ander [1] die weisze frum zu werden. Wo denn der geist hie nit bewaret wirt und [2] weisze ist, 
szo fellet er erausz und folget, Kumpt auff die euszerlichen werck [3] und weiszen, meinet da mit frum zu 
werden: szo bald ist der glawb vorlorenn, [4] und der geist todt fur got.“ 
342
 Joest 1967, 183 agrees with this view. On the Tabernacle image see also Olsson 1971, 454-455; 
Ebeling 1982, 241-250. 
343
 One can ask how Luther’s term unbegreiflich should be understood here, as the term can be used both 
in a concrete and in an abstract sense. However, neither understanding of the term causes problems for the 
analysis. The divine and spiritual reality contains for Luther both invisible things (e.g., the presence of God 
in the sacraments and creation) as well as incomprehensible things (e.g., the divine nature itself), as 
discussed in chapters 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.3.3. 
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which it participates. In the human being it is the dwelling place of God and faith. 
Therefore it is symbolized by the Holy of Holies of the Tabernacle, where God appeared 
on the mercy seat upon the Ark between the Cherubim (Exod. 25:10-22). It is important to 
note, however, that Luther can speak of this presence of God and knowledge of invisible 
things in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, he speaks about God being present in 
gloomy or enigmatic faith (finsternn glawben) without light, but on the other hand he calls 
faith the “higher light” (eynem hohern liecht) illuminating the spirit.344  
For Luther, to put it simply, faith is the true intellect, the higher part of the reason, 
through which the human being can grasp divine and invisible things. When Luther speaks 
about it as a “higher light”, this is not merely a metaphor, but the concept is connected to 
an epistemology of illumination. As evidenced by the texts discussed above which utilize 
the Tabernacle image, Luther holds that God alone dwells in and fills the higher mind of 
the human person (i.e., the spirit or intellect). He further holds that it is just by faith that 
this indwelling and the presence of the glory of God is received by the spiritual person.
 345
 
Furthermore, this presence and reflection of God received in faith by the spiritual person 
constitutes the imago Dei in the human being. The concept of the imago Dei is not merely 
a symbol for Luther, but it signifies real participation in Christ as the substantial and true 
image and reflection of Father. Precisely as this reflection it carries along with it the 
ability to grasp invisible, heavenly and divine things.
346
 When Luther sets faith at the 
place of the highest faculty, he combines the Augustinian superior pars rationis or 
intellectus, Gerson’s apex mentis and Tauler’s seelengrunt in his concept, changing the 
understanding of the highest part of the person from an active capacity for knowing God 
into a receptive possibility actualized by the light of faith. In accordance with faith taking 
the role of the highest faculty, Luther calls the knowledge of the spirit sapientia (wisdom), 
which already for Augustine signifies the knowledge of intellectual, immaterial and 
eternal things, and the knowledge of the soul scientia, which is knowledge of mutable, 
temporal things.
347
 However, besides this modification, the general structure of Luther’s 
                                                 
344
 This duality is noted by Schwarz 1962, 144-147 (see especially Schwarz’s footnote 209), who also 
notes the connections the figure has to Dionysius, Gerson and Bonaventure. 
345
 How this epistemology of illumination functions will be discussed at detail in chapter 3.3. Against 
this view Hägglund emphasizes darkness and passivity in concluding that Luther resists identification of the 
spirit with divine light; on the contrary the spirit identical with the word. See Hägglund 1959, 323-324. 
Joest, disregarding the above analysed texts on the image of the Tabernaclewhich speak of God dwelling in 
and filling the higher mind, interprets the spirit relationally as faith in the external word. In his view, all such 
expressions only mean “encounter with Word and Faith” (“Begegnung von Wort und Glauben”). See Joest 
1967, 184-185. 
346
 On the imago Dei, especially in Luther’s later works, see Hägglund 1959, 77-91; Olsson 1971, 277-
302; Huovinen 1981, 29-39; Huovinen 1984, 133-142; Peura 1990, 121-161; Huovinen 2009, 127-132; 
Raunio 2010, 34-38. Hägglund’s original interpretation of the image tends towards a relational 
understanding, while Olsson and Huovinen emphasize the substantial and psychological reality of the imago. 
The image of God confers with it participation in eternal life and knowledge of the will of God: not in a full 
and complete sense, but in an incipient and growing sense. In the Finnish school represented by Peura, this 
notion is a central concept for understanding the restoration of human nature that takes place through 
participation in Christ. 
347
 See Luther’s glosses to Tauler’s sermons, WA 9, 97, 1-5; 99, 36-40; 103, 39-41. See also Joest 1967, 
175-178; Hägglund 1967, 91; Ozment 1969, 2-3; Olsson 1971, 489-494; Ebeling 1982, 241-250; Stoellger 
2010, 220-222; 230. On the Augustinian background see De Trin. XII, 3.3-4.4; 15.25; Mulligan 1955, 
especially pages 1-4; Nash 2003, 7-9; 63-66. Ebeling recognizes the connection of the superior pars rationis 
to the spirit and to eternal things, buthis examination misses its identification with the  intellect of faith. 
 113 
 
 
threefold anthropology exhibits a clear connection to the mystical theology of the 
medieval Augustinian tradition. The Tabernacle image is found in many authors. 
Bonaventure uses it in his Itinerarium mentis in Deum both as an image of the universe 
and as an image of the human being entering into himself in meditation.
348
 Luther’s use of 
this image in his Commentary on the Magnificat has usually been traced to tractatus 7 of 
Gerson’s Collectorium super Magnificat, but this view seems mistaken.349 Gerson uses a 
different division of the human capacities (mens – ratio – anima) than Luther, and his 
reference to the Tabernacle is brief and in passing.
350
 However, in the Collectorium 
Gerson refers to Richard and Hugh of St. Victor.
351
 Indeed, in the works of the Richard 
one can find a text which is a great deal closer to Luther’s interpretation of the Tabernacle 
than Gerson’s. Richard, in his appendix to and short summary of Benjamin Major called 
Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi foederis, writes: 
By the tabernacle of the covenant the state of perfection is to be understood [...] The 
tabernacle ought to have an atrium around it. By the atrium understand the discipline of the 
body, by the tabernacle the discipline of the mind. Where the exterior discipline is lacking, 
interior discipline cannot be observed. But on the other hand, without the discipline of the 
mind discipline of the body is not useful. The atrium lies open under the sky and the 
discipline of the body is visible to all. But what is inside the tabernacle is not visible from 
                                                                                                                                                   
According to Ebeling, a question mark needs to be added with regard to the capacities of the spirit with 
respect to eternal things, because Luther stresses their incomprehensible nature as well as faith and the word 
as the true inhabitants of the spirit. Olsson correctly recognizes Luther's connections to Gerson and the 
connection of the spirit to the superior pars rationis but his work misses Luther's idea that the spirit is dead 
and empty without faith. Instead he constructs the idea of a carnal spirit, which leads him to argue for a 
greater distance between Luther and the concept of superior pars rationis. Stoellger interprets Luther’s 
replacement of the highest part with faith as an indication of the motif of passivity, stating that Luther is 
related rather to the passive concept of “nous” than to the active concepf of the “intellect”. However, for 
Luther faith has both the side of passive receptivity with regard to the divine light (see chapter 3.3.1), as well 
as an active side, when it understands other things by that light (see chapter 3.3.2). Stoellger therefore 
overemphasizes the theme of passivity in Luther’s thought.  
348
 See Itinerarium mentis in Deum, III, 1; V, 1. 
349
 See StA I, 321 footnote 7 as well as Burger 2007, 41-47. On older attempts to trace the division to 
Gerson’s De mystica theologia speculativa pars 2 consideratio 9 (=DP III, 370 C) see Hägglund 1959, 321 
footnote 36. The distinction used there (intelligentia, ratio, sensualitas) is closer to Luther's text, but does 
not contain the Tabernacle image. Gerson utilizes the image of the three chambers also at the lectiones 
Contra vanam curiositatem (DP I, 87) in connection to the concept of the different lights that enter the soul. 
One of the lights Gerson mentions is the light of faith. The text as a whole however does not very closely 
resemble that of Luther. On Luther’s use of Gerson in general see also Olsson 1971, 490-491. 
350
 “Assignabimus igitur humano cordi tanquam loco grandi, & spatioso, tria cenacula, supremum, 
medium & infimum. Primum nominabimus cenaculum mentis; medium vero cenaculum rationis. Tertium 
erit & infimum, animae cenaculo deputatum. Nolumus tamen, ut statim arbitretur inspector, haec idcirco 
depingi, quod ita sint; sed ut facilius accipiat figurata, dum incipit, sed non sistat in figuris. Sic per mysticos 
intellectus arca Noe litteralis, sic Arca foederis, habens instar illius spiritualis quae monstrata est in monte, 
sic triclinium Samuelis per typum, sic triclinium feminarum in Ester, sic universaliter (ut ad unum dicamus) 
omnes parabolicae locutiones significatum accipiunt. Sic praeterea coram oculis positum cordis triclinum, in 
quo mens obtinet summum locum, de quo seorsum consequenter propriae considerationes annectuntur, quod 
rarius sermo invernitur de mente parcisus. Ratio ponitur in medio, anima stat in imo. Spiritus noster tanquam 
Architriclinus praesidet toti triclinio, nunc ab arce mentis dilabens ad ultimum animae cenaculum pro 
administratione sensuum, nunc stat in cenaculo rationis ad investigationem Philosophicae cujuslibet 
disclipinae.” Gerson, Tractatus septimus super magnificat (DP IV, 330). 
351
 “Triclinium eleganter exposuit, & distinxit, venerabilis Richardus, & ante eum Hugo, fundantes se in 
Augustino praecipue.” Gerson: Tractatus septimus super magnificat (DP IV, 331). 
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the outside. And no one knows that which belongs to the internal man, except of the spirit 
of the person which is in it. The habit of the internal person is divided into rational and 
intellectual. By the exterior tabernacle is understood the rational habit, by the internal, the 
intellectual habit. We call the rational sense that by which we understand ourselves, and 
the intellectual in this place that by which we are raised up to the speculation of divine 
things. The man leaves from the tabernacle to the atrium by exercising works. The man 
enters the first tabernacle when he returns to himself. He enters the second when he 
transcends himself, because when he transcends himself, he is elevated to God. He stays in 
the first one by means of consideration of himself, in the second one through 
contemplation. The atrium, the first tabernacle and the second together had five things for 
sanctification. The atrium had only one, as well as the second tabernacle. The first 
tabernacle had the remaining. In the atrium of the tabernacle was the altar of burnt 
offering. In the first tabernacle, the candelabrum, the table and the altar of incense. In the 
interior tabernacle, the Ark of the Covenant. The external altar: the affliction of the body; 
the internal altar: the contrition of the mind. Candelabrum: the grace of discretion. Table: 
the teaching of sacred reading. By the Ark of the Covenant understand the grace of 
contemplation. [...] The candelabrum is a holder for the lights, discretion is the light of the 
internal man.
352
  
So, whereas Gerson speaks about the threefold composition of the heart (soul, reason, 
mind), Richard’s text operates using the same divisions as Luther: the body, the reason 
and the intellect. Furthermore, Richard (as Luther) dedicates the divine things to the 
intellect, and both Richard and Luther attribute the light of the discrimination to the 
middle part of the Tabernacle: i.e., the reason. Both also emphasize the openness of the 
body (i.e., the forecourt) for all to see, as well as the hiddennes of the two other parts from 
outside perception. The difference between the two lies in that Richard highlights the 
interplay between these two in achieving contemplation: the mode of spirituality is built 
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 “[Col.0191C] Per tabernaculum foederis intellige statum perfectionis. Ubi perfectio animi, ibi et 
inhabitatio Dei. Quanto ad perfectionem appropinquatur, tanto mens arctius Deo foederatur. Ipsum autem 
tabernaculum debet habere circumadjacens atrium. Per [Col.0191D] atrium intellige disciplinam corporis, 
per tabernaculum disciplinam mentis. Ubi exterior disciplina deest, interior pro certo observari non potest. 
Disciplina vero corporis inutilis certe sine disciplina mentis. Atrium sub divo et aperto jacet et disciplina 
corporis omnibus patet. Quae in tabernaculo erant forinsecus non patebant. Et nemo novit quod interioris 
hominis est, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est. Habitus interioris hominis dividitur in rationalem et 
intellectualem. Rationalis habitus intelligitur per tabernaculum exterius, intellectualis vero habitus per 
tabernaculum interius. Sensum rationalem dicimus, quo nostra discernimus; intellectualem hoc loco dicimus, 
quo ad divinorum [Col.0192C] speculationem sublevamur. Exit homo de tabernaculo in atrium per operis 
exercitium. Intrat homo tabernaculum primum, cum redit ad seipsum. Intrat in secundum, cum transcendit 
seipsum. Transcendendo [Col.0192D] sane seipsum elevatur in Deum. In primo moratur homo per 
considerationem sui, in secundo vero per contemplationem Dei. Ecce de atrio, ecce de tabernaculo primo, 
vel secundo. Dicta autem atria habebant quinque sanctificia. Atrium habebat solum unum, sicut et secundum 
tabernaculum. Reliqua horum duorum habebat tabernaculum primum. In atrio tabernaculi erat altare 
holocausti. In tabernaculo priori candelabrum, mensa, altare incensi. In tabernaculo interiori arca testamenti. 
Altare exterius, afflictio corporis; altare interius, contritio mentis. Candelabrum, gratia discretionis, mensa, 
doctrina sacrae lectionis. Per arcam foederis intellige gratiam contemplationis. In altari exteriori animalium 
carnes concremabantur, et per afflictionem [Col.0193A] corporis carnalia desideria annullantur. In altari 
inferiori fumus aromatum Domino adolebatur, et per cordis contritionem coelestium desideriorum flagrantia 
inflammatur. Candelabrum est gestatorium luminis, et discretio est lucerna interioris hominis.” Richard of 
St. Victor, NONNULLAE ALLEGORIAE TABERNACULI FOEDERIS. PL 196, 0191C – 0193A. 
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around an active exercise.
353
 For Luther, in turn, the external and the internal are set 
against each other, and active contemplation is replaced by faith, to which is attributed the 
role of the intellect grasping the divine. This transformation shows both Luther’s 
agreement and disagreement with the theological anthropologies of his predecessors. 
Luther takes the tripartite construction of human being from the preceding authors and 
seeks to harmonize their opinions, but makes a subtle yet decisive change at the most 
important point by replacing the highest ability directed to the divine things with the 
passively received faith. The consequence is that there remains for Luther no natural 
ability in the human being for turning to God, only a passive, receptive capacity actualized 
in the infusion of faith through the means of grace. Nevertheless, this capacity is not only 
a relational orientation or an act of turning, but is actualized through the divine light of 
faith. Therefore, even though in these anthropological summaries Luther sometimes calls 
this capacity the superior part of reason, he more often refers to it as the intellect (of faith), 
in contrast to reason. 
For Luther, the reason, also called the lower part of reason or natural reason, is an 
ability belonging to the soul. Being a part of the animal and carnal man and directed 
towards earthly things, it has its own natural light and is useful in its own area in dealing 
with concrete things. In the Tabernacle it is symbolized by the candelabrum. It is, 
however, too weak and feeble to grasp the divine things and will err when used in 
theology.
354
 This feebleness offers a partial explanation for how Luther can speak at the 
same time about the light and darkness of faith. Luther’s understanding of the relationship 
between the light of reason and light of faith may also owe something to Gerson, who in 
his De mystica theologia speculativa contemplates the relationship between the divine 
light and the abilities of the soul, which he conceives as analogous to natural lights. 
According to Gerson, even in nature a weaker light looks like a shadow (umbra) compared 
to a brighter light.
355
 Luther, however, seems to accentuate this contrast. According to 
Luther, the light of the natural reason and the light of faith are related to each other as light 
is to darkness. This is because the natural reason (in the proper sense) was born in the Fall 
when the knowledge of God was lost, and the capacities of the human being became 
bound to visible things. Especially in this sense, the natural reason is an opposite of 
grace.
356
 And even when considered from a more neutral perspective and in the spiritual 
person, the superior divine things are nevertheless hidden from the natural reason as if by 
superior waters or by a cloud, in which Christ is hidden. For the reason and the soul, the 
superior divine things are in darkness, whereas for the spirit, Christ who is present in faith 
is a gloomy light.
357
 Nevertheless, the reason is useful when dealing with created, visible, 
                                                 
353
 See McGinn 1994, 406-407. 
354
 Cf. Joest 1967, 160; 185-186; 194-195. Joest interprets Luther’s criticism of reason in the 
Commentary on the Magnificat as the break with mystical and platonist tradition, disregarding the 
distinction existing within that tradition itself between higher and lower reason (of which he is aware), as 
well as the numerous times this distinction is employed by Luther. The hollowness of Joest’s point is 
demonstrated by the fact that Luther actually follows the same terminology as Richard of St. Victor when 
distinguishingon between intellectus and ratio.  
355
 Gerson, De mystica theologia speculativa, consideratio XVII (DP III pars 2, 375). 
356
 WA 56, 76, 3-7; 76 gloss 1; 356, 17 – 357, 17; WA 57, b143, 7 – b144, 12. 
357
 WA 55, II, 754, 14-19; 804, 138-143. See also chapter 3.4.3. 
bodily, concrete and measurable things, and will function using concepts, figures and 
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phantasms derived from them with its natural light, applying them in the arts and sciences.  
In addition, the part of the constitution of the human being which Luther calls the 
“soul” usually refers only to these capacities and abilities connected with the bodily life. 
Because of its place between the two worlds (the invisible and the visible), the soul is 
symbolized in the Tabernacle by the Holy. Though it is of the same essence as the spirit, it 
refers to the spirit as turned towards external things. In this sense, the soul is the animating 
principle and lifegiver to the body. Thus a human being living a purely external life amidst 
sensible and rationally cognizable objects and turned towards them can be called homo 
animalis. Sometimes, as we have seen, the soul can nevertheless mean the intermediate 
part, as if it were the center of the person, which can be turned towards either of the two 
worlds – analogically with the spirit, which is of the same nature as the soul, but can 
which be called dead when turned towards created and visible things. Thus the spirit and 
soul on one hand signify different ‘parts’ or constituents of the person, and on the other 
hand different aspects of his relationality. Both can also be used in a twofold sense: 
ontologically they are the same and interchangeable, but derive their meaning from the 
object they participate in and turn towards.
358
  In a certain sense, they can be defined as 
potencies requiring external actualization, or which are observable in their functions. This 
is the case especially with the spirit, which is dead and can be disregarded without the 
indwelling of God. But the same duality between ontological and relational definition is 
demonstrated by the fact that the soul in itself can be used as a neutral concept (as the 
lifegiver of the body and a part of the trichotomy) or as a negative concept (when it is 
related to the person as turned away from the spiritual).  
Finally, the body, (when speaking of the natural constitution) simply means the trunk 
and the limbs. It puts into action that which the spirit and the soul want, and is observable 
to all. In this sense, the “body” and the “flesh” also do not carry a negative connotation, 
but are rather natural parts of the human being in this life. In the Tabernacle the body is 
symbolized by the forecourt, because it is visible and accessible to other people and its 
sense organs are illuminated by the light of the sun. The entire natural composition of the 
human being can thus be summarized by the following diagram listing contains the three 
parts as abstract and their respective objects and capacities: 
Spirit (spiritus) 
Object 
Capacity 
 
God, invisible world 
intellectus, higher reason 
Soul (anima) 
Object 
Capacity 
 
species, phantasms, concepts etc.  
ratio, lower reason 
Body (corpus) 
Object 
Capacity 
 
visible and sensible world 
limbs, five senses 
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 See Olsson 1971, 456-459. On the dual nature of the soul, see also Hägglund 1959, 61-66; Raunio 
2010, 42-47. Raunio, however, does not take into account the chronological development concerning the 
place of the soul in the trichotomy. Likewise, Hägglund misses the fact that the term “soul” is usully 
associated with the visible and bodily life, and “spirit” with invisible and heavenly life, even though on the 
ontological level they are of the same nature. 
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2.4.1.2 The Role of the Spirit as the Determining Part 
The text of the Magnificat leads to the next anthropological question, that of the 
qualitative division of the human being into two parts: spirit and flesh. Luther refers to this 
division briefly at the beginning of the previous chapter’s quote from the Commentary on 
the Magnificat (the passage in bold face): 
We wish to observe the words one by one. The first is “my soul.” Scripture divides man 
into three parts, as St. Paul says in 1 Thessalonians last [5. chapter]: “May the God of 
peace Himself sanctify you wholly; and may your whole spirit and soul and body be kept 
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” And each of these three as well as 
the whole man is also divided in another way into two parts, which are the spirit and 
the flesh. This latter division is not a division of the nature, but of the qualities. That 
is: the nature has three parts: spirit, soul and body, and all of these together may 
either be good or evil – that is, they may be spirit or flesh – but this is not the issue 
under discussion at the moment.
359
  
The question which arises is: how is the three-part natural division related to the two-
part qualitative division between the spirit and the flesh? The meaning of the same terms 
used in these two distinctions is not identical. Their meaning depends on which of the 
distinctions is used, although they are also connected to each other in a way that will be 
demonstrated below.
360
 A tentative answer can be found at the end of the same section of 
the Commentary on the Magnificat. There Luther writes: 
Now Paul prays God, who is the God of peace, to sanctify us not in one part only, but 
wholly, through and through, so that spirit, soul, body, and all may be holy. We might 
mention many reasons why he prays in this manner, but let the following suffice. When the 
spirit is no longer holy, then nothing is holy anymore.  
The greatest battle and the greatest danger is in the holiness of the spirit, which depends 
wholly upon pure faith, because the spirit has nothing to do with concrete [or: 
comprehensible] things, as is said. Then come false teachers and lure the spirit outside. 
One gives this work, another that method of becoming godly, and if the spirit is not 
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 WA 7, 550, 19-28: “[19] Wollen ein wort nach dem andernn bewiegen: das erst ‘Meyn seele’. [20] 
Die schrifft teilet den menschen ynn drey teil, da S. Paulus 1. Thessal. ult. [21] [1. Thess. 5, 23.] sagt: ‘Got 
der ein got des frids ist, der mache euch heilig durch und durch, [22] alszo das ewer gantzer geist und seele 
und leip unstreflich erhalten auff die [23] zukunfft unszers herrnn Ihesu Christi’. Und ein iglichs dieszer 
dreier sampt [24] dem gantzen menschen wirt auch geteylet auff ein ander weisz ynn zwey stuck, [25] die da 
heissen geist und fleisch, wilch teilung nit der natur, szondernn der [26] eygenschaff ist, das ist, die natur hat 
drey stuck: geist, seel, leip, und mugen [27] alle sampt gut oder bosz sein, das heist denn geist und fleysch 
sein, davon itzt [28] nit zu reden ist.“ 
360
 See Haikola 1958, 24-31; Olsson 1971, 454-462; Huovinen 1981, 42-44; Stoellger 2010, 226-227. 
Even Hägglund 1959, 313-316, though not making an adequate distinction between the two anthropologies, 
correctly notices the two different uses of the terms caro and spiritus (as pertaining to part and orientation). 
See also WA 18, 735, 31-35 as pointed out by Hägglund. Luther’s distinction between the natural and 
qualitative meaning of the terms may be at least partially indebted to Gabriel Biel, who likewise separates 
the parts of man from the theological orientations, see Oberman 1963, 58-60. 
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protected and wise, it will turn outwards and follow. As soon as it comes to external works 
and ways and seeks them to become godly, faith is lost and the spirit is dead before God.
361
 
Luther argues in the Commentary on the Magnificat that spirit (which is the highest 
and most noble part of the person) is as also the part on which the quality of the person 
depends. If the spirit is not holy, then nothing in the person is holy. Therefore, it is the 
spirit which determines the nature or quality of the person before God. With regard to this, 
there are only two possible options: either the spirit is turned inwards toward God and 
invisible things, participates in them, and the person remains holy and spiritual, or the 
spirit turns outwards toward the world and created things, so that the person ceases to be 
holy and is consequently made carnal. This is the foundation of the bipartite distinction 
between the flesh and the spirit. . Thus Luther writes that the holiness of the spirit is 
always threatened, because it depends wholly upon pure faith, not upon concrete (or 
comprehensible) things. False teaching can cause the spirit to lay its trust upon the 
external, from which follows instantly the loss of faith and the death of the spirit, as faith 
and spiritual life are received externally from the object of faith (God), and do not exist as 
the human being’s own property. The same idea was portrayed in the previous chapter as 
turning the face towards created things and the backside to God, as the internal man 
moving into and becoming the external carnal man, and as the spirit becoming deserted 
and migrating to the flesh. The orientation of the spirit determines the standing of the 
person before God. Because of this, the distinction between flesh and spirit, spiritual and 
carnal, can be called the “qualitative division.”   
Moreover, as one can observe, Luther connects spirit and faith closely with each other. 
This is not surprising, since already in the Dictata super Psalterium (1513-15) Luther 
equates the spirit with faith.
362
 Spirit is the dwelling place of God in the human being. The 
presence of God and the knowledge of invisible things are realized in the spirit, but only 
through faith by which the spirit partakes in divine reality. Therefore Luther can say that a 
human person is spiritual and has a spirit (or at least has anything more than a dead spirit) 
only insofar he or she has faith. Faith is the reality connecting a person to God and 
allowing him or her to be in touch with invisible reality. In this sense Luther also equates 
spirit and faith with the intellect: the capacity to grasp the invisible.
363
 Luther also calls 
faith a “foothold” (locus) which is fixed on the soul – or rather the soul is fixed upon it as 
upon a solid rock (petra). Luther states that this foothold is no transitory thing, but rather 
most firm and wide, allowing the person to ascend to the knowledge of God. It is nothing 
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 WA 7, 551, 25 – 552, 4: “[25] [1. Thess. 5, 23.] Nu bittet Paulus: Got, der ein got des frids ist, wolte 
unsz heilig [26] machen, nit ynn einem stuck allein szondernn gantz und gar, durch und durch, [27] das 
geyst, seel und leib und allisz heilig sey. Von ursachen solch gepettis [28] were viel zu sagen, kurtzlich: 
Wenn der geist nit mehr heilig ist, szo ist nichts [29] mehr heilig. Nu ist der groste streit unnd die groste far 
ynn des geistis [30] heilickeit, wilche nur ynn dem blossen lautternn glawben steet, die weil der [31] geyst 
nit mit begreiflichen dingen umbgaht, wie gesagt ist. Szo kommen denn [32] falsche lerer unnd locken den 
geist erausz, einer gibt fur das werck, der ander [1] die weisze frum zu werden. Wo denn der geist hie nit 
bewaret wirt und [2] weisze ist, szo fellet er erausz und folget, Kumpt auff die euszerlichen werck [3] und 
weiszen, meinet da mit frum zu werden: szo bald ist der glawb vorlorenn, [4] und der geist todt fur got.“ 
362
 WA 55, I, 798, 22-24; WA 55, II, 152, 13-22. See also Hunzinger 1905, 60-61. 
363
 WA 55, I, 24 gloss 13; 101, 1-4; 118, 1-2; 278, 2-3; 292, 18; 520 gloss 17; 782, 15-16; WA 55, II, 
121, 11-13; 341, 101-102; 481, 481-483; 718, 13-14; 734, 109-111; 942, 1455-1456; 974, 2378; 1008, 3400-
3401; WA 56, 238, 28; AWA 2, 107, 30-31. 
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temporal and fleeting, but the eternal Word of Christ.
364
 As such participation in the divine 
reality, faith is the light of the face of God and the fullness (plenitudo) of souls.
365
 With 
regard to his mind and spirit, the human being is created such, that he can be satisfied 
spiritually only by God (Dei capax est et solo Deo saturari potest). Therefore, in the 
Commentary on Romans Luther can state that the spiritual life flows from Christ through 
faith to the believer as eternal rays from the eternal Sun. The grace of faith (gratia fidei) 
regenerates the person so that he or she becomes a spiritual man, and begins to live an 
eternal and spiritual life.
366
 Or, as Luther writes in Commentary of Galatians (1519): Faith 
makes a person spiritual, works make a person carnal. The spirit accepts the Word of God 
hiddenly and internally, and so is justified.
367
 Thus it is precisely the spirit endowed with 
faith which allows the person to live a spiritual life and be oriented towards the invisible, 
spiritual and eternal things. When participated in in faith, these things, flowing from God, 
satisfy the person with their fullness and make him or her a spiritual man. 
The contrary happens when a person turns away from spiritual things and loses his or 
her faith. There is some variation in Luther’s texts regarding whether it is the will (love, 
affect, fruitio) or intellect (spirit, faith) that turns away from God first. Regardless, Luther 
portrays the results in a consistent fashion. When one turns away from God, one loses the 
knowledge of God and begins to love things that are created and should be used (fruitur 
utibili). These things offer no permanent foothold, and thus one who loves them becomes 
empty (vacuus) and like nothing (nihil). Intellectually, this emptiness corresponds to 
blindness: The person has turned away from God and has become empty of truth. He is in 
darkness and can now only err in spiritual things.
368
 Thus once turned away, human beings 
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 WA 55, II, 641, 335 – 642, 357: “[335] 3, 651 ‘In loco quem posuit’, quomodo hoc consonat huic, 
‘fontem [336] ponent eam’? Quare locum hic mystice oportet accipi. ⌈⌈‘[L]ocum’, vt [337] Psal. 78.: 
‘[l]ocum eius desolauerunt’ exposui. [Quia] ‘Locus’ Est vniuscuiusque [338] propositum, vt [i]n tentatione 
Christi [pa]tet, Quomondo diabolus [339] [e]um de loco ad [lo]cum transtulit. Sic [erg]o vnum fixum est 
propositum [340] assumendum, quod non sit transitoria res.⌉⌉ Sic enim fides est ‘Locus’ [341] anime, Quia 
domus conscientie nostre, sicut et tota Ecclesia ponitur ‘supra [342] firmam petram’ i. e. super fidem Christi. 
He  c petra enim est firmissimus [343] locus et spaciosus, de quo Psal. 39.: ‘Et statuit supra petram pedes 
[344] meos.’ Et alibi: ‘Et statuit in loco spacioso pedes meos.’ Et Psal. 30.: ‘Esto [345] mihi in domum 
refugii et in locum munitum.’ Sed Ecce nostram translationem, [346] quam proprie loquatur. Nullus enim 
poterit ascensiones in corde [347] disponere et ex libertate vias Dei ire, nisi primum fixe ponat eas in loco 
[348] fidei, immo nisi fidem prius firmiter ponat. Qui enim dubitat et hesitat in [349] fide, que est substantia, 
quomodo ascendet? Ideo dicit, Quod ascensiones [350] in loco disponantur, quem tamen prius solide 
posuerit. Sic enim Christus [351] in Euangelio: ‘Crede’, ‘credite’, ‘confidite’, ‘credenti omnia possibilia 
sunt’ [352] etc. Maxima enim vis est in fide statuenda, vnde Psal⌊mus in fine: ‘Beatus [353] homo, qui 
confidit in te.’ Sed hoc non est locum ponere, immo pedes potius [354] ponere in loco. Quare Locum ponere 
Est eligere fixum, in quo homo fide et [355] spe nitatur, i. e. in nullum temporale, quod poni non potest, Sed 
semper [356] fluit; Sed in e  ternum, scil. verbum Christi, quod ‘manet ine  ternum’, quia [357] ‘positum est’ 
etc.” 
See also WA 55, I, 586, 4.5; gloss 8; 55, II, 218, 2 – 219, 16. 
365
 WA 55, I, 648-650 gloss 17, 6-9; 798, 22-24. 
366
 WA 56, 66, 5 – 67, 1; 327, 9-14; 327, 26 – 328, 2; 373, 2-6. 
367
 WA 2, 564, 35 – 565, 7; 570, 5-20. 
368
 WA 56, 12, 4-7: “non sicut deum glorificauerunt Sed mox sibi gloriam [4] tante cognitionis 
inflexerunt | scil. quasi subtilitate ingenii cognouissent | [5] aut gratias egerunt: de tantis bonis creatis et de 
ipsa cognitione sed [6] euanuerunt vacuati veritate vani et nihil facti sunt, licet coram [7] hominibus magni 
et sapientes facti sunt ac velut omnia scientes” 
WA 56, 178, 24 – 179, 9: “[24] Vide ergo ordinem et gradus perditionis. Primus est Ingratitudo [25] seu 
omissio gratitudinis. Sic enim Lucifer ingratus fuit Creatori suo, [26] antequam caderet. Quod facit ipsa 
complacentia sui, qua in acceptis non [27] vt acceptis delectatur pretermisso eo, qui dedit. Secundus Vanitas, 
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no longer know either God or spiritual good. Luther states that no one can think rightly 
about God without the spirit.
369
 With regard to the will, the Fall has the following 
consequence: because a human being has to love something, but has lost the knowledge of 
God, the love of the fallen humanity has  turned towards created things:
370
 things which 
are empty, fleeting, vain and transitory. Through this love, men themselves have become 
transitory, as one becomes like the object of one’s love. They have lost the internal man 
and become empty of faith and grace – and with it of the divine plenitude. Because of this 
loss Luther frequently states that every man is emptiness (vanitas) and seeks a lie.
371
 He 
has become wholly carnal and is no longer spiritual. He is mentally and spiritually blind, 
and no longer able to think, speak or work rightly with regard to God.
372
 Even worse, from 
this combination of the necessity to have an ultimate object of love (frutio), and the loss of 
                                                                                                                                                   
[28] Quia scil. in seipso et in creatura pascitur et fruitur vtibili et ita necessario [29] vanus fit ‘in 
cogitationibus suis’ i. e. omnibus consiliis, studiis et Industriis. [30] Quia quicquid in iis et per he  c querit, 
totum vanum est, cum non nisi seipsum [1] Bl. 36. querat i. e. gloriam, delectationem et vtilitatem suam. 
*Tercius [2] est excecatio, Quia euacuatus veritate et immersus vanitati toto [3] affectu et omnibus 
cogitationibus necessario ce  cus fit, cum sit penitus [4] auersus. Tunc iam in tenebris positus Quid aliud agat, 
nisi quod sequitur [5] errans et insipiens? Quia Ce  cus facillime errat, immo semper errat. Ideo [6] Quartus 
est Error erga Deum, qui est pessimus, qui facit idolatras. Huc [7] autem venisse est in profundum venisse. 
Quia amisso Deo nihil iam restat, [8] quam quod sit traditus in omnem turpitudinem secundum voluntatem 
[9] diaboli.” 
 WA 56, 241, 6-25: “[6] Alio modo etiam ‘inutiles’ dicuntur, Quia Deo inutiles sunt et [7] sibi. Sed prior 
sententia melior, quia Vult probare, quod vani facti sunt [8] eo, quod declinauerunt a veritate et Iustitia Dei 
ad sua propria. [9] Possunt autem ista tria per modum iterationis et ad maiorem expressionem [10] dicta 
intelligi, Vt, quod dictum est: ‘Non est Iustus quisquam’ [11] Sit id, quod dicitur: ‘Omnes declinauerunt’; Et 
quod dictum [12] est: ‘Non est Intelligens’, Sit illud: ‘Simul inutiles facti sunt’; Et quod [13] dictum est: 
‘Non est requirens Deum’, Sit illud: Non est qui faciat bonum [14] [3, 12].[15] Siquidem ‘declinare’ hoc 
est Iniustum fieri. Et Vanum fieri hoc est [16] veritatem amittere in intellectu et vanitatem meditari. Vnde in 
multis [17] locis Vanitas ascribitur eorum intelligentie  . Insuper ‘Non facere bonum’ [18] hoc est Deum non 
requirere. Quoniam etsi foris operentur bonum, non [19] tamen ex corde faciunt nec Deum per hoc 
requirunt, Sed potius gloriam [20] et lucrum aut saltem libertatem a pena. Ac per hoc nec faciunt, Sed potius 
[21] (si liceret dicere) faciuntur bonum i. e. a timore Vel amore compelluntur [22] facere bonum, quod liberi 
non facerent. Sed ii, qui Deum requirunt, [23] faciunt gratuito et hilariter propter solum Deum, non propter 
aliquam [24] cuiuscunque creature possessionem, siue spiritualis siue corporalis. Sed hoc [25] non est opus 
Nature  , sed gratie  Dei.” 
369
 WA 56, 186, 1-5: “Nemo enim potest de Deo recte [2] sentire, nisi spiritus Dei sit in ipso, Sine quo 
false enunciat et Iudicat, [3] siue Iustitiam, siue misericordiam Dei, siue super seipsum, siue super [4] alios | 
enunciat |. Oportet | enim | testimonium spiritus Dei perhiberi [5] nostro spiritui.” 
370
 WA 56, 13 gloss 1; AWA 2, 174, 7-13. 
371
 WA 55, I, 521 gloss 22; 649 gloss 17, 8-9; 886, 22-27; 886 glosses 13-15; 888, 7-11; WA 55, II, 338, 
14-17; WA 56, 241, 6-25; WA 2, 564, 35 – 565, 7; WA 57, b24, 5-12; AWA 2, 177, 24 – 179, 6. See also 
Olsson 1971, 149-157. 
372
 WA 5, 393, 12-27: “[12] [1. Mos. 6, 3.] Nam nec illi Gen. vi. scribuntur deum sic ignorasse, quod 
nihil de eo [13] scierint, cum iustitiae praeco, Noe, illis deum praedicaret, sed ‘spiritus meus’ [14] inquit 
‘non permanebit in hominibus istis inaeternum, quia carnes sunt’, seu [15] ut hebraeus ‘spiritus meus non 
iudicabit, non disceptabit cum eis, non habet [16] operationem suam in eis’, quia crucifixionem carnis 
respuunt, ideo spiritus [17] mei iudicium non sustinent. Quibus verbis sive per Noe sive (quod magis [18] 
credo) per alios quoque dictis idem voluit quod hic psalmus, scilicet publice [19] arguens, eos esse carnes et 
sine spiritu, idest abominabiles et corruptos, non [20] facientes bonum usque ad unum, Ita hic in spiritu 
loquens, facie contempta, [21] et renes scrutans ac corda dicit, Nabal istum negare deum, non in ore et [22] 
gestu et pompa externis, ubi deum etiam prae veris dei amatoribus iactat [23] se nosse, sed in corde, idest 
intimo affectu, cuius caecitatem mox sequitur [24] caecitas quoque mentis, ut nec recte de deo cogitet nec 
loquatur nec operetur, [25] [Tit. 1, 16.] sicut ps. x. dictum est. Et Paulus Tit. i. ‘dicunt, se nosse deum, factis 
[26] autem negant’. Hi ergo soli habent deum, qui in deum credunt fide non [27] ficta. Caeteri omnes sunt 
stulti et dicunt in corde suo: non est deus.“ 
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right knowledge concerning God, it follows that the fallen person will necessary create for 
himself a perverted image of God. Therefore, the result of the Fall is idolatry: the creation 
of a false mental image and phantasm of God which the fallen person attempts to serve.
373
 
In a certain sense, for Luther the fallen, carnal person is no longer wholly a man, but rather 
becomes ruled by the lower parts belonging to his soul (anima). Thus Luther likens the 
life he lives to an animal life (vita animalis). This changed quality and direction of his life 
is reflected both in the operation of the cognitive capacities and of the volitional capacities 
of the fallen human being. 
With regard to mental operation, the result of the Fall is that the human being is no 
longer ruled by his highest, spiritual (i.e., intellectual) part, but by the lower parts (the 
reason and senses). In the Fall the spirit, the noblest part, has been lost or at least 
submerged wholly in created things. Luther calls the resulting darkness “blindness of the 
original sin in intellect”.374 On the one hand, the person can still be said to possess the 
intellect, but it has become totally sensual and occupied with phantasms.
375
 On the other 
hand, it can be said that carnal people have no intellect, because they have lost the ability 
to grasp intellectual and spiritual things.
376
 In a wider sense, human beings still possesses 
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 WA 56, 179, 11-25: “[11] Eisdem gradibus peruenitur etiam nunc ad spiritualem et subtiliorem [12] 
idolatriam, que  nunc frequens est, Qua Deus colitur, non sicut est, Sed [13] sicut ab eis fingitur et e  stimatur. 
Ingratitudo enim et amor vanitatis [14] (i. e. sui sensus et proprie  Iustitie  siue, vt dicitur, bone intentionis) 
vehementer [15] excecant, ita vt sint incorrigibiles nec aliter credere possint, quam [16] se eximie agere et 
Deo placere. Ac per hoc Deum sibi propitium formant, [17] cum non sit. Et ita phantasma suum verius 
colunt quam Deum [18] verum, quem similem illi phantasmati credunt. Et hinc ‘mutant eum in [19] 
similitudinem imaginationis sue  ’ [1, 23] carnaliter sapientis et corruptibilis [20] affectus existentis. Ecce 
ergo quantum malum ingratitudo, que [21] amorem vanitatis mox secum trahit, et hic ce  citatem, he  c autem 
Idolatriam, [22] he  c autem vitiorum gurgitem. Econtra gratitudo conseruat [23] amorem Dei et sic manet cor 
in eum directum. Quare et hinc illuminatur, [24] Illuminatum vero non nisi verum Deum colit Et huic cultui 
adheret mox [25] omnis chorus virtutum.” 
See also WA 56, 15, 1-4; 183, 6-14; WA 5, 392, 26 – 393, 27. 
374
 WA 55, II, 903, 350-354. See also WA 55, I, 704, 21-23; 705 gloss 9; WA 56, 312, 6-10; 355, 19-26; 
WA 57, a89, 2-19; WA 2, 537, 25 – 538, 17. 
375
 WA 55, II, 122, 23-24: “Et sic Cum in aliis etiam Intellectus sit [24] sensualis pene factus totus [...]”. 
 WA 55, II, 903, 365-367: “Vnde Qui Intellectum suum occupant tantummodo [366] cum visibilibus, 
Non habent suos oculos, Sed bestiarum tantummodo, [367] que  et ipse vsque ad phantasmata vident.” 
376
 WA 55, II, 179, 79 – 180, 105: “Et hoc vult Titulus | dicens: Eruditio [80] Dauid. Quia intellectu per 
fidem de istis docemur Et non sensu aut [81] ratione. [82] ‘Intellectus’ in scrip⌊turis sanctis potius ab obiecto 
quam potentia nomen [83] habet, contrario quam in philosophia. Est enim ‘Intellectus’ cognitio [84] vel 
notitia ‘sensus Christi’, de quo Apostolus 1. Corin. 1. et 2. excellenter [85] docet, quoniam ‘Sapientiam 
loquimur’, inquit, ‘absonditam in mysterio, [86] quam nemo principum huius se  culi cognouit.’ Et est 
breuiter nihil aliud [87] nisi sapientia crucis Christi, que ‘gentibus stultitia et Iude  is Scandalum est’, [88] 
Scil. intelligere, Quod filius Dei est incarnatus et crucifixus et mortuus et [89] suscitatus propter nostram 
salutem. De huius sapientie Intellectu intelligitur [90] titulus Psal⌊mi, quando dicit: ‘Eruditio Dauid’ vel 
‘Intellectus Dauid’, [91] scil. ipsi datus. Sed quia totum hoc est in fide et non in sensu neque ratione, [92] 
Ideo Etiam Intellectus hominum in scrip⌊turis dicitur Sensualitas, [93] eo quod non nisi sensibilia capiat, 
quantumcunque sit subtilis et acutus et [94] prudens. Sic Apost⌊olus ait ‘Prudentia carnis’ i. e. carnalis 
hominis, qui [95] vtique habet intellectum, in quo sit prudentia, ‘mors est’. Quare hic dicit: [96] 31, 9 Sicut 
equus et mulus, sic sunt omnes, qui hunc intellectum non [97] habent, qui est de Inuisibilibus, diuinis et 
celestibus, eo quod solum visibilia [98] intelligant et sentiant, quod etiam ‘equus et mulus’ facit. Intelligere 
[99] itaque est Spiritualia et mysteria salutis et gratie  Dei agnoscere; vnde [100] vsus loquendi obtinuit 
dicere mysteria redemptionis et incarnationis, eo [101] quod non nisi mysticis pateant et spiritualibus, Non 
autem hominibus, [102] quibus est potius stultitia, quia ipsi sunt stulti ‘equi et muli’; ideo primum [103] illos 
oportet mutari, vt sic mysteria, que sunt e  terna, cognoscant. Qualis [104] enim quisque est, taliter Iudicat. 
Sed ipsi sunt ‘equi et muli’; ideo ista pro [105] nihilo Iudicant, quia non sentiunt ea.” 
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intellect, but one that is to such an extent bound to sensible things that only faith and grace 
can liberate it to see the invisible world again.
377
 Thus the loss of the higher capacities 
results from the death of the spirit, and the lower parts begin to guide the life of the 
person. The fallen man is therefore ruled by his body and soul, senses and reason. These 
remaining abilities can only operate using concepts, images and phantasms derived from 
sensual things. Therefore, according to Luther the fallen man is “like a horse and a mule” 
(Ps. 32:9 [Vulg: 31:9]) who does not obey God in anything he cannot grasp.
378
 Luther also 
quotes 1. Cor 2:14 in this context: “The ‘animal man’ [or ‘man with soul’ (animalis 
homo)] does not perceive those things that are of God’s spirit”. This is because after the 
loss of the spirit the remaining part (the soul), which assumes the role of guiding the 
person, can only grasp sensible and visible things, as even animals do.
379
 Luther can also 
refer to the abilities of the fallen human being as “nature”, and to the capacities of the 
spiritual person (granted by faith) as “grace”. Compared to the light of grace (which has 
God as its object), and to Christ (who is the true light), the light of nature (i.e., the reason 
and the senses) is like darkness. It is blind to God and reaches only to created things.
380
  
The loss of the light of faith, leads not only to the fallen person losing the knowledge 
of God, but also to replacing the love of God as ultimate object with love of created 
things, including the love of oneself.
381
 Therefore, this turning away also has grave 
consequences with regard to the will: that is, for the way carnal people (in contrast to 
spiritual people) live and love. According to Luther, carnal people have a heavy heart and 
their works are burdensome, because they lack the inner help of God. They walk along 
winding paths like the Jewish people did in the desert, and have no direction (directio). 
Their heart is not straight ([di]rectus) and their spirit is not with God and filled with the 
solidity of the divine grace, but empty, and therefore twisted (curvus) and crooked 
(pravus). This means that their empty will is scattered out among the diversity of different 
created things, none of which satisfy the soul.
382
 They are ruled from bottom to top, with 
                                                 
377
 This way Luther uses the term “intellect” analogically with the terms “higher reason” and “lower 
reason” as well as the distinction between the soul and the spirit: In the proper sense as the higher reason 
directed to the divine the intellect no longer exists after the Fall or at least does not work: 
WA 55, I, 292, 17-25: “[31, 8] Intellectum6 scil. spiritualium, quod fit per fidem tibi o homo        gratis 
dabo
7
 et instruam docebo per filium incarnatum te in via hac scil. quam docuero in Christo filio qua 
gradieris: firmabo et tunc in perpetuum et stabiliter super te oculos meos beneplacitum habebo super te et 
dirigam te in bonitate . [31, 9] Nolite fieri per incredulitatem spiritualium bonorum sicut equus et mulus vt 
qui solum secundum carnem sapiunt et sentiunt : quibus non est intellectus scil. spiritualium bonorum, Sed 
tantum sensus etc.” 
WA 55, I, 293 gloss 6: “GLOSSA:6) Ex hoc loco disce, quid sit ‘intellectus’. Quia etsi omnes homines 
non sint sine intellectu, tamen dicuntur hic Iude  i et carnales ‘equus et mulus’ sine ‘intellectu’, Quia solum 
sensibilia meditantur et volunt, Non autem Inuisibilia et spiritualia.” 
378
 WA 55, II, 257, 9-12: “Alterum Est ‘Enos’, Quod interpretatur [10] ‘obliuiscens’ seu ‘desperatus.’ Et 
proprie exprimit hominis rationalem naturam, [11] secundum quam corpori peccati immersus est et 
desperatus ac obliuiosus [12] factus.” 
AWA 2, 140, 30 – 141, 32: “Hic est sicut equus et mulus, qui eo usque dominum sustinet, quousque 
sentit aut capit, ultra captum suum non sequitur, quia fide non vivit, sed ratione sua.” 
See also WA 55, I, 520 gloss 18; WA 55, II, 179, 79-81; WA 2, 538, 15-16; WA 57, 143, 23 – b144, 12. 
379
 WA 55, I, 631 gloss 7; WA 56, 170, 26 – 171, 8; AWA 2, 108, 6-14. 
380
 WA 56, 356, 17 – 357, 17; WA 2, 538, 15-16; WA 57, b143, 11-22; AWA 2, 132, 4-16. 
381
 WA 56, 356, 17 – 357, 17. 
382
 The idea of faith directing the soul towards the future and invisble world is clearly connected with the 
spiritual nature of faith as the reality that gathers the soul into unity, whereas the created things divide it into 
plurality. WA 55, I, 220 gloss 9; 648, 19-21; 649 gloss 13; WA 55, II, 246, 191-195; 305, 124 – 306, 137; 
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the lower faculties of the soul and body and the sensual pleasures guiding them. They have 
become captured by the fleeting pleasures of the world and the winds of passion, or by 
seemingly rational wisdom bent on maximising earthly good. However, the true good (the 
lasting, invisible things and the spiritual goods) is unknown to them. Thus in this sense 
also they are almost like a beast or “a horse and a mule”, occupied with sensual things and 
living an animal life.
383
 With regard to the will, Luther’s notion of animal life seems to be 
connected with the idea in Aristotelian psychology which regards the soul (anima) as the 
mover of body and the principle which makes it grow. Natural life wants to grow and 
collect matter in order to sustain itself, not give good to others. It will end in the death of 
the person, unlike the spiritual life, which is participation in the heavenly things.
384
 
Therefore Luther’s ideas about the selfish nature of the natural life and natural love seem 
to at least partially stem from his understanding of Aristotelian natural psychology.  
In contrast to people living a carnal and animal life, spiritual people are ruled by faith, 
from top to bottom.
385
 They understand the deeper significance of reality as the sign of 
God. Where carnal people see only phantasms and species of external things, the intellect 
of faith shows the faithful the true nature (res) of these things residing in God.
386
 Thus for 
the faithful, visible things are not an end in themselves. The life of spiritual people is not 
centred on their own welfare, but rather they are spontaneously and cheerfully willing to 
serve God and the good of others following Christ. They are willing to do so because they 
participate in God’s law of love with their will, not only superficially, because their will is 
united with God who in his nature is the self-diffusing highest good.
387
 He is the good of 
spiritual people, the good the light of faith shows and in which they participate with their 
will.
388
 This spiritual good does not run dry, but rather fills the spiritual people with self-
giving love, creating in them a will which seeks to spread good unto others.
389
   
                                                                                                                                                   
544, 283 – 545, 310; 628, 430-445; 697, 310-315; 866, 45 – 868, 81; AWA 2, 172, 9 – 173, 14; 177, 7 – 
179, 6; 261, 23 – 262, 5. The concepts of directio and rectitude appear in Gerson, according to whom they 
mean uniformity with the will of God. See Gerson: Tractatus consolatorius de directione seu rectitudine 
cordis (DP III pars 2, 468-479). See also Metzger 1964, 29, who analyses the concept in Anselm. 
383
 WA 55, I, 226 gloss 22; 292, 17-25; 461 gloss 18; WA 55, II, 121, 21 – 123, 2; 204, 50-55; 588, 103-
106; 619, 206 – 621, 246; WA 57, b143, 23 – 10; AWA 2, 140, 30 – 141, 32; AWA 2, 203, 3 – 204, 5; WA 
5, 418, 9-32. 
384
 See WA 55, II, 97, 1-3; 330, 34-51; WA 5, 669, 37 – 670, 34. Hägglund, Olsson and Huovinen draw 
the same distinction between two kinds of life, natural and spiritual. See Hägglund 1959, 71-75; Olsson 
1971, 273-275; 290-294; 456-465(!); Huovinen 1981, 39-45; Raunio 2010, 34 (with reference to Huovinen). 
Hägglund, however, stretches the distinction too far by interpreting the two lives as the opposite affects of 
the person, in which sense they lose their relation to the objective corruptibility and incorruptibility of the 
two lives. Olsson, who near the end of his work examines the concept in the context of the tripartite 
anthropology gives by far the best account of the meaning of the term, but unfortunately the chapter is 
missing all its footnotes. 
385
 WA 55, II, 357, 74 – 358, 96; 863, 335 – 864, 344; WA 57, b113, 20 – b114, 7; WA 2, 587, 27-35. 
The idea that faith or spirit rules the believer is somewhat analogical to the idea of ‘ruled sin’, see WA 57, 
a105, 7-19; WA 2, 562, 6-11. 
386
 WA 55, II, 341, 94-100; 511, 138 – 512, 161; 512, 176-182; 903, 364-367. On the light of faith with 
regard to intellect, see chapter 3.3.2.1. 
387
 WA 55, I, 398 gloss 8; WA 55, II, 638, 249 – 640, 285; WA 56, 234, 22 – 235, 9; 241, 15-25; 308, 4-
24; WA 2, 613, 9-21; WA 57, b113, 20 – b114, 7; AWA 2, 40, 15 – 41, 15; 43, 21 – 44, 17; 48, 1 – 50, 4. 
388
 AWA 2, 40, 14 – 41, 10; 43, 21 – 44, 16. 
389
 WA 55, II, 80, 28 – 82, 2. See also WA 55, II, 284, 111-120; 427, 53 – 58; 637, 221-227; 997, 3069 – 
998, 3093; AWA 2, 43, 21 – 44, 3. On the light of faith with regard to will, see chapter 3.3.2.2. 
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Carnal people, however, know nothing of this spiritual good. They are fixed on 
perishable and finite earthly goods. These goods are like an illusion, pleasant in 
appearance but internally empty (vacuus). Luther grants that they are in themselves good, 
but nevertheless only the picture and image (species et figura) of the ultimate end. Carnal 
people, however, ignorant of spiritual goods, seek these finite goods as if they were the 
ultimate, thus replacing the reality (res) with appearances (species). Luther states that 
created goods are in their nature merely limits (termini, limites), because they are only 
signs and coverings of things, whereas God and the spiritual good, their real content 
accessible in faith, is without beginning and end, wide and spacious. Thus carnal people 
will never find rest in these limited goods, but always have to seek more and more, and 
still receive no satisfaction.
390
 
Luther’s view of the difference between the spiritual and carnal life is therefore 
decidedly connected with the different natures of the divine and created good. It is exactly 
this distinction that also lays the foundation for Luther’s view of the difference between 
the two loves – the light-hearted self-giving love, and the mercenary self-seeking love. 
One can further see behind them two different interpretations of the nature of the good: the 
Platonic, which emphasizes the self-diffusing nature of the good as the source of action, 
and the Aristotelian or Thomistic, which emphasizes the nature of the good as an end 
towards which creatures strive.
391
 Luther appears to think that the natural life follows the 
Aristotelian model, but that the spiritual life follows the Platonic model.  
2.4.1.3  Spirit and Flesh as a Qualitative Distinction 
The central question therefore, in Luther’s two-part qualitative anthropology, is whether 
the person is spiritual or carnal. A spiritual person has a spirit and is therefore ruled by the 
love of God. A carnal person does not have a spirit and is therefore not ruled by the love 
of God. His heart is both ‘heavy’ (grave) and ‘empty’ (vacuus) in the manner described 
above. This emptiness leads to the insatiable love of vanity (i.e., a love of visible good). It 
is exactly this greedy desire (cupiditas) that according to Luther is the root (radix) and 
primary weight (gravitas) which sprouts forth evil and pollutes all other affects.
392
 In the 
                                                 
390
 WA 55, I, 520 gloss 20; 676 gloss 4, 1-5; WA 55, II, 66, 25 – 68, 29; 213, 124 – 214, 151; 366, 297-
304; 367, 33 –  368, 345; 949, 1650 – 950, 1682; 955, 1844 – 956, 1865; WA 56, 75, 9-15; 356, 18 – 357, 
11; 372, 26 – 373, 12; WA 5, 418, 9-32. See also chapter 2.3.3.1. 
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 See chapter 2.2.2. 
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 WA 55, II, 338, 13-18: “⌈⌈[A]liter sic: ‘Cor [14] [altum]’ Est cor spirituali[ter sa]piens, Quia 
‘spiritualis [a n]emine Iudicatur’, [15] et [i]n profundo Dei [absc]onditus; et in [tali] ‘exaltatur Deus’. [16] 
[Car]nale autem cor est [‘a]ltum’, Sed vanum [sine] spiritu, i. e. in illo [17] [non] ‘exaltatur Deus’, [Sed 
p]otius ipsemet. Iob 5.: ‘Vir va[nus] in superbiam [18] eri[git]ur.’⌉⌉” 
WA 55, II, 66, 15 – 67, 14: “Et ‘Graue’ cor dicitur, quod subiacet iniustitie cuicunque. [16] Et tota 
iniustitia vocatur hic ‘grauitas cordis’. Que tamen potest diuidi [17] per singulas suas species, procedendo ex 
radice, vt Cupiditas est radix [18] et prima ‘gravitas’, ex qua pullulat ira, Inuidia, superbia, malitia, dolus 
[19] et omnia fere opera carnis, que apostolus Gal. 5. enumerat. Quodlibet [20] autem eorum est ‘ grauitas 
cordis’ et infert suam ‘vanitatem’ et ‘mendacium’, [21] sicut dicemus. Econtra leue Cor est Cor Iustitie 
totius cum [22] omnibus suis partibus, de quo in primo versu dictum est. Et recte Sane [23] dixit ‘Cor 
graue’, non corpore aut manu aut carne aut sensu, quia in [24] hiis sunt nimis leues. Qua autem ratione 
Iniustitia dicatur grauitas, [25] satis patet. Quia non sinit eleuari in Deum, Quia deiicit Spiritum sub [26] se 
indignioribus, ipsum meliorem. Stante ergo ista ‘grauitate Cordis’ [27] sequitur necessario, Quod diligant 
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qualitative sense, according to Luther, the distinction between the spiritual and carnal 
person is based on the nature of this basic affect. The basic affect of a person is either self-
giving love, which comes from faith and leads the person to freely and cheerfully serve 
God and other people, or greedy and self-seeking love, which comes from the emptiness 
of the heart. The former is satisfied by the spiritual goods grasped in faith, the latter seeks 
sensual pleasure or serves God and other people only coercibly, from fear of punishment 
or desire to attain merit.
393
 Thus it can be said in general, that for Luther the entire carnal 
person ruled by the evil affect can be called “flesh” and carnal, and the entire spiritual 
person “spirit” and spiritual.394 
However, as noted above, Luther’s anthropology undergoes development during the 
period under consideration.
395
 This is the case especially with the Dictata, which is 
dominated by the flesh – spirit distinction. At the same time the concepts of flesh and 
spirit are used in such a way that their qualitative sense and their use in designating a part 
of the person cannot usually be distinguished from each other. In the Dictata Luther uses 
expressions such as “You have flesh and you are in flesh” (caro est tibi et in carne es) or 
“Spirit and flesh are one human being” (spiritus et caro unus homo est),396 which 
anticipate the simul anthropology he arrives at in the Lectures on Romans. But these 
concepts are nevertheless still strongly related to the flesh and the spirit as ‘parts’ of the 
person, which derive their affects from their object, so that the term “flesh” retains its 
connection with corporeality. Thus the Dictata expresses in the strongest manner of 
Luther’s writings the link between the invisible, infinite spiritual goods and the love of the 
spirit associated with them, as well as the visible, finite carnal goods and the love of the 
flesh associated with them, although this theme continues through all Luther’s writings 
under consideration in the present study.  
In the Lectures on Romans the concepts of simul and sapientia carnis come to the fore. 
For example, Luther states in the Lectures that “the same man is spirit and flesh, but flesh 
is his sickness or wound, and insofar he loves the Law of God he is Spirit, insofar he has 
evil desire he is the sickness of the spirit and wound of sin, which has begun to heal”.397  
Nevertheless, Luther uses the terms flesh and spirit primarily with reference to the external 
and internal man, and only in a few places does it appear that the terms are used to refer to 
the affect only.
398
 It is not until the Lectures on Galatians that Luther clearly defines that 
the term ‘flesh’ can, aside from the part, mean only the affect ruling the person. This 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘vanitatem’. Quia enim veritatem et [28] Iustitiam non habent, et cor sine amore esse nequit, ideo 
necessarium [1] est, vt Deum non diligant, Sed ‘vanitatem’ (i. e. bonum tantum apparens) […] Omne enim 
quod homini seruit et vtile est sine fructu et salute spiritus, [12] vanitas est secundum Eccles⌊iasten. Quia 
Spiritus est maior et dignior [13] pars hominis, eterna et immortalis, cuius bona sunt vera et e  terna, [14] 
Caro autem vilis et fluxa sicut fenum, quod cito exiccatur.” 
393
 WA 55, II, 638, 249 – 640, 285; WA 56, 8 gloss 4; WA 2, 500, 17-35; AWA 2, 40, 3 – 41, 10; 44, 7-
16; 48, 1- 49, 19. 
394
 A similar idea is expressed by Olsson 1971, 460-462.  
395
 On this development of the bipartite flesh – spirit distinction as concerning the whole man, see also 
Joest 1967, 197-202. 
396
 WA 55, II, 972, 2321 – 973, 2348. 
397
 WA 56, 350, 27 – 351, 1: “Sic idem homo simul est spiritus et caro. Sed Caro est eius infirmitas seu 
[28] vulnus, Et inquantum diligit legem Dei, Spiritus est; inquantum autem [1] concupiscit, est infirmitas 
spiritus et vulnus peccati, quod sanari incipit.” 
398
 See e.g. WA 56, 69, 17 – 70, 20; 73, 3-11; 75 gloss 2; 258, 9-16; 345, 29 – 346, 1 vs.  WA 56, 343, 8 
– 344, 22; 350, 22 – 351, 2. 
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development results in the formation of the two distinct, interpenetrating anthropologies 
(the natural and the qualitative) as illustrated by the above passage from the Commentary 
on the Magnificat. Luther now begins to emphasize the latter, qualitative point according 
to which the “spirit” and “flesh” refer not to any particular part of the human being, but 
rather to the entire person and everything he does, which flow forth from the basic affect. 
Thus Luther states in the Lectures that “‘flesh’ is not only the sensual man or sensuality 
with its desires etc. but everything which is outside the grace of Christ ... Therefore all 
righteousness and wisdom outside grace is ‘flesh’ and carnal.”399 This innovation in 
interpretation is confirmed and expanded upon in the Commentary on Galatians, a work 
containing a great deal of anthropological discussion and which occupies an important 
place in the refinement of Luther’s anthropology.400 There Luther explains that the same 
deed can be spiritual or carnal – carnal, if forced by the letter of the Law; spiritual, if 
proceeding from the spiritual Law, which presupposes faith.
401
 Flesh thus denotes not only 
sensuality or desires of the flesh, but everything, which lies outside of grace and the spirit 
of Christ. Correspondingly, everything external proceeding from the faith of the spirit can 
be called spiritual.
402
 Luther further makes it clear near the end of the Commentary (while 
commenting Gal 6:19-21) that the fact that the quality of a thing is determined by the basic 
affect concerns the whole man, and not only his works: 
Here it is most manifestly seen that ‘flesh’ is not used only for the lustful desires, but 
before all else especially for those which are against the spirit of grace. Heresies, sects and 
disagreements are namely vices of subtle minds and of those who shine with an appearance 
of holiness. Therefore I will say to confirm that which I have said before: flesh signifies 
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 WA 57, a77, 18-25: “[18] Hic manifestissime patet, quod ‘caro’ non est tantum sensualis homo [19] 
seu sensualitas cum suis concupiscentiis etc., sed omnino, quicquid est [20] extra gratiam Christi. Nam 
certum est, quod Galatas ideo dicit carne [21] consumari, non quia luxurias vel crapulas sectarentur, sed quia 
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401
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402
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quod extra gratiam et spiritum Christi est. [23] Nam certum est, Galatas non ideo consummari carne, quod 
luxurias, libidines [24] aut quibuscunque moribus carnem sequerentur, sed quod opera legis et iusticiam [25] 
relicta fide quaererent. At iusticia et opera legis non sunt tantum res [26] sensuales, cum huc etiam pertineat 
opinio et fiducia, quae in corde sunt. [27] [Hebr. 9, 10.] Quicquid igitur ex fide non est, caro est, Heb. ix. In 
variis iusticiis et baptismatibus [28] [1. Mos. 6, 3.] carnis. Sic Gen. vi. Non permanebit spiritus meus in 
homine, quia [29] [Röm. 7, 18.] caro est. Non ait ‘quia carnem habet’ sed ‘quia caro est’. Et Rho. vij. [30] 
Non invenio in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum. Idem ergo ipsemet et [31] [1. Cor. 15, 50] caro sua, 
quantum est ex Adam. Sic iterum: Caro et sanguis regnum dei [32] [Matth. 16, 47.] non possidebunt, et 
Matth. xvi. Caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi. Sed et [33] i. Corin. iij. adhuc, inquit, carnales estis, homines 
estis, cum tamen de Apostolorum [34] [1. Cor. 3, 3.] nominibus certarent. Quibus fit, ut omnis omnium 
hominum, philosophorum, [35] oratorum, etiam pontificum doctrina et iusticia carnalis sit, ubi [36] non 
fidem docent, et satis abusive sacros Canones dici, qui de dignitatibus [37] et opibus statuuntur, intelliges, si 
hic Apostolum audias. Rursum, nihil tam [38] carnale est et externum, quin, si operatore fidei spiritu fiat, 
spirituale sit.” 
See also Vind 2010, 23-24. Unlike Vind states, however, Luther does not move away from the 
trichotomy, but introduces a second, qualitative dichotomy (which Vind calls “theological”) alongside the 
trichotomy. 
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the whole man, and spirit also the whole man. The internal man and external man, or new 
and old man, are not distinguished by a difference between the soul and the body, but by 
the affect. And while the fruits or works of the spirit are peace, faith, continence etc. and 
these take place in the body, who could deny that the spirit and its fruits are present in our 
carnal body and members, as is clearly said in 1. Cor. 6, which asks: Do you not know that 
your members are temples of the Holy Spirit? Therefore not only the soul but also the 
members are a spiritual temple. And again: Glorify and bear God in your body, not: “in 
your soul”. But on the other hand, when envy and enmity are vices of souls, who would 
deny that the flesh is in the soul? Therefore, the spiritual man is the whole man when he 
minds (sapit) those  things which are God’s, carnal man the whole man when he minds 
those things which are his own.
403
 
However, one should note that what takes place is more a shift of focus than a change 
per se. Whereas in the Dictata the relationship between the visible and invisible was the 
central theme, the theology of love (i.e., the question of the quality of the basic affect of 
the person) assumes a more prominent place in the latter works. Being spiritual is no 
longer defined first and foremost in relation to the invisible world, but more in terms of 
the nature of the love that rules the person. The same is true in the Operationes in 
Psalmos.
404
 Nevertheless, the nature of love still retains its dependence on faith and the 
invisible goods known through it.
405
 Furthermore, as is clear from the passage of the 
Commentary on the Magnificat of 1521, the tripartite natural anthropology persists 
alongside the bipartite qualitative anthropology even after the development of the latter 
anthropology, so that neither one is merged into the other. Rather, the person is defined 
through them from different aspects, so that Luther can use both simultaneously. Both are 
related to each other.
406
  
Therefore one can say, that the entire man is carnal or ‘flesh’ when his affect is carnal 
and he minds and seeks (sapit) those things which are his own. The entire man is spiritual 
or ‘spirit’ when his affect is spiritual and he minds and seeks (sapit) those things which 
are of God. The carnal man and the spiritual man possess the same lower parts of soul and 
body, and their respective capacities of reason and senses. The difference between the two 
depends on the spirit, which in the carnal person is dead or submerged in sensual things. 
Therefore, his love, will or affect has turned towards those things. From this fixation 
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 WA 2, 588, 26 – 589, 3: “[26] Hic omnium manifestissime patet, carnem non pro libidinosis accipi 
[27] tantum concupiscentiis, sed pro omni prorsus eo, quod contrarium est spiritui [28] gratiae. Nam 
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quantum sapit quae [3] sua sunt.” 
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 See e.g. WA 5, 564, 35 – 565, 13. 
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 See e.g. AWA 2, 40, 14 – 41, 10; 43, 21 – 44, 17. 
406
 WA 7, 550, 19 – 552, 4. See also WA 2, 585, 31-33. 
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follows the greedy love (cupiditas) that rules the carnal life, and makes the whole person 
‘flesh’ and carnal. The spiritual person, on the contrary, has a living spirit, and participates 
through faith in the spiritual and eternal things. These things satisfy his will with their 
abundance, and create in him a self-giving and self-sacrificing love (caritas) that wishes to 
give good to others. This basic affect penetrates all the actions of the person and takes the 
natural parts into its use. In this sense, the entire man is either flesh when ruled by the 
carnal affect, or spirit when ruled by the spiritual affect. The relationship of the parts to the 
whole as portrayed in the Commentary on the Magnificat is illustrated in the following 
table, in which the carnal man is compared to the spiritual man. The affect is connected in 
the table to the spiritual part, as it stems from the quality of the spirit: 
 
 Carnal man (‘Flesh’) Spiritual man (‘Spirit’) 
Spirit 
Capacity 
 
Object: 
Affect 
(dead) 
blindness of original sin  
in intellect 
created visible finite goods 
greedy love (cupiditas) 
(ruling) 
intellect of faith 
 
divine invisible infinite goods 
self-giving love (caritas) 
Soul 
Capacity 
Object 
 
reason 
species, phantasms,  
concepts etc. 
 
reason 
species, phantasms,  
concepts etc. 
Body 
Capacity 
Object 
 
senses 
visible and sensible things 
 
senses 
visible and sensible things 
 
However, a reservation needs to be given concerning that for Luther the spiritual man 
exists only as an ideal case. Whereas the human beings after the Fall are for Luther purely 
and simply carnal, having lost the gift of original righteousness, the only purely spiritual 
people are those who have departed this life. They no longer have flesh, but are wholly 
spirit, having a spiritual body like Christ. The faithful on this Earth, on the other hand, are 
in the process of being sanctified. In this respect, they are only partially, or at the same 
time, spiritual and carnal. Thus to understand Luther’s view of the human condition it is 
not enough to examine the tripartite and bipartite anthropologies alone. One must also 
examine the struggle which takes place within the person of the faithful. Luther 
understands this struggle in very concrete, Pauline terms as a conflict between two 
“natures” in the same person.407 The struggle begins at the infusion of faith, which is the 
topic of the next chapter. 
                                                 
407
 WA 55, I, 916 gloss 5; WA 55, II, 122, 23-27; 882, 55-69; 911, 609 – 912, 632; 972, 2321 – 973, 
2348; WA 56, 343, 8 – 344, 22; WA 57, a102, 6-18; WA 2, 585, 31 – 586, 22; 586, 37-38; WA 5, 669, 37 – 
670, 34. 
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2.4.2. The Christian 
2.4.2.1 The Infusion of Faith – the Creation of the Spirit 
Luther establishes in several places, that the precise hallmark of the carnal person is being 
at internal peace. The carnal person is blind, evil and submerged in external things up to 
the point that he cannot discern the evil that is in him. Rather, he co-operates willingly and 
is at unity with his evil desire (concupiscence), and therefore there exists no internal 
struggle in him.
408
 At the most, if he knows the law of God externally, he can try to fulfil 
it with his deeds, but because his will is united with the desire of the flesh and the law 
only affects him externally.
409
 With all his capacities (which discern only created things) 
and all his will (which loves only himself and created goods) he stands against the grace of 
God.
410
 Furthermore, Luther’s idea of God as incomprehensible and hidden under his 
opposites (visible and external evils) makes God unapproachable for the carnal person.
411
 
This unapproachability is often illustrated by Luther with the image of a cloud, in the 
middle of which God is hidden. This cloud has both the meaning of incomprehensibility 
and hiddenness, but for the flesh it signifies above all the hiddenness under the external 
letter and the sufferings, which cover the presence and action of God in the Law and in 
Christ.
412
 Because of this covering, carnal people will find no pleasure in the word of God, 
and will flee from it. Luther describes this aversion in the following way: 
‘Now’ I say, after Christ has been made the King of everything, there are two things which 
hinder you most so that you do not think/know right (ne recta cognoscatis). 
First, that this Christ – who was crucified, killed and condemned by you, and on God’s 
authority was even cursed according to the Law of Moses – is proclaimed the Lord of 
Lords. It will be most difficult of all to recognize as a King one who died such a desperate 
and shameful death. The senses oppose fiercely, reason is horrified, experience denies it, 
there is no precedent. This will be complete foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling 
block to the Jews, unless you raise the mind over all this. 
Second, that this king reigns in a manner that he teaches that all in which you hoped for in 
the law should be condemned and all which you feared be loved. He sets before you the 
Cross and death. He urges that visible good and evil should be despised and a far different 
good, ‘which the eye has not seen nor the ear has heard’ be conferred to you. You must 
die, if you wish to live under this king. [...] 
How will anyone endure this, who leans on the senses, measures things with reason and 
‘stands on the doorway of his tent’; who is unable to look at the face of Moses? Therefore 
intellect (intellectus) and education are necessary, through which you will transcend these 
                                                 
408
 WA 55, II, 882, 55-69; WA 56, 342, 30 – 343, 28; 345, 20-28; WA 57, a89, 2-19; WA 2, 537, 35 – 
538, 17; WA 5, 479, 12-15. This simplicity is also the reason why Luther thinks that a human being cannot 
co-operate in the birth of faith, but that when he has become spiritual (and thus is partly flesh, partly spirit), 
then he can co-operate with grace. See e.g., WA 56, 379, 1-17. 
409
 WA 55, II, 639, 257-268; WA 56, 235, 4-9; 308, 4-13; AWA 2, 40, 3 – 41, 10; 44, 8-15; WA 2, 492, 
36 – 493, 2. 
410
 WA 56, 76 gloss 1; 170, 26 – 171, 8; 356, 17 – 357, 17. 
411
 See chapter 2.2.4. 
412
 WA 55, I, 136, 12 – 138, 1; 136 gloss 1; 609 gloss 19; 650 gloss 1; WA 55, II, 136, 8-13; WA 5, 503, 
4-34; 506, 26 – 507, 15. On other meanings of the cloud, see WA 55, II, 139, 3 – 140, 19. 
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and, despising the visible, be elevated to the invisible; not minding those which are upon 
earth, but those which are above, where Christ is, etc. [...] 
This intellect is not that of which the philosophers opine, but it is faith itself which can see 
both in prosperous and adverse things that which is not visible. Therefore, not saying what 
it is that should be understood, he says in an absolute way: Understand, that is, make it so, 
that you would be intelligent, take care, that you would be believing. For that which faith 
understands has no name or form (speciem). Prosperity or adversity in present things 
completely subverts everyone who does not understand the invisible by faith. For this 
intellect comes from faith, according to this: ‘If you will not believe, you will not 
understand’, and it is entrance into that cloud in which everything that the human senses, 
reason, mind or intellect can comprehend is overwhelmed. For faith unites the soul with 
the invisible, ineffable, innominable, eternal, incogitable Word of God and at the same 
time separates it from all that is visible. This is the Cross and ‘passover’ of the Lord, in 
which he predicates this necessary intellect.
413
 
One can distinguish in the text both aspects of God’s unapproachability: hiddenness 
under contraries (shame of the cross, etc.), and incomprehensibility (i.e., that the 
theological good is far different than all visible goods, invisible and heavenly). The text 
also juxtaposes the senses, reason and visible things (on which the carnal person is 
dependent) to the the intellectual and invisible things of faith. Therefore, it is natural, that 
Luther describes the action of God in the birth of faith as something that causes suffering 
for the carnal person. One of the images Luther takes from the Bible to demonstrate this 
effect is the portrayal of the Word of God as a wand or a sceptre with which the carnal 
person is struck. The impact of the word is painful and crushing for the flesh. It reduces 
the carnal person to nothing and brings him to that darkness (i.e., the hiddenness of God 
                                                 
413
 AWA 2, 106, 18 – 108, 5: “’Nunc’, inquam, postquam Christus constitutus est rex omnium <v 6>; in 
quo tempore duo sunt, quae vos maxime remorabuntur, ne recta cognoscatis. 
Pr imum, quod Christus ille a vobis crucifixus, mortuus, damnatus, etiam auctore deo maledictus 
secundum legem Mosi, praedicatur dominus dominantium <1Tim 6,15b; Apc 19,16>. Difficillimum 
omnium erit agnoscere eum regem, qui tam desperata et ignominiosa morte interiit. Sensus fortiter repugnat, 
ratio abhorret, usus negat, exemplum deest, plane stultitia haec gentibus et Iudaeis scandalum erit <1Cor 
1,23>, nisi super haec omnia mentem elevaveritis. 
Secundum, quod rex iste sic regnat, ut omnia, quae in lege sperastis, contemnenda, omnia, quae 
timuistis, amanda doceat; crucem mortemque proponit; bona, quae videntur, et mala iuxta vilipendenda esse 
suadet, longe in alia vos bona eaque, ”quae nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis 
ascenderunt” <1Cor 2,9>, vos transpositurus. Moriendum est vobis, si sub hoc rege vivere vultis; crux et 
odium totius mundi feranda, ignominia, pauperitas, fames, sitis, breviter: mala omnium fluctuum mundi non 
fugienda. Hic est enim rex, qui et ipse stultus factus est mundo et mortuus, deinde conterit suos virga ferrea 
et tamquam vas figuli confringit eos <v 9>. 
Quomodo hunc sustinebit, qui sensu nititur, qui rem ratione metitur, qui stat ’in ostio papilionis sui’ <Ex 
33,8>, qui faciem sui Mosi videre nequit? Ideo intellectu opus est et eruditione, quibus haec transcendatis et 
visibilibus contemptis in invisibilia rapiamini non sapientes ea, quae super terram, sed quae sursum sunt, ubi 
Christus est etc <Col 3,1s>. [...]  
Non enim habent nomen nequem speciem ea, qua fides intelligit. Nam praesentium rerum prosperitas vel 
adversitas penitus subvertit omnem hominem, qui fide non intelligit invisibilia. Hic enim intellectus ex fide 
venit, iuxta illud <Is 7,9>: ’Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis’, et est ingressus ille caliginis, in qua 
absorbetur, quicquid sensus, ratio, mens intellectusque hominis comprehendere potest. Coniungit enim fides 
animam cum invisibili, ineffabili, innominabili, aeterno, incogitabili verbo dei simulque separat ab omnibus 
visibilibus, et haec est crux et ’phase’ domini, in quo necessarium praedicat hunc intellectum.” 
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under external things) where Christ is present.
414
 Luther combines this image with the 
description of the external word as a vehicle of Christ with which Christ, the Truth, enters 
the soul and subjects the flesh to his rule.
415
 Another common image Luther uses to speak 
about the birth of faith is that of infusion: i.e., the infusion of faith or grace, related to the 
medieval concept of infused virtues. The work of grace in the infusion and growth of these 
virtues leads the person into darkness and suffering, in the midst of which Christ is 
embraced.
416
  
Both images are connected with Luther’s understanding of the sacramental nature of 
the Church. Luther holds that in the Church the invisible things are present, but concealed 
by the veil of Christ’s humanity, the external word and the sacraments. Grace draws the 
human being through that veil.
417
 The images also follow Luther’s distinction between the 
alien and proper work of God. The alien work, the crushing, judgement and pain which 
meets the carnal person, is necessary for the proper work of God (in infusing faith, 
drawing into the midst of the cloud or through the veil, and uniting with Christ, who is 
present under the alien work) to be actualized and complemented. The significance of the 
crushing work is not understood until the saving work has taken place.
418
 This is because 
the form of the flesh and the light of the natural reason completely contradict the light of 
faith and do not recognize the presence of God. Therefore, it is necessary that the flesh, 
the natural reason and the prudence of the flesh are brought to darkness and nothingness 
through the annihilating action of the Word and grace.
419
 Thus both of the ways Luther 
uses to illustrate the work of God in the creation of faith are united in that they both 
contain the idea of bringing the subject into darkness and cloud. The external form of the 
word and the sacraments, as well as the passions, are the dark cloud in which God is 
                                                 
414
 WA 55, II, 848, 214-224; WA 57, b109, 2-23; b143, 7 – b144, 12; AWA 2, 96, 12 – 103, 22; 107, 3-
8; 109, 16 – 27. On the concepts of annihilatio and  nothing in Luther’s theology see also Juntunen 1996. 
415
 WA 55, II, 328, 506-511; 847, 187 – 848, 203. Note that when Luther speaks of the dual effect of the 
Word of God, it is sometimes very dificult to maintain a grammatical distinction between the (external) 
word (in lower case) and the (internal) Word, i.e, Christ (with capital letter). The external word contains the 
effective internal Word, but also the exterior form of the external word is involved in the effect the preached 
Word of God has on a person: the external word hides the proper content of the Word of God, the internal 
Word, under a lowly form displeasing to the flesh. The external word is also necessary, for the function of 
the Word of God, as following the incarnational principle it is the vehicle with which a material person can 
in the first place be touched by God. Because of this problem, when speaking of the effect of both the 
external and internal word combined, the lower case wording will be preferred. 
416
 The infusion of grace and the theological virtues is dealt with in length in the excursus entitled De spe 
et passionibus, AWA 2, 283-321. See also WA 56, 379, 1-17; WA 57, b79 gloss 3. On Luther’s concept of 
infused faith in general, see Huovinen 1997 and chapter 3.5.1 as well as Schwarz 1962, 40-42. 
417
 Chapter 2.3.3.3. See also WA 55, II, 328, 506-511. Notwithstanding the emphasis on the sacraments 
Luther recognizes that God also uses the sufferings of life to draw the human being to him, or at least to test 
and strengthen faith. See AWA 2, 363, 6-18. There are also a few places in the latter writings (Lectures on 
Galatians and Commentary on Galatians) where Luther speaks about the sweetness of grace and the intution 
of the passion of Christ drawing people to God. However, it seems that these texts should be interpreted as 
speaking about the dual effect of the word (both sweet and harsh), so that it is not disputed that the effect of 
the word is harsh with regard to the flesh, as the perception of the sweetness of grace is linked to faith. See 
WA 57, a102, 19 – a103, 9. See also WA 2, 587, 27 – 588, 20. 
418
 WA 55, I, 382 gloss 10; WA 55, II, 725, 35 – 726, 77; 926, 1039 – 932, 1182; WA 56, 375, 1 – 379, 
17; WA 57, b79 gloss 3; AWA 2, 97, 12 - 98, 8; WA 5, 503, 24-34. See also the analysis of tribulations in 
chapter 3.5.2. 
419
 WA 55, II, 722, 134-142; WA 57, b143, 7-15. The form of the flesh must be annihilated so that the 
form of Christ may be born in the believer. WA 56, 62 gloss 1; 329, 27 – 330, 5; WA 2, 548, 20-29. 
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hidden and in the midst of which Christ as the internal and uncreated Word is 
encountered.
420
 Even though the carnal person wants to avoid this cloud, he is drawn into 
it by God’s grace, at first against his will. However, when he is smitten by the sceptre of 
the word of God, grace effects the theological virtues of faith, hope and love which 
connect the person with “the pure and internal Word” that is Christ. Luther describes this 
infusion of grace using mystical terms such as “descending to the darkness” and entering 
the “wine cellar” (Song of Songs 2:4). In these passions connected to the infusion the 
human being is ‘pulled away’ from self-centeredness and will begin to rely on God instead 
of his or her own abilities.
421
  
The passage of Christ into the human heart by the means of the external word, infused 
grace and sufferings results in the creation of a new man. Luther stresses that justification 
is not about sin being taken away and the same old man remaining, but rather it is about 
the old man being taken away and sin remaining. That is; grace and spiritual righteousness 
destroys and exchanges (tollit et mutat) the person, carries him away from sin as it 
justifies the spirit, although sin still remains in the flesh.
422
 What takes place is an 
ontological change: the old, carnal man and flesh are vain and temporal and are incapable 
of receiving spiritual grace.
423
 In the creation of faith, the carnal person is given a new 
                                                 
420
 AWA 2, 97, 13 - 98, 8; 131, 23 – 132, 16. 
421
 WA 57, b143, 7 – b144, 12; AWA 2, 107, 9 – 108, 5; 317, 7 – 319, 3. 
422
 WA 56, 334, 13 335, 4: “Corol⌊larium.[14] Modus loquendi Apostoli et modus methaphysicus seu 
moralis sunt [15] contrarii. Quia Apostolus loquitur, vt significet | sonet | hominem potius [16] aufferri 
peccato remanente | velut relicto | et hominem expurgari a [17] peccato | potius quam econtra |. Humanus 
autem sensus econtra peccatum [18] aufferri homine manente et hominem potius purgari loquitur. [19] Sed 
Apostoli sensus optime proprius et perfecte diuinus est. Sic enim et [20] Scrip⌊tura psalmo 80.: ‘Diuertit ab 
oneribus dorsum eius.’ Non ait: [21] diuertit onera a dorso eius. || Sic supra 6.: ‘in qua traditi estis.’ || Et [22] 
figura exodi, quia non abstulit Egyptios a filiis Israel, Sed eduxit Israel [23] ex Egypto remanente. Et psalmo 
16.: ‘De reliquiis tuis preparabis [24] vultum eorum, quia pones eos dorsum.’ Et ratio huius locutionis: Quia 
[25] gratia et spiritualis Iustitia ipsum hominem tollit et mutat et a peccatis [26] auertit, licet peccatum 
relinquat, Vt dum Iustificat spiritum, reliquit [27] concupiscentiam in carne | et in medio peccatorum in 
mundo |. || Et [28] iste modus Validissima machina est contra Iustitiarios. || Iustitia Vero [1] humana studet 
tollere et mutare peccata primum et conseruare ipsum [2] hominem; ideo non est Iustitia, Sed hipocrisis. 
Ergo donec homo [3] ipse viuit et non tollitur ac mutatur per renouationem gratie  , Nullis [4] operibus potest 
facere, Vt sub peccato et lege non sit.” 
WA 57, b109, 2-19: “Dicitur autem ‘virga equitatis’, id est rectitudinis [3] seu, quod idem est, 
‘direccionis eque’ Hebreo ideomate, quod Latine [4] diceretur virga equa, recta, directa etc., sicut ps. 20.: ‘in 
benediccionibus [5] dulcedinis’, quod Latine diceremus ‘in benediccionibus dulcibus’. Igitur [6] ad 
differenciam omnium aliorum regnorum, eciam Sinagoge, licet legem [7] Dei habuerit, dicitur ‘virga regni 
tui’ non sicut aliorum regnorum, [8] quorum virge sunt curvitatis seu iniquitatis, tui autem solius ‘virga [9] 
rectitudinis’, quia nulla prorsus doctrina sive civilis sive canonica sive [10] philosophica et quocunque modo 
humana potest hominem dirigere et [11] rectum facere, siquidem eo usque tantummodo ducit, ut homine 
servato [12] in vetustate bonis instituat moribus. Et ita necessario facit non nisi [13] simulatores et 
hipocritas, quia remanet illa fex cordis et sentina veteris [14] hominis, scil. amor sui ipsius; ideo merito est 
doctrina iniquitatis, cum [15] rectitudinem prestare non possit. Evangelium vero dicit: ‘Nisi quis [16] D Bl. 
24 a renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu* denuo, non potest intrare regnum [17] celorum’, ac sic nihil reservat 
veteris hominis, sed totum destruit et [18] facit novum usque ad odium sui eradicans penitus amorem sui per 
fidem [19] Christi.” 
423
 WA 55, I, 680, 3-22: “[102, 13] Quomodo miseretur quia ‘castigat’ et erudit17 pater filiorum quos 
tamen ‘diligit’ et heredes facit misertus est dominus timentibus se castigans eos hic, vt in futurum heredes 
habeat: [102, 14] quoniam ipse cognouit 4, 165 quod carnalis homo non 
|
 cognoscit, Sed spirituales ipse 
cognoscere facit figmentum nostrum corpus nostrum de terra plasmatum est, quia vana querit et non solida 
       ideo ipsum castigat
18
. Recordatus est quoniam puluis sumus ideo non in illum ‘suam misericordiam 
corroborat’ / [102, 15] homo inquantum homo et nondum filius Dei sicut foenum quare non est capax 
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spiritual nature from Christ. In and of himself he is flesh, visible and mortal. But from 
Christ, by having become a faithful Christian, he is holy in his spirit. With regard to the 
new nature given in Christ he is spiritual, immortal and invisible, and begins to participate 
in a new, heavenly life. Thus what happens is a kind of miraculous exchange analogous to 
the Incarnation. The Christian acquires a new spiritual nature from Christ, in whom he 
participates.
424
 This new, spiritual nature constitutes in him a “new being” (novum esse), 
which is in discontinuity with and in conflict with his old being. Thus, the human person 
cannot cooperate in the infusion of faith. He can only cooperate with grace after grace has 
become the new reality in him.
425
 Luther explains this change in the Lectures on Romans 
using even Aristotelian metaphysical terms. The existence of the old man is non-being 
(non esse); justification is becoming (fieri), and righteousness is being (esse). In the new 
birth, the Christian crosses over from non-being through becoming to new being; from sin 
through justification to new life. For this reason Luther places annihilation at the 
beginning of the process of justification. As long as the human being presumes to be 
something in himself, he cannot receive the new form from Christ. Thus grace destroys the 
                                                                                                                                                   
e  terne  misericordie  19: dies i. e. prosperitas et gloria secundum carnem eius tanquam flos agri sic efflorebit 
transeunter, ideo secundum aliud est ei prouidenda misericordia quam secundum carnem        per mortem 
corporis. [102, 16] Quoniam spiritus anima corporis vita et motrix pertransibit in morte in illo homine et 
supple: ipse homo non subsistet permanebit in hac vita semper
20
: et supple: homo non cognoscet quia 
obliuiscetur nec reuertetur amplius locum suum Vitam et habitationem in hoc mundo. [102, 17] 
Misericordia autem domini gratia autem non huiusmodi est, Ergo non in hac Vita Sed ab aeterno quia 
‘ante constitutionem mundi nos elegit’ ad istam misericordiam, Eph. 1. et usque inaeternum: super 
timentes eum ergo et ipsos e  ternos et non temporales esse oportebit, alioquin non erunt eius capaces.” 
See also WA 55, I, 681 glosses 18, 19, 20 and 21. 
424
 WA 55, I, 684, 1-4: “Qui facis angelos tuos vt sint nuncii tui missi ad homines, Heb. 1. spiritus 
spirituales naturas : et ministros tuos eosdem, vt sint ministri tui ignem spiritualem naturam vrentem quia 
alios accendunt” 
WA 55, I, 684 gloss 5: “GLOSSA:5) [1]Potest autem etiam sic intelligi vt Iacet: Qui facis eos qui sunt 
[2]angeli tui, vt sint ‘spiritus’, i. e. spirituales, agiles, mobiles et non sicut [3]homo qui facit suos nuntios 
tardos, carneos etc. Et eosdem Ministros [4]facis ‘ignem vrentem’, i. e. Efficaces ad exequendum. Vnde et 
angeli [5]semper in luce et igne apparuisse leguntur. Sed prophetice loquendo et [6]magis ad propositum 
Sensus est: O Christe, ‘Angeli’ tui, qui sunt Apostoli [7]et eorum successores, sunt ‘spiritus’, i. e. spirituales, 
quia spiritum et non [8]literam predicant Et non sunt caro, sicut Angeli Mosi et regum terre sunt [9]caro, 
Quia nunciant tantummodo carnalia. Sed tui sunt Inuisibiles, quia [10]spiritus, inquantum sunt nuncii tui et 
angeli tui.        Vnde in quolibet [11]Christiano, maxime prelato, duo sunt consideranda: primum, quod est 
ex [12]seipso secundum carnem visibilis, mortalis etc. Alterum, quod est ex [13]Christo, i. e. scil. fidelis 
Christianus, sanctus secundum spiritum, et sic [14]est Inuisibilis, immortalis spiritus et clarissimus. Sicut 
enim In persona [15]Christi Caro assumpta visibilis, Deus assumens Inuisibilis. Ita quilibet [16]eius 
secundum hominem visibilem assumptus, Sed secundum hominem [17]interiorem Inuisibilem assumens. 
Igitur idem est, siue dicas, Qui facis [18]{spiritus angelos tuos/ [19]angelos tuos spiritus} i. e. 
[20]{spirituales, vt sint angeli tui/ [21]Angelos tuos, vt sint spiritus} Sic eodem modo Et [22]{ministros tuos 
ignem vrentem/ [23]ignem vrentem ministros tuos} Melius tamen, vt Iacent verba in ordine [24]suo, quia 
differentiam ponit Gratie et legis. Lex enim Angelos habuit [25]non spiritus, Sed carnem, Non ignem 
vrentem, Sed aquam fluentem, [26]i. e. mortales homines. 
[27]Vnde mirabilis est iste psal⌊mus, Nam ex Apost⌊olo, Heb. 1., cogimur [28]istum versum de angelis 
ad literam accipere celestibus, Et per consequens [29]etiam alia, saltem multa. Econtra in multis indicat se 
spiritualiter loqui.” 
See also WA 55, I, 819 gloss 1; WA 57, b222, 24 – b223, 23. 
425
 See WA 56, 379, 1-17; AWA 2, 320, 15 – 321, 5. 
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old form and makes the human person non-being in order to impart to him the form of 
Christ.
426
 Luther summarizes this process: 
GLOSS 6) Up to this point he teaches becoming a new man and describes the new birth, 
which gives new being, John 3. Now, however, he teaches the works of the new birth, 
which are attempted in vain, if one has not yet been made a new man. Being (esse) 
precedes action (operari), suffering (pati) precedes being (esse). Therefore becoming 
(fieri), being (esse) and action (operari) follow each other.
427
 
As can be seen from the foregoing analysis, Luther’s understanding of the new birth of 
the Christian in the infusion of faith corresponds to his understanding of the two distinct 
works of God (the visible creation and the invisible creation) as well as the three-stage 
structure of the world. The human creature with regard to his old being as a carnal person 
is part of the visible world. Through the infusion of faith he is created anew, so that he 
becomes part of the invisible world and the New Creation, the Church.
428
 On the one 
hand, it can be said that infused faith elevates him to heavenly life, and that he thus 
crosses over through the cloud into the presence of God as Moses did. This crossing over 
corresponds to leaving the Forecourt and entering through the veil of the Tabernacle into 
the Holy: turning from outwards to inwards. On the other hand, it can be said that in the 
infusion of faith God descends to the heart of the believer, so that his spirit is no longer 
empty, but that it becomes the dwelling place of God. These actions happen 
simultaneously and according to Luther are the same act.
429
  
2.4.2.2 The Duality of Christian Existence: The Conflict between the Spirit and the 
Flesh 
However, as the Church is still hidden, so is the spiritual life of the Christian, and as the 
Church is travelling from its persecuted state towards the heavenly glory, so is the 
Christian.
430
 Therefore, the Christian is not purely spirit (although insofar he is a Christian 
his primary identity is with the spirit), but the infusion of faith constitutes a starting point 
in his existence of the struggle between the spirit and the flesh.
431
 The flesh that was at 
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 WA 56, 441, 13 – 442, 26; WA 2, 548, 20-29. Luther does not think, however, that this process takes 
place only at the birth of faith and in the first imparting of righteousness. As the human being also remains a 
sinner at the same time when he is made righteous, the life of the Christian constitutes an ongoing process in 
which he is always in non-being (non esse), always in becoming (fieri) and always in being (esse). On the 
analysis of the Aristotelian concept of movement behind Luther’s text, see Dieter 2001, 335-343. On the 
idea of the transformation of the Christian into new being see also Peura 1994, 144-150. 
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 WA 56, 117 gloss 6: “GLOSSA:6) [25]Hucusque docuit nouum hominem fieri et nouam natiuitatem 
[26]descripsit, que dat nouum esse, Iohann. 3. Nunc vero Noue natiuitatis [27]opera docet, Que frustra 
presumit nondum nouus homo factus. Prius [28]est enim esse quam operari, prius autem pati quam esse. 
Ergo fieri, esse, [29]operari se sequuntur.” 
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 See chapters 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.3. See also WA 2, 614, 28-36. 
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 WA 55, I, 214 gloss 5; WA 55, II, 452, 102 – 453, 129; 654, 297 – 655, 316; WA 56, 229, 7 – 230, 8; 
AWA 2, 107, 9-13; 108, 1-5; 202, 21 – 203, 2; WA 5, 506, 26 – 507, 15. 
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 See chapters  2.3.3.3 and 3.4. 
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 WA 57, a19, 1-10: “[2, 19] Ego enim1 et quilibet in Christum [2] credens per legem: sc. spiritus, 
fidei legi operum et littere mortuus sum [3] sicut debitor mortuus nihil debet exactori suo, ita nec iustus legi 
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peace is now roused to conflict against the flesh. There are two aspects to this conflict, 
which we will consider next. 
The first aspect of the conflict concerns concupiscence. Luther describes it in the 
Dictata as follows: 
Therefore I however, he says, have been humbled exceedingly, i.e., have been afflicted 
because of the word of the Cross, because it is a scandal and foolishness to the proud. 
‘Humiliated’ is namely commonly used in this way, as previously: ‘I have been altogether 
humiliated, O Lord’. Truly this happens even in a moral way, so that a person afflicts 
himself deeply, when the conscience declares faith to him. Or certainly, when the spirit 
begins to live from faith and mind those things which are God’s, soon the flesh rises and 
will persecute as the Pharaoh persecuted the Israelites and the Synagogue the Apostles of 
Christ. At that point it will begin to desire (concupiscere) against the spirit and the spirit 
against it. Then the spirit says this with the Apostle: ‘Wretched man that I am, who will 
liberate me from the death of this body? I namely see another law in my members, 
opposing the law of my mind and capturing me in the law of sin’ etc. This is [the same as] 
when the Psalmist says: ‘I however have been humbled exceedingly’, namely by the law of 
the members, because by faith the law of the mind was awakened. ‘I have believed’, as if 
he would say: ‘I take delight in the law of God according to my internal man.’ But also the 
flesh, which formerly slept when it alone ruled over the spirit, stays awake in guard against 
its enemy.
432
 
Luther states the same thing in multiple places: when grace awakens the spirit and 
creates the man anew, a battle begins between the spirit and the flesh. The word separates 
the spirit from the corporeal, animal and evil affects, so purifying the heart. If the life of a 
carnal person was peaceful when the spirit slept, and the infusion of grace was at first an 
anguishing experience because the word afflicted the flesh and the flesh did not 
understand it, now there exist simultaneously internal peace in the spirit and external 
conflict in the flesh. Grace even awakens the entire world and the Devil to begin waging a 
war against the Christian. Externally, the Christian may thus appear most wretched, while 
internally he is secure and at peace. Luther does admit, however, that sometimes both the 
                                                                                                                                                   
ut deo [4] uiuam: sc. in spiritu et novo homine, et sic Deo debitor sim        ideo vivo [5] Deo, quia Christo 
confixus sum cruci. sc. secundum veterem hominem, [6] qui vivebat legi [2, 20] Viuo autem sc. secundum 
novum hominem iam [7] non ego: quia ego sum vetus homo viuit uero in me Christus. qui vivit [8] soli 
Deo, ad Ro. 7.: ‘Quod autem vivit, vivit Deo’ Quod2 ·3 autem nunc [9] uiuo sc. in tempore huius mortis in 
carne: licet non secundum carnem [10] in fide uiuo q. d. vita carnis non est mea vita propria” 
On this conflict see also Vind 2010, 28-33 and chapter 3.4.3. 
432
 WA 55, II, 882, 55-69: “Ideo Ego autem inquit humiliatus sum [56] nimis, i. e. afflictus propter 
verbum crucis, quia scandalum est superbis et [57] stultitia. Sic enim communiter ‘humiliatus’ accipitur, Vt 
infra: ‘humiliatus [58] sum vsquequaque, Domine’. Verum moraliter quoque id fit, vt homo [59] seipsum 
affligat nimis, Vbi conscientia sibi dictat fidem. Vel certe, Vbi incipit [60] spiritus ex fide viuere et sapere 
que Dei sunt, mox caro insurgit, et persequitur [61] sicut Pharao Israelitas Et Synagoga Apostolos Christi. 
Tunc enim [62] incipit ipsa concupiscere aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus eam. Tunc [63] spiritus dicit 
illud cum Apostolo Ro. 7.: ‘Infelix homo ego, quis me liberabit [64] de morte corporis huius? Video enim 
aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem [65] legi mentis mee  et captiuantem me in legem peccati’ etc. 
Hoc est, [66] quod iste dicit: ‘Ego autem humiliatus sum nimis’, scil. a lege membrorum, [67] quia per 
fidem lex mentis euigilauit. Credidi enim, hoc est vt ille ait: [68] ‘Condelector enim legi Dei secundum 
interiorem hominem’. Sed tunc hostis [69] simul euigilat caro, que dormiuit, quando sola regnabat super 
spiritum.” 
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internal peace and the external conflict remain hidden, but that they nevertheless exist.
433
 
Therefore, for Luther the experience of a Christian is – save for some specific 
occurrences
434
 – dual and divided. The spirit receives the word with pleasure, is at peace 
with God and seeks to fullfill God’s law of love through the external members. But the 
flesh receives the word only with “the greatest aversion”; it is at war with the spirit and 
seeks to regain control of the person. It and resists the actualization of the imperatives of 
the spirit in the corporeal members. Most of Luther’s texts in which the influence of the 
word on the person is treated aptly illustrate this duality. For an example, Luther writes in 
the Operationes about why the word is called an iron sceptre: 
You can see that this verse is completely allegorical, and not without reason, because it 
signifies an allegory taking place in life and by the thing itself. For since the Word of 
Christ is the Word of prosperity and peace, the Word of life and grace, and since it works 
not in the flesh, but in the spirit, it must suppress and drive out the prosperity, peace, life, 
and grace of the flesh. When it does this, it appears to the flesh harder and crueler than iron 
itself. For whenever a carnal man is touched in a wholesome way by the Word of God, one 
thing is felt, but another actually happens, accordingly with ‘the Lord kills and brings to 
life, sets down to Hell and brings back […] humbles and exalts.’ This allergorical action of 
God is beautifully depicted by Is. 28: ‘So that he would perform his proper work, his work 
is alien from him, so that his work would be accomplished, his work is foreign from him’, 
as to say: Although He is the God of life and salvation and this is His proper work, yet, in 
order to accomplish this, He kills and destroys, which are works alien to him, so that he 
could arrive at his proper work. He namely kills our will so that he would establish his own 
in us, mortifies the flesh and its desires, to bring into life the spirit and its desires.  
This is what is said before without allegory: ‘I will preach the precept of the Lord’. For the 
spirit accepts the Word of the Lord as a most pleasant command. And so it happens, that 
the Mount Zion becomes holy in the Kingdom, and the Nations will fall into its inheritance 
and the ends of the Earth into its possession. But the flesh endures the commandment or 
Word of God with the greatest aversion; nor does it recognize it, since it is completely 
contrary to it in every way.
435
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 WA 57, a54, 27 – a55, 13; WA 57, b161, 9-14; WA 2, 456, 29 – 457, 19. 
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 Luther seems to be open to the possibility that in special instances the soul might be lifted to heaven 
so that it does not feel the restraints of the flesh. See WA 6, 121, 23 – 122, 6. See also WA 56, 258, 8-15. 
Vind 2010, 33-36 is therefore wrong in interpreting the extraordinary experiences as the joy experienced 
after tribulation. Luther seems to seems to have an even more extraordinary experience of heavenly rapture 
in mind.  
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 AWA 2, 97, 12 - 98, 8: “Vides autem et hunc versum esse totum allegoricum, non sine vausa, 
siquiden significant quondam allegoriam, quae geritur re ipse et vita. Cum enim verbum Christi sit verbum 
salutis et pacis, verbum vitae et gratiae, atque haec non in carne, sed in spiritu operetur, necesse est, ut 
salutem, pacem, vitam, gratiam carnis opprimat et expellat. Quod cum facit, apparet carni ferro ipso durius 
et inclementius. Aliud enim sentitur et aliud fit, quoties homo carnalis verbo dei salubriter tangitur, nempe 
illud 1Reg 2<,6s>: ’Dominus mortificat et vivificat, deducit ad inferos et reducit […], humiliat et exaltat’. 
Hanc allegoricam operationem dei pulchre Is 28<,21> depingit dicens: ’Ut faciat opus suum, alienum opus 
est eius, ut operetur opus suum, peregrinum est opus eius ab eo’, quasi dicat: Cum sit deus vitae et salutis, et 
haec opera eius propria, tamen, ut operetur, occidit et perdit, quae sunt opera ei aliena, quo perveniat ad opus 
suum proprium. Occidit enim voluntatem nostram, ut statuat in nobis suam; mortificat carnem et 
concupiscentias eius, ut vivificet spiritum et concupiscentias eius. Hoc est, quod supra <v 7> sine allegoria 
dixit: ’Praedicans praeceptum domini.’ Spiritus enim accipit verbum dei ut praeceptum iucundissimum. 
Tunc enim fit, ut mons Zion sanctus <v 6> in regnum, et gentes in hereditatem, et termini terrae in 
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What is clearly observable in the quote is the dual and divergent effect of the word on 
the spirit and the flesh. The human being, having been created anew, shares both spirit and 
the flesh. Therefore the effect of the word, which previously was only distressing for the 
flesh, is now at the same time pleasurable for the spirit. As the proper work of grace is 
carried out under the alien work, now the word simultaneously effects two mutually 
opposite things: crucifying the flesh and pleasing the spirit. Therefore, the Word of God is 
simultaneously a word of the cross and salvation, the Law of Christ and the Gospel, 
judgement and sermon, word of discipline and goodness, word of destruction and 
edification.
436
 The reason for his is that the Word in its proper nature as spirit (distinct 
from the sensual figures and the letter), spoken in the spirit of the hearer, is so concise and 
abridged that it does not touch the flesh and the external man, but only the internal man. In 
this sense, the word (with regard) to its true content, is very much like a Platonic idea. It is 
immaterial and invisible, conferring spiritual and invisible goods that have to be received 
internally in the spirit. Therefore, the Word, like a blade, cuts and separates the person 
from the sensual objects of love and all created things. As it quiets the internal man, at the 
same time it brings the external man into anguish and darkness. Thus the Word perfects 
and weakens, fullfills and makes empty at the same time.
437
 It turns the person away from 
external things and towards the internal things, kindling in him the love of the spiritual 
and eternal and contempt for the temporal, and so directs the person to the right way, 
making him straight (rectus) like the unbendable rod it is.
438
  
The second aspect of the conflict is cognitive. The divine reality conferred by the 
Word now becomes present and accessible to the new person (internal man; the spirit) but 
it remains unknown and incomprehensible for the old person (external man; the flesh). 
Luther illustrates this aspect of the New Creation by speaking of the cloud in which God is 
hidden. At the beginning of the infusion of faith, the cloud meant the hiddenness of God 
under the external letter and the water of the baptism. In the infusion of faith, using the 
external word and signs of grace as his vehicle, Christ enters the human heart. When 
Christ enters, the external cloud becomes internal, covering the presence of Christ in the 
spirit, as the human being has become the Tabernacle of the Lord.
439
 That Christ is present 
                                                                                                                                                   
posessionem <v 8> cedant. At caro fert praeceptum seu verbum dei indignissime nec agnoscit ipsum, cum 
sit ei penitus et omnibus modis contrarium.” 
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 WA 55, I, 904-908; 906-907 glosses 7, 9, 10; WA 55, II, 733, 60-68; 848, 214-224; 898, 201-216; 
904, 383-388; 926, 1039 – 927, 1051; 936, 1284-1292; 960, 1968 – 961, 1994; WA 56, 170, 7-25; WA 57, 
b109, 2-23; AWA 2, 97, 12 - 98, 8; 101, 1-8. 
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 WA 55, I 220 gloss  9; WA 56, 406, 16 – 407, 1; 409, 13 – 410, 19. See also WA 55, II, 253, 370 – 
254, 393. 
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 WA 55, II, 654, 282 – 655, 323; 875, 43-58; AWA 2, 100, 16 – 102, 10. On this direction, see chapter 
3.3.2.2. 
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 WA 5, 506, 26 – 507, 15: “[26] Sed ad montem Sinai quoque veniamus, de quo scriptum est, quod 
[27] descendente domino mons operiri coepit caligine, et ipse in vertice et medio [28] montis recte dicitur 
posuisse tenebras latibulum suum, quo eadem fides est [29] significata, per quam habitat in medio Ecclesiae 
suae in cordibus nostris, [30] ubi non videtur. Heae autem tenebrae, dum extra nos sunt, litera occidens [31] 
est terribilis prudentiae carnis, quae vehementer exhorret occidi et tamen [32] occidi oportet, sicut lex 
occidendam docet, ut cum Mose ascendat ad verticem [33] montis, ingresso in caliginem ad dominum. 
Neque enim ad dominum [34] intra caliginem venitur, nisi mortificata per legem prudentia carnis [35] ‘In 
circuitu suo tabernaculum’, scilicet posuit, idem est per repetitionem, [36] quanquam in hebraeo non sit 
praepositio ‘in’, sed ‘sic circuitum suum tabernaculum [37] suum’, hoc est: sicut posuit, ut tenebrae essent 
latibulum suum, ita [38] posuit, ut et circuitus suus esset tabernaculum suum. Quod mihi videtur [39] in eum 
sensum dici, quod fides seu Ecclesia fide sanctificata sit illud, in [40] quo deus moratur. Nam ideo ponit 
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in the internal cloud signifies that the presence of Christ is not understood by the old man. 
Faith forms a cloud in the intellect (here used in the wider sense of both the lower and 
higher intellect), covering and hiding the superior part (i.e., spirit and internal man, the 
proper intellect) from the inferior part (soul and reason, the lower intellect). Thus for the 
old man the presence of Christ in faith is mere darkness, and causes him cognitive 
anguish.
440
 Only the new, internal man and the intellect of faith can grasp this presence. 
Luther describes this dual nature of the cognition of the Christian as follows: 
Cloud and darkness is around Christ, and he himself is in the middle of the cloud that is in 
the soul and in the middle of the darkness that is in the flesh. For the new man by faith 
receives the cloud, that is, a gloomy light, and by this the old man receives the darkness 
and is obscured in a beneficial way. Because when the spirit is illuminated, the flesh is 
blinded, the latter by justice and the former by righteousness. And so is the throne of Christ 
restored.
441
 
So, as we can see, through the infusion of faith the human person has been restored as 
the Throne of Christ. Christ, however, dwells in the person in a way analogous to the 
presence of God in the Temple and in the desert of Sinai. For the flesh, his dwelling place 
is in darkness, but for the spirit, a gloomy light proceeds out as it did from the pillar of 
                                                                                                                                                   
tabernaculum suum non nisi id, quo [1] circuitur, idest clauditur et absconditur, sicut sancto sanctorum 
circumibatur [2] et claudebatur et in monte Sinai nube et caligine circumibatur. Et valet [3] adversus 
personarum respectum, quod dicit tabernaculum suum esse id, quo [4] circuitur. Quicquid illud tandem sit, 
nec nomen nec personam habet. Quicunque [5] [Gal. 3, 28.] enim eum circundant eique adherent, sive 
gentes sive Iudaei, fiunt [6] eius tabernaculum, non est enim distinctio. Verum aspera (ut dixi) haec [7] carni 
ingressurae sunt, suavia spiritui ingresso. Non enim homo nisi per [8] tenebras fidei, fides non nisi per 
mortificationem carnis ingreditur. Unde [9] tenebrae istae, donec sunt exteriores, mors et infernus sunt, ubi 
fuerint factae [10] interiores, vita et salus sunt. Litera enim opponit caliginem et crucem, sed [11] spiritus 
fidei perrumpit et ingressus caliginem invenit dominum. Ideo qui [12] [2. Mos. 20, 19.] fugit et horret 
caliginem sicut populus Israel excusans se, ne fieret eis verbum [13] legis, non pervenit ad dominum. Nisi 
enim legem audieris, quae te [14] humiliet et crucifigat, dominum intus cum Mose loquentem non audies, 
sed [15] [2. Mos. 19, 20.] nec Moses intrat nisi vocante domino, sicut habent verba Exodi.” 
440
 WA 55, II, 803, 110-113: “Et hoc est, quod iste versus dicit, Quod ‘Celum extendis [111] sicut 
pellem’, scil. super veterem hominem, vt eum pellem faciat. Et ‘tegit [112] aquis superiora eius’. Hee sunt 
Euangelice scripture  , que  hominem Interiorem [113] tegunt tegumento fidei et abscondito enygmatis.” 
WA 55, II, 804, 138 – 805, 153: “[138] Spiritus enim Est Superius, Caro autem inferius hominis [139] in 
hac vita. Et sic homo prout rationalis vel secundum animam est [140] ‘firmamentum inter aquas et aquas’ i. 
e. inter sapientiam carnis et [141] spiritus. Si autem sese vertit ad sapientiam spiritus, iam superiora eius 
[142] teguntur aquis, quia ⌈[non] inferiora, sed su[peri]ora eius tegit [143] [a]quis⌉. [144] Qui ponis nubem 
ascensum tuum, Qui ambulas super pennas [145] ventorum.⌈⌈Lit⌊eraliter:⌉⌉ Ad literam de Christo factum 
est, vt patet [146] Act. 1. Secundo Quia aquas tectrices dixerat, Ex quo sequitur, Quod in [147] tegumento et 
velamento istarum aquarum simus, Ac sic sine dubio in [148] Nube et fidei vmbraculo. In hac autem 
ascendit Christus et nos ascendere [149] facit. ⌈⌈Trop⌊ologice:⌉⌉ Hec enim est Scala Iacob, Sed non nisi in 
somno et [150] visione perceptibilis. Quis enim sciat fidem esse Schalam et nubem ascensus, [151] nisi qui 
mundo dormit et visione spirituali vigilat? Igitur Tegi aquis [152] (i. e. captiuari intellectum verbis 
Euangelii) hocipsum est nubem accipere [153] in intellectu. Et he  c nubes ponitur fixe pro fundamento.” 
441
 WA 55, II, 754, 14-19: “Nubes et caligo sit in circuitu Christi, Et ipse in [15] medio nubis, que est in 
anima, Et caliginis, que est in carne  . Nam Nouus [16] homo per fidem accepit nubem, i. e. enygmaticam 
lucem, Et per hoc vetus [17] homo accepit caliginem et obscuratus est salubriter. Quia dum spiritus [18] 
illustratur, caro excecatur; hoc per Iudicium et illud per Iustitiam. Et sic [19] est sedes Christi correcta.” 
The descent of Christ in Incarnation, assumption of risen humanity, humbling the proud and at the 
sacrament of the altar all follow the same logic. See WA 55, II, 139, 3 – 140, 19. 
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cloud.
442
 Therefore even if the senses and the carnal nature do not reach God’s presence, 
the spirit experiences the incomprehensible presence and the help of God. Christ present in 
faith in the midst of darkness thus becomes a powerful proof (argumentum) of present but 
not visible things, augmenting the cognitive capacities of the Christian. Luther explains: 
That in the Holy of Holies there was no light, signified God to be present in the Church by 
the faith of Christ in their hearts, which does not comprehend and is not comprehended, 
does not see and is not seen, but still sees all things. It is a powerful proof of present, but 
not visible things. Likewise the Ark of the Covenant was present in the Holy of Holies, but 
was not visible, because the Tabernacle surrounded it – in the midst of which in the Holy 
of Holies he sat – as is said in Ps. 46: ‘God is present in the midst of the congregation’, so 
that they cannot be shaken, as also similar prophecies derive from this figure. God does not 
rule among us superficially, with tongue and words, but in might, and they do not remain 
unshaken who believe with tongue and words, but ‘those who believe in the heart, are 
justified’, in the midst of whom God is present. They are the strong, who receive help from 
the face of God (that is, the presence of God), as Ps. 46: ’They will be helped from the face 
of God’, or, ’at daybreak’, that is, in the presence of the might and divinity and the face of 
God.
443
 
Therefore, for Luther the cognitive experience of the Christian is also dual and divided. 
Through the intellect of faith (i.e., the light shining from the face of the present Christ) he 
can grasp spiritual and heavenly things, which are present for his internal man and spirit. 
At the same time the external man and flesh understand neither this presence nor this light. 
Luther states in numerous places, that the spirit and the flesh experience all things in 
opposite ways: the flesh suffers when the spirit rejoices, becomes cold when the spirit is 
warmed. Spiritual goods dilate the spirit but suppress the flesh (and vice versa). Doctrine 
and the Gospel is goodness for the new man and discipline for the old. The flesh serves 
the law of sin, the spirit the law of God. The former seeks external good and God in his 
positive properties, the latter under his negative properties.
444
 This division is reflected 
even in the way Luther refers to the cognitive capacities of the carnal and the spiritual 
person. Luther usually uses the vocabulary of feeling (sentire) and seeing (videre) to 
describe the experiences of the carnal person. They are bound to sensible and visible 
things, which can be understood by reason (ratio) and from which phantasms and mental 
                                                 
442
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 WA 5, 506, 12-25: “[12] Quod enim in sancto sanctorum nullum fuit lumen, significabat, inhabitante 
[13] Ecclesiam suam deo per Christum fidem esse in cordibus eorum, quae nec [14] comprehendit nec 
comprehenditur nec videt nec videtur et tamen omnia [15] videt. Est enim argumentum rerum valde quidem 
praesentium, sed nequaquam [16] apparentium. Sicut Arca foederis erat praesentissime in sancto [17] 
sanctorum, non tamen apparebat, ita tabernaculum eius fuit in circuitu [18] eius, quia in medio sancti 
sanctorum ipse sedebat, quo significatum est, ut [19] [Ps. 46, 6.] ps. 45. dicit, Deum esse in medio Ecclesiae 
suae, ideo non posse eam [20] commoveri, quam et similes prophetias ex ea figura hauserunt. Non enim [21] 
deus in nobis regnat superficietenus, lingua et verbo, sed in virtute, nec sunt [22] [Röm. 10, 9.] stabiles, qui 
in lingua et verbo in eum credunt, sed ‘qui corde credunt, iusti [23] sunt’, in quorum medio ipse habitat. Hi 
sunt fortes et adiuvantur in [24] [Ps. 46, 6.] omnibus vultu dei (idest praesentia dei), ut ps. 45. ‘Adiuvabit 
eam deus [25] vultu suo’, seu mane diluculo, idest praesenti valde numine et ipso vultu.” 
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 WA 55, I, 208 gloss 6; WA 55, II, 189, 139 – 190, 150; 216, 42-47; 282, 62 – 283, 83; 349, 26 – 350, 
49; 398, 419-432; 453, 137-155; 499, 2 – 500, 22; 624, 328-331; 926, 1039 – 927, 1051; 936, 1286-1292; 
991, 2877 – 992, 2912; 997, 3069 – 998, 3093; 1025, 2 – 1026, 37; WA 56, 73, 3-11; 361, 6 – 363, 7; WA 2, 
456, 29 – 457, 19; 517, 19-31. 
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images can be formed. But through them human beings grasp only the appearances of 
things (species), not what things really are. When Luther describes the cognitive 
capabilities of the spiritual person, rather than speaking of sensing and seeing, he speaks 
of experience (experientia, experiri) and understanding (intellectus, intelligere). Instead of 
appearances, they grasp the thing itself (res). The spiritual goods cannot be grasped by 
reason, but they rather seize the soul and draw it to follow them. Understanding them is 
not based on one’s own abilities, but on the abilities given to the soul in faith.445 Even 
though the abilities of the old and new man are related to different anthropological parts 
(i.e., soul vs. spirit), with regard to their function they are comparable. Thus, the old man 
and the new man operate almost as two distinct anthropological systems within the same 
person. A general comparison of the different terms Luther uses for the abilities of the old 
and new man can be made as follows:  
 
Old man (’Flesh’) 
 Reason (ratio) 
 Senses, feeling (sensus) 
 Appearance (species) 
 Visible and comprehensible things 
New man (‘Spirit’) 
 Intellect = faith (intellectus) 
 Experience (experientia) 
 The thing itself (res) 
 Invisible and incomprehensible 
things 
  
We have now come to see that in order to form a balanced view of Luther’s 
understanding of the nature of the existence of the Christian, we must take into account the 
conflict between the flesh and the spirit, the old man and the new. From this strife it 
follows that for Luther there is always a certain element of passion and internal conflict in 
the life of the Christian. Even though Christ is present to the new will and intellect and 
rules the spiritual man in faith, the remaining carnal nature understands nothing of his 
presence. Therefore, both the act of faith itself and everything the person does in 
accordance with the directives of the spirit causes suffering for the flesh. For this reason 
Luther also holds that although the presence of Christ, the Word of God, fills the spirit 
with the virtues of faith, hope and charity, when these affects are realized in action there is 
always some resistance from the flesh. Thus faith and love, when incarnated into works, 
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 WA 55, I, 520, 4-18; 520 gloss 20; WA 55, II, 56, 19 – 58, 1; 75, 25 – 76, 1; 179, 79 – 180, 107; 213, 
124-140; 366, 291-304; 481, 481-488; 628, 430-445; 734, 109 – 735, 131; 758, 50 – 759, 55; 903, 342 – 
364; 921, 872-897; WA 56, 70, 15-17; 445, 13 – 447, 27; WA 57, a93, 21 – a94, 12; WA 57, b159, 5-15; 
WA 2, 578, 40 – 579, 7; AWA 2, 45, 17-18; 70, 16-23; 106, 19 – 108, 13; 132, 1-16; 139, 7 – 141, 18; 178, 
24-29; 179, 17 – 182, 18; 199, 25 – 204, 5; 318, 5-19; 547, 16 - 548, 1-4 ;559, 17- 560, 2; 617, 7-18; WA 5, 
410, 36-38; 418, 9- 419, 21; 474, 13-21; 506, 9-34; 555, 28-40; 570, 8-17; 623, 17-40. Note, however, that 
Luther uses the terms seeing (visio) and appearance (species) versus reality (res) from two different 
viewpoints. One is that of the natural cognition, in which respect the spiritual things are unseen and not 
present in re. The other is the cognition of faith and the viewpoint of the spiritual man, with regard to whom 
the spiritual things are present and seen in faith and are more real than the carnal appearances.  See chapter 
2.3.3.3. The other terms can also be used with regard to the natural abilities. See WA 55, II, 903, 364-367; 
916, 751 – 917, 761; WA 56, 58, 15-17; 424, 27 – 425, 5; AWA 2, 132, 10-11; 141, 8-10; 178, 29; 201, 14-
15; 348, 15-19; 379, 4-8. 
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can never be totally pure in this life. The Christian remains at the same time sinner and 
righteous.
446
 This ongoing conflict can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Old man (‘Flesh’) New man (‘Spirit’) 
Spirit 
 
Christ present in faith  
= darkness 
Christ present in faith  
= light 
Soul 
 
Wishes to rule 
Senses and reason 
battle against faith 
Ruled by faith 
Senses and reason  
complemented by faith 
Body 
 
Hates suffering 
 
Resists commands of the spirit 
Submits to suffering according to 
God’s will 
Bends to the commands of the 
spirit 
2.4.2.3 The Relationship of the Flesh and the Spirit in the Same Person 
Now arises the question of how Luther understands the relationship of the flesh and the 
spirit, the old man and the new, within the same person. How is it possible that the same 
person at the same time sees and does not see, accepts the word with pleasure and does not 
accept it, receives the light of faith and does not receive it? Furthermore, what kinds of 
consequences does this internal and cognitive duality cause for the unity of the person? 
How are the flesh and spirit as the two ‘natures’ of the person related to each other? 
Luther’s answer to the question seems to develop somewhat over the course of his 
works discussed in the present study, but here as well the basic principles remain the 
same. These principles can be summarized as follows: 1) Even though the concepts of the 
flesh and the spirit are applied to the whole man and to the affect, nevertheless they retain 
their connections to the anthropological parts. The spirit needs the flesh (or body) to act, 
and the person does not become wholly spiritual before the body becomes spiritual in the 
resurrection. 2) The relationship between the spirit and flesh is not static, but it is marked 
by movement and progress. 3) Because of this dynamic, the Christian is both flesh and 
spirit at the same time (simul), but still progressing and in this sense also partially (partim) 
spiritual and partially carnal. 4) As this movement includes progress and direction, in the 
Christian person the flesh (or sin) is ruled by spirit (or grace). The latter dictates what the 
person does, the former resists. 5) Acts of both ‘parts’ or ‘natures’ are attributed to the 
whole person. Furthermore, one can say that the subtle differences regarding how the 
relationship between flesh and spirit develops between Luther’s earlier and later works 
echo the development of Luther’s qualitative anthropology as presented in chapter 2.4.1.3. 
We can outline this correspondence in the following analysis. 
In the Dictata the terms “spirit” and “flesh” seem to have the strongest connection to 
the anthropological parts. The flesh is connected with the body and sensuality, and seeks 
to set up its own its own idol and opinion (sensus) in the spirit.
447
 Nevertheless, Luther can 
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 WA 56, 344, 23-30; WA 2, 497, 13 – 498, 1; 584, 35 – 585, 7; AWA 2, 317, 6 – 321, 5. This is also 
one of the reasons why in the life of the Christian there is always still sin and need for its forgiveness.  
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also speak of them as two natures: one acquired from Christ, the other being the person’s 
own.
448
 Furthermore, Luther confirms that these two make up the person. That is, the 
person is identical with them both: 
Who could boast to be only spirit and not have also the flesh which opposes the spirit, even 
if he no longer has a share in lust (luxuriae) or greed (auaritiae) or other manifest 
wickedness, or has the temptation to them? For if you have flesh and are in the flesh, 
certainly some kind of its pride is with you and you are in it until the day this body 
becomes wholly spiritual. Therefore we always sin, always are impure. And if we say there 
is no sin in us, we are liars, because we deny that we have flesh. And wherever flesh is, it 
acts according to its wickedness and fights the spirit. And because the spirit and the flesh 
are one man, without a doubt it is his fault that the flesh is evil as it is and acts wickedly.
449
  
One can see here how the two meanings penetrate each other. On one hand, the flesh is 
corporeality (and it remains until the body becomes spiritual in the resurrection). On the 
other hand, the flesh is wickedness defined by the evil affects. And whatever the spirit and 
the flesh may be, the human person nevertheless shares in both and is both, bearing 
responsibility for the sins of the flesh. However, the relationship between the two is not 
static. Even though they are related to each other in a fashion analogous to the two natures, 
the spiritual person should be in movement from the flesh to the spirit, from the carnal to 
the spiritual. However, were a person to consider himself wholly spiritual, progress would 
cease and he would revert to a carnal state.
450
 Luther illustrates the nature of this transition 
using an analogy of the Aristotelian concept of movement.
451
 The Christian is in motion: 
he is leaving this world and entering the future world. During this movement he is still 
imperfect, always partly acquired and partly to be acquired (semper partim acquisitus et 
partim acquirendus), between the opposites and at the same time consisting from both the 
starting point and the goal (simul in termino a quo et ad quem consistens).
452
 In this way 
                                                 
448
 WA 55, I, 684, 1-4 and WA 55, I, 684 gloss 5. 
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 WA 55, II, 973, 2339-2348: “Quis enim gloriabitur se [2340] esse purum spiritum et non habere 
adhuc carnem aduersariam spiritui, [2341] etiam si iam nec luxurie  nec auaritie  aut aliarum manifestarum 
nequitiarum [2342] pars aut tentatio in ipso sit? Si enim Caro est tibi et in carne es, [2343] Certe superbia 
ista quoque tecum est et tu in illa, vsque dum corpus istud [2344] fiat totum spirituale. Semper ergo 
peccamus, semper immundi sumus. [2345] Et si dixerimus, quod peccatum non habemus, mendaces sumus, 
Quia [2346] negamus nos habere carnem, Cum tamen caro vbicunque sit, secum ista [2347] mala habet, vt 
spiritum impugnet. Et quia Spiritus et caro vnus homo est, [2348] Sine dubio Culpa hominis est, Quod caro 
tam mala est et male agit.” 
450
 WA 55, II, 911, 609 – 912, 632; 942, 1451-1468; 973, 2348-2360; 987, 2768 – 988, 2792; Thus the 
way in which Luther examines the relationship between the spirit and the flesh is connected with the 
concepts of humility and pride as well as good and evil. Humility (as the prime monastic virtue) guards the 
spiritual person, and pride as the prime vice forfeits it. Luther’s concept of humility can be seen as linked to 
this thought. This theme is also connected with Luther’s notion of God as the only true good. If a person 
calls himself good he robs God of God’s goodness, while when he condems himself he confesses the 
goodness of God. On humility, see WA 55, II, 471, 219 – 472, 247; 720, 81 – 721, 94; 872, 39 – 873, 67; 
885, 160-167; 887, 230 – 888, 261; 888, 6 -  889, 40; 940, 1408 – 941, 1426; On goodness, see chapter 
2.2.2. 
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 As a thorough analysis how Luther understands this concept and uses it in his theological 
argumentation see Dieter 2001, 276-346. 
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 WA 55, II, 971, 2287-2300: “[2287] 118, 121 Fe ci Iudicium et Iust⌊itiam; non trad⌊as me 
Calum⌊niantibus [2288] me. [2289] Licet non perfecerim, Sum tamen in opere, fe  ci et facio. Quis enim 
[2290] perfectus est aut se apprehendisse putat? Igitur Que  fecisti, perficienda [2291] sunt. Vt Ecclesiastes: 
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already in the Dictata Luther introduces the later more developed concepts of simul and 
partim, although he does not yet use them explicitly of the Christian as simul iustus et 
peccator. But because the model of the Christian life is movement, it requires direction 
and progress. Therefore, the opposite natures do not have an equal standing. In the 
Christian, the spirit must rule and subject the flesh. However, the spirit only subjects the 
flesh, does not annihilate it. Thus the aspect of corporeality appears again: the spirit needs 
the flesh to use it in order to serve. If the flesh overcomes, however, it annihilates the 
spirit, leaving nothing remaining.
453
 Under the rule of the spirit the person thus progresses 
in faith, becoming more and more spiritual and more sensitive in the spirit to the divine 
things, yet never perfect in this life.
454
 
In the Lectures on Romans, on the other hand, the concept of the Christian as simul 
iustus et peccator (at the same time righteous and sinner) comes strongly to the fore. The 
Christian is at the same time righteous and not righteous, sinner and non-sinner.
455
 On the 
one hand Luther can state, that the Christian is a sinner actually (in re), and righteous by 
reputation and promise in hope (in spe).
456
 On the other hand, he is righteous and eternal 
insofar he lives in spirit, unrighteous and temporal insofar he lives in flesh. Thus Luther 
retains the ontological framework behind the distinction.
457
 In faith, and as a spiritual 
person, he is elevated over everything, but in temporal things he is subject to everything. 
Thus he is (as Christ) like a twin, having two forms in himself.
458
 Luther also compares 
the relationship between the spirit and the flesh to that between sickness and health: they 
are aspects of the same whole. In this respect the spirit and the flesh are not two, but 
one.
459
 
In the Lectures on Romans Luther also uses ideas from Augustine’s Contra Iulianum 
and Retractiones, presenting them in the course of commenting on Romans 7:7.
460
 In this 
text Luther repeats the basic conviction (expressed already in the Dictata) that the carnal 
person is simple and does not suffer from internal battle, whereas the spiritual person does 
suffer from it. Furthermore, the spiritual person and the carnal person wish and mind 
(sapit) opposite things.
461
 Second, Luther states that when the Apostle speaks about doing 
evil (“quod odi malum, illud facio”), he does not mean that he would not do external good 
deeds, but rather that because of the resistance from the flesh he does not do them as 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘Quid est quod fuit? id quod faciendum.’ ‘Homo enim [2292] cum Consummauerit, tunc incipiet.’Non enim 
fecisse satis est et quiescere, [2293] Sed secundum philosophiam Motus est Actus imperfectus, semper 
partim [2294] acquisitus et partim acquirendus, Semper in medio contrariorum et simul [2295] in termino a 
quo et ad quem consistens. Quod si in vno fuerit tantum, iam [2296] 4, 363 nec Motus | est. Vita autem 
presens Est Motus quidam et phase, i. e. transitus [2297] et Gallilea, i. e. Migratio ex hoc mundo ad futuram, 
que est quies [2298] e  terna. Ergo partim illam habemus in conscientia, partim tribulationes in [2299] carne. 
Et sic inter Mala peccatorum et bona meritorum assidue mouemur [2300] Velut in termino a quo et ad quem. 
Sed he  c latius alibi tractanda.” 
453
 WA 55, II, 845, 115 – 846, 166. 
454
 WA 55, I, 916 gloss 5; WA 55, II, 122, 23-27; 882, 55-69; 863, 335 – 864, 344; 873, 5-9; 911, 609 – 
912, 632; 972, 2321 – 973, 2348. 
455
 WA 56, 269, 21 – 271, 31. 
456
 WA 56, 272, 3-21. 
457
 WA 56, 293, 14-30; 298, 8-15; 327, 9 – 328, 6. 
458
 WA 56, 476, 2-26. 
459
 WA 56, 217, 8-25; 272, 3 – 273, 1; 350, 22 – 352, 20. 
460
 WA 56, 339, 4 – 347, 28. 
461
 WA 56, 340, 5 – 341, 25. 
 144 
 
 
much, with such ease, and to the degree that he would wish. To explain the nature of this 
conflict, Luther takes up Augustine’s distinction between facere and perficere, to do and 
to do perfectly (i.e., with the entire will), thus deepening the nature of the distinction in 
relation to the Dictata.
462
 However, Luther does not content himself with using only this 
Augustinian distinction. He also explicitly takes the model of Christ’s person to illustrate 
the relationship between the spirit and the flesh in the believer. In his comments on 
Romans 7:18-19 (“I know that no good is in me, that is, in my flesh. I am able to will 
good, but not to complete it. I namely do not do that good which I will, but that evil which 
I do not will, I commit”), he states the following: 
Sixth. I know that no good is in me, that is, in my flesh. See, how he ascribes to himself his 
flesh, a part of him, as if he himself were flesh. As he said before: “I am carnal”; he now 
confesses himself to be evil, not good, because he commits evil. On account of the flesh he 
is carnal and evil, because there is no good in him and he commits evil, on account of the 
spirit he is spiritual and good, because he does good. Therefore it is to be noted that these 
words, “I want” and “I hate” refer to the spiritual man or spirit, “I do” and “I act” to the 
carnal or to the flesh. But because the flesh and the spirit constitute one and the same 
single human being, therefore he ascribes to the whole man both the contraries which come 
from his contrary parts. Therefore a communication of attributes takes place, so that the 
same human being is spiritual and carnal, righteous and sinner, good and evil, as the same 
person of Christ is at the same time dead and alive, at the same time suffering and blessed, 
at the same time active and and at rest etc, on account of the communication of the 
attributes, even though neither nature agrees with that which is proper to the other, but 
rather in a most contrary way disagrees with it, as is known. This however has no place in 
the carnal man, where the whole man is totally flesh, and the spirit of God does not remain 
in him. [...] Truly the Apostle, looking at the identity of the person, sees a marriage 
[Coniugium] in each one of them, so that the flesh is the wife, and the soul or the mind the 
husband. When they both consent to concupiscence, they are one flesh like Adam and Eve. 
If however the mind, the husband of the flesh, dies spiritually, we are now dead in the 
whole person to the flesh, and so we are also liberated in the whole person. Even though 
one refers to the flesh and the other to the spirit, even then we are the same, the man dead 
and the woman liberated from the Law, which made this man and this marriage, i.e., by its 
irritation increased the concupiscence and made the mind consent to its opportunity. 
Therefore we, the wife on account of the flesh, i.e., carnal people, and man on account of 
the spirit which consented with the flesh, are now at the same time dead and liberated. 
Because of this the benefit of the both comes to the person, though the parts, on account of 
which it comes, are opposite. For the properties of the parts communicate to the whole that 
which they have individually.
463
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As in Christology, in which the two natures of Christ (divinity and humanity) are 
united without mixture or change, but unseparated and undivided so that the actions and 
experiences of either nature, even when they are opposite to each other, are attributed to 
the same person of Christ, so also does Luther think that the flesh and the spirit are two 
conflicting ‘parts’ or natures of the human being which together form a single person. This 
model explains more fully how Luther understands the relationship between the whole and 
the parts. As in the hypostatic union both the natures are whole natures and the whole 
Christ is wholly man and wholly God, so also in the Christian person the same man can be 
considered at the same time wholly sinner and wholly righteous. But as the natures can 
also be called (in a more relaxed sense of everyday language) ‘parts’ which ‘form’ the 
person of Christ, so can also the Christian man be called partly sinner and partly 
righteous.
464
 In this sense, there can be development and interaction between the natures. 
One nature can occupy the ruling position and be stronger in proportion to the other. 
Nevertheless, the other nature can resist so that the external act is neither purely spiritual 
nor carnal, and yet one can ascribe the properties and acts of both the natures to the same 
person.
465
 The actions and experiences of both natures are attributed to one and the same 
person, and are properly acts and properties of the single individual, even though they may 
be separate and contradictory. The flesh and the spirit may want opposing things and sense 
things in an opposing manner (diverse sentiant), yet nevertheless both desires and 
experiences are attributed to the same person.
466
 Thus the Christological analogy comes 
                                                                                                                                                   
seu [15] spiritum, ‘facio’ autem et ‘operor’ ad carnalem seu ad carnem [16] | refertur |. Sed quia ex carne et 
spiritu idem vnus homo constat [17] totalis, ideo toti homini tribuit vtraque contraria, que ex contrariis [18] 
sui partibus veniunt. Sic enim fit communio Ideomatum, Quod idem [19] homo est spiritualis et carnalis, 
Iustus et peccator, Bonus et malus. [20] Sicut eadem persona Christi simul mortua et viua, simul passa et 
beata, [21] simul operata et quieta etc. propter communionem Ideomatum, licet [22] neutri naturarum 
alterius proprium conueniat, Sed contrariissime dissentiat, [23] vt notum est. He  c autem in Carnali homine 
nequaquam habent [24] locum, Vbi omnino totus homo caro est, quia non permansit in eo [25] spiritus Dei. 
Ideo carnalis non potest dicere: ‘in me id est in carne mea’, [26] quasi ipse aliud a carne per voluntatem sit, 
Sed est idem cum carne per [27] consensum in concupiscentias eius, Sicut vir et mulier vna sunt caro [28] 
figuratiue, Sed meretricaliter et fornicarie. Et ex hoc iam potest  [1] melius intelligi, Quod supra dixit in 
similitudine, Mortuo viro mulierem [2] esse Liberam, cuius similitudinis ideo videtur inepta applicatio, [3] 
Quia dicit potius animam ipsam velut mulierem mortificari et sic liberari, [4] virum autem i. e. passiones 
peccatorum manere, Sed captiuari etc. [5] Verum Apostolus ad persone identitatem respiciens Coniugium in 
vnoquoque [6] videt, Quod Caro sit mulier et anima vel mens sit vir. Que  [7] dum sibi in concupiscentias 
consentiunt, sicut Adam et Eua sunt vna [8] caro. Si autem moriatur mens, vir carnis, morte spirituali, iam 
nos [9] mortificati sumus in tota persona legi, Et sic Liberati etiam in tota [10] persona. Licet alterum 
respiciat carnem, alterum spiritum, idem tamen [11] ipsi sumus nos, vir mortificatus et mulier liberata a lege, 
que faciebat [12] hunc virum et hoc coniugium, i. e. irritatione sua auxit concupiscentiam [13] et mentem 
cum carne consentire occasione sui fe  cit. Ergo nos, mulier [14] propter carnem i. e. carnales, et vir propter 
spiritum carni consentientem, [15] simul sumus mortui et liberati. Quia persone prouenit he  c vtilitas [16] 
vtraque, licet partes sint diuerse  , propter quas prouenit. Communicant [17] enim ideomata partes toti suo 
singulas suas.” 
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closest to providing an answer to the question of how it is possible that mutually opposite 
and contradictory experiences take place at the same time within the same person.  
Furthermore, one should note that Luther almost always uses the term homo when he 
speaks about the constitution of the human being (both the tripartite and bipartite 
anthropology). With regard to the latter there is literally the old and new, carnal and 
spiritual, external and internal man which battle with each other. Here, however, Luther 
uses the concept of “person” to name the subject of these two (and the tripartite 
anthropology as well). Thus “person” (persona) becomes the term for the subject to whom 
the individual properties and opposite experiences are ascribed, and it alone seems to 
guarantee the identity and unity of the subject. Therefore, it is my opinion that we can see 
at this point in Luther’s thought a unique transformation and break with the medieval 
tradition of theological and philosophical anthropology. Luther takes the idea of the 
tripartite man from medieval theology and builds his own system upon it. But Luther 
breaks this system when he relates it to the Pauline anthropology and interprets the flesh 
and the spirit as two wholes (totus homo) – not only different parts – which battle within 
the same person. This reinterpretation brings about the obvious difficulty of relating the 
differing and opposite desires and experiences of the old and the new man together in the 
same subject. Luther’s best response to this difficulty seems to be to take Trinitarian and 
Christological doctrine of “person” and to apply it to the person of the believer. Apart 
from that, however, the concept of the person has little role in Luther’s usual discussions 
of anthropology. The concept has no explanatory role with regard to the function of the 
human being in relation to the visible or invisible world, and besides its role as the subject 
of the two natures’ contradictory experiences, it does not play a significant role in Luther’s 
anthropological hierarchies.
467
  
The idea of the Christian’s being at the same time righteous and sinner is further 
developed in the Lectures on Galatians and the Commentary on Galatians, in both of 
which Luther also builds strongly upon Augustine. In the Lectures on Galatians, Luther 
again confirms the dependence of the spiritual person and righteousness on participation in 
Christ. The Christian person is in the process of transformation, but is not yet wholly 
spiritual. The flesh, however, is now clearly defined as everything outside the grace of 
Christ: not only sensuality and corporality, but also the reason. The spiritual man 
nevertheless retains a connection to the invisible. The flesh and the spirit are strongly 
opposed to each other.
468
 Luther also uses in the Lectures on Galatians the distinctions 
between facere vs. perficere and ruling sin vs. ruled sin (or ruling grace) to illustrate the 
duality that exists in the Christian person. Christians are still carnal, because even though 
                                                                                                                                                   
concupiscere et bonum Iudicat [30] Bl. 88b. non concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit *et non perficit hoc 
velle suum [31] Et ita secum ipse pugnat, Sed quia spiritus et caro coniunctissime sunt  [1] vnum, licet 
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they do not perfect (perficere) their concupiscence but rather do (facere) good, they 
nevertheless have concupiscence and so do not perfect that good which they do either. 
They “have sin” when and because they feel concupiscence, but they do not follow its 
titillations up to the act itself. Thus sin does not rule them, and they “do not sin”. On 
account of having sin they are nevertheless partially carnal. Because of this remaining sin 
and carnality, Christian life is defined as a fight and progress which has not yet been 
perfected.
469
  
The Lectures on Galatians, however, are quite short and their content is expanded in 
the Commentary on Galatians. In the latter work, Luther employs the same facere – 
perficere –distinction, again with explicit reference to Augustine’s Contra Iulianum and 
Retractiones. Because Christians do not perfect their good will owing to resistance from 
the flesh, they are partly carnal, partly spiritual. For this reason, all of their good works 
also are partially evil. Thus it can be said that the same man at the same time both sins and 
does not sin.
470
 Internally, however, the Christian is already fully spiritual. The spirit of 
the justified is pure and without sin through faith. In the flesh there nevertheless remains 
some sin, which is not imputed for sin on account of the faith of the internal man. The 
spirit, ruling the Christian like Christ rules his Church, continuously drives this sin out, 
although this action will be complete only in the future consummation.
471
 As in the 
previous works, Luther connects the flesh and the spirit to their respective affects. The 
flesh lusts through the soul and the spirit; the spirit moves the flesh. In this sense, Luther 
likens the relationship between the flesh and the spirit to sickness and health: both are 
parts and opposite aspects of the same whole. When the spirit wholly agrees (consenserit) 
with the affects of the flesh it is wholly flesh, when it agrees wholly with the affects of the 
spiritual law it is wholly spirit, which will be realised only when the body becomes 
spiritual in the resurrection. Therefore, in this sense the old and the new man relate to each 
other as the daybreak, which is neither fully darkness nor light, and which can be called 
either one. But following these two images (sickness – health; darkness – light) the whole 
man can also be said to love chastity and to be titillated by forbidden lusts. Thus it is one 
man who battles with himself, who wills and does not will.
472
 
Furthermore as argued in the preceding chapters the distinctions between the spirit and 
the flesh are in the Commentary on Galatians as well firmly related to the nature of the 
love of the person.
473
 The justified person lives internally for God through the law of love, 
guided and led in faith by spirit, which donates a joyful affect that spontaneously seeks to 
do good.
474
 Therefore, the carnal and spiritual person can be distinguished by the cross 
(i.e., adversities), in which they will sense opposite things. The carnal person will burst 
out in hate and cry in the face of unpleasant occurrences, whereas the spiritual person will 
suffer in patience and work to do good for others.
475
 However as neither flesh nor the 
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spirit is yet perfected in the Christian, the Christian  will sense contrary things and 
experience an internal battle. Luther presents in the Commentary on Galatians the image 
of the mercy seat (propitiatorium) with the two Cherubim facing each other as the model 
of the Christian life. There, two contraries come together, just as the Christian is at the 
same time simul iustus et peccator. Although it is not stated explicitly, it seems obvious 
that the image carries a connection to Christology, as in the Dictata and the Lectures on 
Hebrews the mercy seat is explicitly employed as an image of the person of Christ, in 
whom the opposite natures meet. Thus Luther’s theological anthropology follows the (for 
Luther important) miraculous nature of God’s works, in which it is proper for God and 
divine wisdom to unite mutually opposite things in a way surpassing human wisdom.
476
 
Of the other works examined in this study, the Lectures on Hebrews and Operationes 
in Psalmos contain very little material related to the simul anthropology. In the Lectures 
on Hebrews the Christian is defined as participating at the same time in the earthly and 
heavenly life and progressing from one to the other, so that these two lives of the flesh and 
of the spirit battle within the Christian: one must die for the other to live.
477
 In the 
Operationes in Psalmos the concept of simul appears explicitly at least once, and is 
present implicitly when Luther discusses the dual effect of the word and Christian 
existence with respect to faith and love.
478
 Neither work, however, discusses in any detail 
Luther’s ideas concerning the composition of the Christian person. 
One can conclude that the Christological analogy expressed in the Lectures on Romans 
remains Luther’s most in-depth explanation of the relationship of the two natures of the 
Christian to each other. Though the focus of the analogy is on explaining the nature of the 
Christian as one who is at the same time both sinner and righteous, it also concerns the 
mutually exclusive and diverse ways the flesh and the spirit sense things. Therefore we 
can say that Luther’s anthropology consists of multiple components. First, there is the 
natural tripartite composition, which contains several elements derived from the medieval 
Augustinian tradition. In this scheme Luther utilizes texts from Augustine himself, but 
alongside these the mystical tradition represented among others by Hugh and Richard of 
St. Victor, Jean Gerson and John Tauler appears to have had much influence especially 
with regard to the use of the image of the Tabernacle. Luther’s most important 
contribution with regard to this tradition lies in his replacing the highest capacity with 
faith. The chronological development among the texts analysed in this study concerns here 
the place of the soul in the triad. Upon the tripartite natural composition Luther builds the 
bipartite distinction between flesh and spirit, which concerns the whole man as either 
carnal or spiritual. This distinction seems derive from Luther’s interpretation of Paul, 
Augustine and his own theological innovation. The third component is the concept of 
person, which unites the last two anthropological frameworks within one subject, though 
its exact nature remains vague. The idea of the function of the concept of person is clearly 
expressed only in the Lectures on Romans, even though it seems to reflect the (for Luther) 
peculiar Christological mode of thinking, in which mutually opposite and contrary things 
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are brought together through Christological means. One can also suggest that Luther’s 
introduction of the Christological and Trinitarian concept of person might be an 
expression of a turn in focus in the development of theological anthropology from the 
Medieval model of parts of the soul towards a more modern idea of the concept of person 
as a subject. Luther uses the concept of person as the conscious (but not necessary self-
conscious) focus of experience, who observes, experiences and unites the experiences of 
the flesh, the spirit and their interaction. In this sense the concept of person is no longer 
defined first and foremost metaphysically, but refers more to individual subjectivity. The 
notion, however, remains rather undeveloped in the texts discussed here, as its major 
appearance is restricted to the Lectures on Romans. 
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3. Luther’s Understanding of Faith 
3.1. The Question of the Light of Faith and the Intellect of Faith in 
Previous Research 
The aim of the previous main chapter (chapter 2) was to form a picture of Luther’s 
understanding of reality. The examination there of Luther’s understanding of God, the 
universe and the human being argued that Luther’s understanding of reality is related 
especially to the Augustinian tradition represented by the Victorines, Bonaventure and 
Gerson, both in its use of single terms and images as well as a whole. Especially 
interesting is the idea that being and understanding are understood by Luther as 
participation in the divine light. Luther’s views suggest that one should attempt to 
examine from the basis of a realist ontology and epistemology of Platonist nature his 
understanding of faith as well. The doctrine of divine illumination has served as the 
epistemological foundation of the Augustinian School, to which Luther’s doctrine shows 
strong signs of being connected. In the history of Luther research many scholars have 
noticed Luther’s use of the concept “intellect of faith” (intellectus fidei) as well as the 
numerous places where Luther speaks of faith as a light. Nevertheless, besides 
Mannermaa’s brief remarks in the article Hat Luther eine trinitarische Ontologie?479 no 
scholar has engaged in a serious attempt to reconstruct, based on these texts, a realist 
epistemological theory following the Augustinian idea of illumination. This chapter aims 
to provide such reconstruction. By way of background, however, the following section 
will survey the subject of the most important studies that have until now been made on the 
nature of faith in Luther’s thought, as well as discuss the newest interpretation of faith in 
Luther’s theology offered by the Finnish School. The studies are examined insofar they 
have significance for Luther’s understanding of faith. 
Bengt Hägglund analyses Luther’s concept of faith in his study Theologie und 
Philosophie bei Luther und in der occamistischen Tradition: Luthers Stellung zur Theorie 
von der doppelten Wahrheit (1955). As the title of the book suggests, about half of the 
work is dedicated to the relationship of philosophy and theology in general. In the latter 
half of the work, however, Hägglund analyses what he calls Luther’s critique of the 
medieval concept of faith. There he examines the difference between Luther’s and the 
Nominalists’ use of the terms infused and acquired faith. Hägglund points out, that unlike 
for the Nominalists, for Luther the infused faith does not perfect acquired faith but stands 
in opposition to it, so that no bridge exists from nature to grace. Hägglund furthermore 
shows that Luther has a much more ‘realist’ understanding of infused faith than the 
Nominalists, in the sense that it is effective and active and really grasps and apprehends 
Christ as its object. It is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, Hägglund argues that this 
grasping and apprehension takes place through the Scripture (i.e., external word), which is 
the light of faith. Hägglund even quotes the principle (enunciated by Luther in WA 5, 118, 
20) that the illuminating God and illuminated heart are one, but directly after that 
Hägglund defines, that faith comes only through the Word. In Hägglund’s work there is, 
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therefore, no deeper examination of the underlying ontology or epistemology of 
illumination. Rather he emphasizes the personal nature of faith: i.e., that it grasps what 
Christ has done pro me. According to Hägglund by means of this emphasis Luther rejects 
the concept of infused faith in general. Thus, for Hägglund, faith is not primarily 
knowledge (notitia), but steadfast trust (fiducia). As knowledge it is not objective and 
rational, but arises out of the experience of concrete life and prayer. This observation 
means that the content of faith is objective, but that it cannot be acquired by speculation, 
only by personal experience. However, faith cannot be defined only as experience, as 
sometimes experience is lacking or contrary. Rather, faith is trust arising from this 
experience, and thus it can be said to concern invisible things. In this sense faith is 
practical, not theoretical. It cannot be acquired by reason but through the word, which 
humbles and kills the reason. In this sense faith is in itself a higher understanding 
illuminated by the Holy Spirit, concerning invisible things which cannot be grasped with 
natural reason. Instead, it understands natural things better than reason alone. Thus, reason 
and faith can be considered as enemies but subjected to faith, reason also can have its role 
in theology.
480
 Hägglund concludes his analysis by stating that unlike in Ockhamism, the 
relationship in Luther’s thought between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, 
cannot be analysed epistemologically. Rather, faith is related to the general conception of 
existing (Dasein), which is created by faith.
481
 
It is to be noted regarding Hägglund’s interpretation that he does not distinguish 
clearly among Luther’s texts from different periods. Moreover, although Hägglund 
examines the concept of infused faith only in the Nominalists, yet he claims that Luther’s 
understanding of faith stands in contrast to the medieval concept of faith in general.
482
 The 
scope of Hägglund’s analysis is thus quite narrow, and even as he offers a realist 
conception of Luther’s understanding of faith, he does not attempt to link it to specific 
epistemological theories. Rather, he sees Luther’s understanding as an unique innovation 
that stands in contrast to the medieval concept of faith, although it utilizes specific 
traditional terms. The concept of illumination is interpreted metaphorically by Hägglund: 
i.e., the light is the Scripture. When illumination by the Holy Spirit is discussed, the 
specific nature of the concept remains vague. 
Bernhard Lohse focuses on the concept of reason in his study Ratio und Fides: Eine 
Untersuchung über die ratio in der Theologie Luthers (1958), in contrast to Hägglund,. 
His thesis centers on the juxtaposition of faith and reason, from which Luther’s negative 
attitude toward reason can in his opinion be explained. In his study Lohse appears to use 
the concepts ratio and intellectus somewhat interchangeably. Nevertheless, he notices that 
Luther can also use intelligere as a synonym of credere to signify faith. Although Lohse 
identifies the connection of the intellect to invisible things, he sees intelligere as 
signifying the act of faith in relation to actual knowledge. It is not to be understood as a 
capacity, but as referring to the act by which the human being believes the word of God. 
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Through this faith and understanding, the “human reason” is killed and a new 
understanding of faith achieved. Lohse even speaks about illumination of the reason (i.e., 
intellect) by faith, but by this he understands obedience to the Scripture. Through this 
illumination reason becomes an instrument of the word of God, and can be used in faith 
for good purposes.
483
 For Lohse, the battle which ensues in the Christian between faith 
and reason is primarily a battle between the self-will of the Christian and the will of God, 
which the Christian does not always understand, and which goes against his or her selfish 
desires. The correlate of faith is not knowledge or understanding, but rather God’s 
promise.
484
  
Thus also for Lohse the intellect of faith and the concept of illumination bear no 
specific metaphysical or epistemological meaning. Rather, they are used as metaphors for 
believing. According to Lohse, Luther has no interest in using epistemological theories to 
explain the knowledge of God. His interest is rather in the situation of the human being as 
a whole, who is turned away from God. Lohse surveys the cognitive capacities from the 
perspective of this general view, and thus Lohse describes Luther’s approach as 
existential. Lohse explicitly states that although a Christian can use reason in theological 
dialectics, one cannot understand this process in the sense of immediate illumination. It is 
rather the external word, which the Christian is captured to follow.
485
  
Reinhard Schwarz analyses Luther’s concept of the theological virtues of faith, hope 
and charity in Luther’s early writings up to 1518 in his work Fides, Spes und Caritas beim 
Jungen Luther unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Mittelalterlichen Tradition (1962). 
The foundational question of his work concerns the issue whether Luther remains within 
the medieval framework of habitual grace when he criticizes the Ockhamist understanding 
of grace and justification, and whether they are understood as gifts which create in the 
Christian anthropological capacities that make it possible for him to attain the highest 
religious possibilities and ends.
486
 In the first chapter of the work Schwarz examines 
Luther’s comments on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. With regard to charity, Schwarz 
shows that Luther considers infused charity to be the Holy Spirit himself, not a created 
habitus which occupies a mediating position between God and the soul.
487
 When 
analysing Lombard’s question regarding how an unformed faith (fides informis) is 
changed by the infusion of grace, Luther in Schwarz’s view states that by grace a new 
infused faith is given. That faith is indistinct from charity and works along with it, as the 
three theological virtues cannot be separated from each other. Schwarz, however, does not 
wish to define this unity ontologically, but phenomenally.
488
 In his analysis of faith, 
Schwarz thus emphasizes faith as the foundation of hope, not taken in an ontological 
sense, but metaphorically, as affective recognition of and agreement with the preached 
word. Schwarz also examines Luther’s understanding of faith as signum in the sense of 
testimony, which is contrary to the definition of for example Lombard, for whom the word 
refers to the internal certitude of will given by grace. For Luther, the promised things are 
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hiddenly present in the signs, which according to Schwarz constitute the basis for hope. In 
general, Schwarz emphasizes the existential or theological nature of faith in contrast to the 
physical and ontological. Faith does not provide a rational explanation of what a thing is, 
but confers significance upon it. It creates a new relation in the person to the objects of 
faith. According to Schwarz, Luther is not interested in the anthropological or 
psychological mode in which the things hoped for are present. Schwarz emphasizes that 
along with the concept of habitus, Luther also rejects the general notion of virtue. Luther, 
he argues, is is interested in faith, hope and love only as actual acts of the person.
489
  
In his second chapter Schwarz analyses the period of the First Lectures on the Psalms. 
First he analyses the concept of virtue in general, paying attention to the exegetical 
allegories used by Luther, such as the concept of beauty (decor, pulchritudo). Schwarz 
criticises Luther for using these allegories, because according to Schwarz the idea of the 
virtues as an ornament of the soul is connected to the idea of virtues as habitual qualities. 
However, he sees Luther as distancing himself from this idea and connecting the term 
virtus to the power of faith in which God acts. Schwarz also notes the distinction between 
intellectual and affective virtues. In general, however, by their orientation they are either 
carnal or spiritual, which demonstrates how they arise not out of free will, but out of an act 
of the Holy Spirit. For Luther, spirit, virtue and grace are essentially identical terms, 
according to Schwarz, that describe the actuality of the work of God in the human being. 
They are, however, to be distinguished from the essential power of God in himself (virtus 
increata). The effects of the power of God in human beings cannot be distinguished in 
relation to the different powers of the soul, but rather they constitute a range of 
phenomena caused by the actual presence (Dasein) of the works of God.
490
 Schwarz also 
analyses the connection of the three powers of the soul (according to the Augustinian 
tradition) to the doctrine of the Trinity and the three virtues.
491
 More fundamental for 
Luther, however, is the distinction of the intellect and the affect. Schwarz notes that 
Luther defines the “mind” as the “face” of the soul when it is turned towards God, 
stressing that only by actual knowledge does the mind become the face, and rejecting the 
idea that this term signifies an anthropological ‘part’. The knowledge of God is acquired 
when the person is existentially turned towards God by faith and love (i.e., intellect and 
affect). Schwarz notices Luther’s use of traditional expressions related to illumination of 
the intellect and warming of the affect, but does not draw conclusions about them. With 
regard to their relation to each other, he stresses the primacy of the intellect but 
emphasizes that faith and love cannot be made separate. Good works already flow from 
faith. Schwarz also notices in this connection Luther’s distinction between living and dead 
(or informed) faith (fides mortua or informis), but stresses that Luther does not understand 
them through the lens of the Scholastic materia – forma –scheme. In spiritual devotion the 
affect also can precede the intellect, and here Schwartz notes Luther’s connections to the 
Augustinian–Franciscan tradition represented by Bonaventure and Gerson. However, 
Schwarz especially sees Gerson as placing emphasis on affect alone, whereas for Luther 
the intellect is of greater importance. Nevertheless, Schwarz argues that the opposite train 
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of thought can also be found in some of Luther’s texts, which demonstrates the existential 
nature of faith as trust and blind obedience.
492
 With regard to the concept of the intellect, 
Schwartz sets against each other an Aristotelian understanding of intellect as human 
capacity, and what he calls a biblical concept of intellect as content of understanding. The 
theological intellect proceeds out of the sensus Christi, by which it receives content, to 
which the human being could not come to with his natural capabilities. Schwarz notes the 
connection of the intellect to invisible things, which stand as opposites of visible things, 
but are not abstracted from them. However, according to Schwarz Luther has no 
epistemological interest. Rather, the motivation for their opposition is the difference of 
faith with regard to the wisdom of the flesh. The theological intellect is attained through a 
change in self-understanding. The question is not of a change in psychological structure, 
but of an absolute contrast between two ways of observing and understanding. This 
understanding grows out of belief in Scripture and out of faith, as their result or 
fulfillment. Thus  in Schwarz’s interpretation Luther utilizes sentences of Augustine 
concerning faith and understanding, but departs from them and Scholastic ideas, 
abandoning the doctrine of habitus or an infused gift of the Spirit. Although faith can be 
described as illumination and seeing, this refers to the absolute change taking place in the 
human being. However, faith has future things as its object, things which it does not see 
clearly, because it does not yet possess them. Because of this, faith can also be described 
as hearing. Schwarz recognises that in illustrating this difference between faith and its 
future fulfilment, Luther uses terms from Neoplatonic mysticism, such as ‘shadow’ and 
‘enigma’: God is present in the heart in the cloud of faith. This presence can also be called 
a light in relation to faith, but for the natural intellect it remains darkness veiled by the 
shadow of faith. Only faith can reach to the cognition of God, and Schwarz correctly notes 
that Luther rejects both the via eminentiae and the via negationis. He also notes Luther’s 
use of the Tabernacle image. According to Schwarz, Luther uses the image of the first veil 
of the Tabernacle to illustrate the hiddenness of faith from carnal people, and the second 
veil to illustrate the hiddenness of their ground of existence (which is hidden in faith) from 
the faithful themselves. The intellect of faith thus stands in absolute opposition to all 
natural knowledge. It is knowledge of its own kind, not understood in terms of ontological 
dualism, but as an existential understanding oriented towards the future. Its content is 
understanding Christ as God by the proclamation of the word, so that Christ’s life acquires 
special significance for the believer. It understands the saving deeds of God not 
metaphysically, but in their hiddenness in history. Therefore, faith does not offer any 
supernatural capabilities to the intellect. Rather, it rather shows the wisdom of the world to 
be stupidity. Faith allows the believer to perceive the salvific deeds of God (which are 
hidden under historical actions) by destroying the self-righteousness of the human being 
and freeing him for a new way of understanding his existence. It does not show objective 
good things, but changes the self-understanding of the person.
493
 Correspondingly, 
Schwarz emphasizes in Luther’s analysis of Hebr. 11:1 and Ps. 4:7 the definition of faith 
as a sign and indication of future things which have not yet become reality. He interprets 
the invisibility of the objects of faith as a reference to their being in the future. For 
Schwarz, faith is an active sign of the future, not to be understood through an objective 
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ontological analogy between signum and res. In this connection Schwarz speaks about 
faith as a light which points to future things, but he in no way analyses the epistemological 
connotations of this expression. Also Schwarz (like the other German Scholars) sees this 
pointing as taking place through the word, which is a testimony of future things. Faith 
already possesses future things in the sense that it possesses the word. It is the substance 
of those things in the sense that the believer bases his existence on the word. Thus 
Schwarz argues that for Luther, the word “substance” has an existential, not an ontological 
meaning. Faith is the foundation of all virtues in this sense, not as a supernatural 
ontological reality, but as connected to a word which justifies and creates a new self-
understanding.
494
 Schwarz builds his analysis of the affect on emotional theory, but also 
distinguishes between the two basic orientations (spiritual and carnal) through which the 
emotions are connected to opposite objects. In deriving the affect from the object, 
Schwarz sees a parallel to the intellect of faith: for him neither are psychological 
capacities but terms describing the orientation of the person. This orientation, with regard 
to the affect, is changed by humiliation and confession of sin, by which the person is 
liberated from basing his existence on his self-will.
495
 In his analysis of will (voluntas) and 
love (caritas), Schwarz again emphasizes, that by these terms Luther does not refer to 
certain potencies of the soul, or to infused habits, but to the orientation of the person and 
the effects of faith, which cannot be separated from it. The hope as a virtue is for Schwarz 
in the main identical with faith, but is more closely connected to the affect.
496
 
In his third chapter Schwarz analyses the period of the exegesis of Paul (1515-1518). 
Schwarz argues that in this period Luther no longer employs the concept of virtus. In his 
opinion, the requirement that an infused virtue should exist along with the act (related to 
the virtue) was the greatest error of Nominalist theology. In Luther’s supposed rejection of 
the concept, Schwarz interprets Luther as attacking the whole of Scholastic theology. In 
Schwarz’s view, Luther replaces the concept of virtus with the idea of two ways of 
existing: virtus hominum and virtus dei. The Cross of Christ reveals the virtus hominum to 
be nothing: by faith a person can participate in the Gospel as the power (virtus) of God. 
That power does not become the property of man in an anthropological sense. It remains a 
power of God, which through the Gospel can change the existence of the human being. It 
is the active power through which God works. Thus according to Schwarz, Luther’s 
unified conception of the action of God allows him to leave behind the schema of the three 
virtues and their connection to the powers of the soul, as well as the distinction between 
intellect and affect. The psychological way of understanding their effect is abandoned. 
True faith is inseparably connected to love, not as a form which fills it but as a living 
power in and of itself, from which good works spring.
497
 According to Schwarz, in the 
Pauline lectures faith consequently acquires a strong connection to the word, through 
which God is active and working. The relation to the word determines the existential self-
understanding of the person, as well as the relation of God to the person. The word 
functions as the address (Anspruch) of God towards human beings, who are called to hear 
his judgements and promises. Their self-identification and position coram deo is 
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determined by how they receive this word: not by their powers of the soul and their 
ontological objects, but by their self-understanding and relation to God. The invisible and 
non-apparent things of faith now refer to things that are to be believed by the word (such 
as that we are sinners), not to any hidden metaphysical things. The objects of faith, 
moreover, are not just any general truths, but only such that touch the existence of the 
individual person and his situation before God and neighbour. The Christian life is no 
longer actualized as moral strife through the theological virtues towards beautitude and 
perfection, but as continuing confession of sin and hope of righteousness which is not 
attained in this life in re.
498
 Justification is thus consequently attained through our 
judgement of ourselves as sinners, and of God as righteous. It is to be considered as 
reputatio, not an ontological change or transformation through infused grace. When 
Luther uses the latter concept of infused grace, it only refers to faith that is in us, and by 
which we consider God righteous. The same applies also to the interpretation of the partim 
aspect of sinfulness and righteousness. However, there is also a mystical and unitive 
aspect in Luther’s thought. This aspect is the adhesion to the word, through which Christ 
and eternal goods are possessed. Those things are, however, possessed only by hearing of 
and obedience to the external word. They are hidden by it and not understood.
499
 Schwarz 
also touches upon the question of the relation of the light of nature and light of grace in the 
context of his analysis of love. He correctly notes, that for Luther the two are opposed to 
each other as light and darkness. However, on the basis of this opposition Schwarz 
concludes, that the illumination of faith is not a supernatural quality, but an actual power 
which can be also described as charity, because it frees the person from his self-
centeredness. Thus the lights are not cognitive opposites, but are related to the orientation 
of the person.
500
  
As we can see, Schwarz constructs a beautiful story of how Luther in his 
understanding of faith departs step by step from the medieval concept of virtue. 
Unfortunately,  the thread of this story is false: Luther continues to employ the notion of 
infused virtue in his works after the Pauline exegesis. Luther’s Disputation on Acquired 
and Infused Faith (1520) is based on the notion of infused faith, and in the Operationes in 
Psalmos (1519-1521) the definition of faith, hope and love as infused, divine virtues plays 
a central role.
501
 Schwarz’s study thus aptly demonstrates the problem of focusing on 
select sources instead of examining the period of Luther’s early lectures as a whole, i.e., 
up to Operationes in Psalmos. Moreover, although it is clear that Luther abandons the 
concept of habitus in his understanding of the theological virtues, this does not 
demonstrate (contra Schwarz) that Luther abandons the idea of the ontological 
inhabitation of grace and its connection to the anthropological capacities as a whole. 
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Schwarz reads Luther’s emphasis on God’s direct action in faith and grace as an 
expression of a relational and existential understanding of faith. However, the Schwarz’s 
conclusions are better explained by noticing, that Luther rejects the concept of habitus 
(which he deems ontologically too weak) in order to replace it with the idea that the 
theological virtues are ontologically divine. This idea can be found in the Operationes in 
Psalmos and is in accord with Schwarz’s finding according to which Luther considers 
infused charity to be the Holy Spirit himself. Instead of being interpreted existentially, 
Luther’s emphasis on the direct action of God on the soul can be understood within a 
Platonist epistemology which rejects the Aristotelian concept of habitus. This mistake 
regarding the central concept of virtue does not, however, diminish the many merits of 
Schwarz’s study in the details. As we can see in the individual chapters, many of his 
findings on the cognitive aspects of faith (e.g., with regard to the relation of light and 
darkness to spirit and flesh and the use of the Tabernacle image) are in themselves correct, 
even though the existential framework in which he interprets them is not. 
In his 1964 work Gelebter Glaube – Die Formierung reformatorischen Denkens in 
Luthers erster Psalmenvorlesung Günther Metzger examines the affective dimension of 
faith. He notes, how Luther’s rejects the concept of habitus already in his early comments 
to the Sentences. This rejection is connected, says Metzger, to a positive attitude towards 
Nominalism. Metzger notes also Luther’s criticism of philosophical definitions.502 
Although Metzger focuses on the concept of affect and emphasizes its role in reading 
Scripture, especially the Psalms,
503
 he nevertheless at the same time analyses the role of 
the intellect and their mutual relationships. In the Nominalist understanding the affect and 
the intellect form the main capacities of the rational soul, one connotating the soul as 
knowing, the other the motivating potency, although with regard to the substance the soul 
is one. Metzger notes Luther’s frequent use of the paired concepts of “intellectus et 
affectus”, which he sees as an indication of an emphasis on the unity of the person. Faith 
converts both (i.e., the whole person) towards God as the foundation of the person’s 
existence, so that the distinction between the powers takes on a lesser importance. Metzger 
notes that “the illumination of faith” concerns the whole person in his totality. He does 
not, however, analyse this concept further, but states merely that faith is not only 
knowledge. In conclusion he states that Luther follows the idea of Nominalist psychology 
formally, but moves in the content of his theological thought in another direction. The 
Aristotelian idea of potencies and acts is completely missing in Luther, argues Metzger, 
and in its place Luther is interested in the orientation of the person.
504
 In this context 
Metzger also analyses Luther’s concept of facies and its related definition, in which Luther 
mentions Gerson and interprets the term as signifying existential orientation. For Luther 
faith seeing the face of God in Christ means, that Christ is the face in whom God turns 
towards us, and that this turning is recognized in faith, which signifies the relation human 
being has to God. Therefore, faith is, according to Metzger, not an activation of a potency; 
it is a relation, and Luther’s way of thinking about the whole human being in this manner 
separates him from Gerson and the others, to whom he is formally connected. The 
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expression “with the whole intellect and affect” means that a human being should be freed 
from his own opinion (Eigensinn) and own will, for obedience to God in faith.
505
 
Metzger also analyses the relationship between faith and intellect, as well as faith and 
affect. He notes that Luther often speaks of the invisible things as the object of theological 
knowledge. On the question of how their nature is to be understood, he refers to 
Hunzinger’s thesis, but rejects it, arguing that “the invisible” refers to understanding the 
relevance of the saving act of Christ. Nevertheless, Metzger admits that Luther was able to 
use also Pseudo-Dionysian vocabulary to illustrate his ideas. Metzger also notes that 
Luther speaks of the intellect as a gift of the Spirit, but rules out understanding this gift 
habitually or as supernatural knowledge. Rather, the intellect is faith (i.e., the content of 
faith) which is received from Scripture. Theological knowledge means personal encounter 
with the Christ event, which changes the existence of the one who understands. It is 
soteriological knowledge, and in this sense distinct from the natural and philosophical. It 
is passive, as in faith the human being is ‘seized’ (ergriffen) by God. In faith this 
“invisible” becomes the ground of concrete personal existence, not as ontological quality 
but as theological relation. Luther also speaks of faith as illumination, because in faith the 
human being realizes things about God and himself (i.e., sin) which a self-oriented person 
cannot. Illumination by faith always means the uncovering of sin, and thus it is a life-long 
process. Metzger explicitly denies that illumination means a special, higher form of 
experience of God. It is rather the enlightenment of the state in which the sinful person 
finds himself before God. It includes sin, but also knowledge that guilt is not the final 
word. Metzger also states that precisely because Luther connects illumination to faith, we 
can see that he does not mean any kind of ecstatic illuminationism. The same observation 
applies to the invisible things faith understands. They mean the changing of the existential 
self-understanding based on the salvific action of God in Christ. The contents of this 
illumination are tied to the content of Scripture. Nevertheless, faith in itself has no 
objective criteria but rather takes place intus. It is, however, connected to the hearing of 
the word. It is not yet visio and res; it is fides and signum.
506
  
With regard to the relation of faith and affect, Metzger notes Luther’s positive use of 
the concept of affective knowledge. According to Metzger it is related to the contingent 
and concrete character of our life. Theological knowledge (Erkenttnis) is not only rational 
(Wissen), but must also be received existentially. Metzger notes the sections of Luther’s 
texts, in which he speaks of the precedence of the affect over the intellect.
507
 He connects 
this precedence to the priority of hearing and obedience over understanding. The word has 
an effect on the whole man and his relations to the world, not only on some specific 
capacity of the soul. Only where life stays attached to the word is theological knowledge 
born, and faith can acquire an element of experience. Although this experience is not 
achieved through any special technique, Metzger agrees, that if the Christian life as a 
whole is understood as a meditation or encounter with the word, one can see parallels to 
the medieval idea of meditation in Luther’s use of the concept of affective knowledge.508 
Because of the emphasis on the whole person, Metzger concludes that Luther sets aside 
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the ontological differentiations with regard to the concept of faith, and his focus becomes 
the concept of credere (i.e., to believe). By this concept Metzger understands the relation 
to God of the whole human being. Metzger argues that Luther has already in the Dictata 
detached the concept of faith from its intellectualist connotations. Faith has only Christ 
and his word as its authority. Its power comes from the word of Christ through the 
Scripture, and its focus is on the historical person of Christ (literal sense), his meaning for 
the existence of the believer (tropological sense) and for the existence of the Church in the 
world (allegorical sense). Faith is thus Christological, yet connected to the historical 
phenomenon that is the Church. It creates a personal bond to Christ and a new self-
consciousness. Its place is sinful human existence, not nature elevated by grace. However, 
by faith the person now has access to God. Metzger thus concludes that Luther speaks 
about faith in the category of person, leaving behind ideas of infusion of grace and habits. 
According to Metzger, the distinction between infused and acquired faith is completely 
missing in Luther’s thought. For Luther, faith is trust in God who has descended to human 
beings and in the midst of sin and flesh, as well as trust in his promise of salvation pro 
nobis. Faith is thankful trust that cannot be reduced to theological sentences, because it is 
existential and personal. It needs to be experienced and tested in the midst of life and in 
tribulation.
509
 
Also in Metzger’s work we see a typical example of the approach of the Ebeling 
School. Luther’s actual texts are analysed thoroughly, but the starting point of the analysis 
is an existential perspective. From this approach results the conclusion that the 
anthropological, cognitive and mystical expressions of Luther are an expression of 
existential experience. Luther’s expressions are interpreted from a given starting point, 
without paying attention to their content in its own right. Moreover, Metzger’s study is 
once again plagued by its focus on one source alone, which leads Metzger to derive 
conclusions such as the claim that Luther does not utilize the concept of infused virtue. 
One can see that the older studies of Hägglund, Lohse, Schwarz and Metzger are 
surprisingly united in their existential emphasis, which hinders the analysis of the 
connections between ontology and epistemology in Luther’s thought, as that connection is 
already given in the foundational principles of each work. A very different critical 
approach is offered by Eero Huovinen, who in his work Fides Infantium: Martin Luthers 
Lehre vom Kinderglauben (1997) analyses Luther’s conception of the faith of the child.510 
Huovinen notes a tension in the prior research on the topic, especially with regard to the 
question whether faith should be understood as a personal relation, or whether there is an 
ontological, passively received concept of infusion connected to faith.
511
 To resolve this 
tension between these two views, Huovinen refers to Luther’s concept of duplex iustitia or 
two kinds of righteousness. The first righteousness is Christ (the alien righteousness 
received passively) with whom the Christian is united in faith. The second righteousness is 
actual righteousness (understood as co-operation), which the indwelling of Christ in the 
Christian causes. The first righteousness is given in baptism, the second grows as a fruit of 
baptism. According to Huovinen, Luther’s concept of faith can be understood as including 
both: i.e., the gift given, and the personal understanding of faith, which grows on the basis 
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of the first. The first righteousness is infused in baptism and is the faith which justifies. 
This discovery opens up the possibility of understanding the faith of the child on the basis 
of the idea of infusion. Infused faith is then contrasted with acquired faith, which a child 
does not yet have. This infused faith, which exceeds reason, is more perfect than any faith 
the person could acquire by the means of his or her own understanding.
512
  
In the third chapter of his study Huovinen relates the notion of infused faith to the 
concept of sacrament. He criticizes the scholastic doctrine of ponere obicem for 
considering the efficacy of the sacrament as too weak. On one hand it is not enough for the 
reception of the sacrament not simply to set an obstacle (ponere obicem), but the 
sacrament must also be received in faith. However, it is the sacrament itself which also 
creates this faith: in baptism the baptized receives faith as an infusion and is united with 
Christ.
513
 This view is connected on one hand to the conviction, that reason is not required 
to receive faith, as faith is rather over and against reason, and on the other hand to the 
conviction, that the word of God is effective in and of itself. It is not simply an existential 
Anrede, but a creative word through which a child receives his or her own proper faith. 
The child is rather better equipped to receive faith than an adult, because he or she does 
not yet possess reason that resists faith. Huovinen also emphasizes the hidden character of 
faith. According to him, faith, first of all, is often hidden from the believer himself. It is 
also hidden because it is not perceptible by others. Faith is not to be understood as actual 
reasoning in the sense that, for example, a sleeping person would not then possess faith. 
However, an adult may also have that kind of faith and self-knowledge, but it is secondary 
in relation to the gift of faith itself. That faith is hidden in the heart and cannot be 
perceived externally. Huovinen also stresses that this kind of understanding of faith has as 
a consequence that the understanding of the grammatical content of the preached word is 
not a requirement for the birth of faith. The word is effective even when it is not 
understood, and creates spiritual understanding in the hearer. The understanding is thus 
not a requirement for the reception of the word, but is its possible result. The external 
word is required as a vehicle, but the actual understanding comes from the internal word. 
However, this internal word is not given apart from the external.
514
  
In his fifth chapter Huovinen thoroughly analyses Luther’s use and reception of the 
concept of fides infusa. He notes studies taking a negative attitude toward the concept, 
even though it is accepted generally that Luther uses the term. According to Huovinen this 
issue has been examined completely insufficiently given the central importance of the 
idea. Huovinen argues that many theologians who have opposed the concept have passed 
over central sections of Luther’s writings containing the term. Huovinen rejects the claim 
that fides infusa is for Luther merely an anthropological term which excludes the relation 
to its object. Rather, he emphasizes that Luther uses the term of faith which comprehends 
Christ. He also notes in the work of some scholars the apparent conceptual confusion 
between the concepts of fides infusa and fides caritate formata and how these are 
identified with the habitus doctrine, from which they are in reality distinct. Criticism of 
the idea of habit does not necessarily imply the rejection of the idea of fides infusa. 
Luther’s criticism is directed toward the idea that faith has to be informed by love in order 
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to be justifying, not toward the idea that faith itself is infused. In actuality, Luther defends 
the idea of infused faith when it is understood in a strong enough sense, not merely as an 
idle quality. Luther’s aim is to reject the scholastic idea that infused faith is merely one 
‘degree’ of faith which should be complemented by something else. Luther rather sets side 
by side acquired faith (which he criticizes) and infused faith (which is true faith). Infused 
faith not only is the perfector of acquired faith, but is rather, “everything”. Infused faith 
does not require for its foundation an acquired faith which is the act of the human being, 
nor does it require being complemented by love. According to Huovinen, it is neither a 
supernatural habit nor a virtue towards which one can dispose oneself by natural means. It 
is a gift infused by the Holy Spirit in the human being, a gift which is itself justifying 
faith. The idea of infused faith thus expresses the notion that justification comes from 
outside (ab extra), but happens in us (in nobis). It becomes a new reality and form in the 
human being, a new reality which is the source and foundation of all good.
515
 The faith of 
the child is just this infused faith, but in time it grows to become comprehensible, as it is 
effective and powerful in itself. This idea of growth is illustrated by example of a child 
kidnapped by the Turks, whom faith (according to Luther) teaches internally.
516
 This is 
analogous to the efficacy of the sacrament. Infused grace is not a weak and ineffective 
quality, but rather one that saves and makes holy, a gift of God received internally. 
Huovinen stresses that although this gift is not to be understood as a habit, and although it 
does not become the property of the human being, it is nevertheless real participation in 
Christ’s alien righteousness and a real union between Christ and the believer. This 
participation is effected in baptism and realized in the everyday life of the Christian, in 
which he or she must live a new life and fight against sin. Thus the regeneration effected 
by baptism is a result of the faith given in baptism. The infused faith given in baptism, 
which justifies, thus also constitutes the beginning of the second righteousness of the 
Christian, creating new affects in the Christian.
517
 
As we can see, Huovinen’s study differs greatly from the interpretations of Luther’s 
understanding of faith offered by existentialist researchers. Huovinen emphasizes real 
union with Christ and shows that the concept of infused faith plays a major role in 
Luther’s thought. Nevertheless, most probably due to the emphasis of the study on the 
faith of the child, the cognitive nature of faith remains almost. Huovinen notes the idea 
that faith is opposed to reason, but does not attempt to clarify their relationship. Along 
with the existentialists he shows little interest in the relation of faith to the anthropological 
capacities. Concepts such as illumination are left outside of the scope of Huovinen’s 
study. 
Olli-Pekka Vainio presents the latest views of the Finnish School in his article “Faith” 
in the 2010 work Engaging Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment. He begins his article 
with the question of why faith justifies. Vainio distinguishes between the victory of Christ 
over the power over sin and death in the action of Christ, and the application of his merit, 
which is received by believers in the “happy exchange” (commercium admirabile) 
effected through ontological participation in the person of Christ. Belief in Christ brings 
forth this union. Therefore, faith requires as its content both the cognitively understood 
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information about what Christ has done for human beings (gratia) as well as Christ 
himself as the gift (donum). According to Vainio the participation in Christ’s merit is 
described by Luther by the means of the concept of “apprehending Christ” (apprehendere 
Christum). Behind the Latin word apprehendere lies the distinction between appetitive 
and apprehensive faculties, the latter connected to knowledge and understanding. 
According to Vainio, apprehendo means as well for Luther intellectual apprehension and 
comprehension, but in a special way: the object of knowledge becomes the property of the 
knowing subject. Faith evoked by the Gospel graps and possesses (apprehendit) Christ. 
Vainio suggests that the mode of this apprehension is to be understood in terms of realist 
Aristotelian epistemology. Central to it is the concept of form, which in knowing is 
transferred into the knower, although it also remains in the object which is known. Luther 
interprets this apprehension theologically: when the intellect focuses on Christ in the 
Gospel, it apprehends Christ so that he becomes the form of the human intellect, not only 
as species (i.e., representation of the object), but as himself. Thus faith becomes an 
essentially divine act in the human person. In this union the corrupted will is also 
annihilated and created anew by Christ, with the result that the appetitive and 
apprehensive faculties merge. In faith, Christ becomes not only the object of faith, but also 
the subject, becoming a new reality in the human being. Besides using this Aristotelian 
theory to explain the nature of faith Vainio notes that faith as a salvific act ultimately 
eludes exact definition. Luther uses mystical language and multiple biblical metaphors to 
explain the act of faith.
518
  
Vainio continues his discussion with the statement that faith also unites with God (who 
is love). He points out that Luther nevertheless criticizes the medieval idea of the ordo 
caritatis, whereby human love is naturally inclined towards God as the highest good 
(summum bonum). As human love is corrupted by evil desire, it may lead away from God 
and be contrary to him. Moreover, this idea makes faith secondary to salvation, whereas 
Vainio points to Luther’s texts in which he rejects the concept of fides caritate formata, 
arguing that the formal righteousness of a Christian is not love which forms faith, but is 
Christ himself present in faith. However, Christian faith in the authentic Lutheran sense 
unites with God who is love, and in this sense faith means also union with the divine love. 
Love is not a human endeavor by which one reaches to heaven, but a result of 
participation in Christ, a result which enables good works. It is not a medium of salvation, 
because Christ alone is sufficient.
519
 Vainio then discusses whether one can speak about 
growth in grace and active spirituality. Justification cannot, he says, be considered mere 
reputation, because it involves participation in Christ. As a result, the person becomes a 
new creature (nova creatura) in such a way that something changes in the person. 
Justification and sanctification must be kept together, as Christ is the source of both. The 
renewal cannot, however, be considered a meritorious act because it is a form of 
participation in God’s love. The Christian, who has been changed by God, can now 
perform good deeds in the sight of God. However, this renewal is always limited, and the 
Christian also needs the imputation of alien righteousness until death. Although the 
Christian is simultaneously sinful and righteous, with regard to its partial aspect the 
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righteousness can grow. This growth happens through participation in Christ in faith, as 
well as through participation in the sacramental life of the Church.
520
 
Vainio outlines a fairly balanced view of the life of the Christian. The limitation of his 
discussion (caused at least to some extent by the relatively short length of his article) is 
that Vainio approaches the cognitive aspect of faith only from the perspective of the 
Aristotelian theory of apprehension. This limitation is also partially explained by Vainio’s 
sources, as he primarily utilizes the second Commentary on Galatians from 1535. Though 
this particular viewpoint can be found in Luther’s writings, it does not seem to be the 
principal theory Luther uses to illustrate the cognitive nature of faith. It does not, for 
example, explain the multiple passages in which Luther speaks about the divine light of 
faith. Vainio also refers to the mystical language and metaphors used by Luther in one 
sentence, but does not examine the issue further. The analysis offered by Vainio therefore 
needs to be complemented by a comprehensive study, which takes into account the variety 
of Luther’s viewpoints. 
The foregoing analysis of the most important studies on Luther’s concept of faith as 
well as some of the recent scholarship shows that until now no serious study has been 
attempted, which analyses Luther’s understanding of faith from a viewpoint of a realist 
ontology and epistemology. The Finnish research has suggested that such a theory lies 
behind Luther’s thought, but apart from individual articles and monographs focused on 
specific elements of the concept of faith (such as the faith of the child, or the union with 
Christ in faith) to date there has not been an attempt to construct such a theory as a whole. 
The objective of this main chapter is to undertake such an analysis, with the doctrine of 
illumination as the conceptual and historical background. After this first subchapter on 
history of the scholarship, the second subchapter examines Luther’s relation to the 
tradition of divine illumination in general (chapter 3.2). The third subchapter focuses on 
the functions of the light of faith in Luther’s thought (chapter 3.3). The fourth subchapter 
discusses the role of faith as the enigmatic middle stage between the earthly and the 
heavenly vision (chapter 3.4). The fifth and final subchapter examines the question of the 
nature of faith as beliefs and trust (chapter 3.5).  
3.2. Luther’s Relation to the Tradition of Divine Illumination 
3.2.1. The General Development of the Theory from Augustine to the 
Nominalists 
As already indicated in the previous chapter, Luther’s understanding of faith is decidedly 
connected to the doctrine of illumination. By divine illumination is meant the idea that the 
human mind receives knowledge through being illuminated by a divine, intellectual light. 
The doctrine appears in Augustine as a Christian interpretation of Plato’s idea of 
recollection (anamnesis), but it also incorporates Biblical and Neoplatonic motifs about 
the nature of light and the nature of God. The general purpose of the doctrine is to give an 
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account of how the soul can know immutable ideas or forms, and recognize them in the 
data provided by the senses. However, the doctrine also serves a theological purpose. The 
idea that it is exactly Christ, who is the divine light of understanding or intellect integrates 
epistemology and Christology. There are, however, various interpretations of the precise 
nature of this doctrine both in Augustine and in the thought of its later proponents, both 
with regard to the function and to the theological purpose of the doctrine. One can 
distinguish between an epistemic function and a noetic function. In the first case, the 
doctrine serves as an explanation for how the soul can understand language and other 
signs unambiguously as well as make judgements (illumination as a guarantee of 
certitude). In the second case, the doctrine serves as an account of concept formation (i.e., 
how the soul receives certain ideas, which it would seem not to able to abstract from sense 
perception alone).
521
  
Connected to these questions also are different interpretations of the doctrine in the 
history of theology. According to Thomist and formal interpretation, illumination 
functions not as a direct source of any ideas, but gives the human being a general capacity 
of abstraction (Thomist view), or serves as a criterion of the ideas of the mind (formal 
view). On the contrary, according to Early Franciscan (Bonaventure among others) and so-
called ontologist interpretation, illumination gives the human mind a direct contact with 
the divine ideas, which reside in the divine essence. However, this interpretation has been 
criticized by Thomists, the later nominalist Franciscans and Neo-Thomists on the grounds 
that it would make the vision of God the property of any mind. If one were to support an 
ontologist understanding of illumination, according to this criticism one would have to 
give a credible explanation of how the knowledge of ideas or of God received by 
illumination, and the knowledge of God in the beatific vision or mystical rapture differ 
from each other.
522
  
However, there is yet another way to view the function of the doctrine. In the history 
of philosophy, the doctrine is often discussed from the viewpoint of general epistemology, 
                                                 
521
 See Gilson 1934, 322-323; Markus 1967, 364-368; Wienbruch 1971; Detloff 1986, 140-145; 
Matthews 2001, 180-181; Marrone 2001, 21; Nash 2003, 77-93; Pasnau 2011. Schumacher 2011, 4 lists five 
functions of illumination in Augustine: source of the cognitive capacity, cognitive content, help with the 
process of cognition, certitude, and knowledge of God. Marrone 2001, 33-34; 252 lists four: The question of 
judgement; ideogenesis or the question of concepts and how the divine light inserts them into the mind; the 
specific issue of explaining immutable truth; and the matter of the mind’s journey to God. Nash discusses 
the same questions in his examination of the Franciscan view (illumination as source of ideas) and formal 
view (illumination as source of certitude), and rejects the formal view. 
522
 E.g., Ivánka 1964, 214-215 criticizes Augustine for intermingling normal cognition and knowledge of 
God, so that the knowledge of abstract truths is equated with the knowledge of God and normal knowledge 
becomes equal to the visio beatifica. Gilson 1961, 78-81, on the contrary, argues that Augustine strictly 
separates the light and its source (i.e., God). According to him, illumination as a term is only a metaphor 
about God as the source of all Creation. The natural light of reason is related to the divine light only as a 
created light. Nash 2003, 94-124 discusses the above four views (Thomist, Franciscan, formal, ontologist), 
defending the ontologist interpretation of Augustine and attacking especially Gilson’s Neo-Thomist 
interpretation. For an overview of different interpretations of illumination both historical and modern, see 
Schumacher 2011, 7-24. The difference between these views is related to two different ways of 
understanding the function of the doctrine, which Schumacher defines as 1) the interpretation that “the 
divine light simply imparts an intrinsic cognitive capacity to form ideas in the way Aristotle described” and 
2) the interpretations which “define illumination in one way or another as an extrinsic influence, or as a 
force that is super-added to the cognitive capacity”, the latter obviously being more open to special 
knowledge of God. 
 165 
 
 
as an explanation of how the act of apprehending any truth whatsoever happens. In this 
case, the theological doctrine of illumination serves as a justification for epistemology in 
general. (This seems to be the view of, among others, Augustine and Bonaventure, as well 
as of Thomas Aquinas regarding the light of the natural reason). Another interpretation, 
however, is to read the doctrine as the basis of theological epistemology, whereby the idea 
of divine illumination serves as an explanation of how immediate, direct and intimate 
knowledge of God, or the knowledge of the truth of  some theological dogmas which 
exceed reason, is possible. In this case, illumination concerns a limited area of theological 
knowledge, not all intellection. (This seems to be the view of Hugh of St. Victor, of 
Thomas Aquinas regarding the light of faith, as well as of the Nominalists who assign a 
role to special illumination. In addition, many post-Reformation theologians, such as 
Luther and Calvin, seem to fall into this category).
523
 These two interpretations are also 
related to the question of how the Augustinian concept of the human being as the image of 
God is understood. One can either read Augustine to mean, that the human being with 
regard to his higher mind is the image of God in general: that is, every human being is an 
image of God on account of his rationality. Or, one can interpret Augustine to mean, that 
because the divine reflection in the human mind constitutes the image of God, a human 
being is an image of God only insofar he or she is turned towards the the divine light with 
his or her mind, and reflects it.
524
  
In the West, in the Early Middle Ages the theory of illumination was widely received 
and accepted as an epistemological theory. The formation of the Scholastic schools in 12
th
 
and 13
th
 Centuries led to the precising of theological doctrines. This was also the case with 
the doctrine of illumination, which was given formulation especially in the Franciscan 
School, above all in the theology of Bonaventure.
525
 Bonaventure considers divine 
illumination a necessary condition of all true knowledge due to the mutability and 
fallibility of the human subject, in contrast to the immutable and infallible nature of the 
knowledge of God. According to Bonaventure, by illumination the higher part of the mind 
receives the divine exemplar (idea, concept) as the regulating and motivating principle of 
knowledge. The content of the illumination is not the sole principle of knowledge (because 
often sense data is involved), but the principle which guarantees the immutability of the 
object known (i.e., the idea, concept or exemplar derived), and the infallibility of the 
knower (because natural light can err, but the divine light which is involved in the process 
is inerrant). And precisely with regard to the illumination it receives the soul is an image 
of God. Primary among these divine exemplars are the concepts of being and goodness, 
the knowledge of which demonstrates (as Bonaventure argues in his Itinerarium) how the 
soul must intuitively know God as the foundation of all thought. The soul, however, does 
not see the eternal reasons clearly, fully and distinctly as it still lives in this life and not in 
the heavenly vision; it only sees them to the degree of its conformity with God. 
Furthermore, according to Bonaventure the divine light received can be divided into 1) 
                                                 
523
For example, White 2001 distinguishes between natural illumination, which is involved in all 
knowledge, and supernatural illumination, which takes place by infusion of the light of faith and has God as 
its object, already in Augustine and Bonaventure. 
524
 See Matthews 2001, 182-185; Mulligan 1955, 2-8; Detloff 1986, 145-146.  
525
 On the general development of the theory, see Owens 1982; Doyle 1984; Marrone 2001; Pasnau 
2011; Schumacher 2011. Hägglund 1955, 22-26 provides a good general overview and comparison of the 
Augustinian, Thomist and Ockhamist interpretations with an accent on the Ockhamist tradition. 
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exterior light (i.e., the light reflected in the vestigia of the creation); 2) interior light (i.e., 
the light impressed in the mind as the imago Dei); and 3) superior light (i.e., when the 
mind, by the image impressed in it, turns towards the source of that light, God, who is the 
superior light). These three lights are related to the spiritual ascent and their distinction 
reflects the orientation of the person. Even the wayfarer can contemplate God in the divine 
light itself (in ipsa luce), at least partially and incipiently.
526
  
The Early Franciscan interpretation of illumination, however, soon was challenged by 
the emerging Aristotelian philosophy and its focus on sense perception. Aristotelian ideas 
were synthesized with Christian theology in the thought of the Dominican School, above 
all in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Accordingly, Thomas replaces external divine 
illumination with the idea of the intellect having its own natural light, with which it 
abstracts ideas from the sensory phantasms. This light is, nevertheless, related to the 
divine light. Thomas understands the natural light of reason as an imprint and created 
likeness of the divine light, and as such it is the imago Dei in the human person. These 
medieval developments resulted in the one divine light being divided into different lights 
of different degrees, as can be seen already in Bonaventure. In Thomas, the scheme of 
dividing the divine light becomes 1) the natural light of reason; 2) the light of faith or 
grace; and 3) the light of glory. Thus the distinction Bonaventure draws between the 
stages of contemplation is replaced by Thomas with a distinction among the three stages 
of human life: that of the unbeliever (natural light), the Church Militant (light of 
faith/grace) and the Church Triumphant (light of glory). Thomas reserves the immediacy 
of the divine light of Augustine and Bonaventure only to the light of glory. For Thomas 
only the light of glory confers a cognition of God in his essence, cognition attained only in 
the future life. The light of faith, on the other hand, confers only a mediated knowledge of 
God. It either strengthens the natural light, receives divinely-formed sensual images (but 
not intellectual forms), or grants the ability to trust in propositions given in revelation and 
to be oriented to the future life through them. The light of reason represents only for the 
general capacity of abstraction and does not in itself serve as a basis for orienting the 
person towards God.
527
  
Due to certain inherent philosophical issues, the doctrine of illumination as a whole 
came to be contested. Gradually it was abandoned as a general epistemological theory. 
This, surprisingly, took place within the Franciscan School. Peter Olivi criticizes the 
theory of ontologicism, for mixing the natural and supernatural modes of knowledge, as 
well as for being insufficient as a guarantee of the certitude of knowledge. Olivi argues 
that rather than to illumination, infallibility should be attributed to the human mind itself. 
Despite his criticism, however, Olivi approves of illumination as a source of theological 
knowledge (knowledge of God).
528
 Henry of Ghent reacts to Olivi’s criticism by 
distinguishing between the natural cognition of natural objects and the supernatural 
                                                 
526
 Bonaventure’s theory can be found in condensed form at the conclusion of book IV of the Questiones 
disputate de scientia Christi. See also Itinerarium II-V; on the three lights see Itinerarium VII, 1; Scarpelli 
2007; Schumacher 2011, 141-143. 
527
 Schumacher 2011 challenges the traditional view according to which the Franciscan School and 
Bonaventure represent a faithfully Augustinian doctrine, which she reviews on pages 14-16. She argues 
instead for a Thomistic reading of Augustine. On the relationship of the three lights in Thomas Aquinas, see 
Sth I q 12; Ia IIae q 109 a 1 and Winkler 2013, 204-223. 
528
 Schumacher 2011, 181-186. 
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cognition of objects that can only be known supernaturally by special divine illumination. 
Henry admits that natural knowledge of natural objects is obscure and hazy. Pure, 
infallible knowledge (pure truth) is only possible by means of special illumination, 
through which the mind knows the foundational exemplars. These exemplars function as 
kind of a check with regard to the truth of the exemplars acquired by natural cognition. 
Thus Peter and Henry narrow the scope of the theory of illumination, so that it no longer 
applies to all knowledge. In his interpretation of the light of faith, Henry seems to verge 
on that of Aquinas. Henry argues, that the light is to be understood not as comprehension 
of the theological objects of faith, but as assent to propositions, the reality behind which is 
not understood. However, Henry construes a theory of a higher medium light (lumen 
medium) between the light of faith and the light of glory, a light which allows a more 
thorough grasp of and comprehension of the objects of theological doctrine. This light 
comes closer to the immediacy of the light in Bonaventure.
529
  
Duns Scotus is the Franciscan commonly known for eliminating the doctrine of divine 
illumination as a credible foundation of general epistemology. Scotus rejects the 
supporting arguments of Henry. The position of Scotus can be summarized in the 
statement that if any certitude is to be obtainable at all, the objects of knowledge must be 
inherently intelligible, and the mind must be naturally equipped to perceive intelligibility. 
If the mind does not possess natural competence for recognizing truth, it cannot know 
anything with certainty: if an element in the process is fallible, then the entire process is 
fallible. Scotus therefore attempts to prove the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge 
and the infallibility of the knower by turning to a univocal concept of being. According to 
this concept the divine being and the created beings exist in the same way (i.e., 
immutably). The only difference between them is the degree of being, which in God is 
infinite and in the creatures, finite. Scotus reinterprets the Augustinian concept of 
illumination as a doctrine of the univocity of being: the divine light permeates reality and 
makes objects exist in an immutable mode of being, in which they become manifestly 
knowable.
530
 Thus illumination is not a property of the subject, but is ‘applied’ to reality to 
confer on it the nature of immutability which Bonaventure attributes to the divine light. 
Moreover, Scotus defines knowledge of the transcendentals as something that comes not 
from divine illumination, but which is a natural feature of the mind. Furthermore, Scotus 
distinguishes among four kinds of knowledge: self-evident principles known by means of 
themselves (per se nota); inductive knowledge; introspective knowledge and sensory 
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 Schumacher 2011, 186-191. See also Henry of Ghent: Summa Questionum Ordinariarum, a 1 q 2. On 
the lumen medium and the three other lights in Henry of Ghent, see Työrinoja 2000. 
530
 See Ordinatio I dist. 3 pars 1 q 4, nro 262-263. The concept of univocity stands against both the 
Thomistic concept of analogy of being and the Pseudo-Dionysian, apophatic or mystical concept of the 
superessential nature of divine being. Both reject the univocal application of terms to the divine nature, i.e., 
the idea that terms carry the same meaning when applied to God and to created beings. (Cf. Ordinatio I dist. 
3 pars 1 q 1-2, nro 10; nro 26-27). The Scotist and, later, Ockhamist developments lead to the result that the 
incomprehensibility of God is no longer understood in ontological terms and with regard to the simplicity of 
the divine being, but rather with regard to the freedom of the divine will. Thus the acceptance of the 
principle of univocity leads also to a rejection of mystical epistemology based on the idea that in the 
immediate mystical contact with the divine, the conceptional boundary between human cognition and divine 
being is transcended. The relationship to and union with God is no longer understood in epistemological 
terms, but in terms of love and will: one’s will is united with the will and directives of God. Accordingly, 
Nominalist mysticism is commonly considered a mysticism of love rather than mysticism of knowledge. 
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knowledge; as well as between two kinds of cognition: abstractive and intuitive. For 
Scotus, the perfect form of cognition is the intuitive cognition of a present object, because 
unlike abstractive cognition, intuitive cognition involves knowledge of the actual 
existence of an object. The capacity for intuitive cognition predisposes the human being to 
the immediate knowledge of God. However, according to Scotus, that knowledge is only 
attained in the future life. Scotus nevertheless agrees that in this life there may be need for 
supernatural knowledge or knowledge of God by special illumination, which is the only 
possible proof for certain theological truths.
531
  
The distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition introduced by Scotus forms 
one of the most important aspects of the epistemology of the followers of the via moderna, 
the theological school which includes both the voluntarist Scotus as well as the later 
Nominalists such as William of Ockham and Gabriel Biel.
532
 The theology of these 
authors rejects the intellectual mysticism of the Augustinian-Bonaventurean tradition, as 
they view immediate (i.e., intuitive) cognition of God as a present object as being 
excluded in this life and only admitted as taking place in the beatific vision. Consequently, 
besides certain theological truths evident to reason, the relationship to God becomes 
something which is actualized through will and love, not intellect. The nominalist pactum 
theology and its emphasis on justification by facere quod in se est reflect this view. The 
concept of authority comes to the foreground and faith is consequently defined as the 
acceptance in the intellect of doctrinal propositions (fides qua) with which the will agrees 
(fides quae), received through preaching (fides acquisita) and applied to the individual 
(pro nobis). Although the notion of supernaturally infused faith (fides infusa) is still 
sometimes employed within Nominalism, it is considered unnecessary. It is understood by 
the Nominalists as an infused habit which inclines the intellect to accept revealed truths, 
not any longer as an immediate cognition of the divine. Thus the development begun in 
Thomism leads especially in Scotism and Nominalism to the result that God is no longer 
considered the object of immediate theological knowledge. Faith is understood as an 
assent of the will to propositions given by doctrinal authority.
533
  
Unlike as is often claimed,
534
 the concept of divine illumination did not, however, 
completely disappear from academic theology alongside the rise of Nominalism.
535
 This 
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 Schumacher 2011, 194-201; Pasnau 2011.  
532
 Scotus can be considered also a representative of the via antiqua for the sake of his realist ontology, 
but here I use his epistemology as the point of differentiation. That which pertains to the definition of an 
Augustinian school is true also here with regard to the definition of a school in general. To some extent, the 
concept is applied a posteriori so that a certain school cannot be considered as a single whole, but here the 
concept is rather used to highlight features in which there is distinct continuity. 
533
 See Biel: Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum I q 1 art 3 conclusio; Oberman 1963, 68-
80; Hägglund 1955, 27-40; 71-82. A contrary view is represented by Metzger 1964, 122-125, who notes on 
p. 123 that acquired faith is the foundation of the act of faith, but that it has to be complemented by infused 
faith to become meritorious. However, on p. 124 Metzger attributes this merit to love, so that his analysis 
seems to confuse the concept of infused faith with faith informed by love. 
534
 Pasnau 2011; Marrone 2001. 
535
 Schumacher 2011 is right in criticizing previous research for its narrow focus on philosophy, which 
has resulted in the omission of the examination of the doctrine of illumination in its theological context. 
With the coming of the via moderna, the doctrine of illumination disappears in the 14
th
 Century as a general 
epistemological theory. After this time its later development is not followed in the compendia of the history 
of philosophy. Nevertheless, it continues to persist in the works of mystical authors, as will be demonstrated 
below. The same view is held by Boler 1982, 462 (footnote 8). 
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can be seen in the thought of Jean Gerson among others. The theology of Gerson is 
usually described as a Nominalist mysticism in which the mysticism is that of love and 
will, not of the intellect. If any intuitive cognition of God takes place in this life, according 
to this view it is accepted only in the most extraordinary cases such as the rapture of St. 
Paul (2. Cor. 12).
536
 However, when one examines the sources, it becomes exceedingly 
clear that Gerson accepts the doctrine of divine illumination. He seems to accept the 
possibility of intuitive cognition of God in this life as well, although that is less clear. One 
can find in Gerson’s writings multiple instances of texts which speak of illumination by 
divine light. A good example of this are his lectiones Contra vanam curiositatem, intended 
to be read before his treatise on Mystical theology. In Contra vanam curiositatem Gerson 
mounts a fierce attack against Duns Scotus while simultaneously praising Bonaventure. 
Following Bonaventure, Gerson states that God is the best object that can be thought of, 
and that this revelation is the basis of the natural knowledge of God, which is is the light 
of the face of God sealed (signatum)
537
 in the human beings, in accordance with and with 
explicit reference to Bonaventure’s Itinerarium.538 Gerson also speaks about different 
lights which the soul receives: corporeal, spiritual and the light of faith. These correspond 
to three parts of the soul: sensuality, reason and the intelligentia simplex. According to 
Gerson, it is above all by the divine light (lumen divinum) of faith coming from above that 
the face of God is sealed on the soul, although all three lights are related to the knowledge 
of God in a lessening degree.
539
 Gerson also speaks about divine illumination in the work 
De vita spirituali animae, where he states that the principles of the natural law are derived 
from divine law and are known through immediate irradiation by the divine light. Here 
also Gerson refers to Bonaventure’s Itinerarium and to Augustine.540 Thus it is clear that 
Gerson builds upon the earlier texts which employ the idea of divine illumination, and that 
he continues to argue for the tradition and against Scotus.  
Further evidence of Gerson’s relation to the epistemology of Nominalism appears in 
his treatise De oculo, which discusses ways of seeing. In this short text Gerson 
distinguishes between three different types of mental vision of God, later adding also a 
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 See Oberman 1963, 326-340; Fisher 2006, 216-239. In recent studies, Oberman’s characterization of 
Gerson as a Nominalist has been criticized. According to Brett 1997, 77-78 rather than being a Nominalist, 
Gerson seems to use many different medieval sources in an eclectic manner, a view with which I tend to 
agree. The amount of literature available on the mystical theology of Gerson is regrettably somewhat 
limited, the most extensive study being that of Combes 1963-Combes 1964 (La théologie mystique de 
Gerson) and the most recent comprehensive work being Vial 2006 (Jean Gerson théoricien de la théologie 
mystique). 
537
 The use of this term stems from Ps. 4:7 ,“signatum est super nos lumen vultus Dei”, which is a key 
biblical passage for the tradition of divine illumination. In the interpretation of the sentence, the focus is 
sometimes on the idea of making an imprint or a mark of the seal upon the soul, and at other times on the 
content of the light being sealed (i.e., concealed) and superior to the soul.  
538
 DP I, 91 (Contra vanam curiositatem, Prima consideratio). Scotus is criticized throughout the work, 
but see especially DP I, 98-101 (Secunda consideratio & Quinta consideratio). See also Morrall 1960, 20-24. 
On the positive relation of Gerson to Bonaventure, see Glorieux 1974; Grosse 2004. 
539
 DP I, 87 (Contra vanam curiositatem). The difference with Thomas Aquinas is noticeable. Whereas 
for Thomas the highest light is the light of glory received in the future life, in this text Gerson considers the 
highest light to be the light of faith, through which God is known already in this life. 
540
 DP III, pars I, 22-23 (Liber de vita spirituali animae, lectio secunda, corollarium sextum). See also 
Morrall 1960, 49-50. 
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fourth one.
541
 Gerson states that the three visions correspond to three types of knowledge: 
midday, morning and evening.
542
 The most immediate of these is the visio dei facialis & 
intuitiva, the intuitive vision of God face-to-face, in which God is present as the 
immediate object. Gerson examines three different ways in which God can be the object of 
this immediate vision: 1) as the actual form of sight (Deus esset ipsa formalis visio 
creaturae); 2) as the object of sight without a mediating species (objectum sine alia media 
specie) and 3) and as the immediate object seen with the light of glory as the medium 
(objectum immediatum & tamen mediante specie videretur cum lumine gloriae). Here 
Gerson’s point seems to be that the vision exists, but he does not take a stance on how it 
happens, though he considers the second way most probable.
543
 However, it is interesting 
that Gerson states that this vision can be had either ad tempus or ad perpetuum. 
Unfortunately he does not elaborate on what he means by having the vision ad tempus, but 
one can offer at least two options. The first possibility is that Gerson suggests that this 
vision can be had already during this temporal life. If so, then Gerson accepts the intuitive 
knowledge of God in this life. The other option is that Gerson thinks that the soul can 
cease from the heavenly vision of God and then return to it. This option does not seem 
very likely either. The text is furthermore somewhat vague with regard to the points at 
which Gerson expresses his own opinion, and the points at which he merely lists the 
opinions of others. 
The second type of vision according to Gerson is the visio Dei specularis & sincera, in 
which God can be seen through the special light of grace. Contrary to what Oberman 
claims, it seems that this is the type of vision Gerson attributes to St. Paul, not the visio dei 
facialis & intuitiva. This vision seems to refer to a special, momentanous rapture, as 
Gerson notes that it is not permanent, but momentary. Gerson emphasizes that this type of 
vision can be attained through sincere faith or meditation. In this vision God is seen 
without any phantasms, movement, this or then, i.e., he is seen absolutely. Noteworthy 
here is that Gerson explicitly rejects the phantasms, which Thomas Aquinas connects to 
the light of grace. In the midst of this vision one is lifted up out of mental disturbances 
into a silence of the mind, but then one is quickly taken back again, because of phantasms 
and disturbances which disrupt the peace of the heart. The difference with regard to the 
first type of vision seems to be that this vision takes place through the light of grace as the 
mediating species. The difference with the visio dei facialis & intuitiva is that the former 
either has no mediating species, or is mediated by the light of glory, not by the light of 
faith. Thus according to Gerson the first type of vision is intuitive and immediate, but this 
type of vision abstractive. Nevertheless, this vision seems as well to suggest a strong sense 
of immediacy, as it is absolute and not concerned with phantasms, movement or time.
544
  
                                                 
541
 See DP III pars II, 485-486 (Tractatus de oculo).  See also Vial 2006, 164-167, where he discusses the 
text and the three types of vision. 
542
 These three types of knowledge are distinguished also by Bonaventure, see Itinerarium I, 3. The idea 
is a development of Augustine’s division between two types of knowledge: morning and evening. On this 
division between types of knowledge on Augustine and Thomas see p. 48, especially footnote 161. 
543
 DP III pars II, 485-486 (Tractatus de oculo). Gerson seems to speculate here on the manner in which 
the heavenly vision is actualized. In the first option, God himself is the capacity of vision. In the second, 
God is the object of the vision without a mediating species. In the third option, a mediating species (i.e. the 
light of glory) is posited, which is the Thomistic view on which see STh I q 12 a  2. 
544
 Gerson’s description of this vision is somewhat problematic. He states first that “Visio Dei specularis 
& sincera, quae dicitur abstractiva, non intuitiva vel immediata, habita est ab Angelis & hominibus, pro statu 
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Alongside these two, Gerson also lists a third vision (visio Dei nubilaris & 
aenigmatica), which is the vision of God through the light reflected in the creation. This 
vision seems to refer to the meditation of God through created things. As one can see, all 
these three types of vision have God as their object of cognition and are intellectual in 
their nature. In their categorization Gerson appears to attempt to harmonize the three lights 
of Bonaventure with the three visions and with the Thomistic and Scholastic doctrines 
concerning the vision of God, and with Augustinian types of knowledge. Thus here 
Gerson seems to stand closer to the Nominalist rejection of the intuitive vision of God in 
this life. However, Gerson’s descriptions are still connected to the metaphysics of light. 
The three visions take place through different lights and are of an intellectual nature, a fact 
which calls into question the usual classification of Gerson as a Nominalist mystic. Much 
more pre-Nominalist content can be found in Gerson’s writings than one might expect. 
The erroneous classifications of Gerson’s theology can be explained by the interesting 
fact that according to Gerson the three examined modes of vision discussed above are not 
the objective of mystical theology(!). Mystical theology according to Gerson, aspires to a 
fourth type of vision, the visio dei anagogiga, which is indeed acquired through the love 
of God. As the term “anagogical” implies, in this particular vision God is not yet seen, 
only grasped by love, the cognition having been left behind. Thus Gerson compares the 
last type of vision to the sense of smell that a blind dog has.
545
 (Incidentally one might ask 
in which sense it is proper to call this experience of God a “vision” per se). It therefore 
seems that Gerson does indeed approach the Dionysian mystical tradition (the central 
point of which is the hiddenness and unknowability of God) through the concept of love. 
For Gerson the term “mystical” is indeed connected to love, but this does not imply that 
Gerson’s theology excludes Augustinian and Bonaventurean intellectual mysticism. It is 
rather the case, that that Gerson does not call the intellectual knowledge of God (as 
defined in the Augustinian and Bonaventuran mysticism) “mystical”, although under the 
rubric of contemporary classification we are looking at two different types of mysticism, 
one concerned with intellectual cognition of God, the other with affective cognition. On 
the contrary, Gerson seems to reserve the term “mystical” only for the experiential 
knowledge of God of the fourth kind, which emphasizes the unknowability of God and is 
more easily attained by the uneducated layman. Nevertheless Gerson’s theology clearly 
contains both types of mysticism. Therefore, when in the past Gerson has been seen as 
rejecting the intellectual pre-Nominalist mysticism and the doctrine of illumination for the 
sake of the priority of the affect, this interpretation seems to be built on a misreading 
which considers only his explicit definition of mysticism. That explicit definition has been 
taken from Gerson’s works as prima facie evidence of his understanding of mysticism, 
                                                                                                                                                   
naturae primitius institutae & ante collationem gloriae, licet diversimode in utraque.” Thus he denies that the 
vision is immediate and intuitive. But then he continues: “Visio Dei specularis & sincera, longe facilius 
acquitur per Fidem, Spem & Charitatem, cum vita conformi purificante mentis oculum, quam per solas 
physicas disciplinas acquiritur, & post raptum, qualis esse potuit visio Pauli reflexa super actum, quo 
intuitive vidit Deum.” (DP III pars II, 486). Thus he also seems to call also this vision intuitive, unless the 
text is taken to mean that those who have seen God intuitively (like St. Paul) will more easily see God 
speculatively after that intuitive vision.  
545
 DP III pars 2, 485. 
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without examining its place within the wider context of Gerson’s theology.546 On the 
contrary, when examined in the wider context, Gerson can be seen as a supporter of the 
doctrine of illumination and defender of Bonaventure, up to the point where he speaks 
about illumination by the divine light of faith. Based on the textual evidence, it is clear 
that Gerson accepts multiple types of intellectual mystical vision. What remains open for 
more analysis is the question whether Gerson accepts the immediate intuitive vision of 
God in this life, as well as whether he refines the exact nature of the vision given by the 
light of faith. There seems to be at least a possibility that his texts can be read as speaking 
about the immediate vision of God through the light of faith, and that such a reading 
seems possible is significant with regard to his influence on Luther. 
This short review of the theologies of Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Peter 
Olivi, Henry of Ghent, Scotus and Gerson allows us to see how the theory of divine 
illumination developed through the Middle Ages. The one divine light discussed by 
Augustine was first refined into a general epistemological theory of illumination. In 
Thomism and later Franciscan theology, however, the idea of illumination by divine light 
was gradually rejected with regard to the natural reason. Divine illumination nevertheless 
kept its place as an explanation for the cognition of God realized through the lights of faith 
and glory. In theologies related to Thomism, the light of faith was seen as a mediating 
light, in which the actual object of faith, God, remains unknown. The immediate cognition 
of God is reserved for the Church Triumphant. In theologies related to that of 
Bonaventure, however, the light of faith was understood in a more immediate sense, so 
that a closer connection to Platonist epistemology (according to which the invisible 
objects of faith are immediately grasped) remained. This difference between the two ways 
of understanding the light of faith is of primary importance for the understanding of 
Martin Luther’s theology concerning the light of faith. 
3.2.2. Traditional Interpretations of Ps. 4:7 
The doctrine of divine illumination is closely connected to specific biblical texts and to the 
images derived from them. One of the most important passages related to the doctrine is 
Ps. 4:7: “Multi dicunt: quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos Lumen vultus tui, 
Domine”. The verse is divided into two parts. The first part is a question about the good, 
the second speaks about “the light of the face” (lumen vultus) of God, which is 
“imprinted” or “sealed” (signatum) upon “us” (i.e., human beings or the faithful). Though 
in many modern translations of the Psalm the first part is translated as “Who will show us 
any good?” in the Medieval tradition the question was usually interpreted as “Who will 
show us what is good?” That is, the verse was understood as a question regarding the 
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 The survey of Gerson’s theology set forth here unfortunately must omit the development of his 
theology between his works. Vial 2006 divides the theological development of Gerson’s mysticism into two 
stages. According to Vial, at the beginning of the first stage Gerson emphasizes God as the object of the 
affect and then moves to an abstractive concept of mysticism in which God is grasped through an absolute 
concept of being. In the second stage Gerson moves to a more eclectic and diverse theology focusing on the 
concept of experience. According to Vial, in this second stage Gerson considers God himself as the intuitive 
object of mystical experience (see p. 209-213). Vial also sees traces of doctrine of illumination in Gerson 
(see p. 74-84; 165). 
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foundation of moral principles, or as a question regarding where the true good (i.e., God, 
good in an absolute sense) can be found. Thus, the entire verse was read as a question 
regarding the source of the first principles of understanding (either theoretical or practical 
or both) or the knowledge of God. And it is precisely to this question that the answer is 
“the light of the face of God”. This light is understood to be the divine light which confers 
upon the soul eternal principles or knowledge of God, or both (as they can be taken as 
identical). Thus in the interpretation of the verse a major question of theological 
epistemology was connected to theological anthropology by the concept of lumen 
signatum (the light sealed upon us) understood through the Augustinian imago Dei 
doctrine. The highest part of the soul is impressed with the divine light, through which it 
knows God and eternal principles, and especially in this sense becomes an image of 
God.
547
 In the following paragraphs I will discuss some interpretations of this verse which 
are important for understanding Luther’s treatment of this Psalm. 
Just as the origin of the doctrine of divine illumination can be found in Augustine, so 
also can the traditional interpretation of Ps. 4:7 as referring to divine illumination. One of 
the most significant passages where Augustine discusses the Psalm from this point of view 
can be found in the Confessions, book IX chapter 4: 
Nor were my good things external nor could they be sought with carnal eyes in that sun; 
when they wish to rejoice in the external they will easily become empty and leak out into 
those things, which they see and which are temporal, and they will lick their images with 
starving thoughts. Oh if they would grow weary of their starvation and say: “Who will 
show us good?”, and we would respond, and they would hear: “The light of your face has 
been sealed in us, O Lord”. For we are not the light that illuminates everyone, but we are 
enlightened by you, so that we who once were darkness, would be a light in you. Oh if they 
only could see that internal light Eternal, since when I tasted it, I gnashed my teeth, 
because I could not show it to them, unless they would turn their heart which is in their 
external eyes from me towards you and say: “Who will show us good?”548 
One can see how Augustine connects his interpretation of the Psalm with divine 
illumination. In this passage Augustine sets external and internal good things against each 
other. He reads the question of the Psalmist as a cry about where true good things can be 
found. In his answer Augustine wishes that those, whose eyes are turned towards external 
and temporal things, insufficient for satisfying the soul, would turn their mind toward the 
internal Eternal light (i.e., Christ), the light that illumines everyone.  The light of the face 
of God would then satisfy the seeker either by showing the eternal good things, or,  by the 
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 On the significance of this verse for Augustine and the medieval tradition see Ebeling 1989, 328-330; 
Marrone 2001, 22. In some translations the two sentences are divided between verses six and seven of the 
Psalm. I use here the Vulgate translation used by Luther, see AWA 55, 80, 6-7; 730, 169-192; AWA 1, 492, 
18 – 493, 10; AWA 2, 198, 1-2. 
548
 Conf. IX, 4: 8-10: “nec iam bona mea foris erant nec oculis carneis in isto sole quaerebantur. volentes 
enim gaudere forinsecus facile vanescunt et effunduntur in ea quae videntur et temporalia sunt, et imagines 
eorum famelica cogitatione lambiunt. et o si fatigentur inedia et dicant, `quis ostendet nobis bona?' et 
dicamus, et audiant, `signatum est in nobis lumen vultus tui, domine.' non enim lumen nos sumus quod 
inluminat omnem hominem, sed inluminamur a te ut, qui fuimus aliquando tenebrae, simus lux in te. o si 
viderent internum aeternum, quod ego quia gustaveram, frendebam, quoniam non eis poteram ostendere, si 
afferent ad me cor in oculis suis foris a te et dicerent, `quis ostendet nobis bona?'” Translation is NPNF vol. 
1, 132 but modified for clarity and precision. 
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fact that it itself consists of them. (The exact nature of this light for Augustine, whether as 
identical with God or emanating from him, is difficult to ascertain.) There are two points 
to note here: First, that it is by divine illumination received ab extra that the human heart 
recognizes what is good, as Augustine clearly states that “we are not that light”. Second, 
that turning toward that light conveys fellowship with God, as one turned toward that light 
becomes “a light in you” (i.e., in God). Augustine also discusses the same passage in the 
Enarrationes in Psalmos, where he likewise defines the light as “the true good, which is 
grasped not by the eyes, but by mind”. There he also describes the meaning of the 
“sealing” by explaining how a coin is imprinted with the image of the king. In a similar 
manner, the soul is imprinted with the image of God by the divine light.
549
 In a summary, 
in Augustine’s view by turning towards the divine light the mind participates in God, the 
true good, and in the eternal principles which it knows by divine illumination. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in medieval theology different views concerning 
the doctrine of illumination developed. Those accepting the doctrine, such as Bonaventure 
and Gerson, interpreted Ps. 4:7 in accordance with Augustine. In the Itinerarium 
Bonaventure speaks of the contemplation of God outside ourselves through the vestiges 
(vestigia) of God, within ourselves through the image (imaginem) of God, and above 
ourselves through the light (lumen), which has been impressed upon (supra) our mind and 
is the light of the Eternal truth.
550
 Gerson refers to Bonaventure’s description in the 
Itinerarium of God as the best object that can be thought of, and to the natural cognition of 
God in the soul through this concept as the imprint of the face of God.
551
 In the De vita 
spirituali animae he states that the divine laws, through which we know what is true and 
good, are impressed upon us by the immediate irradiation of the divine light, also referring 
here to the said Psalm.
552
 In the Contra vanam curiositatem he speaks about the intuition 
                                                 
549
 Enarr. in Ps. IV, 8: “Signatum est, inquit, in nobis lumen vultus tui, Domine. Hoc lumen est totum 
hominis et verum bonum, quod non oculis, sed mente conspicitur. Signatum autem dixit in nobis, tanquam 
denarius signatur regis imagine: homo enim factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem De i (Gen. I, 26), quam 
peccando corrupit: bonum ergo ejus est verum atque aeternum, si renascendo signetur. Et ad hoc credo 
pertinere, quod quidam prudenter intelligunt, illud quod Dominus viso Caesaris nummo ait: Reddite Caesari 
quod Caesaris est, et Deo quod Dei est (Matth. XXII, 21); tanquam si diceret: Quemadmodum Caesar a 
vobis exigit impressionem imaginis suae, sic et Deus; ut quemadmodum illi redditur nummus, sic Deo anima 
lumine vultus ejus illustrata atque signata.” 
See also Ebeling 1989, 329. 
550
 Itinerarium mentis in Deum V, 1: “Quoniam autem contingit contemplari Deum non solum extra nos 
et intra nos, verum etiam supra nos: extra per vestigium, intra per imaginem et supra per lumen, quod est 
signatum supra mentem nostram, quod est lumen Veritatis eternae, cum  « ipsa mens nostra immediate ab 
ipsa Veritate formetur »” 
551
 See Itinerarium mentis in Deum chapter V, to which Gerson refers at Contra vanam curiositatem, 
prima lectio, prima consideratio: “Ductus itaque ratiocinationis naturalis ad hoc pertingit, ut sciat quod sit 
unus Deus, princeps & rector omnium, qui dedit omnibus esse & vivere; his quidem clarius, illis vero 
obscurius. Invisibilia enim Dei a creatura mundi per ea que facta sunt intellect conspiciunt, sempiterna 
quoque virtus ejus & divinitas. Rom. 1.20. Est quippe omnibus inditum a multis naturali demonstratione 
conclusum, ut Deus sit quo nihil melius cogitari potest, esse qui habeat quicquid melius ipsum quam non 
ipsum. Haec est enim Philosophia quam Apostolus & instructus ab eo Dionysius nominat Dei sapientiam, 
immo relevationem. Deus (inquit Apostolus) revelavit eis, Philipp. 3.15. quam revelationem intelligo lumen 
vultus Domini signatum super nos, quemadmodum  pulcherrimo & evidentissimo compendio divinus 
Bonaventura deducit in suo Itinerario mentis ad Deum.” (DP I, 91) 
552
 “Sequitur quod non absurde concedi potest omnia pricipia Juris naturalis esse de Lege divina proprie 
dicta, licet diversa ratione: hoc perspicuum erit si attendimus quemadmodum omnia principia Juris naturalis 
Deo revelante ac jubente continet Lex tam antiqua quam nova ad finem beatitudinis aeternae. Et aliunde 
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of the face of God, which is impressed on the soul especially when the soul is elevated by 
the most gracious light of faith that is infused in it.
553
 Bonaventure and Gerson thus 
represent a reading in which the Psalm 4:7 is taken as speaking of immediate divine 
illumination, through which the human mind receives knowledge of God and eternal laws. 
Furthermore, we can see here how the text is applied to human knowledge of the eternal 
law (i.e., the highest moral principles). The light works as the foundation of natural 
knowledge of God and, indeed, as the foundation of all permanent or true knowledge. The 
light has this function because foundational concepts of understanding such as the 
transcendental concepts of being and goodness, or first principles of the moral laws, are 
received through the light. However, the light also functions as the foundation for 
contemplation, in which the soul ascends by it from itself over itself to the contemplation 
of the essential properties of God, so that the light increases to the degree of contemplation 
achieved.
554
 In Contra vanam curiositatem Gerson interprets this ascent described by 
Bonaventure in the Itinerarium as the light of faith, which above all shows the face of 
God.
555
 Thus, different degrees of light also emerge within the tradition that leans most 
heavily on Augustine, such that we can speak of two different distinctions: A) That 
between the 1) external light of the visible creation received by the senses, 2) the internal 
light of reason as the image of God, and 3) the superior light, of which the image of God is 
the reflection (i.e., the light of faith); and B) that between 1) the natural light of reason, 2) 
the light of grace or faith, and 3) the light of glory. Bonaventure and Gerson follow the 
first distinction, with Gerson also evincing traces of the other in places,
556
 whereas 
Thomists and the proponents of the via moderna in general seem to follow the second. 
Within the first distinction made by the Augustinian-Bonaventurean tradition, the lights 
are not separated from each other on account of the status of the person (i.e., for 
unbelievers the natural light, for believers the light of faith, for triumphant souls the light 
of glory), but on account of the disposition of the person towards the divine light. Thus the 
                                                                                                                                                   
forsan istud suadere possumus, ex hoc quod talium principiorum indita este notification creaturae rationali 
per immediatam divinae lucis irradiotionem, quemadmodum tradiderunt Augustinus & alii Doctores elevate, 
& olim super hoc fuit Articulus Parisiensis tempore Guillelmi Parisiensis, prout legi in beato Thoma, & 
Bonaventura declarati pulcherrime in Itinerario mentis in Deum, ostendiens nullum esse dictamen rectae 
rationis solidum & obligatorium nisi in prima Lege & luce stabiliatur. Propterea Philosophorum maximi & 
praecipui, inter quos florerunt Socrates & caeteri Academici, ingénue professi sunt, nihil in rebus 
mutabilibus se scire, nullam eis reperire veritatem, & nullum esse dictamen rectum rationis: quod si per hoc 
omnem a nobis veritatem & rectum dictamen simpliciter excludebant, errant intolerabiliter, quod de tantis 
investigatoribus veritatis sentine nefas est, nisi pro quanto forsan Deum cognoscere & non sicut Deum 
glorificantes, neque gratias agentes; quia quae abscondita ejus errant manifestarit eis, dati eran jam in 
reprobum sensum, & deficiebant scrutantes scrutinio. Sentiebant igitur, si bene sentiebant in hac tanta 
confessione ignorantiae, quod solus Deus sicut est immobilis, ita est Veritas stabilis & Lex certa & constans, 
in qua videmus quae bonae sunt & vera, consonantis in hoc Prophetae eximio, qui postquam praemiserat; 
multi dicunt quis ostendit nobis bona? Ps IV.6. Respondens subintulit: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus 
tui Domine.” De vita spirituali animae, lectio secunda, corollarium sextum (DP III, pars I, 22-23) 
553
 “Quamobrem elevanda est anima ab infimo habitaculo carceris ad medium, & consequenter ad 
supremum, quatenus intueri valeat lumen vultus Domini, quod signatum est super eam maxime si est lumen 
gratuitum Fidei de super infusum ad credendum Evangelio, praemittit poenitentiam.” Contra vanam 
curiositatem (DP I, 87). 
554
 This is described in chapter V of the Itinerarium mentis in Deum. 
555
 Contra vanam curiositatem (DP I, 87-88). 
556
 See the distinction between the light of glory and the light of grace and the three types of vision of 
God in De Oculo (DP III, 485-486). 
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grades of ascent described by Bonaventure, when the soul enters itself, are understood 
with regard to the clarity of the light without positing an insurmountable ontological 
difference between the lights. Even though the lower lights are at a different ontological 
level as reflections and derivatives of the light of the higher degree, the hierarchy of lights 
at the same time enables an ascent from one light to the other. This view is unlike  that of 
the Thomist and Nominalist system, because here the  hierarchy of the lights is based on a 
Platonist hierarchy of being.  
The other view regarding illumination that developed in the Middle Ages is that in 
which the light Augustine spoke of was understood as the natural light of the human 
intellect. Thomas Aquinas represents a mediating view, according to which the intellect 
has its own natural light, but that light is nevertheless an impression of the divine light, but 
as a created likeness and not as participation in the first light. Also Thomas refers to the 
Psalm 4:7 in multiple locations in the Summa Theologiae.
557
 First, Thomas defines that in 
order to understand, a mobile and imperfect thing requires the pre-existence of something 
immovable and perfect (which is God himself) from whom the soul receives its 
intellectual light as participated similitude, derived from the first light, but as a natural 
power.
558
 Second, Thomas discusses the question regarding in which way the eternal types 
are known. According to him, the soul does not know the eternal types directly, but as a 
principle of knowledge. Beside the eternal type, actual cognition also requires the material 
object: Thomas thus refutes the Platonist view. When Augustine speaks of the holy and 
pure souls who see the eternal reasons in the divine light, Thomas interprets this as 
pertaining solely to the souls in the heavenly vision. Thomas thus excludes the immediate 
contemplation of the divine light in this life.
559
 Furthermore, according to Schumacher for 
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 See Ebeling 1989, 337-338. 
558
 Sth I q79 a 4 “Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est 
creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale 
participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine.”  
Sth I q12 a 2: “Respondeo dicendum quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectualem, duo 
requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu, non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res 
visa quodammodo est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparet quod res visa non potest esse in 
vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per suam similitudinem, sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per 
quam fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis. Si autem esset una et eadem res, quae esset 
principium visivae virtutis, et quae esset res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem visivam habere, et 
formam per quam videret. Manifestum est autem quod Deus et est auctor intellectivae virtutis, et ab 
intellectu videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva virtus creaturae non sit Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit 
aliqua participata similitudo ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen 
quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de 
aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae vel gloriae.” 
559
 Sth I q 84 a 5: “Cum ergo quaeritur utrum anima humana in rationibus aeternis omnia cognoscat, 
dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut in obiecto cognito; sicut 
aliquis videt in speculo ea quorum imagines in speculo resultant. Et hoc modo anima, in statu praesentis 
vitae, non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, 
qui Deum vident et omnia in ipso. Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis 
principio; sicut si dicamus quod in sole videntur ea quae videntur per solem. Et sic necesse est dicere quod 
anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. 
Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo 
luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae. Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, multi dicunt, quis ostendit 
nobis bona? Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. 
Quasi dicat, per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia nobis demonstrantur. Quia tamen praeter 
lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus 
materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus materialibus 
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Thomas the divine light does not allow access to the ideas themselves or to the knowledge 
of God, but rather works as a capacity that abstracts concepts from sense material. The 
origin of the capacity is divine, but divine illumination is not directly required in the 
actions of this capacity.
560
  
In addition to the functioning of the intellect in concept abstraction, Thomas also 
writes about the role of illumination with regard to the natural reason in discerning 
between good and evil. This is possible, says Thomas, because of the participation of the 
intellect in the eternal law. Referring to the Psalm 4:7 Thomas affirms that: 
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most 
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for 
itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a 
natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the 
rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm 4:6): 
"Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, 
adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: 
"The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of 
natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of 
the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore 
evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the 
eternal law.
561
 
Unlike in Thomas’s account of concept abstraction, here the sense in which the eternal 
reasons direct the created rational creature remains more vague. Nevertheless, here also 
one can see a strong emphasis on natural cognition: the natural reason is enough for a 
creature’s participation in the divine law and for discerning the difference between good 
and evil. Therefore we can see in Thomas a shift from the direct illumination of 
Bonaventure towards the self-sufficiency of the natural cognitive capacities of the human 
                                                                                                                                                   
notitiam habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod sola idearum participatio sufficit ad scientiam habendam. 
Unde Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., numquid quia philosophi documentis certissimis persuadent aeternis 
rationibus omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis rationibus perspicere, vel ex ipsis colligere 
quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum? Nonne ista omnia per locorum ac temporum 
historiam quaesierunt? Quod autem Augustinus non sic intellexerit omnia cognosci in rationibus aeternis, 
vel in incommutabili veritate, quasi ipsae rationes aeternae videantur, patet per hoc quod ipse dicit in libro 
octoginta trium quaest., quod rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, 
asseritur illi visioni, scilicet rationum aeternarum, esse idonea; sicut sunt animae beatorum.” 
560
 Schumacher 2011, 173-178. According to Schumacher, the difference between Bonaventure and 
Thomas is that Bonaventure uses divine illumination as an extrinsic influence which grants the mind a priori 
concepts, whereas for Thomas the illumination stands as capacity which abstracts the concepts. Schumacher 
claims that Thomas represents the more genuinely Augustinian view, with which I do not agree. In my 
opinion, Augustine clearly speaks about cognition of the light itself, which satisfies the soul. 
561
 Sth. Ia IIae q91 a2 co: “Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae 
providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa 
participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis 
participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate 
sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis 
ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, 
quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, 
nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam 
participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.” English translation taken from Summa Theologica 2008. 
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reason. Furthermore, for Thomas (unlike Bonaventure and Gerson) the divine light 
imparts no direct knowledge of God on the knower, except in the heavenly vision enjoyed 
by the blessed in the special light of glory. Thomas’s view can nevertheless be seen as a 
mediating one, because he ascribes some function to the divine light in the human 
cognition. Moreover, also Thomas utilizes the concept of the light of grace or light of 
faith, but for him that light only strengthens the natural capacity of the intellect and allows 
it to receive prophetic images (phantasmata) and to understand and trust the revelation 
given through them. It ordains or disposes the soul towards the heavenly glory and allows 
it to be oriented towards the heavenly beautitude. It allows the soul to discern the dogmas 
that are to be believed from those that are not. At the same time, however, it remains faith 
because it does not yet comprehend the objects towards which it disposes the soul. It does 
not yet grant any immediate cognition or knowledge of God. That is, it does not grant the 
soul that cognition whereby the veracity of the truths believed are confirmed through the 
comprehension of the object to which they refer. Thomas therefore maintains the 
distinction between the heavenly glory and the light of faith as an insurmountable 
ontological distinction between the light of faith and the light of glory. This distinction 
does not allow an ascent to immediate contemplation of God, unlike the hierarchy of lights 
in Bonaventure and Gerson.
562
 Thomas’s idea regarding the light of natural reason is 
developed further in the via moderna, the representatives of which argue for the complete 
self-sufficiency of the human cognitive capacities in knowing immutable principles. 
Among others, Scotus and Biel argue that these principles are known by means of 
themselves (per se nota), such that no external influence or illumination is needed.
563
 In 
the work of some authors the views of Thomists the via moderna seem to be combined, so 
that for an example Nicholas of Lyra, the famous biblical commentator frequently 
employed by Luther, a Franciscan and co-temporary of Scotus, seems to combine both 
views in his glosses on Psalm 4:7. He writes: 
The natural light of the human intellect, which is a certain imprint of the divine light, by 
which the human being in his intellectual part is an image of God, shows us sufficiently 
what the works of righteousness are, because as the first principles of the speculative 
(sciences) are known by means of themselves [per se nota], so also of the practical 
(sciences), of which conclusions can be deduced by the light of natural reason.
564
 
Thus, though Lyra retains the idea of the intellect as an imprint of the divine light, on 
the other hand he affirms its capacity of knowing the moral principles sufficient for 
righteous works by purely natural reason in its own natural light, without any general or 
special divine illumination. Thus in the glosses of Lyra and in the views of the via 
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 See Sth I a 12 q 13; Ia IIae q 109; Stolz 1933; Aubert 1958, 43-71; Kirjavainen 1983, 130-136; 
Rosental 2011. According to Aubert, in his early works Thomas has a more illuminationist view, but departs 
from it and places more emphasis on the persuasion of the will (through the habit of faith) to acceptance of 
propositions not understood. 
563
 See Scotus: Ordinatio I dist. 3 pars 1 q 4 (229-234), Biel: Collectorium circa quattuor libros 
sententiarum, Prologus, q2 a1 n2 (p. 33) 
564
 Lyra, Biblia cum glossis: “Lumen naturale intellectus humani, quod est quaedam impressio divini 
luminis, eo quod homo secundum partem intellectivam est ad imaginem dei, sufficienter ostendit, quae sint 
opera iustitiae; quia sicut prima principia speculabilium sunt per se nota, ita et operabilium, ex quibus 
possunt deduci conclusiones in lumine naturalis rationis.” (cited in AWA 2, 200 footote 20) 
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moderna the natural capabilities of the human being become sufficient for knowing what 
is right. From one side, the relationship between God and the human being established by 
divine illumination is eliminated and a cognitive gap driven between God and the human 
mind. From the other side, the human being acquires the capacity to know, without any 
special divine illustration or faith, the first principles of morals, i.e., that which is right and 
good. These are according to Lyra sufficient for righteous works. These ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions of the via moderna form the precondition for the radically 
Pelagian understanding of the doctrine of facere quod in se est of the Late Middle Ages. 
This background creates the necessary conditions for understanding the foundation upon 
which Martin Luther in his biblical commentaries addresses the issue. 
3.2.3. Luther’s Interpretation of Ps. 4:7: The Light of the Face of God as the 
Light of Faith 
Psalm 4 and its words about the light of the face of God seem to have held a special 
significance for Martin Luther, as he returned to it in the course of his two early psalm 
lectures (Dictata super Psalterium, Operationes in Psalmos) more often than any other 
psalm. Luther’s first remarks on Psalm 4 are in the glosses of the Dictata super Psalterium 
(1513-15). However, he seems not to have been satisfied with his work, returning to the 
psalm again in conjunction with Ps. 92 and having replaced the original scholia on Ps. 4 
with a later text that has been dated to 1516. Luther then returns to the Psalm in the so-
called Vatican Fragments (1516/17) and finally in the Operationes in Psalmos (1519-
21).
565
 Therefore, Luther’s first extant remarks on Psalm 4 are the 1513 glosses of the 
Dictata. Here the most significant features of Luther’s interpretation already appear. 
Luther explains Ps. 4:6-7, the central text in the tradition of divine illumination, as 
follows: 
Many [who are] wise, strong, holy in their own eyes say ‘who will show us good’, i.e., we 
know by ourselves, ‘are you the one to teach us?’, John 6. We do not want to be directed 
by faith [fidei ostensionem]: Therefore, because they do not wish, behold, sealed is 
impressed by a fixed sign upon us because we are not those ‘many’ the light which shows 
the good of your face, the divinity or spirit of the Lord. But to them only the light of your 
backside is shown.
566
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 There also exist Luther’s Adnotationes Quincuplici Fabri Stapulensis (WA 4, 473, 8-32), which do, 
however, not cover verse 4:7, and Luther’s short comments on Ps. 4 in connection with his exposition of Ps. 
118/119 (WA 55, II, 991, 2898 – 992, 2912). An overview of Luther’s texts between 1513-1521 
commenting on Ps. 4 can be found in Byung-Sig Chung’s dissertation Martin Luthers Auslegung von Psalm 
4 in den Jahren 1513-1521 (Chung 2000). This work unfortunately contains very little theological analysis, 
although it is a good review of the source material. Ebeling 1989, 328-345 also examines Luther’s 
interpretations of Ps. 4:7, but here also the theological background of Luther’s interpretation is described 
unsatisfactorily. Ebeling superficially examines the interpretations of Augustine and Thomas, but omits the 
significance of the text for the doctrine of illumination, especially in the Franciscan and mystical traditions. 
566
 WA 55, I, 22, 3 – 24, 2: “Multi sapientes, fortes, Sancti in oculis suis dicunt quis ostendit nobis [4] 
bona q. d. nos ipsi scimus, ‘tu nos doces?’ Iohann. 6. Nolumus fidei [5] 3, 39 ostensionem: Ideo, quia 
nolunt, Ecce [4, 7] signatum est signo fixe 
|
 impressum [6] super nos
12
 qui non sumus de illis ‘multis’ 
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Luther’s interpretation is dependent on the Augustinian tradition at least in two 
respects: First, in his understanding the question of the Psalm as mockery by those who 
think they already know what is good and do not seek a teacher.
567
 By so doing they turn 
their faces away from God and their backside to him; and consequently then only see the 
light of the backside of God (i.e., created things). They are blinded in the spirit, which is 
the face of the mind, and do not know the light of the face of God, which is faith. The true 
good, however, is given through the divine light, which shows the face of God. This is 
then the second point in which Luther is connected to the exposition of Augustine: there 
are those who have the light of the face of God, and those who do not. That Luther relies 
here on Augustine in his interpretation of the Psalm is explicitly confirmed by a gloss in 
which Luther points to Augustine’s treatment of the Psalm in the Confessions.568 For 
Augustine (as well as Bonaventure) the light was, in principle, accessible to everyone by 
turning inwards. In this sense it could also be interpreted as a natural light: as a light 
which every human being could (at least, in theory) perceive if he turned towards it, 
because the imago Dei present in him consisted of that light. But for Luther, as we have 
seen, that turning is only possible through the infusion of the light of faith, not by one’s 
own means. It comes ab extra, it is an infused divine virtue and not a natural capacity of 
man after the Fall.
569
 In this sense, Luther’s interpretation of the light is distinctly 
medieval: it is not the natural light of reason, but the light of faith infused through the 
external word and sacraments. A further supposition behind Luther’s view seems to be 
that because the light is not known to all, it must be the light of faith, not the natural light 
of reason. Therefore, even if Augustine does not speak of the light of the Psalm as the 
light of faith, Luther interprets him as doing so. Luther’s understanding of the light of the 
Psalm precisely as the light of faith may also be indebted to Gerson, who also speaks 
about the light of faith in connection with Psalm 4.
570
 However, besides the point that the 
light is faith, in other respects the light is treated in Luther’s theological anthropology very 
much like the light is treated in Augustine’s thought. In accordance with the Augustinian 
view in which the divine light, comprehension of the eternal truths, the highest part of the 
soul (intellect) and the imago Dei are all interconnected, Luther in the marginal glosses to 
the Psalm 4 defines the light in relation to the intellect, as “knowledge” or “perception” 
(agnitio) of living spirit (i.e., spirit made alive by faith) and as “spiritual intellect”.571 Thus 
only those who possess faith possess the intellect in the proper sense, as was seen already 
above.
572
 Thus through this connection we can clearly see that Luther subscribes to the 
doctrine of illumination. What we are speaking of here is specific a theological 
illumination for a theological purpose, however. For Luther, the doctrine of illumination 
(by faith, at least) is not the foundation of all understanding, as it was for Augustine and 
                                                                                                                                                   
lumen bonorum [1] ostensiuum  fides vultus
13
 tui diunitatis vel spiritus domine illis autem [2] dorsi tui 
tantum ostenditur lux.” 
567
 See Ebeling 1989, 334-335. 
568
 See WA 55, I, 26 gloss 16, which is the final gloss on the Psalm. That Luther also relies on 
Augustine’s Confessions when interpreting the verse Ps. 4:7 has escaped the attention of  both Ebeling and 
the editors of WA volume 55. Luther points to book VIII of the Confessions, but the text is actually in book 
IX. The passage in which Augustine discusses verse 4:7 is quoted in footnote 548. 
569
 See chapter 2.4.2.1. 
570
 See footnote 553. 
571
 WA 55, I, 24 gloss 13: “Lumen Vultus est agnitio spiritus viui seu spiritualis intellectus” 
572
 See chapters 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2. 
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Bonaventure. Rather, it forms the foundation for the understanding of God, the true good, 
and divine and incomprehensible things. Thus one can say that in distinguishing between 
the natural light of reason and the light of faith, Luther follows the Thomist division 
between the three lights, but that in his understanding of the actual nature of the light as 
the spiritual intellect which grants knowledge of God, he follows the Augustinian 
Franciscan tradition. 
However, there is one reservation that needs to be made. This concerns Luther’s 
peculiar understanding of faith (or the content of faith) as a sign (signum) or something 
concealed (signatum). This understanding together with Luther’s statements about how 
faith is connected to things that “do not appear” or “are not present” (rerum non 
apparentium), has prompted many German scholars to define faith as something which 
points outside of itself, as a sign of future things in which the reality is not yet present.
573
 
Regarding this question one can already here note that the concept signatum (“concealed, 
closed”) has multiple meanings for Luther, one of which we will see in Luther’s next 
remarks on the Psalm 4, which appear in the scholia on Ps. 92 in the Dictata. However, 
the exact relationship between faith as sign and faith as illumination (i.e., the ontology of 
faith and the epistemology of faith) cannot yet be fully defined in this chapter. It requires 
that first the way in which the object of faith is present is examined. Only after that can the 
way in which it is not yet present be examined.
574
 
Luther’s glosses on Ps. 4 in the Dictata would normaly have been accompanied with 
scholia written at the same time. However, in the manuscript the pages that would have 
contained the scholia on Psalm 4, along with some pages of the scholia on Psalm 1, are 
missing. They have been replaced with a later manuscript which has been dated to 1516.
575
 
The oldest remaining scholia on Psalm 4 therefore appear in connection with Psalm 92, 
where Luther interrupts the exposition of this psalm and returns to Psalm 4 stating that 
“before we expounded it with not enough understanding”.576  In the scholia Luther takes 
as his hermeneutical key the perspective of the theology of the Cross, that is, the idea that 
spiritual good things are hidden under visible bad things.
577
 Luther states that there are the 
many who do not ask, “Who will show us good?”, but: “Who will show us our good?”. He 
continues, possibly criticizing the interpretations of Thomas Aquinas and Nicholas of 
Lyra: “And why? Because they already consider themselves righteous … and only seek 
good as a reward of righteousness.” In contrast to them, Luther continues, the light of the 
face of the Lord leads to that “we do not seek what they seek, for we have been instructed 
and enlightened by you. We seek, not good, but rather bad things … You make us 
wonderful, while you show us good things, when you show evil.”578 Thus Luther 
                                                 
573
 See, for example, Schwarz 1962, 154-156. Already in these first glosses Luther defines faith as rerum 
non apparentium:  “quia supra captum humanum est ’fides rerum non apparentium’. Et in hiis duobus verbis 
stat diffinitio fidei, Heb. xi.” (WA 55, I, 22, gloss 12). 
574
 This question is treated in full in chapter 3.4.1. 
575
 WA 55, II, XXIII – XXXII. 
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 WA 55, II, 726, 56-58. “Vnde [57] 4, 88 quia Psal. 4. meminimus Et supra non satis intelligentes| eum 
exposuimus, [58] Et multi extra crucem Christi eum querentes laboriose eum exposuerunt.” 
577
 On the theology of the Cross see chapter 2.2.4.3. 
578
 WA 55, II, 730, 185-196: “Quia non dicunt simpliciter: Quis ostendit [186] bona? Sed ‘nobis’ bona i. 
e. que nobis bona, placentia et Iucunda sunt. Sed [187] nec sic dicunt: Quis ostendit nobis bona Domini? 
Sicut Psal. 26.: ‘Credo [188] videre bona Domini in terra viuentium.’ Et quare? Quia iam sibi Iusti [189] 
videntur. Non enim dicunt: Quis ostendit nobis Iusta aut recta? Quia [190] suam Iustitiam statuunt et 
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combines here the idea of the light of the face of God illumining and showing good things, 
with the concept of the theology of the Cross: the spiritual good things are hidden and 
concealed under apparent evil. Thus the light of faith acquires an interpretative function. It 
shows the real, hidden content of things, as opposed to mere appearances or apparent 
good. 
After the Dictata, Luther went on to lecture on the Epistles to the Romans and 
Galatians in 1515-16 and on Hebrews in 1517-18. From around this period there remain 
two manuscripts on Psalm 4 that have been viewed as a preparation for Luther’s second 
commentary on the Psalms, the Operationes in Psalmos.
579
 The first of these are the 
Vatican Fragments, published in AWA 1, the other the above mentioned scholia on Psalm 
4 in the Dictata manuscript replacing the original scholia. The glosses contained in the 
Vatican Fragments mostly follow the early glosses of the Dictata. The first sentence of 
Psalm 4 is again interpreted as the mockery of the unbelievers directed to Christ in John 6, 
and in this Luther again follows Augustine.
580
 Luther also states in the glosses and scholia 
of the Fragments that the “word of the Cross” shows evil things, on account of which the 
Jews are scandalized. The idea of the theology of the Cross, that the true good is hidden 
under contraries, is thus repeated.
581
 However, the glosses and scholia are quite interesting 
in another respect, in that they contain a connection to the figure of the Tabernacle, which 
for Luther is both the image of the universe as well as of the human being.
582
 Luther 
explains in these glosses that the light of the face of God is sealed (signatum) to those who 
are blinded by the veil of the letter: i.e., the first veil that stands between the literal 
interpretation of the Jews and the spiritual interpretation of the Christians. Faith is the 
removal of this veil and the clarity of the new covenant, in which true good things are 
shown (ostendatur). Luther’s interpretation seems to be connected to Gerson and 
Bonaventure, who likewise use the Tabernacle as an illustration of the process of the soul 
turnsing inside itself, and being elevated above itself by the divine light.
583
 According to 
Luther’s interpretation, by faith one enters the middle chamber where the light of the face 
shows: not the backside of God (i.e., created things) which the wicked see, but “the very 
face and vision of God” (visio dei).584 Thus, faith (at least in an incipient manner) shows 
God in a way that can be spoken of even in the terms of the visio dei. Here also we can see 
a similarity between Luther and Gerson. Nevertheless, according to Luther there is a 
distinction between faith and the heavenly vision, also defined with the help of the image 
                                                                                                                                                   
Iustitiam se tenere arbitrantur, tantum bona [191] et velut premia querunt Iustiti . Sed, o ‘Domine, Signatum 
est super [192] nos Lumen vultus tui.’ Non querimus nos quod isti, quia eruditi et [193] illuminati sumus a 
te. Nec bona, Sed potius mala querimus. Non fugimus [194] ad bona, vt euadamus mala, Sed suscipimus 
mala, vt clamemus et tu nos [195] exaudias, vt mirifices nos, dum nobis bona ostendis, quando mala 
ostendis; [196] c tera patent satis.” 
579
 See AWA 1, 48-50. 
580
 See Ebeling 1989, 334-335.  
581
 AWA 1, 492, 18 – 493, 9; 509, 18-21. 
582
 See chapters 2.3.3.3 and 2.4.1.1. 
583
 See footnote 553. 
584
 AWA 1, 493, 10-18: “Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine: illi qui in velamine litterae 
excaecati, sic dicunt. Sed: Lumen, id est fides, quae est revelatio istius velaminis et claritatis novi testamenti, 
quo ostenduntur nobis vera bona, signatum est, id est signum et ‘argumentum non apparentium’ nobis tamen 
impressum. Lumen, inquam, vultus tui, id est, quod vultum tuum ostendit, non dorsum; quia bona nostra, 
quae per fidem videmus et nobis ostenduntur, sunt ipsa facies et visio dei, sicut dicit: ‘Haec est vita aeterna, 
ut cognoscant te solum’ etc, ‘Et ostendam ei meiupsum’; et Apostolus ‘Videbimus eum, sicuti est’.” 
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of the Tabernacle. Namely, Luther clarifies in the scholia of the Vatican Fragments that, 
when the Psamist says regarding faith “it is sealed (signatum)”, this “indicates that it is 
concealed and closed with regard to the latter veil, though it is light with regard to the first 
veil”. Faith is thus the reality between merely carnal vision and the heavenly vision. It 
opens a reality that is closed for carnal people and is light with regard to the first veil. 
Nevertheless, there are things which are still hidden from faith behind the second veil. In 
the same scholion Luther also states quite paradoxically that “faith is a possession or 
faculty of non-present, future things”.585 One the one hand they are possessed and seen; on 
the other hand, they still remain in the future glory. Thus one can gather from Luther’s 
texts that the concept of faith as “sign” and “sealed” points to two things. First, that even 
faith follows the Christological principle of being hidden under its opposite; and second, 
that there is a difference between faith and the eschatological vision, even though faith 
already has an initial grasp of divine reality. The text is vague, however, on the exact 
nature of this difference. Its nature will be analysed further below. 
Also the manner in which faith shows that divine reality is discussed to some degree in 
the scholia. Luther criticizes the interpretations suggesting that the Psalm speaks about 
syntheresis, an inexhaustible light of the reason. That this is not the case is clear, says 
Luther, because the need to ask the question “Who will show us good?” demonstrates that 
those who ask it do not have that light.
586
 The light spoken of in the Psalm 4 is the light of 
faith, and as the light of the face of God it does not show visible things but invisible good; 
it is the light which leads the faithful through temptations and tribulations. The good 
things it shows enlarge the heart and give it internal joy in the midst of external 
sorrows.
587
 The same idea of faith as showing the spiritual good continues in the 1516 
replacement scholia of the Dictata. Luther states in them as well that faith always has joy 
accompanying it: it is light to the intellect and joy to the will. It is also precisely this 
context in which Luther quotes the so-called Platonic principle of the good: The divine 
light gives joy to the will, because the good is self-diffusing (bonum est diffusivum sui).
588
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 AWA 1, 511, 12-21: “Quod ait signatum, indicat, quod sit signum et clausum adhuc novissimo 
velamen, licet sit lumen ad primum velamen. Ac per hoc recte Apostolus eam dicit ‘Argumentum non 
apparentium’, id est , signum et indicium rerum, non res ipsae.’ … Hoc alibi dicit ‘sperandum rerum 
substantiam’, id est, possessionem seu facultatem non praesentium, sed futurarum rerum esse fidem. Qui 
enim credit, habet et possidet res sperandas, et est substantia eius apud deum per fidem.” 
586
 AWA 1, 511, 4-10. 
587
 AWA 1, 511, 21 – 512, 15: “Differunt autem lumen vultus et lumen dorsi: Lumen vultus est agnitio 
spiritus sive spiritualis intelligentiae, que deus cognoscitur per fidem; lumen dorsi est agnitio litterae 
occidentis, quae potius tenebra est, qua Christus solum homo cognoscitur et scriptura, immo omnis creatura 
carnaliter astimatur secundum hominem, Hiere ‘Ostendam eis dorsum et non faciem’. ‘Nos autem’, 2.Cor 3, 
‘revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes transformamur a claritate in claritatem’. Igitur qui in 
adversitatibus et passionibus vult stare, opus habet fide, qua visibilia contemnat, intentus in invisibili, ne et 
ipse in tempore tentationis recedens dicat cum illis: ‘Quis ostendit nobis bona?’ et cesset sacrificare 
‘sacrificium iustitiae’, set potius gaudeat praesentia sibi per crucem et passions auferri, quorum ablatio est 
collation aeternorum iis, qui credunt et spirant. Ideo sequitur: Dedisti laetetiam in corde meo, quasi dicat: 
Licet in corpore meo et vetere homine tristitiam des auferens temporalia, tamen in eadem ‘tribulatione 
dilates mihi’ sive laetitiam cordis mihi retribuis in spe futurorum. Infelix enim laetitia in carne concessa, 
exclusa cruce.” 
588
 WA 55, II, 80, 28 – 82, 2: “Nos autem non sic, Domine, Sed confitemur tibi, quia indigemus [29] 
ostensore bonorum et ex nobis non videmus ista bona. Sed lumen [30] vultus tui (i. e. fides, per quam 
cognoscimus faciem tuam et gloriam [31] tuam) signatum est (i. e. signum factum, nondum autem res, quia 
[32] ‘fides est argumentum rerum’, non autem ipse res) super nos (i. e.) [1] desursum: quia ‘omne donum 
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Thus here also we can see a link to Bonaventure, who taught that the divine light 
impresses in the soul the concepts of being and goodness, which happens through the 
immediate contact with God who is being and goodness.
589
 But unlike Bonaventure, 
Luther attributes this function only to the light of faith, not to a light known by all as the 
first principle. In understanding the light as not known to all, but only to those who turn 
towards it and seek it,  Luther exhibits (as noted above) the influence of Augustine’s 
Confessions, to which Luther points at also in these later scholia, as he does already at the 
earliest glosses of the Dictata.
590
  
Luther’s final commentary on the Psalm 4 of the period between 1513 and 1521 
appears in the Operationes in Psalmos (1519-21). This text is the lengthiest of Luther’s 
expositions and it contains many interesting issues. Luther renders the Psalm verses here 
in a slightly different way than previously: “Many say: Who will show us a good sign over 
us? The light of your face, O Lord.” The focus is thus on faith as constituting “a good 
sign”. According to Luther, again, there is a contradiction between visible good signs and 
faith. The Jews and the unbelievers seek a visible sign of visible good, but the only sign 
given is faith. It is in reality the only true good sign as only it can be a certain sign of 
future goods.
591
 Why? Because the presence of God is conveyed by faith itself. Luther 
explains: 
Faith is best called the light of the face of God, which is divine illumination of our mind 
and a kind of ray of divinity infused in the heart of the believer, by which everyone who 
will be saved is directed and protected, as is described in Ps. 31: ‘I will give you 
understanding [intellectum] and instruct you on the way you are travelling; I will fix my 
eyes upon you’ and Ps. 43: ‘They did not seize the land with their sword and it was not 
their arm that saved them, but your right hand and your arm and the illumination of your 
face’; as well as Ps. 88: ‘Lord, they walk in your light’. Of this, Ps. 26 rejoices: ‘The Lord 
is my light and my salvation’.  
The pillar of fire and cloud by which the sons of Israel were guided and led through the 
desert is an image of this. In the same way we are led unknown ways deserted of any 
human help, that is, through passions and tribulations. But as then the pillar was present 
                                                                                                                                                   
desursum est’, et fides est super omnem [2] sensum sursum; hoc est enim ‘lumen’, in quo ‘ostenduntur nobis 
bona’). [3] Sic enim ostendis faciem tuam et ostendis nobis omne bonum. Ex qua [4] ostensione in memoria 
et intellectu facta non potest voluntas continere, [5] quin gaudeat, Quia omne bonum letificat appetitum, cum 
sit eius [6] 4, 7b proprium obiectum. Ideo sequitur: Dedisti letitiam in corde meo. [7] letatus sum, inquit, in 
hiis, que dicta sunt mihi, dicta scil. per [8] ostensionem huius luminis. Sic Zacha⌊rias audiuit verba bona et 
consolatoria, [9] quia ‘ostendit’ Dominus populo suo ‘bonum’. Sic itaque fides [10] semper habet comitem 
letitiam in spiritu sancto. Vnde hic dicit: ‘in [11] corde meo’, i. e. spiritu, non in carne mea, que est 
impiorum, qui diligunt [12] vanitatem. Sic iam sunt omnia salua in spiritu, Memoria, intellectus: [13] quia 
‘lumen’ quoad intellectum ‘Signatum’, i. e. firmiter impressum [14] signum, ‘letitia’ quoad Voluntatem. 
Non solum autem in se, Sed quia [15] bonum est diffusiuum sui. Si ‘Multi’ sunt, qui ‘dicunt: quis ostendit 
[1] nobis bona?’ cur non etiam multi sint, super quos ‘signatum est hoc [2] 3, 58 lumen’ boni ostensiuum, 
quibus ‘brachium Domini | reuelatum est’?” 
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 See Itinerarium mentis in Deum V, 1-2; VI, 1-2. 
590
 WA 55, II, 75, 25 – 76, 1: “[25] Ostenso itaque filiis hominum vero saluatore Sequenter instruit eos 
[26] ad veram penitentiam et pulcherrime eam describit. Et si bene inspexeris, [27] Omnis qui cepit 
agnoscere Christum et veritatem, mox incipit detestari [28] suam vanitatem. Sicut hunc locum egregie 
exponit b. August⌊inus li. 8. [29] confess⌊ionum per experientiam propriam; antequam enim Scimus 
Sanctum [30] Dei, in vanitate transimus. Sed cum illuxerit nobis Dominus, tanto [1] fedius detestamur 
vanitatem preteritam, quanto clarius Scimus Christum.” 
591
 AWA 2, 198, 3 – 199, 30. 
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and travelled before their faces, so now faith has a God who is present, so that the 
illumination of the heart proceeds as from the face of the God who is present, so that it is 
rightly and most properly the light of the face of God, that is, knowledge of and trust in the 
God who is present. For he who does not know or feel that God is present for him does not 
yet believe, does not yet have the light of the face of God. 
It does not matter whether the light of the face of God is understood actively, in that he 
himself illumines us with his presence when he kindles faith – or passively as the light of 
faith itself, by which we with trust, feel and believe his face and presence. For ‘Face’ and 
‘countenance’ signify presence in the Scriptures, as is known. They are the same and both 
are at the same time: the illuminating God and the illuminated heart, God seen by us and 
God who is present.
592
 
Here Luther confirms in the strongest terms his understanding of faith as divine 
illumination. For Luther, faith is ontologically divine light: It is immediate illumination 
proceeding from the “face” (i.e., presence) of the present God; a radiance of divinity. As 
Luther says in another place in the Operationes, it is an infused theological virtue, the 
subject, object and other qualities of which are wholly divine.
593
 It is therefore not a 
created supernatural habitus, but immediate contact with the divine. Faith is ontologically 
an union of soul, or mind, with God which brings with it the feeling (sensus), trust 
(fiducia) and knowledge (agnitio) of God, who is at the same time present in faith as the 
source of the light of faith, as well as the light itself in which the source is known. 
Furthermore, as Luther illustrates with images of the Exodus, faith functions as the 
understanding or intellect which leads and directs believers through the tribulations and 
afflictions of this life. It accomplishes this function most of all by showing the believer the 
real and true good (God) who is all and every good (omne bonum). As as an such 
inestimable good, he stands in contrast to all created and visible things.
594
 Thus according 
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 AWA 2, 200, 3 – 201, 21. “Optime autem vocatur fides lumen vultus dei, quod sit illuminatio mentis 
nostrae divinitus inspirata et radius quidam divinitatis in cor credentis infusus, quo dirigitur et servatur, 
quicumque servatur; qualiter Ps. 31<,8> describitur: ’Intellectum tibi dabo et instruam te in via hac, qua 
ambulabis; firmabo super te oculos meos’, et Ps. 43<,4>: ’Non enim in gladio suo possederunt terram, et 
brachium eorum non salvavit eos, sed dextera tua et brachium tuum et illuminatio vultus tui.”; item Ps. 
88<,16>: ’Domine, in lumine vultus tui ambulabunt’. Hinc gaudet Ps 26<,1>: ’Dominus illuminatio mea et 
salus mea’. 
Hoc figuratum est in columna ignis et nube, quibus filii Israel regebantur et ducebantur per desertum. 
<Ex 13,22> Sic enim sola fide ducimur per vias ignotas ac desertas omnium homilium auxilio, hoc est, 
passiones et tribulationes. Atque ut illic columna praesens ante faciem eorum ibat, ita hic fides praesentem 
deum habet, ut velut a vultu praesentis dei illuminatio cordis procedat, ita ut rectissime et propriissime 
lumen vultus dei, id est, agnitio et fiducia praesentis dei sit. Qui enim praesentem sibi deum non novit aut 
non sentit, nondum credit, nondum habet lumen vultus dei. 
Nihil ergo refert, sive lumen vultus dei intelligatur act ive , quo nos ipse presentia sua illuminat fidem 
accendens, sive passive  ipsum lumen fidei, quo nos cum fiducia vultum et praesentiam eius sentimus et 
credimus – nam ’facies’ seu ’vultus’ in sacris litteris praesentiam significat, ut notum est. Idem enim est et 
utrumque simul est: deus illuminans et cor illuminatum, deus visus a nobis et deus praesens.” 
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 See AWA 2, 292, 1 – 293,11; 317, 6 - 318, 19. See also Schwarz 1962, 40-42. 
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 AWA 2, 202, 11-20: “Videmus, quod sit signum bonum super nos, seu quis ostendit nobis bonum: 
Fides, inquam, haec, quia est lumen, quod praesentem et vultum ipsum dei ostendit, omne bonum nimirum 
ostendit, quod deus est, dum ipsum ante nos statuit et fiduciam in ipsum format. Itaque non est hominis 
erudire hominem. Iam facile erit concinnare alias interpretationes. Communis proxima est huic sensui: 
Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Dum illi quaerunt, quis ostendit nobis bona, volentes ea 
praesenter videre potius quam credere, hic non optat ostendi, sed gloriatur lumen vultus dei – id est, notitiam 
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to Luther it is only the light of faith through which the true good and the true first 
principles of morals can be known. This knowledge is not accessible to the light of the 
natural reason, which has turned away from God. Luther writes: 
So it is demonstrated, that this verse cannot be understood about the syntheresis of the 
natural reason, as is the opinion of many, that the first moral principles are known by 
means of themselves as in the speculative sciences [or: as in a mirror]. They are wrong. 
Faith is the first principle of all good works, but this is unknown to such an extent that all 
reason is extremely horrified by it. Reason with its highest powers says: Who will show us 
good? There are many who say so; that is, all who are directed by reason.
595
 
Luther’s criticism seems to be directed first of all against Nicholas of Lyra. According 
to Nicholas’s comments on the Psalm 4 in his Biblia cum glossis, the first principles are 
known by means of themselves with the light of the natural reason sufficiently for the 
works of righteousness.
596
 In this view, suggested by many theologians of the via 
moderna, justification by loving God above all by purely natural means without grace is 
possible.
597
 Luther likewise rejects the common epistemological view of the via moderna, 
that God is unknown for the viator and that the first principles of speculative and practical 
reason are known by means of themselves, not by divine illumination. Even the view of 
Thomas Aquinas seems to fall under Luther’s condemnation: according to Thomas the 
divine light is natural reason’s participation in the eternal law. Thus natural reason is able 
to discern what is good and evil. On the other hand, Luther’s passage about faith as an 
infused virtue is closer to Thomas, but the concept is used also in the Franciscan tradition. 
The main differences between Luther and Thomas seem to be Luther’s understanding of 
faith as ontologically divine, not only a habit and a created similitude. Faith grasps God as 
its object in a more immediate manner than in Thomas’s view. This divine character of 
faith is related to Luther’s sharp criticism of the natural abilities of the human person.598 
Luther’s main point against Thomas’s interpretation of the Psalm 4 in the Summa seems to 
be his rejection of the idea that the human beings can know what is good and evil with 
their natural reason, so that there can be theologically good or meritorious works without 
faith. This is not possible in Luther’s thought, because natural reason lacks the immediate 
cognition of divinity (i.e., God, the highest good) as he really is, not only as an abstract 
concept. As we have seen, Luther holds that natural reason does know the abstract 
properties of God. However, without the concrete and immediate knowledge provided by 
the light of faith, human love remains attached to finite, perishable created good things 
and becomes vain and perverted. Consequently, human love also creates a vain and 
                                                                                                                                                   
et fiduciam praesentis dei, ut dictum est – signatum et impressum esse super ipsos, et satis patet intelligentia 
ex dictis.” 
See also AWA 2, 206, 27 – 207, 13. 
595
 AWA 2, 203, 3 – 204, 5: “Quo fit, ut hic versus nequeat intelligi de naturali ratione synderesi, sicut 
multorum habet opinio dicentium principia prima in moralibus esse per se nota sicut in speculabilibus. Falsa 
sunt haec. Fides est primum principium omnium bonorum operum, atque haec adeo incognita, ut omnis ratio 
summe eam exhorreat. Ratio in summis suis viribus constituta dicit: Quis ostendit nobis bona? Multi enim 
sic dicunt, id est, omnes, qui ratione ducuntur.” 
596
 See Lyra as cited in AWA 2, 200 footote 20 (text in footnote 564). 
597
 See Oberman 1963, 153-154; 184. 
598
 See Sth. Ia IIae q91 a2 co as cited in footnote 561. 
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perverted illusion of God as its object, imagining God to be qualitatively like the created 
objects known to it. Attached to this illusion it imagines that it knows God and does not 
need the light of faith to be righteous before him. It is important to note, however, that 
Luther’s criticism of the insufficiency of the natural reason does not pertain to external 
acts, but only to the quality of the will and the reasoning of the intellect in relation to God: 
i.e., the moral intention. It pertains to the spirit and the heart, not to externally good works 
towards the neighbor, which Luther notes can be accomplished without faith, though not 
out of free and joyful love.
599
 
As we have seen, Luther’s interpretation of Ps. 4:7 is thoroughly rooted in the 
traditional interpretation history of the verse, although it also contains a strong 
contribution of his own. Luther explicitly mentions only Augustine as his source, but his 
concrete interpretation appears to be related also to those of Bonaventure and Gerson, as is 
indicated by the use of the Tabernacle figure. Also Luther’s interpretation of the “light” of 
the Psalm as the light of faith appears to be in continuity with specific traditional 
interpretations. However, Luther highlights it and makes it his main point. Luther’s 
concrete understanding of the nature of the light is connected to the Augustinian tradition 
represented as well by Bonaventure and Gerson. In the theology of these two the light 
itself is taken as divine. Luther’s understanding, on the other hand, is at odds with the 
Thomist interpretation which makes the light a created light. Furthermore Luther draws a 
stark distinction between the light of reason and the light of faith. His main opponents 
appear to be those who read Psalm 4:7 as speaking of the light of natural reason: possibly 
Thomas, Nicholas of Lyra, and other Nominalists. Thus the general line of Luther’s 
interpretation follows the medieval tradition, although it departs from it in the sense that 
the light is understood explicitly as and only as the light of faith. Nevertheless, through 
examination of Luther’s interpretation of Ps 4:7 we can see that Luther’s concept of the 
light of faith must be approached with the tradition of divine illumination as its immediate 
context and conceptual background. Luther’s interpretation fits into that tradition and 
especially follows the line from Augustine to Bonaventure and Gerson. The interpretation 
of the light as faith is not unique. What is unique to Luther is his emphasis on the sharp 
conflict between the natural reason and the light of faith, as well as the resulting rejection 
of schemes of ascent. 
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 See AWA 2, 40, 3 – 44, 17. See also chapters 2.4.1.2 and 2.4.1.3. Luther agrees that the human beings 
know the notion of God (notitiam seu notionem divinitatis) in an abstract sense. That is, they know the 
general properties of God (potentem, Invisibilem, Iustum, immortalem, bonum), which Luther also calls the 
major syllogism (of practical reason, i.e. the imperative that good is to be done). The problem is that because 
without faith they do not know God as he is (veram notitiam de vera essentia), which Luther takes as  the 
minor syllogism of practical reason (what concretely is good; intuitive knowledge of God), they attribute the 
abstract notion of divinity to different created things and fall into idolatry. See WA 56, 15, 1-4; 176, 14 – 
179, 25; Raunio 2001, 167-170. 
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3.3. The Functions of the Light of Faith 
3.3.1. The Light of Faith in Relation to God 
3.3.1.1 Faith as Actual and Direct Cognition and Union with Christ 
Regarding the concrete operation of the light of faith as an instrument of understanding we 
can distinguish in Luther’s commentaries four central features of the light of faith. These 
functions are distinguished from each other by their relation to the concepts of knowledge 
and good (and the respective capacities of intellect and affect), and by their relation to the 
God and the creation. The light of faith functions in relation to God as 1) as an 
incomprehensible light making the presence of God known (intellectual aspect or the 
aspect of knowledge); and 2) as a captivating light making the goodness of God 
experienced (affective aspect or the aspect of goodness). In relation to the creation, the 
light of faith functions as 3) the light of the intellect which gives understanding and shows 
the true content of things (intellectual aspect); and 4) as the light which directs and guides 
the affect of Christians and makes them able to internally obey the law of God and do 
good joyfully (affective aspect). We now turn to a closer examination of how these 
functions of the light of faith work, first in relation to God, then in relation to creation.  
As is the case in the Augustinian tradition, Luther’s concept of faith as the intellect 
includes both the active function of the the intellect as the organ of understanding as well 
as the passive function of the intellect as that part of the mind which receives the divine 
light by which it understands. The term Luther uses for the mind, when it is turned 
towards God and illuminated by his presence (i.e., in the passive sense) is “face” (facies). 
The mind turned away from God is “backside” (dorsum).  The terms include the 
connotations of both knowledge and presence.
600
 Two especially precise definitions of the 
notion of facies appear in the Dictata. The first is found in the scholia, and according to it 
facies means the mind or the soul turned towards God through the intellect and affect by 
faith:  
                                                 
600
 See WA 55, I, 243, 15 – 244, 1; gloss 11; 476 gloss 3;  568, 17-19; 569 gloss 6; 694 gloss 7; 798, 22-
23; 840, 1-2; 882, 4-5; WA 55, II, 152, 23 – 153, 13; 208, 4 – 209, 9; 225, 28-32; 355, 11-20; 740, 8 – 741, 
36; 780, 26-36; 783, 134-141; AWA 2, 201, 17 – 202, 10; 212, 20-23; 260, 11-20; WA 5, 388, 22-30; 638, 
3-4; 464, 36 – 465, 16; 489, 31-35. 
Common to all texts is that the term facies always signifies the knowledge of God under one form or 
another. Usually Luther interpretes the term facies as faith, but in some places it can also mean the divinity 
of Christ, the (capacity of) spiritual understanding of the Scripture, or the knowledge of God at the Last 
Judgment and in heaven (WA 55, II, 355, 11-20; 694 gloss 7; WA 5, 464, 36 – 465, 16). In WA 55, II, 780, 
26-36 Luther distinguishes among three types of facies: the knowledge of God in Incarnation, faith, and 
second coming, calling even the knowledge of God in the humanity of Christi facies (when usually he refers 
to it as the dorsum).   
See also the analysis of the text in Schwarz 1962, 118-122. Schwarz stresses the relationality of the 
concept. See also Metzger 1964, 74-80, who emphasizes the existential orientation of the whole person. 
However, Metzger also analyses the idea of ascent (Stufenschema) and the concept of mens in Gerson, 
noting that Gerson speaks of the illumination of the mind by God. According to Mezger both Luther and 
Gerson emphasize the affective nature of the cognition, and in this sense they stand closer to each other, so 
that Luther can be seen as accepting ideas from Gerson. 
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Our face is our mind, i.e. (according to Jean Gerson) the soul turned towards God with its 
intellect and affect ⌈which properly happens by true faith⌉. […] And on the contrary our 
backside is the soul turned away from God with its intellect and affect ⌈which happens by 
unbelief⌉. Our ‘face’ seeks God in this way, because God cannot be sought except by the 
intellect and affect that are turned towards him. And in the same way the ‘face’ of God is 
his recognition and goodwill towards us, as well as his backside is his anger and ignorance 
towards us in front of him, as he says through Jeremiah: ‘I will show them my backside 
and not my face’. And Matthew 25: ‘Truly I say to you, I do not know you.’ As is the habit 
of those who are angered, to turn their face away and their back towards, as well as the 
habit of those who love, to show their face and to recognize [agnoscere] those who are 
close to them. In this way also blessed Gregory explains that ‘face’ means recognition 
[notitia] in the first Homily on Ezekiel.
601
  
As can be seen, Luther refers in the definition given here to the late medieval mystic 
Jean Gerson as his source. This reference recalls the passages of Gerson in which faith 
especially is considered the light of the face of God, and his definitions of the vision of 
God by faith.
602
 The second definition found in the glosses is quite similar, but even more 
precise in defining the nature of this facial knowledge:    
Gloss 11: Our mind is our ‘face’, our senses are our backside, because through the senses 
we turn towards creatures, through the mind towards God. But if we turn our mind towards 
creatures, then we turn our ‘face’ away from God and turn our back to him. Indeed, in the 
most proper sense mind is the actual knowledge⌈and direct knowledge⌉ of the soul [ipsa 
actualis notitia ⌈et directa notitia⌉ anime], or at least on account of it the soul is called 
‘mind’. I say both intellective and affective knowledge, according to devout doctors. 
Moreover, mind is not called ‘face’ unless it is illumined and able to know God 
[noscibilis], which happens through the cognition [cognitio] of God. According to 
Gregory, ‘face’ namely means knowledge [notitia].603 
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 WA 55, II, 152, 23 – 153, 13: “[23] 26, 8.9 Facies nostra Est mens nostra, i. e. (secundum Iohann. 
Gerson) Anima [24] per intellectum et affectum ad Deum conuersa ⌈quod fit proprie per [1] fidem veram⌉. 
⌈⌈Vnde secundum prophetam ‘facies Iud orum redacte [2] sunt in ollam’, Iohel. 2. ‘Et facies omnium sicut 
nigredo oll ’, Naum 2., [3] quod de Christianis nomine tantum dictum.⌉⌉ Econtra dorsum nostrum [4] est 
Anima per intellectum et affectum a Deo auersa ⌈quod fit [5] per incredulitatem⌉. Sic ergo ‘facies’ nostra 
exquirit Deum, quia non [6] potest Deus queri nisi per intellectum et affectum ad eum conuersos. [7] Eodem 
modo et ‘facies’ Dei Est agnitio eius et beneplacitum ad nos, [8] Dorsum autem est Indignatio et Ignorantia 
nostri coram eo. Sicut [9] per Ierem⌊iam dicit: ‘Ostendam eis Dorsum et non faciem.’ Et Matt. [10] 25.: 
‘Amen dico vobis, nescio vos’. Quia solent facie auersa dorsum [11] ostendere et velut nolle agnoscere, qui 
indignantur, Et econtra faciem [12] ostendere et agnoscere, qui amant et propicii sunt. Sic et b. Gre⌊gorius 
[13] Exponit ‘faciem’ pro Notitia, omilia 1. super Ezechie.” 
602
 See the analysis of Gerson in chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Schwarz 1962, 417-420 attempts to trace the 
notion back to Gerson’s definition of the experiential and affective (i.e., mystical) knowledge, but it appears 
that the source of Luther’s definition is not to be located in the anagogical (i.e., mystical) vision of God, but 
that it comes closer to the visio facialis & intuitiva. 
603
 WA 55, I, 242 gloss 11: “GLOSSA:11) [21]Mens nostra Est ‘facies’ nostra, Sensus autem est dorsum 
nostrum. [22]Quia per sensum vertimur ad creaturas, per mentem ad Deum. Si autem [23]mentem etiam ad 
creaturas vertimus, tunc auertimus ‘faciem’ a Deo [24]et dorsum ei vertimus. Veruntamen proprie Mens Est 
ipsa actualis [25]notitia ⌈et directa notitia⌉ anime, vel saltem ab ipsa vocatur anima [26]‘mens’. Notitia 
inquam tam intellectiua quam affectiua secundum [27]doc⌊tores deuotarios. Immo Mens non dicitur ‘facies’, 
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This passage is quite exceptional in its terminological precision. Luther’s use of the 
word “mind” (mens) connects him to the anthropological tradition stemming at least from 
Augustine, a tradition which employs the term for the highest part of the soul that grasps 
the invisible and intellectual objects.
604
 According to this passage the mind is called “face” 
(facies) when and only when it is illumined (illustrata) by God, through which 
illumination it acquires the capacity to know God, and becomes noscibilis Deo. 
Furthermore, this cognition of God is direct and actual knowledge (actualis … et directa 
notitia animae). It is not habitual or indirect knowledge by means of another medium. It is 
very clear that here Luther takes God to be the immediate and direct object of cognition. 
Although Luther does not use the term intuitive cognition, it is nevertheless quite evident 
from this text that Luther in his definition rejects the via moderna’s disqualification of 
divine illumination and direct cognition of God, and agrees that God can in this life 
become the immediate and actual object of cognition. Luther’s reference to Gregory the 
Great should not be taken to mean that Gregory is the primary source of his opinion, as the 
definition in the Moralia is very brief mention.
605
 It seems rather that Luther’s 
understanding stems from the meaning of the notion facialis, which in the late medieval 
context commonly stands for immediate and direct knowledge. In his Summa in totam 
physicen, Luther’s teacher Jodocus Trutfetter calls defines cognition as “intuitive or 
facial” (intuitiva sive facialis), that from which experiential cognition begins.606 The same 
term is also used by Gerson (to whom Luther refers alongside Gregory in his definition of 
facies) to describe the nature of the immediate and intuitive knowledge of God, the visio 
Dei facialis & intuitiva (as noted in the previous chapters of this study). Also Luther’s 
mention of “devout doctors” (doctores deuotarios) may be a reference to Gerson, although 
it might also be a more general nod toward authors who define the nature of mystical, 
spiritual or intellectual knowledge of God in similar terms.
607
 What is clear is that here 
Luther expresses a view deeply consonant with the traditional pre-Scotist understanding of 
divine intellectual illumination, in which God is taken as the immediate object of 
cognition. For Luther, this knowledge of God is already actualized in this life through 
faith. Furthermore, as we have already noted, Luther links the concept of this actual and 
direct knowledge and the face of God (both of the terms vultus and facies) to the divine 
light, thus confirming the dependence of his view on the traditional interpretation of Ps. 4. 
To know God face-to-face is to know God in, through, and by the divine light, by which 
the immediate and direct knowledge of present God is impressed on the mind.
608
 With 
                                                                                                                                                   
nisi quando est [28]illustrata et noscibilis Deo facta, quod fit per cognitionem Dei; per [29]‘faciem’ enim 
Notitia secundum Gre⌊gorium intelligitur.” 
The brackets (⌈⌉) signify linear and marginal glosses to the original gloss; i.e., Luther has refined the 
definition by adding the phrase et directa notitia after the first writing. 
604
 The interchangeable use of the terms “mind” and “soul” occurs also elsewhere in the Dictata, as 
observed in chapter 2.4.1.1 and on p. 99. On Augustine’s use of these terms, see Nash 2003, 63-64. 
605
 “Per faciem quippe solet notitia designari. Unde scriptum est: Et facies mea praecedet te, id est notitia 
ducatum praebebit.” Moralium sive Expositio in Job 34 c 3 n 5 (PL 76, 719C). 
606
 “Seipso inmediate dicit. Intuitiva sive facial’ Et ab illa incipit cognitio experimentalis.” Trutfetter: 
Summa in totam physicen, libr. VIII, tr. I c II de potentia intellectiva. 
607
 In addition to Gerson, Luther could be referring to Bonaventure. See chapters 3.2.1. and 3.2.2. 
608
 WA 55, II, 355, 11-14: “[11] Facies Domini primo Est reuelatio eius siue notitia eius, qua [12] 
cognoscitur esse Dominus. Et hoc est lumen vultus eius Psal. 4. et psal⌊mo [13] preced⌊enti: ‘Illuminet 
vultum suum super nos.’        Secundo est ipsa gratiosa [14] diuinitas anagogice, sicut illud fides eiusdem. 
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respect to God the “face” and the “light” stand for divinity: God as the active and 
illuminating principle. They stand for Christ as the ray of divinity, the light and splendor 
who illumines the believer by making him participate nascently in the divine light. With 
respect to the believer, the “face” stands for the mind or spirit, the passive receptive 
capacity, which is illuminated and made divine through faith, which is itself the same 
divine light in the passive and received sense.
609
  
                                                                                                                                                   
Nam qui Christum [15] 67, 3 nondum Dominum credit, nondum habet lumen vultus eius necdum periit [16] 
a facie eius. Quia tam salubriter quam seueriter ‘peritur a facie eius’: [17] Salubriter in hac vita.        Tercio 
Est reuelatio eius in extremo Iudicio, [18] vbi peribunt inimici eius horribiliter.        Quarto est ipse 
intellectus [19] mysticus in Scrip⌊tura de Christo, de quo supra Psal. 4.” 
See also WA 55, I, 22, 3 – 24, 2; 608, 11-13; 609 gloss 19; 789, 22-23; WA 55, II, 80, 28, 29-31; 783, 
134-141; AWA 1, 493, 10-18; AWA 2, 201, 11 – 202, 20; WA 5, 388, 22-30; 506, 20-25; 508, 36 – 509, 6. 
609
 WA 55, I, 358, 12-16: “Et9 sic introibo per veram fidem in spiritu ad altare Christi sacramentum et 
participationem dei non Mosi : ad deum qui loetificat quia ‘gaudium est fructus spiritus’, Gal. 5. 
iuuentutem meam i. e. nouitatem meam, que fit per gratiam fidei, quando ‘nascimur ex Deo’ ‘ex aqua et 
s⌊piritu s⌊ancto’“ 
WA 55, I, 476 gloss 11, 1-5: “GLOSSA:3) /In Christo humanitas ‘dorsum’ nominatur [1]{Isaie 30.: 
‘Aures tu  [3]audient verbum post tergum monentis’, i. e. Dei in carne loquentis./ [2]Ierem. 18.: ‘Dorsum 
[4]ostendam iis et non faciem’.}[5]Diuinitas autem ‘facies’.” 
WA 55, I, 568, 17-19: “Deus conuerte nos scil. a nobis ad te        per fidem et ostende reuela nobis 
faciem tuam
6
 Diuinitatem” 
WA 55, I, 569 gloss 6, 1-5: “GLOSSA:6) [1]ostendit autem faciem dupliciter: primo in fide. Et sic 
Christum vt [2]hominem videre est posteriora seu dorsum eius videre, Vt Deum autem [3]Est faciem eius 
videre. Secundo in clara visione. Et ita nunc ‘salui sumus [4]in spe’, tunc autem in re. Est autem humanitas 
Christi dorsum siue [5]posterius eius, Et diuinitas facies eius” 
WA 55, I, 608, 11-12: “Domine Deus pater in lumine que est fides et cognitio vultus tui diuinitatis et 
spiritus” 
WA 55, I, 608 gloss 14: “GLOSSA:14) ‘Thabor’ interpretatur Veniens lumen, ‘Hermon’ anathema. 
Vtrunque est Ecclesia, que secundum spiritum est ‘lumen de lumine’ Christo veniens, Secundum carnem 
excommunicata, crucifixa et abiecta, et in vtroque eleuata et magnificata per totum mundum.“ 
WA 55, I, 624, 21-23: “Et sit splendor domini dei nostri ‘lumen’ cognitionis Dei, quod est fides 
Christi, psal. 4. super nos quia est desursum et supra nos” 
WA 55, I, 694 gloss 7, 1-3: “GLOSSA:7) [1]Sepe dictum est, Quod ‘facies’ Domini [2]{Anagogice est, 
diuinitas Christi/ [3]{tropolo⌊gice est agnitio et fides diuinitatis Christi/” 
WA 55, I, 744, 10-14: “Exortum est ortu spirituali        in die pasche in tenebris spiritualibus        
cordium 4, 248 lumen Christus, i. e. fides Christi rectis
2
. 
|
 Heth. lumen inquam, quod est ipse Dominus” 
WA 55, II, 355, 11-14: “[11] Facies Domini primo Est reuelatio eius siue notitia eius, qua [12] 
cognoscitur esse Dominus. Et hoc est lumen vultus eius Psal. 4. et psal⌊mo [13] preced⌊enti: ‘Illuminet 
vultum suum super nos.’        Secundo est ipsa gratiosa [14] diuinitas anagogice, sicut illud fides eiusdem.” 
WA 55, II, 443, 279, 444-286: “Sic Ecclesia, luna spiritualis, ‘auferetur’, Quando secundum corpus 
[280] fulgebit sicut sol, Et secundum animam, qua iam fide fulget, fulgebit in [281] clara visione Dei. Qu  
visio excedit fidei claritatem septies et amplius. Interim [282] autem, donec Est media parte sui (i. e. 
secundum spiritum per fidem) [283] clara, que est radius a sole Christo in eam descendens, Et altera [284] 
parte sui (i. e. secundum corpus) obscura, semper oritur Iustitia et abundantia[285] pacis. Sic enim 1. Corin. 
13.: ‘Cum venerit, quod perfectum est, euacuabitur, [286] quod ex parte est.’” 
WA 55, II, 715, 484-488: “Sicut enim Christo contigit [485] in persona, qui est obiectum, fons, origo et 
Sol Iustiti , [486] veritatis et salutis: ita fit et radiis, riuis, [487] speciebus ab eo pendentibus et fluentibus. 
Simul sol cum [488] radiis oritur et occidit etc.” 
AWA 2, 201, 16-21: “Nihil ergo refert, sive lumen vultus dei intelligatur act ive , quo nos ipse presentia 
sua illuminat fidem accendens, sive passive  ipsum lumen fidei, quo nos cum fiducia vultum et praesentiam 
eius sentimus et credimus – nam ’facies’ seu ’vultus’ in sacris litteris praesentiam significat, ut notum est. 
Idem enim est et utrumque simul est: deus illuminans et cor illuminatum, deus visus a nobis et deus 
praesens.” 
See also WA 56, 298, 21 – 299, 27 as well as the texts in chapter 3.2.3. In addition, Peura 1994, 200-203 
analyses the ontological nature of faith as illumination. The noetic or cognitive nature of faith, on the 
contrary, is left unexplored in his work. 
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In many places Luther emphasizes this interplay of the divine activity and the 
believer’s passive receptivity.610 On one hand this emphasis is connected to the 
Aristotelian theory of perception and the functioning of the intellect, according to which 
the intellect first must be in a passive state in order to receive the form it is to 
understand.
611
 Likewise, according to Luther the old form of the believer (the form of the 
flesh) must be abandoned in order for the form of Christ, or form of the Word, to be 
received. Luther speaks of this rejection of the old form and reception of the new in terms 
of transformation: the flesh, or the believer, becomes the Word.
612
 This is one way of 
expressing the idea of union with Christ in faith, through which the believer shares in the 
divine properties and even in the being (esse) of God. This being is the progression of the 
Word from the Father that the spiritual birth of the Christian reflects.
613
 Aristotle also uses 
the metaphor of  a wax seal impressed with the image of a signet ring to describe the 
passivity of the senses in their reception of the form; if the wax is not be soft and devoid 
of previous impressions, it cannot receive the image.
614
 Luther, probably referring to this 
metaphor, writes in one place that a hard heart does not receive the image of a signet ring, 
but wax, which is softened by the Word, becomes soft to God and clings to God by faith, 
does. Faith, which is the sponsal tie between them, makes the believer one spirit with God 
and the Word, who is the Son.
615
  
On the other hand, the image of the seal comes interestingly close to the central image 
of the Augustinian tradition’s interpretation of Ps. 4:7. According to Augustine the light of 
the face of God impresses on the soul the image of God in a manner analogous to a coin 
which is stamped with the image of a king.
616
 In De Trinitate Augustine also employs the 
image of a signet ring and wax in describing how moral regulations are imprinted on the 
heart by the eternal light.
617
 The metaphors of these two traditions appear to come together 
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 See e.g. WA 55, II, 747, 2-5; WA 56, 227, 18-19; WA 57, a31 gloss 2; a89, 20 – a90, 8; a93, 20 – 
a94, 12; WA 2, 539, 1-18; AWA 2, 201, 16 – 202, 6. 
611
 See Aristotle: De anima III, 4 (429a, 10 – 429b, 9): WA 56, 374, 12-14; Cranz 2000, 162-164; Dieter 
2001, 271-275; Vainio 2010, 141-143. Cranz, Dieter and Vainio note Luther’s use of the Aristotelian theory 
to illustrate the union with Christ. The problem with Vainio’s article is that it is limited to the former, 
missing the influence of the Augustinian theory of illumination and the Platonist epistemology connected to 
it. Dieter’s study is as well focused on Luther’s reception of Aristotle. 
612
 WA 1, 28, 25 – 29, 31; WA 55, I, 62 gloss 1; WA 56, 329, 27 – 330, 5; WA 2, 548, 20-29. 
613
 See WA 2, 536, 28-31; AWA 2, 255, 11 – 259, 14; Mannermaa 1994, 43-53. See also chapter 2.2.1. 
614
 Aristotle: De anima II, 12 (424a, 17-24). 
615
 WA 57, b151, 1-17: “[1] Notandum eciam, quod ‘obduracio’ hoc loco omnis prorsus intelligitur [2] 
difficultas ad credendum. Nam ut solet Hebrea lingua pulcherrimis [3] uti methaphoris, ‘obduracio’ idem 
significat, quod ‘indisposicio’ seu [4] ‘ineptitudo’, sumpta methaphora a cera, que, dura cum fuerit, 
impaciens [5] est figure sigilli, mollis autem in omnia facile formatur. Ita cor hominis [6] inter 4 terminos 
versatur. Dum enim adheret Deo, per verbum [7] natura liquescit, mollescit Deo et durescit creature, dum 
vero adheret [8] creature, durescit Deo et mollescit creature. Semper ergo cor humanum [9] est tum durum 
tum molle diversorum respectu. Hec autem adhesio est [10] ipsa fides verbi, imo illa copula desponsacionis, 
de qua Osee 2. dicit: [11] ‘Et sponsabo te mihi in fide’, secundum illud 1. ad Corin. 7.: ‘Qui adheret [12] 
Deo, unus spiritus est.’ || ‘Sequitur captivus amantem’ || [13] Corollarie sequitur, quod fides Christi est 
omnis virtus et incredulitas [14] omne vicium, ut satis ex dictis patet. Quia per fidem fit homo [15] similis 
verbo Dei, verbum autem est filius Dei. Ita autem efficitur, ut sit [16] filius Dei omnis, qui credit in eum, Io. 
1., ac per hoc sine omni peccato [17] plenusque omni virtute.” 
616
 See Ebeling 1989, 329 and apparatus to AWA 2, 200 (footnote 20). 
617
 De Trin. XIV, 15, 21 (PL 42, 1052). See also Nash 2003, 104. 
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in the interpretation of the word signatum in Psalm 4:7.
618
 Both of them signify a union 
which takes place simultaneously at an ontological and epistemological level. In knowing 
God, the knowing subject must become like God, the object of knowledge. God himself is 
the epistemological principle by which he himself is known. Luther confirms this 
explicitly by stating that the Platonic principle of knowledge “like is known by like” 
(simile simili cognosci) is right, and that the believer must become divinized to know 
God.
619
 He must be united with God and share in his properties. Luther speaks of this 
union in terms of participation, new birth from God, being transformed into the Word of 
God, being inhabited by grace and ruled by Christ, being made one spirit with Christ, 
being transformed from humanity to divinity.
620
 The image of God is thus an ontological 
image in the soul, the reflection of God, Christ, the Word and the ray of divinity, who 
illumines the mind of the believer and is itself the light of faith. To be an image of God 
means ontological participation in the divine light (i.e., Christ) although this participation 
is incipient and not yet perfect. It is interior and hidden, received by the spiritual man, 
whose only work is the act of the reception of the imago Dei in the spirit. It is only this 
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 WA 55, I, 22, 3 – 24, 2: “Multi sapientes, fortes, Sancti in oculis suis dicunt quis ostendit nobis [4] 
bona q. d. nos ipsi scimus, ‘tu nos doces?’ Iohann. 6. Nolumus fidei [5] 3, 39 ostensionem: Ideo, quia 
nolunt, Ecce [4, 7] signatum est signo fixe 
|
 impressum [6] super nos
12
 qui non sumus de illis ‘multis’ 
lumen bonorum [1] ostensiuum  fides vultus
13
 tui diunitatis vel spiritus domine illis autem [2] dorsi tui 
tantum ostenditur lux.” 
WA 55, II, 81, 9 – 82, 2: “Sic itaque fides [10] semper habet comitem letitiam in spiritu sancto. Vnde hic 
dicit: ‘in [11] corde meo’, i. e. spiritu, non in carne mea, que est impiorum, qui diligunt [12] vanitatem. Sic 
iam sunt omnia salua in spiritu, Memoria, intellectus: [13] quia ‘lumen’ quoad intellectum ‘Signatum’, i. e. 
firmiter impressum [14] signum, ‘letitia’ quoad Voluntatem. Non solum autem in se, Sed quia [15] bonum 
est diffusiuum sui. Si ‘Multi’ sunt, qui ‘dicunt: quis ostendit [1] nobis bona?’ cur non etiam multi sint, super 
quos ‘signatum est hoc [2] 3, 58 lumen’ boni ostensiuum, quibus ‘brachium Domini | reuelatum est’?” 
AWA 2, 202, 18-20: “Communis proxima est huic sensui: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, 
domine. Dum illi quaerunt, quis ostendit nobis bona, volentes ea praesenter videre potius quam credere, hic 
non optat ostendi, sed gloriatur lumen vultus dei – id est, notitiam et fiduciam praesentis dei, ut dictum est – 
signatum et impressum esse super ipsos, et satis patet intelligentia ex dictis.” 
619
 See WA 57, a93, 20 – a94, 12: “[20] Formetur in vobis [4, 19]. [21] Magis placuit Apostolo dicere: 
‘donec formetur Christus in vobis’ [22] quam: donec ego formem Christum in vobis. In quo ostendit se plus 
[23] tribuere gratie Dei quam operi suo, dum velut mater eos tanquam rude [24] semen in utero cordis sui 
portat, donec spiritus formet eos, sicut mater [25] carnis portat informe semen, donec per manum Dei 
formetur in foetum. [26] Nec dixit: donec vos formemini in Christum, sed: ‘donec formetur [27] Christus in 
vobis’. Et hoc ideo, quia, ut supra dixerat in 2. ca.: ‘Vivo [28] iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus.’ Vita 
christiani non est ipsius, [29] sed Christi viventis in eo, ut 1. Cor. 6.: ‘Et non estis vestri, empti enim [1] estis 
precio magno.’        Hic etiam notandum est: Licet verum sit Christum [2] personaliter in nullo prorsus 
formari — ac sic glosa illa recta quidem est, [3] sc. fidem seu cognitionem Christi pro ‘Christo’ hic accipi 
atque intelligi —, [4] summe tamen cavendum est, ne ista cognitio accipiatur speculative, qua [5] Christus 
tantum obiective cognoscitur. Nam hec est mortua, et demones [6] adeo habent eam, ut miro studio fallant 
hereticos et superbos per illam. [7] Sed est accipienda ipsa practica, sc. vita, essentia et experiencia ad 
exemplum [8] et imaginem Christi, ut iam Christus non sit obiectum nostre [9] cognitionis, sed nos pocius 
obiectum cognitionis eius, ut supra dixit: [10] ‘Nunc autem cum cognoveritis, immo cum cogniti sitis.’ Nam 
hoc est, [11] quod prius Deus est factus caro, quam caro fieret Deus. Ita oportet in [12] omnibus prius Deum 
incarnari, quam eos in Deo indivinari, et inde recte [13] habet illud Platonicum: ‘simile simili cognosci’.” 
The precondition of this knowledge is the Incarnation, because God only approaches human beings 
through external means under which the divine reality is hidden. See chapter 2.4.2.1. See also Mannermaa 
1994, 53-60.  
620
 WA 55, I, 358, 12-16; WA 56, 227, 2-7; 374, 6-21; WA 2, 502, 11-14; 504, 4-13; WA 57, b19, 11 – 
b20, 2; b187, 4 – b188, 3; b231, 11 – b232, 8. 
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reception which makes the human being the image of God and the spiritual man, totally 
dependent on the invisible.
621
  
Luther can speak of the reception of this image and the passivity associated with it in 
quite a mystical manner. Especially in the Operationes in Psalmos he does so with 
reference to the German mystic Johannes Tauler, such that passivity is understood not 
only as a turning away and being emptied of sensual attachments, but also as real suffering 
and passion associated with the mortification of the flesh. Luther connects this passion to 
the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. According to Luther, 
these virtues are purely divine and have God as their object, subject, operator, work, way 
and mode (divinum obiectum, subiectum, operatorem, opus, artem, modum). They are 
altogether internal with regard to the way they possess Christ as their object. They abstract 
the soul from all visible things and unite it with Christ, the pure internal Word of God. 
This abstraction leads to the suffering of the flesh, but at the same time it also leads to the 
rejoicing of the spirit.
622
 Luther names the entire process “CROSS” and “passover” 
(transitus, phase), demonstrating how the mystical concept of transitus and the suffering 
associated with it forms a central point of his theology of the Cross.
623
 What Luther speaks 
of is no anti-metaphysical theology focused on the external Cross and the humanity of 
Christ, but a theology which possesses Christ in the heart as the divine Bridegroom, in the 
midst of internal and external passion. Nevertheless, this process is not only passive, but 
also active. The new being constituted by faith increases as the Christian ‘transits’ by faith 
from this carnal life to participation in the objects of faith. This growing participation in 
Christ makes the believer more and more an image of God, being conformed to the image 
of Christ and transformed into that image, from clarity to clarity, as Luther is fond of 
saying with allusions to the text of 2 Corinthians 3 and 4. The foundation for this 
transformation is the real participation in Christ by the divine light of faith. 
3.3.1.2 The Cognition of God in Relation to the Intellect 
We have now come to see that for Luther faith is actual and direct cognition of God, 
whereby the believer participates in and is united with God with regard to his mind, both 
intellect and affect, through the divine light that is faith. But what kind of knowledge does 
this actual and direct cognition of God convey? Luther’s mystical allusions point in a 
certain direction. As we already have seen, for Luther God is with regard to his essence 
described in the terms on negative theology, as supereminent and incomprehensible.
624
 
This Luther’s understanding of the nature of God naturally has consequences for how the 
cognition of God is understood. In medieval theology it was commonly assumed that 
                                                 
621
 See WA 57, a78, 12-16: “[12] Spiritualis homo est ipse absconditus nobis, novus et interior, imago et 
[13] gloria Dei et vir apud Apostolum vocatus. Hic est, qui soli proprie Deo [14] vacat pociusque passivus 
quam activus, cum nihil aliud faciat, quam [15] quod Deum in se recipiat; cuius vita est in fide, spe et 
charitate, totus sc. [16] pendens ex invisibilibus.” 
The entire passage in its context can be found in footnote 323. 
622
 On the motif of suffering see also Stoellger 2010, 215-222; 287-293. 
623
 AWA 2, 107, 20 – 108, 5; 293, 7 – 296, 11; 299, 20 – 301, 10; 305, 14 – 306, 7; 317, 7 – 319, 3. See 
also chapter 2.4.2.1 
624
 See chapter 2.2. 
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because the human intellect is created and finite it can never comprehend 
(comprehendere) God, i.e., to acquire a total and comprehensive concept of God. A 
comprehensive concept must be to be equal or superior to the object understood by it (in 
terms of metaphysical, causal hierarchy). The only ‘concept’ of God, however, is the 
divine essence itself, which exceeds the capacity of the finite created intellect. The 
question of how God can be the object of cognition, if the former is true, is discussed 
extensively by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas among others. Thomas envisions that in 
this life God can be the object of cognition only through created similitudes. In the future 
life he will be known through the light of grace, which allows a partial knowledge of 
him.
625
 Bonaventure, on the other hand, uses the concept of cognitio per modum excessus 
in his Questiones disputatae de scientia Christi to explain how the soul of Christ knew 
God. According to Bonaventure: 
The soul of Christ does not comprehend an infinite number of things since it is a creature 
and is therefore limited; for it is neither equal to nor greater than the Word. And therefore, 
the soul does not grasp these things in their totality; rather, the soul is taken captive by 
them (et ideo illa non omnimode capit, sed potius capitur). And thus it is drawn not by 
comprehensive knowledge but rather by an ecstatic knowledge (per modum excessus). I 
call this an ecstatic mode of knowledge, not because the subject exceeds the object, but 
because the subject is drawn toward an object that exceeds it in a certain ecstatic mode that 
draws the soul beyond itself. […] But this mode of knowing by means of ecstasy exists 
both in the wayfaring state and in heaven. For those in the wayfaring, it is only partial, 
while in heaven it is realized perfectly in Christ and in some of the saints.
626
 
Although Bonaventure begins by focusing on the knowledge of the soul of Christ, we 
can see that he also applies the concept of cognitio per modum excessus (i.e., ecstatic 
knowledge) also to the Christian wayfarer. According to Bonaventure it is characteristic of 
ecstatic knowledge that the soul is taken captive by the object which it does not 
understand or comprehend. Rather, the object captures the soul into following it. This 
happens because the intellect and affect of the rational soul are directed to infinite good 
and infinite truth which is God, who is grasped in the ecstatic cognition even though he is 
not grasped comprehensively.
627
 According to Bonaventure it would actually be 
impossible for God to be the object that captures the soul, if he could be grasped 
comprehensively, because only an object which exceeds the capacity of the soul can 
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 On the view of Thomas, see Sth I q 12 a 7-13. 
626
 “Et ideo anima Christi, cum sit creatura ac per hoc finita, quantumcumque sit unita Verbo, infinita 
non comprehendit, quia nec illis aequatur nec illa excedit; et ideo illan on omnimode capit, sed potius 
capitur, ac per hoc in illa fertur per modum comprehensionis, sed potius per modum excessus. Excessivum 
autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in 
obiectum excedens excessive quodam modo, erigendo se supra seipisum. […] – Hic autem modum 
cognoscendi per excessum est in via et in patria; sed in via ex parte, in patria vero est perfecte in Christo et 
in aliis comprehensoribus” Bonaventure: Questiones disputatae de scientia Christi, VII, conclusio (p. 40). 
Translation by Hayes 2005, some changes made to punctuation. 
627
 Bonaventure discusses the idea of cognitio per modum excessus in detail in Questiones disputatae de 
scientia Christi, I; V-VII. See also the introduction in Hayes 2005 (pages 45-67); Sépinski 1948, 77-80; 
Scarpelli 2007, 80-81. 
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suffice for the soul.
628
 Therefore, the ecstatic knowledge of God is at the same time both 
affective and intellectual, carrying both the intellect and the affect to its object. It is 
experiential knowledge, or experiential wisdom, which is the proper object of mystical 
theology. Furthermore, it is knowledge which is obtained partially in this life and 
completely in heaven.
629
  
Let us now turn to Luther. First of all, although for Luther God is the object of direct 
and actual knowledge, Luther agrees with the idea that God, who is present for the mind in 
faith, at the same time transcends the capacity of the mind as its object. Luther writes in 
the Dictata: 
He ascends over the Cherubim. God ‘ascends’ not in his nature but in our cognition and 
love, when he is known to be the most high, most incomprehensible and lovable over 
everything [superamabilis]. And the more we progress in knowing him, the more he 
‘ascends’, because his highness is always known more and more clearly. [...] Therefore 
‘Cherubim’ signify these cognitive powers, over all which God ‘ascends’ in the humble. 
Wings of winds on the other hand properly signify the affective virtues. And so he ‘flies’. 
Therefore he is not said to ‘ascend’ over them but to ‘fly’, because he is loved only to that 
degree as to which he is known. He does not ‘fly’, i.e., is not loved higher that he 
‘ascends’, i.e., is known. Therefore ‘flight’ means that he is the object of love, ‘ascent’ 
means that he is the object of knowing. But he does not ascend in his nature, but in our 
knowledge of him, does not fly in his nature, but in our affect and love of him. […] And 
so, when [the Psalmist] said ‘flies’, he advisedly added ‘flies over wings’, so that you 
would understand that God does not fly or ascend absolutely, but that those who love him 
fly, and he nevertheless is always above them [and is more than can be comprehended].
630
 
                                                 
628
 “Postremo, licet intellectus et affectus animae rationalis nunquam quiescat nisi in Dei et in bono 
infinito, hoc non est, quia illud comprehendat, sed quia nihil sufficit animae, nisi eius capacitatem excedat. 
Unde verum est, quod ipsius animae rationalis et affectus et intellectus feruntur in infinitum bonum et ut 
infinitum” Questiones disputatae de scientia Christi, VI, conclusio (p. 35). 
629
 “quia istum cognoscendi modum vix aut nunquam intelligit nisi expertus, nec expertus, nisi qui est in 
caritate radicatus et fundatus, ut possit comprehendere cum omnibus Sanctis, quae sit longitudo, latitudo 
etc.; in quo etiam experimentalis et vera consistit sapientia, quae inchoatur in via et consummatur in patria” 
Questiones disputatae de scientia Christi, VII, epilogus (p. 43). 
630
 WA 55, II, 137, 2 – 138, 4: “Et Ascendit super Cherubin. Deus ‘Ascendit’ [3] non in natura, Sed in 
nostra cognitione et amore, quando cognoscitur [4] esse altissimus et incomprehensibilis et superamabilis. Et 
sic quanto magis [5] proficimus in cognitione eius, tanto magis ‘ascendit’, quia semper clarius [6] ac clarius 
cognoscitur eius altitudo. Sed hoc ‘ascendere’ non contingit, [7] nisi vbi prius ‘descenderit’, Sicut Christus 
prius descendit et postea [8] ascendit. Quia ‘nemo ascendit in c lum, nisi qui descendit’, i. e. nemo [9] 
peruenit ad diuinitatis cognitionem, nisi qui prius humiliatus fuerit [10] et in sui cognitionem descenderit, 
simul enim ibi et Dei cognitionem [11] inuenit. Vnde ‘Cherubim’ significat hic cognitiuas potentias, [12] 
super qua omnes ‘ascendit’ Deus in humilibus. Penne [13] ventorum autem significat proprie affectiuas 
virtutes. Et sic ‘volat’. [14] Vnde super eas non dicitur ‘ascendere’, Sed ‘volare’, quia tantum manet [15] 
amabilis, quantum cognoscitur. Non enim altius ‘volat’, i. e. amatur, [16] quam ‘ascendit’, i. e. cognoscitur. 
Igitur ‘volatus’ eius est ipsum esse [17] obiectum Dilectionis, ‘Ascensus’ autem eius est ipsum esse 
obiectum [18] cognitionis. Ascendit non natura, Sed cognitione sui nostra, volat non [19] natura, Sed affectu 
et amore sui nostro. ⌈⌈‘Volat’, i. e. in volatu sanctorum [20] est et amatur. ‘Ascendit’, i. e. in proficiscenti 
cognitione ipse est [21] vel ... Volatus enim significat raptus, Iubilos et affectus diligentium et [1] deuotorum 
spirituum. Vel est o ...⌉⌉ Et notanter cum dixisset ‘Volauit’, [2] addit ‘volauit super pennas’, vt intelligas, 
quia non absolute [3] in se volat, nec ascendit, Sed quia amantes eum volant, et super eos [4] tamen adhuc 
est semper ⌈et plus quam comprehendere possint⌉.” 
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This passage on the incomprehensibility of God belongs to a wider context in which 
Luther discusses the nature of faith also with reference to the image of the cloud.
631
 Luther 
sums up the entire passage: “In everything it is required that our intellect is humiliated and 
a cloud is formed in it, so that it is taken captive to follow Christ”.632 We see here how the 
incomprehensibility is connected to the concept of being captivated to follow something 
that is not understood. A second, similar, text also connects the incomprehensibility of the 
divine nature to the cognition of God: 
And he heard me from his holy temple from the highest divinity or the dwelling place of 
angels [...] and fire i.e., zeal and anger from his face cognition the present God flared 
against sin: coals were set burning by him i.e., dead, black and frigid sinners, before they 
are set on fire by charity and made alive. He bent set down or humiliated the skies 
apostles and disciples and descended by effect, ‘giving to humble his grace’ and 
knowledge: and cloud blindness was under his feet in impious Jews and other 
unbelievers ‘who mind earthly things’ and ⌈they who are not his seat, as the skies⌉ are set 
as a footstool of his feet. And then he ascended is recognized to be superior over the 
Cherubim over all intellect and fullness of knowledge and flew i.e., is made more and 
more high: he flew over wings all virtues of winds spirits, heavenly and human. And he 
made darkness his hiding place i.e., he is made incomprehensible ⌈so that he cannot be 
reached, ‘dwelling in inaccessible light’⌉, or is hidden in faith and is seen through the 
darkness of the intellect ⌈through negations⌉633 
Gloss 15) ‘Ascends’, ‘flies’, ‘to descend’, ‘to ascend’, ‘to fly’ are all said of God not 
regarding the form/substance, but of the effect (non formaliter, sed effectiue). Through 
these namely the incomprehensibility of the divinity is expressed, which the ecstatic and 
contemplative see, as the Apostle says Rom. 11: ‘O highness’ etc. Because as flying we 
cannot be caught by pursuit, so God is above and become incomprehensible to everyone 
who contemplates and looks up the sky of the divinity.
634
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 WA 55, II, 135, 5 – 140, 19. 
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 WA 55, II, 140, 14-16: “In omnibus enim requiretur, vt inclinetur intellectus noster, et fiat ’caligo’ in 
eo, i.e. captiuetur in obsequium Christo.” 
633
 WA 55, I, 134, 9 – 138, 8: “[9] Et exaudiuit de templo sancto suo8 de summa diuinitate vel de [10] 
angelorum habitaculo […] / et ignis i. e. zelus et [8] indignatio a facie eius cognitione Dei presentis12 
exarsit contra peccatum: [9] carbones succensi sunt ab eo i. e. mortui, nigri et frigidi peccatores prius [10] 
iam inflammati sunt charitate et viuificati. [17, 10] Inclinauit demisit vel [11] humiliauit cœlos apostolos et 
discipulos
13
 et descendit per effectum, ‘dando [12] humilibus gratiam’ et cognitionem sui: et caligo cecitas 
sub pedibus eius [13] in Impiis Iudeis et aliis incredulis, ‘qui terrena sapiunt’ et ⌈non sunt sedes [1] eius vt 
celi⌉ positi sunt Scabellum pedum eius14. [17, 11] Et tunc ascendit [2] agnitus est esse superior super 
Cherubin super omnem intelligentiam et [3] scientie plenitudinem et volauit
15
 i. e. magis ac magis sublimis 
[factus] [4] est: volauit super pennas omnes virtutes ventorum spirituum tam celestium [5] quam 
humanorum. [17, 12] Et posuit tenebras latibulum suum i. e. [6] factus est incomprehensibilis ⌈ita quod 
attingi non potest, ‘habitans [7] lucem inaccessibilem’⌉, vel in fide latet et videtur per tenebras intellectus [8] 
⌈per negationes⌉.” 
634
 WA 55, I, 138 gloss 15, 12-17: “GLOSSA:15) [12]‘Ascendit’, ‘volat’, ‘Descendere’, ‘Ascendere’, 
‘volare’ omnia de [13] Deo dicuntur non formaliter, Sed effectiue. Exprimitur enim in hiis [14] 
incomprehensibilitas diuinitatis, quam vident exstatici et contemplatiui, [15] vt apostolus Ro. XI.: ‘o 
altitudo’ etc. Quia sicut Volantes nos nequimus [16] consequi, apprehendere, Sic Deus supereminet et 
incomprehensibilis fit [17] omni contemplanti et sursum spectanti in celum diuinitatis.” 
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Here we see the familiar definition of “face” as meaning the cognition of God who is 
present. In this cognition (i.e., faith) God first descends to the soul in grace, humiliating 
the flesh. God then ascends in effect, when he is recognized as transcending all the 
cognitive capacities of the soul. Thus he is present and seen in faith, but the light of his 
presence is also darkness due to the virtue of its highness, the divine incomprehensibility. 
Luther uses the images of the enigmatic or shining cloud to illustrate the dual nature of 
this knowledge: something is known, but the totality is not understood. Believers and the 
spirit do not know God clearly (clare), but partially (ex parte). Some light is perceived, 
some remains in darkness and enigma.
635
 The same idea of Christ being present in the soul 
“over faith” (super fidem) occurs a number of times in the Dictata as well as in the 
Lectures on Hebrews.
636
 In all these places the incomprehensibility of God is connected to 
the nature of the divinity and the presence of Christ in the soul, as well as to the figure of 
the Cherubim. These images point to a Franciscan influence, which is further corroborated 
by the fact that Luther speaks at multiple places, also in other works than Dictata, about 
faith as “the shadow of the wings of Christ” (pennae or alarum). Francis saw Christ in the 
form of the winged Seraph, and in the mystical tradition the wings of the Cherubim and 
Seraphim signify the meditation and contemplation of God in Christ, as can be seen in 
Richard of St. Victor’s and Bonaventure’s use of the image.637 For Luther, the wings of 
the Cherubim mean both natures of Christ and their incomprehensible unity in him. Luther 
also links these images to contemplation and meditation, and to the writings of the 
contemplative souls (written by quill pens). However, they are especially connected to the 
knowledge of God in faith. Luther states that the shadow of the wings means the 
impression of Christ in the soul, which is faith.
638
  The image is the reverse of that of the 
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 WA 55, I, 650 gloss 1: “GLOSSA:1) [1]Nota: fides Est ‘Nubes’ iis, qui credunt, seu spiritui, Sed 
‘Caligo’ iis, [2]qui non credunt, seu carni. Quia Increduli et caro nullo modo percipiunt [3]ea, que sunt Dei, 
Sed est illis stultitia omnis sapientia. Sed Creduli et [4]spiritus, licet non clare percipiant, tamen ‘ex parte 
cognoscunt’ ac velut [5]in ‘nube lucida’. Eodem modo Et ipsa Ecclesia Est Nubes et Caligo et [6]quilibet 
fidelis. Eodem modo Et ipsa Ecclesia Est Nubes et Caligo et [6]quilibet fidelis. Vnde et psal. 18.: ‘Dies diei 
eructat verbum, et nox nocti [7]indicat scientiam’, cum sit idem vtrunque.” 
WA 55, II, 754, 14-19: “Nubes et caligo sit in circuitu Christi, Et ipse in [15] medio nubis, que est in 
anima, Et caliginis, que est in carn . Nam Nouus [16] homo per fidem accepit nubem, i. e. enygmaticam 
lucem, Et per hoc vetus [17] homo accepit caliginem et obscuratus est salubriter. Quia dum spiritus [18] 
illustratur, caro excecatur; hoc per Iudicium et illud per Iustitiam. Et sic [19] est sedes Christi correcta.” 
636
 WA 55, I, 138 gloss 14; WA 55, II, 590, 21 – 591, 42; 763, 16-18; WA 57, b201, 10-17. 
637
 McGinn 1998, 83-85; 94-96; 108-109; Itinerarium mentis in Deum, especially VII, 3. On the allegory 
of the Cherubim see also pp. 69-70. 
638
 WA 55, II, 126, 6-12: “[6] Vmbra alarum Dei Mystice Est fides Christi, que est in enygmate [7] et 
vmbra in hac vita. ‘Ale’ autem Christi sunt manus eius extense in [8] cruce. Quia sicut corpus ⌈Christi in 
cruce⌉ efficit vmbram, Sic facit [9] spiritualem vmbram in anima, scil. fidem crucis sue, Sub qua protegitur 
[10] omnis sanctus. Secundo ‘Vmbra alarum’ Est protectio et custodia [11] 3, 112 sanctorum, angelorum vel 
| hominum contemplatiuorum, qui sunt al  [12] Dei, quia in ipsis volat et habitat affectuosis raptibus 
mentibus.” 
WA 55, II, 804, 144 – 805, 159: “[144] Qui ponis nubem ascensum tuum, Qui ambulas super pennas 
[145] ventorum.⌈⌈Lit⌊eraliter:⌉⌉ Ad literam de Christo factum est, vt patet [146] Act. 1. Secundo Quia aquas 
tectrices dixerat, Ex quo sequitur, Quod in [147] tegumento et velamento istarum aquarum simus, Ac sic 
sine dubio in [148] Nube et fidei vmbraculo. In hac autem ascendit Christus et nos ascendere [149] facit. 
⌈⌈Trop⌊ologice:⌉⌉ Hec enim est Scala Iacob, Sed non nisi in somno et [150] visione perceptibilis. Quis enim 
sciat fidem esse Schalam et nubem ascensus, [151] nisi qui mundo dormit et visione spirituali vigilat? Igitur 
Tegi aquis [152] (i. e. captiuari intellectum verbis Euangelii) hocipsum est nubem accipere [153] in 
intellectu. Et h c nubes ponitur fixe pro fundamento.        ⌈⌈Alleg⌊orice:⌉⌉ [154] Tercio ex hoc iam et ex illa 
nube et tegumento quilibet est Nubes, qui [155] Christum predicat et portat ad alios. Sic enim ascendit super 
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light reflected on the soul, but contains the same idea: the image of Christ is formed in the 
soul, but now by means of a shadow. In some texts this image is related to God’s 
protection of the believer and the hiddenness of faith and divinity under the humanity of 
Christ. As we can see in the texts quoted, it is also related to the supereminence of the 
divine nature, which though is known actually and directly in faith, nevertheless remains 
incomprehensible, always “flying” and above the believer. Moreover, the image of the 
wings is even linked to another mystical term: elevation or rapture (raptus). Luther states 
that faith is elevation, in which the most high light of faith is effused upon us and we are 
simultaneously elevated by that light to God: 
God indeed elevates his light over us, when he elevates us by that light. For faith is a light 
above all our grasp. Therefore this ‘elevation’ is nothing else than to shed over us the light 
of faith which in itself is most high, by which we are elevated. Therefore it may be called 
sealed, because it is closed and incomprehensible to us, but comprehends us and captivates 
us into following it.
639
 
In multiple places in his works, Luther does indeed connect faith to the concepts of 
elevation, ecstasis or rapture. In the Dictata, the three terms seem to bear the same 
meaning, whereas in the later works ecstasis (excessus) is connected especially with 
humiliation and suffering experienced during or preceding the infusion of faith. The term 
rapture (raptus) is consequently connected to the deliverance from this suffering and the 
experience of the goodness of God.
640
 When one is elevated by the light of faith to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
nubem leuem [156] et ingreditur in Egyptum, Isaie 19. Nam Quis videt Christum in suis [157] predicatoribus 
et fidelibus? Nullus, Sed creditur in illis esse et ex luce verborum [158] et operum, que per illos velut ex 
nube mittit, intelligitur. Igitur In [159] Nube est, i. e. in obscura cognitione sui, qua in aliis esse 
cognoscitur.” 
WA 55, II, 805, 174-182: “Penne ventorum, i. e. [174] spirituum, sunt affectiones et meditationes 
spiritualium vel animarum, [175] Quibus ipse nos volare facit, Sed super nos volitans sicut ‘Aquila 
prouocans [176] pullos suos’. Quis enim tantum vt ille volare presumat? Semper [177] itaque super pennas 
nostras ambulat, semper superior est, Et tamen non [178] remotus, quin vestigia eius in pennis nostris sint. Si 
enim Vestigia eius [179] non in nobis sint, i. e. quod in veritate et Iustitia volemus, Vtique non volabimus, 
[180] Sed reptabimus in terra. Quare ‘Volare’ Est c lestia meditari et [181] amare, Sed ipsum ‘ambulare’ in 
istis meditationibus et amoribus Est in [182] veritate et humilitate ista meditari et amare” 
See also WA 55, I, 138, 1-5; 314, 11-12; 682, 28 – 684, 1; WA 55, II, 368, 347-353; 704, 174-187; WA 
56, 298, 29 – 299, 6; WA 57, b164, 14 – b165, 10; b201, 10-17; WA 5, 503, 35 – 506, 5; 633, 15-22. In 
Operationes Luther interprets the wings of the Cherubim as the two testaments, which Christ conciles, and 
over which he descends to the soul. 
639
 AWA 2, 202, 22 – 203, 2. “Levat vero lumen super nos, dum nos lumine eo levat. Est enim fides lux 
supra omnem captum nostrum. Quare hoc ’levare’ est aliud nihil quam lumen fidei, quod seipso altissimum 
est, super nos effundere, quo ipsi elevemur. Unde et signatum dici potest, quia clausum et incomprehensibile 
nobis comprehendens autem nos et in obsequium sui captivans.” 
640
 WA 55, I, 756 gloss 3: “GLOSSA:3) [5]‘Extasis’ illa [1] 
{Primo Est sensus fidei, qui excedit sensum liter ,/ [2]in quo alii remanent increduli./ 
[3]Secundo Est ‘raptus mentis’ in claram cognitionem/ [4]fidei, et ista est proprie Exstasis./  
[6]Tertio Est Alienatio seu ‘pauor’ mentis in persecutione./ 
[7]Quarto Est Excessus iste quem faciunt martyres,/ [8]sicut Luce 9. de ‘Excessu’ Christi Moses et 
Helias/ 
[9]loquebantur.” 
WA 55, II, 885, 161-167: “Si enim Credidit, coram Deo exaltatus est; fides enim eleuat. [162] Quomodo 
ergo humiliatus est? Nisi Quia simul apud veracem Deum est in [163] excessu ⌈altus⌉, vbi Deum laudat, Et 
apud mendaces homines est humiliatus, [164] quos et miseratur. Ideo Vbi est exaltatus, in excessu agit, quod 
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cognition of God, God as the object of cognition remains above comprehension, but 
himself comprehends and captivates the believer into following him. The same idea of 
being taken captive by faith occurs in a number of Luther’s texts concerning faith.641 Thus 
Luther seems to understand the cognition of God, which takes place in the rapture of faith, 
                                                                                                                                                   
dicit: [165] ‘Quid retribuam Domino?’ Et dicit de suis persecutoribus: ‘Omnis homo [166] mendax’. Vbi 
autem est humiliatus, dicit: ‘Calicem salutaris accipiam’, et [167] ‘Vota mea’.” 
WA 55, II, 888, 252-261: “[252] 115, 11 Ego dixi in excessu meo: omnis homo mendax. Iste est 
excessus, [253] quo per fidem leuatur super se, vt videat futura bona. Alioquin et ipse [254] erat homo 
mendax, Sed in excessu factus mendacium excessit et verax factus [255] est per fidem. Et ideo eos, qui 
vanitatem diligere conspexit et fidem [256] posthabere, mendaces esse vidit, Quia reputant ea bona sua, que 
non [257] sunt. Et cum humiliati sint nimis, exaltati sibi videntur. Et ideo mirum [258] est, quomodo simul 
dicat humiliatum se et in excessu esse, Scil. quia agnoscit [259] se humiliatum et miserum per excessum. Illi 
autem non sunt humiliati [260] (i. e. non agnoscunt), quia nondum sunt in excessu, Sed in volucro [261] 
mendacii.” 
See also WA 55, II, 137, 19 – 138, 1; 174, 1-7; 343, 2 – 344, 21; 880, 19-25; WA 56, 299, 27 – 300, 8; 
WA 57, b143, 7 – b144, 12; AWA 2, 139, 6 – 141, 19; 178, 19 – 179, 6; 305, 16 – 306, 7; 317, 7 – 321, 5; 
WA 5, 444, 32 – 445, 1. In addition, see Oberman 1967, 45-59. In some places Luther connects these 
concepts directly to mystical themes with reference to Pseudo-Dionysius among others, but at other places 
they are more explicitly connected to faith. 
641
 WA 55, II, 714, 471-475: “Veritas autem incomprehensibilis erat, Quia non comprehendi, [472] Sed 
comprehendere debet, Nec protegi scuto aut circundari, Sed [473] esse scutum et circundare. Et ita, quia 
captiuat intellectum, qui appetit videre [474] volantia in die dogmata, ideo non est in die, non est in 
manifesto, [475] Sed abscondit ipsa nos in sese.” 
WA 56, 96 gloss 2: “GLOSSA:2) [20]Et notandum, quod de Verbo Dei loquitur, Quod ipsum sit ‘ 
abbreuiatum’, [21]cum potius Iud i sint ab eo abbreuiati, quia non apprehenderunt [22]illud. | Sed | Quia et 
verum est, Quod verbum fidei magis capit, [23]quam capiatur, Quia captiuat sensum humanum. Vnde 
Christus Iohann. 8.: [24]‘Sermo meus non capit in vobis.’ Qui ergo sunt increduli, non capiuntur [25]et in 
illis verbum abbreuiatur. Sed in credulis consummatur, Quia [26]perficitur, dum capit credentes in se.” 
AWA 2, 317, 14 – 319, 3: “At fidei, spei, caritatis opus et esse videntur idem esse. Quid enim est fides, 
nisi motus ille cordis, qui credere, spes motus, qui sperare, caritas motus, qui diligere vocatur? Nam 
phantasmata illa puto humana esse, quod aliud sit habitus et aliud actus eius, praesertim in his divinis 
virtutibus, in quibus non est nisi passio, raptus, motus, quo movetur, formatur, purgatur, impraegnatur anima 
verbo dei, ut sit omnino negotium harum virtutum aliud nihil quam purgatio palmitis, ut Christus dicit <Ioh 
15,2>, quo fructum purgatus plus afferat. Denique ceterae virtutes versantur circa res crassas et corporales 
externe, illae vero circa purum verbum dei interne, quo capitur et non capit anima, hoc est, exuitur tunica et 
calciamentis suis, ab omnibus tam rebus quam phantasmatibus [V 4] rapirturque per verbum (cui adhaeret, 
immo quod eam apprehendit et ducit mirabiliter) ’in solitudinem’ (ut Oseae 2<,14> dicit), in invisibilia, in 
cubiculum suum, ”in cellam vinariam” <Cant 2,4>. At hic ductus, hic raptus, hic expolitio misere eam 
discruciat. Arduum est enim et angusta via relinquere omnia visibilia, exui omnibus sensibus, educi ex 
consuetis, denique hoc mori est et ad inferos descendere. Videtur enim ipsa sibi funditus perire, dum 
subtractis omnibus, in quibus stetit, versabatur, haerebat, nec terram tangit nec caelum, nec se sentit nec 
deum dicens <Cant 5,8>: Nuntiate dilecto meo, ’quia amore langueo’, quasi dicat: Redacta sum in nihilum et 
nescivi, in tenebras et caliginem ingressa nihil video; fide, spe et caritate sola vivo et infirmor (id est, patior), 
’cum enim infirmor, tunc fortior sum’ <2Cor 12,10b>. Hunc ductum theologi mystici vocant ’in tenebras 
ire’, ’ascendere super ens et non ens’. Verum nescio, an seipsos intelligant, si id actibus elicitis tribuunt et 
non potius crucis, mortis infernique passiones significari credunt. CRUX sola est nostra theologia.” 
WA 5, 418, 9-15: “[9] ‘Et viam pacis non cognoverunt’. Quare? Quia rem sequuntur et [10] sicut equus 
et mulus non habent intellectum, qui est fides rerum invisibilium. [11] Sensuales enim homines pacem in 
rebus huius mundi quaerunt, hypocritae [12] autem in suis consiliis, studiis et operibus, utrique in his, quae 
sentiunt et [13] capiunt. At pax vera est in fide verbi et his rebus, quae nec sentiuntur [14] [Joh. 8, 37.] nec 
capiuntur, sed capiunt credentem sibi, sicut Christus dixit iudaeis ‘Sermo [15] meus non capit in vobis’. 
Pisces enim non capiunt, sed capiuntur rheti.” 
See also WA 55, I, 216, 1-3; gloss 5; WA 55, II, 653, 252-259; 734, 119-122; WA 57, a57, 6-16; AWA 
2, 107, 20 – 108, 5; 141, 11-19; 202, 22 – 203, 2; WA 5, 506, 12-15; 536, 26-37. 
That Luther’s notion of faith includes the concept of captivatio in obsequium Christi is noted also by 
Lohse 1958, 105-106, who relates the concept to the hearing of the external word. 
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in a manner very close to that of Bonaventure’s cognitio per modum excessus. One can 
therefore summarize that Luther’s understanding of the nature of the immediate 
knowledge of God that is faith follows the central features of Bonaventure’s idea: God is 
known in faith as the direct object of experience, who nevertheless in his essence remains 
above the comprehensive faculties of the soul. The knowledge of God received in faith is 
only partial, which Luther describes by means of a number of images. Furthermore, the 
cognition of God is fascinating and miraculous to such a degree that it comprehends and 
captivates the believer to follow the guidance of the divine light. This happens especially 
through the participation of the mind in the spiritual good that is God. It is to this subject 
we turn next.  
3.3.1.3 The Cognition of God in Relation to the Affect 
As we have seen above, Luther’s definition of facies as the actual and direct knowledge of 
God in faith is related both to the intellect and the affect. Referring to “devout doctors” 
and Jean Gerson, Luther says it is “both intellective and affective knowledge” (notitia … 
intellectiua quam affectiua).
642
 God not only is the proper object of the intellect and even 
the source of the theological intellect itself. He is also the proper object of the affect as the 
highest good, and even the source of theological affect itself when it is united to that 
highest good and elevated above all creation.
643
 The concept of faith as the light of the 
face of God and the concept of God as the highest, self-diffusing good are therefore 
intimately connected. As we saw in the previous chapter, for Luther the “light of the face 
of God” in the Ps. 4:7 is the answer to the question “Who will show us good?”. True good 
is not known by human reason, but is shown in the divine light of faith. That same light, 
which is signatum for the intellect is laetitia (joy, delight) for the will. As divine light, it 
shows God, the highest good and all good (omne bonum).
644
 However, the exact nature of 
this spiritual good is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand Luther speaks about the “grace 
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 WA 55, I, 242 gloss 11; WA 55, II, 152, 23 – 153, 13. 
643
 See AWA 2, 40, 3 – 41, 10; 43, 21 – 44, 20; WA 55, II, 81, 4-6. 
644
 WA 55, II, 80, 28 – 82, 2: “Nos autem non sic, Domine, Sed confitemur tibi, quia indigemus [29] 
ostensore bonorum et ex nobis non videmus ista bona. Sed lumen [30] vultus tui (i. e. fides, per quam 
cognoscimus faciem tuam et gloriam [31] tuam) signatum est (i. e. signum factum, nondum autem res, quia 
[32] ‘fides est argumentum rerum’, non autem ipse res) super nos (i. e.) [1] desursum: quia ‘omne donum 
desursum est’, et fides est super omnem [2] sensum sursum; hoc est enim ‘lumen’, in quo ‘ostenduntur nobis 
bona’). [3] Sic enim ostendis faciem tuam et ostendis nobis omne bonum. Ex qua [4] ostensione in memoria 
et intellectu facta non potest voluntas continere, [5] quin gaudeat, Quia omne bonum letificat appetitum, cum 
sit eius [6] 4, 7b proprium obiectum. Ideo sequitur: Dedisti letitiam in corde meo. [7] letatus sum, inquit, in 
hiis, que dicta sunt mihi, dicta scil. per [8] ostensionem huius luminis. Sic Zacha⌊rias audiuit verba bona et 
consolatoria, [9] quia ‘ostendit’ Dominus populo suo ‘bonum’. Sic itaque fides [10] semper habet comitem 
letitiam in spiritu sancto. Vnde hic dicit: ‘in [11] corde meo’, i. e. spiritu, non in carne mea, que est 
impiorum, qui diligunt [12] vanitatem. Sic iam sunt omnia salua in spiritu, Memoria, intellectus: [13] quia 
‘lumen’ quoad intellectum ‘Signatum’, i. e. firmiter impressum [14] signum, ‘letitia’ quoad Voluntatem. 
Non solum autem in se, Sed quia [15] bonum est diffusiuum sui. Si ‘Multi’ sunt, qui ‘dicunt: quis ostendit 
[1] nobis bona?’ cur non etiam multi sint, super quos ‘signatum est hoc [2] 3, 58 lumen’ boni ostensiuum, 
quibus ‘brachium Domini | reuelatum est’?” 
See also AWA 2, 205, 1 – 207, 13. The interpretation of Ps 4:7 holds an extremely important place in the 
tradition of divine illumination. Luther’s interpretation of this verse is examined more precisely in chapter 
3.2.3. 
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of heavenly goods” (celestium bonorum gratia), the “eternal spiritual goods of faith” 
(eterna bona spiritualia fidei), simply “spiritual goods” (spiritualia bona), or he contrasts 
the invisible goods of faith to the visible goods of the wicked.
645
 On the other hand, 
however, Luther defines the object of faith (with regard to the good) as “the Lord himself 
i.e., Spiritual things” (ipse Dominusmet, i.e. Spiritualia), as adhesion to God i.e., the better 
goods in faith, or as the vision of the face of God; stating that all good things are 
comprehended in the light of the face of God. In any case, the attainment of this spiritual 
good requires turning away from the created goods.
646
 But are the spiritual goods 
something existing between God and the soul, or are they identical to God?
647
 Perhaps in 
the background lies a distinction similar to the relationship between God and the ideas in 
Neoplatonic thought: in God all the ideas are in unity, in the creation they are distinct. In 
this case, then, the light would function both as the ontological source of all good (i.e., the 
light itself is the highest spiritual good, God), as well as comprehend in itself specific 
moral criteria
648
: both in an indistinct sense as the totality of good, and in a distinct sense 
as the collection of all specific intellectual goods.
649
 The spiritual goods may also include 
effects of faith such as justification, forgiveness of sins, peace of conscience, and freedom 
from the fear of damnation, all of which flow from the cognition of God in faith.
650
  
Regardless of what can be said concerning the status of the spiritualia between God 
and the soul, Luther considers at least God himself the direct object of the cognition of the 
divine light. For Luther, God in himself is the highest good and therefore the immediate 
knowledge of God in faith leads to the highest blessedness (gaudium), joy (laetitia) and 
delight (delectatio).
651
 Luther especially connects the concept of laetitia to the good 
shown by the divine light. Joy of the heart and a most sweet affect towards God and all the 
creatures infallibly results from knowledge of God in the light of faith. Faith ‘enlarges’ the 
heart and makes the believer ready to suffer and work willingly before God and all 
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 WA 55, I, 176, 3-4; WA 55, II, 152, 13-22; 783, 141-142; AWA 2, 207, 3-13. 
646
 WA 55, II, 119, 20-23: “Dominus pars hereditatis mee [21] i. e. Spes et merces mea et passionis 
me ; non est quid carnale et temporale, [22] Sed ipse Dominusmet, i. e. Spiritualia ⌈quia Dominus non 
habetur [23] nisi in et cum spiritualibus bonis⌉.” 
WA 55, II, 225, 28-32: “Sed quare dicit vultus mei? Quia tota merces Est [29] visio, Et quoniam Deus 
non est ‘salutaris’ nisi iis, qui faciem ad eum vertunt [30] et dorsum ad temporalia. Qui autem in 
temporalibus querunt salutem, [31] volunt Deum sibi facere salutare dorsi sui, Quia faciem ad temporalia 
[32] et dorsum ad Deum vertunt, cum ‘duobus dominis seruiri non possit’.” 
WA 55, II, 783, 134 – 784, 145: “[134] 101, 3 Non Auertas faciem tuam a me. Sepe dictum est, Quid 
facies [135] Domini significet, Scil. ipsum spiritum distinctum contra literam, que est [136] dorsum, vt Psal. 
79.: ‘Ostende faciem tuam et salui erimus’. Psal. 4.: ‘Signatum [137] est super nos lumen vultus tui, 
Domine.’ Et 88.: ‘In lumine vultus tui [138] ambulabunt.’ In ista autem luce et facie omnia bona 
comprehenduntur, [139] Quia Est nihil aliud nisi Scire Ihesum Christum. Et hunc scire est omnia [140] scire 
et habere. Facies enim Notitia est Domini, Qu  nunc per fidem in [141] nobis est, tunc autem per speciem. 
Sensus ergo est: Ne auertas a me spiritum [142] et fidem et spiritualia bona, sicut in illis facis, qui diligunt 
vanitatem [143] et querunt mendacium. Auerte ergo a me, si libet, diuitias, gloriam, sanitatem [144] et 
quicquid potest caro habere in hac vita; tantummodo faciem tuam [145] ne auertas.” 
See also WA 55, II, 284, 111-120; WA 56, 75, 13-15; 461, 4-5; WA 57, b118, 13-16; b228, 17 – b229, 4. 
647
 The same question is made also in chapter 2.2.2. 
648
 See WA 56, 345, 23-25; AWA 2, 203, 3 – 204, 5. 
649
 See WA 55, II, 329, 19 – 330, 33 and WA 55, II, 427, 53-58. On the relationship between the forms 
and God in Augustinian Platonism, see Nash 2003, 22-23. 
650
 See AWA 2, 205, 1 – 207, 13. 
651
 WA 55, II, 45, 12 – 46, 2; 323, 379 – 325, 427. On God as the highest good on Luther see chapter 
2.2.2. 
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people.
652
 It is the foundation, origin, fountain and principle from which all good works, 
virtues, gifts and graces flow.
653
 Luther also speaks about the nature of faith with regard to 
God in terms of “tasting” the sweetness of God, with reference to St. Bernard.654 The 
nature of this good is defined experientially, as it is something which “excels all senses” 
(exuperat omnem sensum) and is known and understood only by one who has been united 
with God in faith.
655
 However, the limitation of cognitio per modum excessus discussed 
above also applies to this experiential knowledge of the goodness of God: God is known 
only partially, not fully.
656
 The joy and blessedness acquired are only incipient and partial, 
not yet the heavenly perfection. Luther can therefore speak about the joy given in the light 
of faith as “enigmatic joy” or “joy of obscurity” (laetitia enigmatis), because compared to 
the heavenly vision, God is known by the light of faith only partially, in a shadowy and 
enigmatic way: as in a (dim) mirror.
657
    
                                                 
652
 WA 5, 460, 37 – 461, 5: “[37] Hoc est, quod dixi: Ad fiduciam istam cordis bonam de deo 
infallibiliter [38] sequi laetitiam cordis et dulcissimum affectum erga deum et omnem creaturam. [39] Sic 
enim credenti spiritus sanctus diffunditur in cor, quo rursum [40] cor hominis diffunditur et dilatatur in 
omnem promptitudinem omnia gratuito [41] faciendi et patiendi tam coram deo quam hominibus. Ibi 
inimicos non [1] minus quam amicos diligit efficiturque libens omnium servus, ut omnibus [2] queat 
prodesse, sui ipsius non modo incuriosus, sed etiam prodigus factus. [3] [Ps. 4, 7.] Sic ps. 4. cum dixisset 
‘Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine’, [4] [Ps. 4, 8.] mox secutus dicit ‘Dedisti laetitiam in 
corde meo’, itidem duo ista connectens, [5] fidem et laetitiam cordis, sicut et hoc loco facit.” 
653
 WA 55, II, 639, 269 – 640, 285. 
654
 WA 55, I, 300, 22-23: “Teth. Gustate Quia affectus plus erudit quam intellectus *et tunc videte 
intelligite quoniam suauis ‘Bonus’ est dominus10”  
WA 55, I, 301 gloss 10: “GLOSSA:10) Vnde ex isto versu discimus, Quod, licet potentiam et sapientiam 
Dei possimus videre sine gustu bonitatis, tamen bonitatem eius recte videre et credere nullus potest, nisi qui 
prius eam aliquo modo expertus sit et gustauerit. Si quis animam Bernhardi haberet, hic versum istum bene 
caperet.” 
655
 WA 57, b188, 7-15: “Similiter et ‘pax’ [8] non ea intelligitur, quae dici, scribi cogitarique ab homine 
potest nec [9] ab ulla creatura dari, sed est ea, ‘quae exuperat omnem sensum’ id est [10] mentem et 
abscondita est sub cruce et morte non aliter quam sol sub [11] nube. Unde de impiis dicitur psalm. 13.: 
‘Viam pacis non cognoverunt.’ [12] Hanc autem impossibile est sine fide id est iustitia Dei haberi, psal. 84.: 
[13] ‘Iustitia et pax osculatae sunt.’ Quia cum per multas tribulationes Deus [14] aufferat omnia bona nostra 
et vitam, impossibile est, ut animus sit quietus [15] et hoc sustineat, nisi melioribus bonis adhaeserit, i. e. 
Deo per fidem [16] coniunctus fuerit.” 
656
 WA 55, II, 119, 20 – 120, 5: “Dominus pars hereditatis mee [21] i. e. Spes et merces mea et 
passionis me ; non est quid carnale et temporale, [22] Sed ipse Dominusmet, i. e. Spiritualia ⌈quia Dominus 
non habetur [23] nisi in et cum spiritualibus bonis⌉. [24] Et Nota: Deus in hac vita est ‘pars’ sanctorum seu 
merces partialis. [25] Vt Apostolus 1. Corinth. 13. ‘Ex parte cognoscimus’ etc. Sed in futuro [26] erit ‘Deus 
omnia in omnibus’, vt eiusdem 15., cum ‘euacuatum’ fuerit, [1] quod ex parte nunc est. Ideo vocat hic 
Christus Dominum ‘partem [2] 3, 106 sortis sue’ et | calicis sui. Quid autem sit ‘calix’, vide supra. ⌈⌈Vel sic: 
[3] ‘Dominus pars hereditatis mee’, i. e. merui, vt Dominus sit merces [4] meorum et pars in hac vita, itaque 
omnia ex me sunt spiritualia eorum [5] bona.⌉⌉ “ 
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 WA 5, 464, 26 – 465, 16: “[36] ‘Laetitia interna’, quam Hieronymous ‘plenitudinem laetitiarum ante 
[37] vultum dei’ non male intelligit, Ea est, qua videtur deus deorum in Zion [38] sicuti est et facie ad 
faciem, ubi est satietas plena cordis nostri, ut digna [39] Emphasi ‘plenitudo laetitiarum’ appelletur. In hac 
enim vita ex parte cognoscimus, [1] ex parte prophetamus, ita ex parte laetamur et omnia ex parte [2] 
habemus. ‘Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex [3] [1. Cor. 13, 10.] parte est’, 1. 
Cor. 13., ubi non miscebitur risus dolori nec luctus consolationi, [4] sicut necesse est in hac vita fieri, dum 
peregrinamur a domino et per speculum [5] videmus in enigmate. Quare laetitiam huius vitae laetitiam 
enigmatis, [6] illius vero laetitiam vultus seu faciei domini appellare possumus. Sic enim [7] hebraice sine 
praepositione ‘cum’ et ‘ante’ dicitur ‘plenitudinem laetitiarum [8] faciei tuae’, ut plenitudinem laetitiarum e 
facie et revelata gloria dei pendere [9] [Ps. 17, 15.] intelligamus, sicut psalmo sequente dicet ‘Satiabor, cum 
apparuerit [10] [Joh. 14, 21.] gloria tua’. Et Christus Ioh. 14. ‘Qui diligit me diligetur a patre meo, et [11] 
ego diligam eum et manifestabo ei meipsum’. Haec est laetitia aeterna, quia [12] plenitudo laetitiarum, cum 
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Thus for Luther faith is immediate and direct, actual and experiential knowledge of 
God. God is known “face to face” in faith, with the highest part of the mind being 
receptive and united with the divine light. Through faith the believer is united with the 
divine nature and becomes one with God. This ontological union is the foundation of the 
epistemological knowledge of God in faith. In his concept of faith Luther agrees with the 
doctrine of divine illumination and seems to reject the via moderna’s exclusion of the 
possibility of attaining the direct and immediate vision of God while one is in the state of a 
wayfarer. Nevertheless, even though Luther describes the cognition of God in faith as 
immediate, it is still only partial and in some sense hidden and shadowy. In general, 
Luther’s concept of faith as illumination seems to be constructed upon the theology of 
Augustine, Bonaventure and Gerson, although it also incorporates other mystical themes.  
One can distinguish three different approaches in Luther’s definition of faith. These 
can be termed Augustinian (emphasis on divine light), Aristotelian (emphasis on the 
concept of form and passive receptivity) and Mystical (emphasis on faith as shadow or 
enigma; ecstasis and the image of the Cherubim). As we have seen, however, Luther fuses 
different images together in specific texts. Thus this categorization should be used as an 
aid in distinguishing different strands of Luther’s thought, rather than in an exclusive 
sense. The Augustinian concept of light is often connected to mystical ecstasis and 
rapture, Aristotelian passivity to mystical darkness, and the mystical image of the 
Cherubim and the shadow to the Incarnation. Thus in Luther’s theology we can see a rich 
interplay of different allegories and typologies taken from different traditions of medieval 
piety. All the three images and ways of defining faith, however, share common features 
and seem to be different ways of speaking about the same central ideas: Faith is divine 
activity and human receptivity. In faith, God is known directly and immediately but at the 
same time only partially and as an object exceeding human comprehension. As such an 
object exceeding human comprehension, God in faith captures the intellect and affect into 
admiration and joy and to follow the guidance of the divine light, both with regard to 
understanding and morals. The formal structure of the cognition of God in faith in 
Luther’s thought seems to be quite similar to Bonaventure’s concept of cognitio per 
modum excessus. In the next chapter we will discuss how Luther understands the function 
of faith as an intellectual and moral direction with regard to the universe. 
3.3.2. The Light of Faith in Relation to the Universe 
3.3.2.1 Faith as Intellectual Illumination 
In the previous chapter we examined the relation between the mind and God constituted 
by the divine light. In this chapter, we will investigate the divine light as it pertains to 
other objects understood and interpreted in that light as the light of understanding, i.e., the 
nature and function of faith as the theological intellect. The concept of faith as the 
                                                                                                                                                   
laetitiae in hac miseria sanctis impartitae sint [13] stillae quaedam et tenues praegustus, qui cito transeant, 
plenitudo autem [14] revelata facie dei perfecta est manens inaeternum. ‘Haec enim est vita [15] aeterna, ut 
cognoscant te solum verum deum et quem misisti, Ihesum [16] [Joh. 17, 3.] Christum’, Iohan. 17.” 
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theological intellect is closely tied to the concept of “spirit”: faith is the spiritual intellect 
which makes the spirit alive, connects it with God and the invisible world and makes the 
human being a spiritual man.
658
 In the passive sense, the spirit is the reception and 
indwelling of God in the human person by faith. In the active sense, it is the spiritual 
intellect: the ability to understand spiritual, invisible and intellectual things by the divine 
light of faith. Luther appears to hold that in his original state man possessed this spiritual 
intellect, but that it was obscured in the Fall, making the human being without it a sensual 
creature who, “like a horse and a mule”, is reliant on the visible. After the Fall, the 
intellect remains only in the natural or philosophical sense as something always connected 
to the visible world.
659
 However, the proper intellect able to see the invisible is restored by 
faith. Therefore, one of the most common definitions of faith Luther gives is that faith is 
the theological intellect that grasps the invisible and spiritual things. However, it also has 
a function with regard to understanding such visible things as Christ and the Scriptures. 
These functions, though they might first seem to differ in terms of their objects, are 
actually connected in a manner that will be discussed below.   
A large number of passages appear in Luther’s writings defining faith as the 
theological intellect in contrast to the philosophical intellect connected to visible things. 
For example, Luther states in the Dictata super Psalterium, in connection with Ps. 73: 
‘Understanding’ [intellectus] or ‘instruction’ [eruditio] in the Psalm titles always refers to 
the invisible; to the spiritual; to that which cannot be seen but only grasped by the intellect 
and faith, wherever they are mentioned, whether good or bad. Therefore ‘to understand’ 
[intelligere] is used in the Scriptures in a different way than in philosophy, regardless of 
whether it is abstractive or universal, because philosophy always speaks of visible and 
apparent or sometimes of that which is deduced from the apparent. Faith, on the other 
hand, concerns the ‘non-apparent’ and that which is not deduced from the apparent. It is 
indeed from heaven, because that which is deduced from the apparent is always contrary to 
faith, as is evident.
660
 
Luther also confirms the same view in the scholia to the first half of Ps. 118:34, “Give 
me understanding and I will explore your law”661: 
                                                 
658
 See e.g. WA 55, I, 24, 1-2; gloss 13; 290 gloss 1; 292, 18 – 25; gloss 6; 520 gloss 17; WA 55, II, 121, 
11-20; 179, 79 – 180, 107; 152, 2 – 153, 4; 220, 2 – 221, 15; 224, 2 – 6; 341, 94 – 343, 144; 452, 125 – 453, 
156; 481, 481 – 488; AWA 2, 107, 14 – 108, 14; 132, 13-16; 200, 3 – 201, 7; WA 5, 418, 9-13; 623, 17-40. 
See also the analysis of the concept of the “intellect” on p. 112.  
659
 See the analysis of animal and carnal life on pp. 121-124. See also Cranz 2000, 162-164 who notes 
the continuity between Luther’s definition and ancient modes of intellection. However, Cranz does not 
distinguish between faith as apprehending God and faith as understanding created reality, of which only the 
latter is the object of the intellect of faith. 
660
 WA 55, II, 481, 481-488: “[481] 73, 1 3, 50734 Bl 115 ‘Intellectus’ vel ‘eruditio’ in Titulis 
psalmorum positum semper Indicat [482] Inuisibilia, spiritualia, que videri nequeunt, Sed solo intellectu et 
fide [483] attingi possunt, ibi dici, siue bona siue mala. Vnde ‘Intelligere’ in [484] 3, 508 Scrip⌊tura aliter | 
quam in philosophia capitur, siue sit abstractiua siue vniuersalis, [485] quia philosophia semper de 
visibilibus et apparentibus, vel saltem [486] ex apparentibus deducta loquitur, fides autem Est ‘non 
apparentium’, [487] nec ex apparentibus deducta; immo de c lo est, Cum ex apparentibus potius [488] 
contrarium fidei semper deducatur, vt patet.” 
661
 WA 55, II, 916, 751-752: “Da mihi intellectum; et Scruta⌊bor leg⌊em t⌊uam et Custo⌊diam [752] 
[illam] in tot⌊o cord⌊e m⌊eo. ” 
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Thus Psalm 31 says: ‘Do not be like a horse and a mule which have no understanding’. 
Because before that he made an offer, saying: ‘I will give you understanding and instruct 
you on this way’, etc. Therefore understanding [intellectus] is from the Lord alone, as he 
says: ‘They will all be taught by God’. Therefore this understanding is not that of the 
philosophers or the natural understanding, by which we observe or speculate visible things, 
but it is theological and given as a gift [gratuitus], and by it through faith non-apparent 
things are contemplated. Therefore it is called ‘the Spirit of wisdom and understanding’. 
When it dwells in us we can explore the law in the right way, that is, seek in an innermost 
way what it has in spirit. For the Gospel gives understanding through which the old law is 
revealed and thoroughly examined.
662
 
Similar descriptions of the nature of the theological intellect are found in Luther’s 
other works as well. In the Lectures on Romans he states: 
There is no one who understands. This is because the Wisdom of God is hidden, unknown 
to the world. ‘The Word has become flesh’ and Wisdom incarnate, and through this it has 
become hidden so that it cannot be attained without the intellect, as Christ is not known 
without revelation. And because of this, those who are wise in the visible things (as are all 
people without faith and those who do not know God and the future life) do not 
understand, do not think, i.e., are not intelligent, not wise, but foolish and blind.
663
 
A bit further on he continues his explanation of the nature of the intellect he speaks of: 
This intellect, which is spoken of here, is faith itself, or knowledge of things invisible and 
believed. It is hidden, because it is understanding of those things which a human being 
cannot know by himself, as in John 6: ‘No one comes to the Father except by me’ and 
again: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father has drawn him.’ And to Peter: ‘Blessed are 
you, Simon son of Jonah, because it is not flesh and blood that has revealed this to you, but 
my Father who is in Heaven.’664 
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 WA 55, II, 916, 753 – 917, 761: “[753] Sic Psal. 31.: ‘Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est 
intellectus.’ [754] Quia prius obtulit d⌊icens: ‘Intellectum tibi dabo et instruam te in via [755] 4, 324 hac’ 
etc. | Igitur Intellectus est a Domino solo, sicut dicit: ‘Erunt omnes [756] docibiles dei’. Quare non est 
philosophorum aut naturalis iste intellectus, [757] quo etiam visibilia speculamur, Sed theologicus et 
gratuitus, quo per [758] fidem res non apparentes contemplamur. Ideo Vocatur ‘Spiritus sapientie [759] et 
intellectus’. Quo habito possumus recte Scrutari legem, i. e. intime [760] exquirere, quid habeat in spiritu; 
Euangelium enim dat intellectum, per [761] quem vetus lex reuelatur et perscrutatur.” 
663
 WA 56, 237, 19-26: “[19] Non est Intelligens [3, 11]. [20] Quia Sapientia Dei in abscondito est, 
incognita mundo. ‘Verbum enim [21] caro factum est’ et Sapientia incarnata ac per hoc abscondita nec nisi 
[22] intellectu attingibilis, Sicut Christus non nisi reuelatione cognoscibilis. [23] Quare qui de visibilibus et 
in visibilibus sapientes sunt (quales sunt omnes [24] homines extra fidem et qui Deum ignorant ac futuram 
vitam), non intelligunt, [25] non sapiunt, i. e. non sunt intelligentes, non sapientes, Sed insipientes [26] et 
c ci” 
664
 WA 56, 238, 8 – 239, 5: “Intellectus iste, de quo hic loquitur, Est Ipsa fides seu notitia Inuisibilium 
[1] et credibilium. Ideo est intellectus in abscondito, quia eorum, [2] que homo ex seipso nosse non potest, 
Vt Iohann. 6.: ‘Nemo venit ad patrem [3] nisi per me.’ Et iterum: ‘Nemo venit ad me, nisi pater meus traxerit 
eum.’ [4] Et ad Petrum: ‘Beatus es, Simon Bariona, quia Caro et Sanguis non [5] reuelauit tibi, Sed pater 
meus, qui est in c lis.’” 
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The Operationes in Psalmos also contains a lengthy definition of the theological 
intellect: 
Therefore intellect [intellectus] and education [eruditione] are necessary, through which 
you will transcend these and, despising the visible, be elevated to the invisible; not 
minding those which are upon earth, but those which are above, where Christ is, etc. 
The word understand in Hebrew is hascilu because it signifies an absolute state: make 
intelligent, that is, yourselves – as Jerome explains – or others, that is, do so, make haste 
that you would be intelligent and think heavenly and spiritual things, as we say in our 
vernacular: ‘Seynd vveys und vorstendig’, a similar expression as Ps 31: ‘Do not be like a 
horse and a mule which have no understanding’. 
This intellect is not that of which the philosophers opine, but it is faith itself which can see 
both in prosperous and adverse things that which is not visible. Therefore, not saying what 
it is that should be understood, he says in an absolute way: Understand, that is, make it so, 
that you would be intelligent, take care, that you would be believing. For that which faith 
understands has no name or form [speciem]. Prosperity or adversity in present things 
completely subverts everyone who does not understand the invisible by faith. For this 
intellect comes from faith, according to this: ‘If you will not believe, you will not 
understand’, and it is entrance into that cloud in which everything that the human senses, 
reason, mind or intellect can comprehend is overwhelmed. For faith unites the soul with 
the invisible, ineffable, innominable, eternal, incogitable Word of God and at the same 
time separates it from all that is visible. This is the Cross and ‘passover’ of the Lord, in 
which he predicates this necessary intellect. 
Receive instruction, judges of the Earth. Augustine understands this as a tautology. Also 
this word receive instruction [erudimini] is in the absolute state, signifying: Act, so that 
you would have been instructed, that is, uprooted from the raw and animal senses and 
affects of sensual things and opinions, so that you would not think childishly of Christ and 
his Kingdom. ‘The animal man [man with a soul] does not perceive those things which are 
God’s’ (1. Cor. 2). To me, receiving instruction [eruditio] seems to signify the drawing 
away of the heart from perishable things, as well as understanding [intellectus] seems to 
signify turning toward and apprehension of eternal things. The former is accomplished by 
the Cross in the mortification of the flesh, the latter by faith in the vivification of the spirit. 
665
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 AWA 2, 107, 10 – 108, 14: “Ideo intellectu opus est et eruditione, quibus haec transcendatis et 
visibilibus contemptis in invisibilia rapiamini non sapientes ea, quae super terram, sed quae sursum sunt, ubi 
Christus est etc <Col 3,1s>. Proinde verbum intelligite in Hebraeo sonat hascilu, quod absoluto statu 
significat: intelligites facite, scilicet vosmetipsos - ut Hieronymus exponit - vel alios, hoc est: sic agite, hoc 
contendite, ut sitis intelligentes et spiritualia ac caelestia sapiatis, quod nostra vernacula dicimus: ’Seynd 
vveys und vorstendig’, simili sententia, qua Ps 31<,9>: ’Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est 
intellectus’. Est autem haec intelligentia, non de qua philosophi opinantur, sed fides ipsa, quae in rebus 
prosperis et adversis potest est ea videre, quae non videntur. Ideo non exprimens, quae intelligant, absolute 
dicit intelligite, id est, facite, ut sitis intelligentes, curate, ut sitis creduli. Non enim habent nomen nequem 
speciem ea, qua fides intelligit. Nam praesentium rerum prosperitas vel adversitas penitus subvertit omnem 
hominem, qui fide non intelligit invisibilia. Hic enim intellectus ex fide venit, iuxta illud <Is 7,9>: ’Nisi 
crediderits, non intelligetis’, et est ingressus ille caliginis, in qua absorbetur, quicquid sensus, ratio, mens 
intellectusque hominis comprehendere potest. Coniungit enim fides animam cum invisibili, ineffabili, 
innominabili, aeterno, incogitabili verbo dei simulque separat ab omnibus visibilibus, et haec est crux et 
’phase’ domini, in quo necessarium praedicat hunc intellectum. Erudimini iudices terrae Augustinus 
tautologice dictum accipit. Est autem et hoc verbum erudimini  absoluti status pro eo, quod est: Agite, ut 
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However, one can ask if Luther uses the term intellectus for the capacity to understand, 
or for the content of understanding. One could argue that, by the theological use of term 
intellect, Luther does not refer to the human capacity, but to a theological 'understanding’ 
of facts. That is, that the term refers to interpretation of things ‘in the light of faith’, as 
metaphorically ‘seen’ or grasped with the help of Christian teaching and doctrine. Indeed, 
Luther asserts at least twice that the terms “mind” and “intellect” refer in the Scriptures to 
their object and act or actuality (actus), not to the powers of the soul (pontentia 
animae).
666
 One could consequently posit that the intellect is theological when it thinks 
about theological objects.
667
 However, it does not follow from this, that the theological 
objects of the intellect are propositional in nature. The issue is more complicated. The 
primary question to be solved is that of how Luther understands the nature of the object of 
the intellect and the relationship of the intellect to it. Is the object of theological intellect 
propositional doctrine, or is there a more fundamental level of epistemology involved? 
The texts examined above, as well as a great number of similar passages, show that the 
answer must be yes. According to Luther, the true intellect is a gift of God given by faith 
and grace. It alone sees the invisible things in contrast to the natural reason or natural 
intellect, senses and vision, which focus on the visible and apparent things.
668
 From a 
careful analysis of Luther’s texts it becomes clear that the above and similar sentences 
express not a metaphorical view of the term “intellect”, but rather are related to the 
ontological status of the theological intellect. The theological intellect is not a ‘natural 
capacity’ of man, but is actualized in illumination by the light of faith, so that its objects 
are the light of faith itself (i.e., God), and the intellectual and spiritual things (understood 
                                                                                                                                                   
sitis eruditi, hoc est, e rudibus animalibusque sensuum et sensilium rerum affectibus et opinionibus eruti, ut 
non puerliter de Christo regnoque eius sentiatis. ’Animalis enim homo non percipit ea, quae dei sunt’ (1Cor 
2<,14>). Mihi autem eruditio videtur significare aversionem cordis a rebus pereuntibus, sicut intellectus 
conversionem et apprehensionem rerum aeternarum. Illam crux operatur in carnis mortificatione, hanc fides 
in spiritus vivificatione.” 
666
 WA 55, II, 179, 79-89: “Et hoc vult Titulus | dicens: Eruditio [80] Dauid. Quia intellectu per fidem 
de istis docemur Et non sensu aut [81] ratione. [82] ‘Intellectus’ in scrip⌊turis sanctis potius ab obiecto quam 
potentia nomen [83] habet, contrario quam in philosophia. Est enim ‘Intellectus’ cognitio [84] vel notitia 
‘sensus Christi’, de quo Apostolus 1. Corin. 1. et 2. excellenter [85] docet, quoniam ‘Sapientiam loquimur’, 
inquit, ‘absonditam in mysterio, [86] quam nemo principum huius s culi cognouit.’ Et est breuiter nihil aliud 
[87] nisi sapientia crucis Christi, que ‘gentibus stultitia et Iud is Scandalum est’, [88] Scil. intelligere, Quod 
filius Dei est incarnatus et crucifixus et mortuus et [89] suscitatus propter nostram salutem.” 
WA 57, a74, 20 – a75, 6: “[20] Insensati [3, 1]. [21] ‘Noys’ Grece, quod Latine significat ‘mentem’ seu 
pocius sensum ipsum [22] mentis, seu ut vulgo dicitur, dictamen rationis. Non enim in Scripturis [23] 
accipitur ‘mens’ pro potencia anime seu pro habitu, sed magis pro actu. [24] Unde transfertur varie. 1. Co. 
2.: ‘Quis cognovit sensum Domini?’ [25] At Luce 2.: ‘Dispersit superbos mente cordis sui.’ Inde in 
Scripturis [26] frequenter eciam ‘consilium’, ‘cogitatio’, ‘intellectus’ vocatur, ut psal. 32.: [27] ‘Dominus 
dissipat consilia Gencium, reprobat autem cogitationes principum’ [1] etc. Et psal. 81.: ‘Nescierunt neque 
intellexerunt.’ Ioannis 11.: [2] ‘Vos nescitis quicquam nec cogitatis.’        Igitur ‘mens’ est actuosa illa [3] 
cogitatio singula ponderans exquisite, econtra ‘amencia’ dormitans illa [4] inconsideracio omnia passive 
suscipiens. Sic 1. Petri 4.: ‘Christo passo [5] in carne et vos eadem cogitacione armamini’, i. e. cogitate et 
intelligite, [6] quod et vos ad eandem imaginem oporteat pati.” 
667
 This kind of interpretation is given by Lohse 1958, 38-41 and Schwarz 1962, 135 among others. 
668
 WA 55, I 290 gloss 1; 346, 22-23; 346-347 gloss 2; 386, 5-10; 388, 4-11; 630, 19 – 632, 2; 630-632 
glosses 2, 4, 7 and 8; 704, 21-23; 705 gloss 9; 772, 21 – 774, 11; 780 gloss 52; 798, 4-7; 806 gloss 140; WA 
55, II, 121, 11-20; 156, 18 – 158, 17;  178, 79 – 180, 99; 220, 2 – 221, 15; 222, 57 – 223, 66; 511, 154 – 512, 
165;604, 2-7; 734, 109-122; 758, 50-52; 769, 180 – 770, 218; 903, 342-367; 937, 1319-1331; 1008, 3397-
3412; WA 56, 228, 12-13; 237, 19-28; 238, 28 – 239, 8; 336, 7-17; WA 57, b185, 9 – b186, 12; AWA 2, 
132, 9-16; 200, 2 – 201, 2; WA 5, 418, 9-15. 
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to be present in the visible object by the light of faith). The opinions of existentialist 
Luther researchers who deny the connection of faith to an anthropological capacity are 
correct, if we consider the capacities as belonging to the natural constitution of the human 
being. However, it clarifies the issue to consider faith (i.e., the theological intellect) as a 
capacity given by grace itself, or at least as analogous to such a capacity – in the sense it 
has an anthropological function analogous to the superior part of the intellect. However, it 
is not a capacity possessed by the human being, but rather created, sustained and 
actualized by the illumination of faith alone.  
As we saw in the previous chapter examining the cognition of God in faith, Luther 
understands the relationship between the ontological and cognitive nature of the light of 
faith in the terms of Augustinian illumination, Aristotelian receptivity and mystical union. 
Consequently, for Luther the creation of the theological intellect is also an act of 
illumination and union. Luther often refers to the process of the creation of the intellect of 
faith as eruditio (“instruction”, “teaching”, “education”). In this process the human being 
is drawn away from rude sensual things and made to understand, grasp and embrace the 
invisible and spiritual things in Christ. This concept of eruditio thus means a recognition 
of and experiential knowledge of the spiritual goods. It is achieved in immediate contact 
with those goods (ultimately God) and in withdrawal of the soul by grace from the created 
goods. One can also distinguish, as Luther does in the passage from the Operationes in 
Psalmos quoted above, between 1) eruditio as a drawing away from the sensual, through 
the Cross and the tribulations; and 2) the creation of the intellect and infusion of faith as 
the grasping of Christ and the spiritual and invisible goods in him. Moreover, in this 
process the person is not only drawn away from the sensual, but is created anew as a 
spiritual person. This creation anew is necessary because the understanding of the 
theological objects is possible only for the new creation of faith, the novus homo 
interior.
669
 What is important is the ontological nature of the object of faith. The object of 
faith is Christ as the internal Word, working through the external word. In this process 
Christ grants the believer the understanding of the external (i.e., access to the spiritual 
internal goods hidden in external things). The internal eternal Word is the understanding, 
which shows the invisible in the external Word and incarnational reality.
670
 In this sense, 
the subject and object of faith are both divine.
671
 The subject is divine, as having become a 
partaker of the divine nature as participant in Christ.
672
 The objects are divine things 
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 WA 55, I, 290, 4; 290 gloss 1; 360 gloss 1; 362 glosses 10 and 11; 520, 4-8; 520 glosses 17 and 18; 
524 gloss 1; 546, 9-10; 546 gloss 1; WA 55, II, 56, 19 – 58, 1; 123, 24 – 124, 20; 224, 2-7; 238, 52-29; 240, 
33-52; 481, 481-488; 944, 2970-2980; AWA 2, 107, 10 - 108, 14; WA 5, 410, 31 – 411, 34. See also chapter 
2.4.2.1. 
670
 Luther speaks in at least two ways of this distinction. The first is the distinction between letter and 
spirit. In this context, Luther refers to the letter as an empty, hollow and a slow reed (calamus) which is 
given content by the Spirit, a reed that is either contrasted to the letter as a quickly writing reed, or to a live 
tongue, which gives the spiritual understanding of the external letter. See WA 55, II, 243, 90 – 245, 155; 
246, 182-195; 323, 378 – 325, 427; 430, 132 – 432, 204. The second is the distinction between the external 
and the internal Word. Luther affirms that the external word is imperfect and and unintelligible until God 
speaks with his internal Word (i.e., faith), which unites the believer with the invisible and gives the correct 
understanding of the external Word as referring to its internal and invisible consummation. See WA 55, I, 
220 gloss 9;  WA 56, 406, 16 – 410, 19. 
671
 AWA 2, 107, 20 – 108, 5; 292, 18 – 293, 10. 
672
 See chapter 3.3.1.1. 
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existing in and under the external visible signs.
673
 Thus the content of faith is not 
propositional in the primary sense. Luther emphasizes the point, that externally hearing, 
that Christ is God is not enough, if God does not in the spirit internally reveal this to be 
true.
674
 Thus even the text in which Luther speaks of intellect as referring to the object and 
not capacity continues with the definition of eruditio and intellectus as the knowledge of 
invisible, divine and celestial things. However, this knowledge is connected to Christ. 
There is no true intellect (or only a dead and empty intellect) unless it is actualized in 
connection to Christ in faith.
675
 This is the sense in which the intellect is not a power of 
the soul (as it does not belong to the soul’s natural constitution), but rather requires the 
external light of faith in order to be actualized. Accordingly, Luther describes the creation 
of faith as the removal of the impediment of the intellect (that is, ignorance) by divine 
illumination. This illumination purifies and teaches the intellect and affect and liberates 
and justifies the heart. Luther speaks of it also as the writing in the heart of the believer by 
the finger of the Holy Spirit of living, shining and burning letters which illumine and 
kindle the heart. He refers to this entire process as divine instruction (divina eruditio).
676
 
                                                 
673
 See chapters 2.2.3 and 2.3. 
674
 WA 55, II, 734, 109-118: “[109] 93, 8 Intelligite insipientes in populo; et stulti aliquando sapite. 
[110] Quia Deus in humanitate apparuit, non potuit ex sensibus nisi homo percipi; [111] ideo intellectu opus 
est, quem dat fides. Isaie 7.: ‘Nisi credideritis, [112] non permanebitis.’ Caro et sanguis nunquam possent 
reuelare hunc hominem [113] Bl 185 v esse Deum verum, nisi spiritus prius reuelaret et* spiritui crederetur. 
[114] Non enim sufficit reuelari et audire Christum esse Deum, nisi quis [115] consentiat auditis et reuelatis; 
alioquin quis non audiuit? Si ergo intellectus [116] 93, 9 habetur, facile persuadetur quod sequitur: Qui 
plantauit aurem, non [117] audiet? Ideo premisit: ‘Intelligite et sapite’, alioquin frustra suadetur et [118] 
auditur.” 
675
 WA 55, II, 179, 79 – 180, 107: “Et hoc vult Titulus | dicens: Eruditio [80] Dauid. Quia intellectu per 
fidem de istis docemur Et non sensu aut [81] ratione. [82] ‘Intellectus’ in scrip⌊turis sanctis potius ab obiecto 
quam potentia nomen [83] habet, contrario quam in philosophia. Est enim ‘Intellectus’ cognitio [84] vel 
notitia ‘sensus Christi’, de quo Apostolus 1. Corin. 1. et 2. excellenter [85] docet, quoniam ‘Sapientiam 
loquimur’, inquit, ‘absonditam in mysterio, [86] quam nemo principum huius s culi cognouit.’ Et est 
breuiter nihil aliud [87] nisi sapientia crucis Christi, que ‘gentibus stultitia et Iud is Scandalum est’, [88] 
Scil. intelligere, Quod filius Dei est incarnatus et crucifixus et mortuus et [89] suscitatus propter nostram 
salutem. De huius sapientie Intellectu intelligitur [90] titulus Psal⌊mi, quando dicit: ‘Eruditio Dauid’ vel 
‘Intellectus Dauid’, [91] scil. ipsi datus. Sed quia totum hoc est in fide et non in sensu neque ratione, [92] 
Ideo Etiam Intellectus hominum in scrip⌊turis dicitur Sensualitas, [93] eo quod non nisi sensibilia capiat, 
quantumcunque sit subtilis et acutus et [94] prudens. Sic Apost⌊olus ait ‘Prudentia carnis’ i. e. carnalis 
hominis, qui [95] vtique habet intellectum, in quo sit prudentia, ‘mors est’. Quare hic dicit: [96] 31, 9 Sicut 
equus et mulus, sic sunt omnes, qui hunc intellectum non [97] habent, qui est de Inuisibilibus, diuinis et 
celestibus, eo quod solum visibilia [98] intelligant et sentiant, quod etiam ‘equus et mulus’ facit. Intelligere 
[99] itaque est Spiritualia et mysteria salutis et grati  Dei agnoscere; vnde [100] vsus loquendi obtinuit 
dicere mysteria redemptionis et incarnationis, eo [101] quod non nisi mysticis pateant et spiritualibus, Non 
autem hominibus, [102] quibus est potius stultitia, quia ipsi sunt stulti ‘equi et muli’; ideo primum [103] illos 
oportet mutari, vt sic mysteria, que sunt  terna, cognoscant. Qualis [104] enim quisque est, taliter Iudicat. 
Sed ipsi sunt ‘equi et muli’; ideo ista pro [105] nihilo Iudicant, quia non sentiunt ea. Tales sunt, qui de 
immortalitate [106] anime, de Inferno et celo et Deo, de Christo fabulas esse putant. Et Iud i [107] precipue 
de Christo, Et post illos heretici similiter.” 
676
 WA 55, II, 743, 105 – 744, 116: “[105] Bl 188 Tercio ex terrore et minis allicit. Quia si ‘super omnes 
deos Magnus’, [106] ergo nullus potest de manu eius eruere. Deut. 32.: ‘Et non est, qui de manu [107] mea 
possit eruere.’ Qui ergo nec potestate nec dignitate nec bonitate, quibus [108] ille rex magnus est, mouetur, 
quomodo potest moueri? Sine dubio insensibilis [109] est. Narratur autem ideo potissimum magnitudo eius, 
Quia [110] homo est in terra visus; ideo a Iud is non reputatur Deus, vt non sint excusabiles, [111] si non 
veniant. Et ita remouet Impedimentum intellectus, scil. [112] ignorantiam. Consequenter etiam 
impedimentum affectus, scil. ‘Quoniam [113] non repellet Dominus’ etc., licet etiam ante remouerit idem, 
Quoniam [114] Magnus Dominus. Immo vbicunque illuminat, simul accendit, simul [115] erudit intellectum 
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What is clear from this description is that the knowledge of spiritual things comes ab 
extra, through divine revelation received internally. Unfortunately, Luther does not give a 
very clear description of how this illumination technically functions with regard to the 
intellect. Nevertheless, certain preliminary points can be noted.  
First, as pointed out earlier, Luther often refers to the intellect as “the eye of the 
mind”.677 Consequently, he describes original sin is as “blindness of the intellect”. The 
remaining eyes of the flesh (or the eyes of reason) are “bestial” and not proper to man, 
because they are fixed on the visible things, turned away from God who is the truth, the 
proper object of the intellect.
678
 In the infusion of faith God illumines the eye of the mind 
and removes its blindness so that believers can see God, even in all things.
679
 Luther refers 
to this event as the “removal of the veil of the letter”, or “the veil of Moses”.680 This figure 
aptly illustrates Luther’s understanding of faith: With regard to the objects of 
comprehension, their external and sensual covering is removed, so that their internal and 
invisible content can be grasped. Here the veil stands for the sensual covering, the letter. 
Luther refers to the veil which covered the face of Moses so that the brightness of God, 
which shone from his face because he had looked at God face to face, was not seen by the 
“sensual” Jews. With regard to the subject who comprehends, however, the veil of the 
letter also refers to the Tabernacle as a representation of the human being, as its interior 
                                                                                                                                                   
et affectum, sicut est natura lucis. Prius enim purgauit, [116] cum dixit: ‘Venite exultemus Domino’ etc., 
Qui vocauit de loco, vbi sunt.” 
WA 2, 469, 7-20: “Ab hac igitur impuritate [8] [Apgsch. 15, 9.] cordis nihil nisi fides liberat, ut Act. xv. 
Fide purificans corda eorum, [9] [Tit. 1, 15.] ut sic stet verbum Pauli Tit. i. Omnia munda mundis, immundis 
vero et [10] [Röm. 2, 21.] incredulis nihil mundum. Eadem regula Rho. ij. dicit: Qui doces non furandum, 
[11] furaris &c. interprete beato Augustino: ‘furaris’, scilicet non opere [12] quod doces non faciendum, sed 
rea voluntate. [13] Quare nisi doctrina fidei, qua cor purificatur et iustificatur, reveletur, [14] omnis omnium 
praeceptorum eruditio literalis et paterna traditio est. Praeceptum [15] enim docet, quae sint facienda. Quae 
cum fuerint impossibilia, [16] doctrina fidei (id est Euangelium) docet, quo modo fiant possibilia. Haec [17] 
enim docet ad gratiam dei confugere et implorare ipsummet deum Magistrum [18] et doctorem, qui digito 
sui spiritus scribat in corda nostra suas literas vivas [19] et lucentes et ardentes, quibus illuminati et accensi 
clamemus ‘abba, pater’. [20] Et haec non est paterna, sed divina eruditio.” 
677
 See p. 99, with reference to WA 55, I, 278, 2-4; 278 gloss 11, 12-17; WA 55, II, 170, 17-18. See also 
WA 55, I, 770, 6-7; 774, 9-11; 790, 23-27; WA 55, II, 342, 118-119; 903, 342-367; WA 5, 479, 12-18. 
678
 WA 55, II, 903, 350-360. See also WA 55, I, 704, 21-23; 705 gloss 9; WA 55, II, 524, 517-518; WA 
56, 75 gloss 1; 312, 6-10; 355, 19-26; 356, 17 – 357, 17; WA 57, a89, 2-19; WA 2, 537, 25 – 538, 17. 
679
 WA 55, I, 632, 15-16: “Et despexit heb⌊reus: ‘respicit’14 ·15 oculus meus personalis Vel mysticus, 
qui est omnis illuminatus fide inimicos meos Iud os” 
WA 55, I, 770, 4-10: “viuifica me per gratiam fidei in spiritu et custodiam sermones tuos sic viuens, vt 
proposui        q. d. Mortui enim non possunt custodire
13
. [118, 18 ] Reuela per lucem fidei oculos meos 
mentis, qui sunt mei proprie, non bestiarum : et consyderabo illustratus scil. mirabilia de lege tua quia 
sicut Christus, ita et verbum eius est ‘mirabile’, scil. Euangelium. [118, 19] Incola ego sum in terra q. d. 
necesse habeo illuminari et gratificari, quia non sum angelus, Sed homo” 
WA 55, II, 524, 515-518: “Hic autem dicit, quod intus de illis tractabit, scil. in spiritu, [516] spiritualia 
eorum intuendo, Vbi oculi carnis ea videre nequeunt. Et [517] quid moramur? Omnia olim facta mirabilia 
Vsque hodie fiunt per fidem; [518] fides enim cecos illuminat, claudos stabilit, surdos audire facit.” 
See also WA 55, I, 774, 9-11; 790, 21-27; WA 55, II, 649, 136-148; 903, 342-364; WA 56, 308, 21-24. 
680
 WA 55, I, 474, 2-6: “illuminet per fidei gratiam in Christo vultum suum super nos ‘auferendo 
velamen’ liter  et dorsum. et misereatur nostri est repetitio eiusdem, Sed non est in hebreo. Sela. [66, 3] 
Sic illuminet Vt cognoscamus intellectu et affectu in terra Iud a viam tuam i. e. que tibi placet et qua ad te 
peruenitur, que est Christus” 
WA 55, II, 903, 342-343: “[342] 118, 18 Reuela Oculos meos, i. e. reuelabis prophetice. Vel scil. mentis 
mee [343] per lucem spiritualis intelligentie, amoto velo Mosi.” 
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was separated from the forecourt by a veil.
681
 Through faith, a person enters through the 
first veil into the Sanctuary and is changed from the external man into the internal man, so 
that his eye is turned towards the invisible things which reside within.
682
 Having turned 
away from the created things, he now sees God face-to-face, as did Moses.
683
 This vision 
takes place in the light of faith: the light of the face of God of Ps. 4:7, the central text in 
the tradition of illumination.
684
 It is revelation given by the Holy Spirit from Heaven. Thus 
Luther even speaks of illumination as elevation by the Spirit to the contemplation of 
divine things and of the divinity of Christ. Noteworthy here with regard to the function of 
the light as the light of understanding (i.e., the intellect) is that the light of faith and the 
face-to-face vision of God especially signify the revelation of the divinity of Christ. The 
light of the faith thus shows that Christ crucified is God. Luther stresses that in this life the 
believer should occupy himself with the vision, knowledge and clarity of God given by the 
spiritual light of faith.
 685
 In this sense, the light of faith is not immediate and open to all, 
but connected to the humanity of Christ. It is received only through Christ and in 
connection with Christ, who as the Incarnate Word purifies the eyes of the heart. He is the 
                                                 
681
 There were two veils in the Tabernacle, the first between the forecourt and the holy, the second 
between the holy and the Holy of Holies. Among other things, the veils represent for Luther the transition 
from the Synagogue to the Church by the light of faith, and the progression from the Church Militant to the 
heavenly glory by the light of glory. See chapters 2.3.3.3, 2.4.1.1, 3.2.3 and 3.4.2. 
682
 WA 55, I, 631 gloss 8: “GLOSSA:8) maxime, quia malis bene est, Bonis autem male, quod nullus 
hominum potest concordare Nisi spiritu reuelante, vt psal. 72.: ‘Donec intrem in sanctuarium Domini’. Hec 
enim per intellectum et fidem tantummodo cognoscuntur.” 
WA 55, II, 342, 115-121: “Vnde ait: ‘Existimabam [116] vt cognoscerem, hoc labor est ante me’, scil. ex 
mea inuestigatione id non [117] apprehenderem, nisi per fidem mihi reuelaretur aliunde, scil. a Deo; ideo 
[118] sequitur: ‘donec intrem’, scil. per fidem a visibilibus vertendo oculum ad [119] Inuisibilia, ‘in 
sanctuarium Dei’, i. e. in mysterium et Ecclesiam et sanctum [120] non s culare Sed spirituale, ‘Et sic 
intelligam’, i. e. intelligens fiam, [121] ‘in nouissimis eorum.’” 
See also WA 55, I, 520 glosses 17 and 18. 
683
 See WA 55, I, 244 gloss 11; 476 gloss 3. See also footnote 600. 
684
 On Luther’s interpretation of this Psalm, see chapter 3.2.3. 
685
 WA 55, II, 740, 8 – 741, 36: “[8] 94, 2  r occupemus  aciem eius. Hoc primo exponitur de aduentu 
eius, [9] tam primo quam secundo. Secundo et melius, vt in glosa. Quia Apostolo [10] docente sepe dictum 
est, Quomodo nos reuelata facie gloriam Domini speculamur. [11] Ergo faciem Domini in hac vita nullus 
videt nisi per fidem. Quare [12] ‘preoccupare faciem eius’ Est fide preuenire diuinitatis eius, vt Psal. 4.: [13] 
‘Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine’. Breuiter ergo ‘facies [14] Domini’ Est ipsa reuelatio 
diuinitatis Christi, que sub litera fuit velata [15] et humanitate, sicut facies Mosi sub velamine. Sed ascenso 
c lo reuelauit [16] eam per spiritum sanctum, sicut promisit dicens: ‘Ille me clarificabit’. [17] Vnde recte 
addit ‘in confessione’, vt exprimat quo modo facies eius [18] possit preoccupari, scil. non in clara visione, 
Sed in fide et confessione. [19] Fides enim confitetur Domino. Et notandum, quod [20] ⌈1.⌉ ‘pr occupare’ 
primo ponitur vt in glosa, Scil. contra diabolum, ne [21] ab eo preoccupemur. ⌈2.⌉ Secundo, i. e. ante omnia 
et pre omnibus festinemus [22] hanc fidem occupare, q. d. Caueamus omni modo, ne aliquid huic [23] 
preferamus aut aliud occupemus vel potius occupemur, Sicut illi qui dixerunt: [24] ‘Villam emi, habe me 
excusatum’. Illi enim volunt prius sua occupare [25] et ea, que Christi sunt, nouissime querere, Contra 
verbum Domini: ‘primum [26] querite regnum c lorum et hec omnia adiicientur vobis’. Sic et Iud i [27] 
prius sua quam spiritualia quesierunt. Et ita videtur Apostolus intelligere, [28] Quando exhortatur secundum 
hunc psalmum dicens ⌈Hebr. 4.⌉: ‘festinemus [29] ergo ingredi in requiem illam’. Q. d. omnia postponamus 
et ante [30] omnia hanc faciem occupemus, etiam si alia nunquam contingeret occupare. [31] Hoc enim 
Iustum et equum est. Iniquum autem est prius dorsum (i. e. [32] literam) occupare et ignorantiam Christi. 
Sicut enim facies Christi est notitia [33] Christi, qu  est per fidem eius et lumen spiritus, Ita dorsum eius est 
[34] ignorantia eius, qu  est per infidelitatem et c citatem liter . Ergo ante [35] omnia hanc notitiam, hanc 
fidem, hanc faciem, hoc lumen spiritus, hanc [36] claritatem festinemus occupare. ⌈Sic Psal. 87.: ‘Et oratio 
mea pre[ue]niet [37] te’, etc.⌉ ⌈3.⌉ ” 
See also WA 55, I, 290 gloss 1; 299 gloss 3; 348 gloss 2; 780 gloss 52; WA 55, II, 337, 2-5. 
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content of faith both as human and as God, and is the access (accessus) to the spiritual and 
intellectual world. The incarnatorial aspect is thus a defining factor  of the light of faith, 
which separates it from the light of glory. However, the intellect of faith is not limited 
only to understanding the divinity of Christ. It also provides understanding of intellectual 
and spiritual things in Christ: that is, in Christ and along with Christ. The entire spiritual 
and intellectual world is opened through him – but only through him.686 This 
understanding extends to the understanding of Christ as the true content of all things. In 
this sense, the spiritual and intellectual world is not limited to Christ, but it contains the 
understanding of all things in the eternal Word. However, one can also say, that there is no 
spiritual world besides Christ, because all spiritual things reside in him and point to him as 
the reality signified by all things and as their final end.
687
 Thus even though the aspect of 
the humanity of Christ remains a defining factor between the light of faith and the light of 
glory, nevertheless the distinction between the light of faith and the light of glory lies not 
in that the object of the light of faith is only Christ in a limited and restrictive sense. 
Rather, the distinction lies in (1) the necessity of the Incarnate One as the “access” 
(accessus) to the understanding of the invisible world, and (2) the difference in the degree 
of clarity between the light of faith and the light of glory. In faith, God and the spiritual 
world are seen only enigmatically, not yet in full clarity and with direct vision, as they will 
be in the light of glory.
688
 
Second, in the previous chapter we discussed the ontological nature of the light of faith 
with regard to God and discerned three approaches: Augustinian, Aristotelian and 
mystical. Here, however, the question is: what is the ontological nature of the light as an 
agent of intellection with regard to the created things that are understood by it? As noted 
above, Luther holds that the light of the natural reason creates an impediment for the 
spiritual light, and it must be extinguished or made darkness in order for the spiritual light 
to be received.
689
 Luther describes the light of faith as “the light of truth” (lumen veritatis) 
which illumines the intellect like the visible light illumines the bodily eyes.
690
 The proper 
object of the intellect is truth (veritas), and it is precisely this light which makes the 
believer capable of understanding spiritual truths.
691
 Through the light of the intellect, the 
                                                 
686
 See e.g. WA 55, I, 360 gloss 1; WA 55, II, 220, 2 - 15; 718, 11-16; 801, 51 - 802,73; WA 56, 298, 21 
– 300, 8; 407, 12-28. On the role of the human nature of Christ as the access to the spiritual world, see also 
chapter 3.4.2. 
687
 See e.g. WA 55, I, 486 gloss 7, 4-10; WA 55, II, 342, 126-140.  On Christ as the end and reality 
signified by all things see also chapter 2.3.1. 
688
 See WA 55, II, 590, 21 - 591, 33; 652, 229-230; 801, 68 - 802, 73; WA 57, a55, 14-24; WA 2, 457, 
20-33. 
689
 WA 55, II, 722, 134-142; WA 56, 238, 28 – 239, 9; 356, 17 – 357, 17. 
690
 WA 55, I, 790, 23-27: “Lucerna pedibus meis verbum tuum euangelium et totius Scrip⌊ture, 
Aug⌊ustinus: quia verbum vocis continet veritatem pro intellectu, sicut lucerna lumen pro oculis : et lumen 
veritatis, que sola intellectum illuminat, sicut solis radii visibiles oculos semitis meis” 
691
 WA 55, II, 722, 134-142: “[134] 91, 3 Et Quod dictum est veritatem per noctem, ‘Nox’ hic et 
‘mane’ pro [135] eodem possunt capi, sicut et misericordia et veritas idem sunt et per idem [136] 
‘annunciare’ nunciantur. Est enim Christus et verbum Christi misericordia [137] et veritas, Sed ideo 
distinguit, Quia Veritas propri  intellectum respicit. [138] Sed hunc oportet noctem fieri et captiuari, vt non 
sua luce offendat in [139] veritatem. Cum enim veritas sit lux intelligibilis, Lux autem spargitur [140] non 
per lucem, Sed per tenebras, Et Sic, Quia simul non stant in intellectu [141] lux et lux, ideo noctem ibi 
oportet esse. Et hinc Quilibet Christianus [142] et tota Ecclesia nox dicitur, vt ‘Nox Nocti indicat 
scientiam’.” 
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person becomes capable of and receptive to (capax) spiritual things, able to understand the 
invisible in Christ, the Scriptures, one’s fellow human beings and in creation.692 By faith 
he internally receives the intellectual light (lux intellectus) with which he can understand 
the external beauty of the world as referring to God.
693
 Thus in these short remarks of 
Luther regarding the light of faith as the light of the intellect we can as well discern 
elements from all three approaches analysed in the previous chapter. The intellect of faith 
is defined in a very Augustinian manner as that which results from the illumination of the 
mind. This illumination is also connected to union, which is described in mystical terms, a 
union with the internal, eternal, incomprehensible Word who grants understanding of the 
external word. Furthermore, in order to receive the intellectual light of faith, the natural 
light of the mind is made darkness, an idea which bears traces of the Aristotelian emphasis 
on passivity.
694
 In general, we can define the theological intellect as the capacity of 
understanding invisible things present in visible things, a capacity created by the infusion 
of the intellectual divine light of faith. In this sense in its general outline Luther’s theory 
follows the Augustinian doctrine of illumination.  
There remains, however, the more difficult  question of how the noetics of the light 
function. What does it mean that the light is an intellectual light and a light of truth? Does 
the light, with regard to its being the light of understanding, impress on the intellect 
specific conceptual truths or principles? Or is the light, also as the light which illumines 
the intellect, incomprehensible and unanalysable until it becomes actualized in the process 
of intellection, such that only the result of the process can be described as conceptual and 
comprehensible? Even though Luther does not give very clear answers regarding the 
relationship of the intellect and the divine intellectual light, he does more closely describe 
the function of the theological intellect with regard to the objects of intellection. For 
Luther a fundamental opposition exists between the intellect (of faith) and the senses. 
Those who merely see or sense, do not understand the works of God.
695
 Luther 
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 WA 55, I, 798 gloss 107. 
693
 WA 55, II, 801, 51-64: “[51] Tercio Est Dominum ex operibus confiteri et honorare, i. e. sicut [52] 
‘magnificare’ est eius opera magna estimare et agnoscere, Ita ‘Confiteri’ [53] est omnia opera eius 
confessionem eius intelligere et videre et decorem. [54] Sed hic opus est luce intellectus et quod primo 
ipsum Dominus confessione [55] et decore ornauerit intus, quam ab eo possit decorari et confiteri [56] foris. 
⌈⌈Maxime sanctos et Ecclesiam eius, in quibus lucet confessio et [57] decor eius.⌉⌉ Omnia enim opera Dei 
sunt Confessio Dei, laudantia, [58] ostendentia, confitentia Deum. Similiter omnia sunt decor eius, quia eum 
[59] decorum et pulcherrimum ostendunt. Sed hoc non videt in rebus et creaturis, [60] nisi qui ipse intus 
decorem et confessionem habeat a spiritu. Non autem [61] habet, nisi prius negationem sui et humilitatem 
feditatis sue habeat. [62] Vnde qui se aliquid esse putant, Multam feditatem putant in rebus esse et [63] 
Deum neque esse neque decorum esse. Quia ipsi nondum fedi et negati [64] sibi sunt, Omnia enim sunt 
pulcherrima et recte Deum confitentia.” 
694
 On nature as light and faith as darkness see also chapters 2.4.1.1, 2.4.2.2 and 3.4.3. 
695
 WA 55, I, 348 gloss 2: “GLOSSA: 2) [1]‘Beatus qui intelligit’ etc. est idem sensus, quem Dominus 
exprimit [2]Matt. xi.: ‘Beatus, qui non fuerit schandalisatus in me’, quia talis solum [3]videt secundum 
carnem, Non autem ‘intelligit’ super istum ‘pauperem’, [4]i. e. non plus sentit de eo quam, quod videt, scil. 
esse purum hominem. [5]Et sic Iud i pro maxima parte sunt Schandalisati, Quia non ‘intellexerunt’, [6]Sed 
solum senserunt, i. e. non rationales Sed sensitiui homines [7]fuerunt.” 
WA 55, II, 157, 12-17: “[12] 27, 5 Recte ergo dicit: Non Intellexerunt, Quia ‘Intelligere’, i. e. 
spiritualiter [13] intueri, necesse est opera ista, alioquin nunquid non viderunt [14] opera Domini? vtique, 
immo senserunt et cognouerunt. Sed non sicut [15] Apostoli, de quibus ‘Annunciauerunt opera Dei et facta 
eius intellexerunt’, [16] i. e. intelligentiam habuerunt, quod essent opera intelligibilia, i. e. [17] fidelia seu 
spiritualia per fidem. ‘C li enim annunciant opera manuum Dei.’” 
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accordingly emphasizes that the information given by the intellect of faith is never sensual 
or deduced from the senses, but is purely intellectual. It is given as a divine revelation in 
the form of spiritual, internal intuition in the light of faith, in which the invisible things 
that are its proper objects are seen.
696
 Gloss 17 to Ps. 72 in the Dictata is perhaps the place 
in which the nature of the knowledge received in faith is most clearly defined in relation to 
sense cognition:  
I considered thought and meditated so that I would understand this difference and 
reason [ratio] of good and evil: this namely to understand work of considerable difficulty 
is before me according to the eye that only sees, were I not changed into another from 
myself
17
 Until I entered from considering the external sensible things the Sanctuary 
where God dwells in the spirit, into the contemplation of God in the heart: and so I 
understood had intellection, not only sensation of their last things the final things i.e., 
spiritual things.
697
 
                                                                                                                                                   
WA 55, I, 386, 7-11: “[48, 21] Homo quilibet tantum ‘secundum hominem’ viuit cum in honore vero et 
 terno esset esse posset non intellexit23 quia solum sentit, i. e. sensibilia attendit        verbum abso⌊lutum : 
       Et ideo comparatus est iumentis insipientibus ignorantibus diuina et spiritualia. et similis factus est 
illis Stultus, sapiens tantum carnalia.” 
WA 55, II, 222, 57 – 223, 66: “[57] Bl 51v 40, 7 Et si ingrediebatur, Vt Videret. Hoc ‘Ingrediebatur’ 
ad carnem [58] intelligitur. Similiter ‘Vt videret’ i. e. obseruaret. Non ait: vt disceret, seque [59] 3, 232 | 
retur, laudaret, neque vt intelligeret. Sed tantummodo, vt secundum [60] carnem videret Christum, hominem 
eum solum credens ac querens Inuenire [61] quid, quod reprehenderet, accusaret. Et vniuersis peruersis et 
suspiciosis [62] idem est hoc ingenium, Ingredi scil., vt videant et obseruent. [63] Quare autem ‘videant’? 
Quia non ‘intelligunt’ i. e. non cogitant de proximo [64] secundum spiritum et animam, Nec quid sit aut fieri 
potest intus coram [65] Deo (hoc enim non videri Sed intelligi tantum potest fide pia), Sed tantum [66] 
vident foris, quid sit secundum carnem.” 
WA 55, II, 341, 97-110: “[94] 63, 10 Et annunciabunt opus Dei et opus eius intelligent, i. e. opus 
redemptionis [95] per Christum fact  ⌈et totius vit  Christi⌉, et intelligent, quoniam [96] opus Dei est 
Iudicium et veritas et  quitas, Non autem vmbra et vanitas, [97] vt Psal. infra 110. et Supra 27. Quia Iud i 
carnales Expectant a [98] Domino solum opera visibilia et vmbratilis huius vit  salutaria. Sed opera [99] Dei 
sunt Spiritualia et  tern  vit  operatiua. Ideo non possunt ab illis intelligi, [100] Sed ab Apostolis et 
fidelibus. Ideo enim opera eius dicuntur veritas. [101] Opera enim Dei sunt intelligibilia i. e. solum intellectu 
[102] et ⌈i. e.⌉ fide perceptibilia in spe, non in re. Nam Qui [103] sensum tantummodo sequitur, in cruce 
Christi et in Ecclesi  [104] su  directione necessario Schandalisatur, cum non [105] nisi penas et priuationes 
huius vit  in ea videat. Et ita [106] fit ei crux Christi schandalum. Quare intellectu opus est, ne stultitia [107] 
3, 368 nobis sit sapientia Dei. Similiter et opera | Dei in malis viuentibus positiue [108] in hac vita solum 
sunt intellectualia, Quia secundum spiritum sunt [109] damnati coram Deo, quibus concedit vitam secundum 
carnem. Et ita [110] opera Domini sunt veritas pro sanctis et Iudicium pro impiis.” 
WA 55, II, 875, 49-53: “[49] ‘Mare Vidit’, i. e. sensu tantum carnis aduertit Christum et verbum eius, 
[50] Sed non intellexit nec intelligere voluit, ideo cecidit. Nam tam Iud i quam [51] gentes, quia non 
predicabantur sensibilia, Sed Inuisibilia, factum est eis [52] verbum crucis scandalum et stultitia et fugerunt 
atque conuersi sunt [53] retrorsum.” 
See also WA 55, I, 290 gloss 1; 386, 5-10; 632 gloss 7; 704, 21 – 706, 1; WA 55, II, 157, 12-17; 179, 79 
– 180, 107; 220, 2 – 221, 16; WA 56, 20-28. 
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 WA 55, I, 520 gloss 17; 780 gloss 52; WA 55, II, 157, 12-17; 481, 481-488; 524, 506 – 525, 524; 649, 
136 – 148; 718, 11-15; 734, 109-113; 825, 723-729; 916, 751-761; 937, 1316-1323; WA 56, 20-28. 
697
 WA 55, I, 520, 1-8: “Existimabam cogitabam et meditabar ut cognoscerem istam diuersitatem et 
rationem bonorum et malorum : hoc scil. cognoscere labor difficile est ante me secundum oculum tantum 
videntem, nisi fiam alius a me
17
. [72, 17] Donec intrem a sensibilibus consyderandis, que sunt foris in 
sanctuarium dei
18
 vbi Deus habitat        in spiritum        in conspectum Dei        in corde : et sic intelligam 
intellectionem habeam, non tantum sensationem in nouissimis eorum vltimis i. e. spiritualibus.” 
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Gloss 17: That is, by the means of visible things and the senses I could not understand why 
there is this difference, but by intellect and faith. For faith, which is not sensual cognition 
and does not proceed from the senses, but is purely intellectual and from above, itself 
teaches how such good things are evil to them, and the evil of the righteous is good for 
them. Thence follows: ’Truly work is before me’, but not before God. Therefore come 
before God and you will see. He who sees spiritual things is before God. He who only 
looks at visible things is before himself.
698
 
In this text the Psalmist ponders the reason why those who are evil seem to prosper 
while the righteous suffer. Luther’s answer is that this difference cannot be understood by 
means of visible things and the senses, “by the eye that only sees”. Understanding only 
results when one by faith turns inward, is changed to another from oneself (i.e., becomes 
new man) and enters the Sanctuary (i.e., spirit) so that he is before God (ante Deum). 
There, faith given as an intellectual cognition from above teaches how visible good things 
are bad for those who are evil, and visible bad things good for the righteous. The one who 
stands in spirit in the view of God (conspectum Dei) sees the spiritual things, which refer 
in this passage especially the final ends of things. When a person sees the ends of things 
by faith, he is capable of understanding the reasons (ratio) behind the Psalmist’s 
puzzlement. The knowledge of those things is purely intellectual; it is not based on 
anything perceived by the senses, but on direct and immediate revelation, i.e., the light of 
faith, which shows these things. This idea of faith seeing the final ends seems to have a 
connection to the four causes scheme, which Luther also uses in other works. Luther 
emphasizes that reason and philosophy can find material and sometimes formal causes, 
but the efficient cause and the final cause of things are understood only by faith, as they 
cannot be abstracted from sense perception.
699
 
We can see, therefore, that according to Luther the light of faith works by 
‘superimposing’ the intellectual knowledge upon that which is perceived, in the sense that 
there is no internal relation in the cognitive process between the sensible things that are 
understood, and the end result of the act of understanding. The ratios (i.e., the criteria, 
reasons or ends under which the sensual data is ‘seen’ in the mind and understood) come 
directly from divine revelation in the light of faith. Nevertheless, the end result of 
understanding is not separate from the reality of the object that is understood, but rather 
there is an external ontological or metaphysical link between them. That metaphysical link 
is God (i.e., Christ or the Word) as the ‘reality’ which already contains the final ends 
(novissmis) and the true content of things. Thus Luther can state that the sign (i.e., the 
visible thing) is understood at that point when the reality itself is seen (i.e., by the light of 
                                                 
698
 WA 55, I, 520 gloss 17: “GLOSSA:17) q. d. secundum visibilia et sensum non possum cognoscere, 
quare sit ista differentia, Sed per Intellectum et fidem, fides enim, que est Non sensitiua nec ex sensitiua 
procedens cognitio, Sed desursum solum intellectualis, Ipsa docet, Quia Bona talia sunt eis mala Et mala 
Iustorum sunt eis Bona, vnde sequitur ‘Veruntamen Labor ante me’, Sed non ante Deum. Veni ergo ante 
Deum et videbis. Est autem ante Deum, qui Spiritualia videt. Est ante se, qui visibilia tantum respicit.” 
699
 The idea is reflected in Luthers famous De homine disputation, on which see Ebeling 1982, 333-431, 
who offers also a comprehensive review of the Scholastic background of the causes and a textual overview. 
See also Lohse 1958, 63-65; 75-76. Interestingly also Bonaventure seems to connect faith especially to 
understanding the origin and the end of the world, see Itinerarium I, 12. 
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faith).
700
 But over against the Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding of the action of 
the intellect, in which the forms are transmitted to the soul via sense perception, and the 
light of the intellect abstracts the intelligible forms from the sensible forms, Luther’s 
understanding of the work of the theological intellect holds that the intelligible content is 
not present and mediated via sense perception, but rather is added directly by the light of 
faith. And this clarifies the matter of why the intellect must be empty of its natural light: 
its natural opinion or reasoning (sensus) based on sense perception. Furthermore, for 
Luther the link between the object and the end result as well as the guarantee of truth lies 
not in the process of abstraction, but is guaranteed by the ontological connection between 
the object and the light of understanding (i.e., God). In this sense Luther’s theory follows 
the internal logic of Augustine’s and Bonaventure’s doctrine of illumination, in which the 
divine illumination functions as a guarantee of truth and certitude. The fact that Luther 
attributes divine illumination only to the theological intellect, unlike Augustine and 
Bonaveture, explains why for Luther the natural reason is so weak and prone to err in its 
discernment. Furthermore, Luther’s connection to the Augustinian rather than the Thomist 
interpretation of illumination clarifies why for Luther the theological intellect is not 
properly speaking a capacity (i.e., an inherent ability residing in the soul), but act or 
actuality. For Luther, without actual illumination by the light of faith there exists no 
understanding. 
Finally, now that we have examined the ontological and noetic nature of the intellect of 
faith, it is time to examine the concrete understanding it provides with regard to the 
objects that are understood by it. As we have mentioned above, for Luther the primary 
object of the theological intellect is Christ. Faith, as the theological intellect, shows 
Christ’s divinity hidden under his humanity. This hiddenness itself follows Luther's idea 
of God hiding under contraries.
701
 Therefore, the invisible divine good that is present in 
Christ cannot be discerned by the natural cognitive means of the fallen person, but only by 
the intellect of faith. This is the primary function of the intellect of faith with regard to 
external objects of understanding. Luther defines the intellect of faith in its function with 
regard to Christ in the Dictata super Psalterium, explaining the meaning of the title of 
Psalm 31, “Education that makes to understand” (Eruditio intellectificatum)702 as: 
which others have translated as ‘intellect’, i.e., this is a Psalm which teaches to understand, 
which inspired by David made even him understand or be intelligent. This act of making to 
understand, however, does not happen according to human wisdom, but only according to 
the spirit and sense of Christ, about which the Apostle in 1. Cor. 2 beautifully argues that 
only those who are spiritual and those who believe have this intellect. In short, it is nothing 
else than to understand the heavenly, eternal, spiritual and invisible, which takes place by 
faith alone; namely those things, which ‘no eye has seen nor ear heard, those which have 
not risen up in the heart of man’; those which no philosopher and no man, ‘no prince of 
this present time has known’. For this is ‘wisdom hidden in mystery’ and concealed under 
the cover of faith. Ps. 50: ‘Your obscure and secret wisdom you have made manifest to 
                                                 
700
 WA 55, I, 468 gloss 7; 546 glosses 5-6; WA 55, II, 342, 126 – 343, 157; 449, 14-22; 453, 137-155. 
See also chapters 2.2.3 and  2.3. Also Schwarz 1962, 136 notes that the contents of the theological intellect 
are not arrived to by abstraction, but they are given in faith. 
701
 See chapter 2.2.4.3. 
702
 WA 55, I, 290, 4: “Tit. [31, 1] Dauid Eruditio intellectificatum.1” 
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me’. Therefore to know that the Son of God has become man for the sake of our salvation, 
and that all who are outside of him are in sin, this is that ‘Education’ [eruditio], that 
‘Intellect’, which no one knows except by the Holy Spirit. Therefore he begins by saying: 
‘Blessed are those whose transgressions have been forgiven’. The aim of the prophet is, 
taught by his own experience, to instruct all in general in the true knowledge by which all 
are justified and by which their sins are forgiven.
703
 
Here already we can observe the two aspects of the theological intellect in relation to 
Christ. Again, Luther mentions the heavenly, eternal, spiritual and invisible things which 
are accessed by the theological intellect. On the other hand, this knowledge is very 
concretely connected to the Incarnation of Christ. Faith as the theological intellect reveals 
that Christ the Crucified, the suffering human being, is God. Luther is absolutely adamant 
that this knowledge cannot be had without internal divine revelation. Those who view 
Christ only “according to the flesh” see nothing but a human being who suffered a 
shameful death, and are necessarily scandalized by him. But faith reveals the divinity of 
Christ as well as the fallen sinful status of humanity and the nature of Christ’s propitiatory 
death, so that it grants forgiveness of sins and makes righteous the person who believes in 
Christ. In this sense, the functions of faith as an agent of understanding and an agent of 
justification belong together.
704
  
                                                 
703
 WA 55, I, 290 gloss 1: “GLOSSA:1) [1]vnde alii habent ‘Intellectus’, i. e. est Psal⌊mus docens 
intelligere, [2]qui Dauid inspiratus eum quoque fecit intelligere vel esse intelligentem. [3]Ista autem 
intellectificatio non est secundum humanam sapientiam, [4]Sed secundum spiritum et sensum Christi, de 
quo apostolus 1. Corin. 2. [5]pulchre disputat, quoniam solum spirituales et credentes hunc intellectum 
[6]habent. Et breuiter est: non nisi c lestia,  terna et spiritualia et Inuisibilia [7]intelligere, quod fit per solam 
fidem, scil. ea, ‘que oculus non vidit, [8]nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascenderunt’, que nullus 
philosophus [9]et nullus hominum, ‘nullus principum huius s culi cognovit’. [10]Quia hec est ‘sapientia 
abscondita in mysterio’ et in velamento fidei [11]occulta. Psal. L. ‘Incerta et occulta sapientie tu  
manifestasti mihi’. [12]Scire ergo filium Dei esse incarnatum pro salute nostra et extra eum [13]omnes esse 
in peccatis, hec est ‘eruditio’ ista, ‘Intellectus’ iste, quod nemo [14]nisi per spiritum sanctum cognouit. Ideo 
incipit dicens: ‘Beati, quorum [15]remiss  sunt iniquitates.’ Mens prophete est, ⌈quod⌉ Ex suo casu ⌈doctus⌉ 
[16]omnes generaliter erudire ad cognitionem veram, quomodo quis Iustificetur [17]et quomodo peccatum 
remittatur.” 
704
 WA 55, I, 346 gloss 2: “GLOSSA: 2) [1]‘Beatus qui intelligit’ etc. est idem sensus, quem Dominus 
exprimit [2]Matt. xi.: ‘Beatus, qui non fuerit schandalisatus in me’, quia talis solum [3]videt secundum 
carnem, Non autem ‘intelligit’ super istum ‘pauperem’, [4]i. e. non plus sentit de eo quam, quod videt, scil. 
esse purum hominem. [5]Et sic Iud i pro maxima parte sunt Schandalisati, Quia non ‘intellexerunt’, [6]Sed 
solum senserunt, i. e. non rationales Sed sensitiui homines [7]fuerunt.” 
WA 55, II, 222, 57 – 224, 66: “[57] Bl 51v 40, 7 Et si ingrediebatur, Vt Videret. Hoc ‘Ingrediebatur’ 
ad carnem [58] intelligitur. Similiter ‘Vt videret’ i. e. obseruaret. Non ait: vt disceret, seque [59] 3, 232 | 
retur, laudaret, neque vt intelligeret. Sed tantummodo, vt secundum [60] carnem videret Christum, hominem 
eum solum credens ac querens Inuenire [61] quid, quod reprehenderet, accusaret. Et vniuersis peruersis et 
suspiciosis [62] idem est hoc ingenium, Ingredi scil., vt videant et obseruent. [63] Quare autem ‘videant’? 
Quia non ‘intelligunt’ i. e. non cogitant de proximo [64] secundum spiritum et animam, Nec quid sit aut fieri 
potest intus coram [65] Deo (hoc enim non videri Sed intelligi tantum potest fide pia), Sed tantum [66] 
vident foris, quid sit secundum carnem.” 
WA 55, II, 341, 94 – 342, 107: “[94] 63, 10 Et annunciabunt opus Dei et opus eius intelligent, i. e. 
opus redemptionis [95] per Christum fact  ⌈et totius vit  Christi⌉, et intelligent, quoniam [96] opus Dei est 
Iudicium et veritas et  quitas, Non autem vmbra et vanitas, [97] vt Psal. infra 110. et Supra 27. Quia Iud i 
carnales Expectant a [98] Domino solum opera visibilia et vmbratilis huius vit  salutaria. Sed opera [99] Dei 
sunt Spiritualia et  tern  vit  operatiua. Ideo non possunt ab illis intelligi, [100] Sed ab Apostolis et 
fidelibus. Ideo enim opera eius dicuntur veritas. [101] Opera enim Dei sunt intelligibilia i. e. solum intellectu 
[102] et ⌈i. e.⌉ fide perceptibilia in spe, non in re. Nam Qui [103] sensum tantummodo sequitur, in cruce 
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However, as mentioned above, for Luther Christ is also the door to all other knowledge 
concerning spiritual and invisible things. Among these Luther counts the recognition that 
Christ dwells in the poor and despised. However, from the wording of the text it is not 
completely clear whether Luther means all poor and despised in general, the Christians 
who are poor and despised by the world, or perhaps even primarily Christ.
705
 This 
presence and action of God in the weak and despised nevertheless in general manifests the 
nature of the wisdom of God, which is hidden under contraries and not perceptible by 
natural wisdom, but only by the intellect of faith.
706
  
The recognition and knowledge of Christ in faith is also the key to understanding the 
Scripture, as for Luther Christ is “the Sun and Truth in Scripture”.707 He is the fulfilment 
of the Old Testament both in an historical and in a spiritual sense. The intellect of faith 
allows the Christian to understand the Old Testament as referring to the New, and to grasp 
its inner content or nucleus. Luther also refers to this true content as the “spiritual 
                                                                                                                                                   
Christi et in Ecclesi  [104] su  directione necessario Schandalisatur, cum non [105] nisi penas et priuationes 
huius vit  in ea videat. Et ita [106] fit ei crux Christi schandalum. Quare intellectu opus est, ne stultitia [107] 
3, 368 nobis sit sapientia Dei.” 
WA 55, II, 734, 109-116: “[109] 93, 8 Intelligite insipientes in populo; et stulti aliquando sapite. 
[110] Quia Deus in humanitate apparuit, non potuit ex sensibus nisi homo percipi; [111] ideo intellectu opus 
est, quem dat fides. Isaie 7.: ‘Nisi credideritis, [112] non permanebitis.’ Caro et sanguis nunquam possent 
reuelare hunc hominem [113] Bl 185 v esse Deum verum, nisi spiritus prius reuelaret et* spiritui crederetur. 
[114] Non enim sufficit reuelari et audire Christum esse Deum, nisi quis [115] consentiat auditis et reuelatis; 
alioquin quis non audiuit? Si ergo intellectus [116] 93, 9 habetur, facile persuadetur” 
WA 56, 237, 20-28: “[19] Non est Intelligens [3, 11]. [20] Quia Sapientia Dei in abscondito est, 
incognita mundo. ‘Verbum enim [21] caro factum est’ et Sapientia incarnata ac per hoc abscondita nec nisi 
[22] intellectu attingibilis, Sicut Christus non nisi reuelatione cognoscibilis. [23] Quare qui de visibilibus et 
in visibilibus sapientes sunt (quales sunt omnes [24] homines extra fidem et qui Deum ignorant ac futuram 
vitam), non intelligunt, [25] non sapiunt, i. e. non sunt intelligentes, non sapientes, Sed insipientes [26] et 
c ci, Et licet videantur sibi sapientes, tamen stulti facti sunt. [27] Quia non sapientia, que in occultis est, Sed 
qu  humanitus reperiri potuit, [28] sapientes sunt.” 
See also WA 55, II, 531, 686 – 532, 709; 649, 136-148; AWA 2, 106, 17 – 108, 14; 179, 15 – 180, 12. 
705
 WA 55, II, 220, 2 – 221, 20: “[2] 40, 2 Beatus Qui intelligit. Sepe dictum est, Quod ‘intelligere’ in 
[3] Scrip⌊turis non dicatur de iis, qui tantum visibilia et sensibilia cogitant, [4] quia in hoc Brutis comparatur 
homo ⌈⌈quomodo in philosophia capitur, [5] Sed respectu Inuisibilium⌉⌉, Sed qui spiritualia et Inuisibilia 
cogitant, [6] quod non nisi per fidem fieri potest in hac vita. Vnde Ro. 1.: ‘Inuisibilia Dei [7] a creatione 
mundi operibus intellecta conspiciuntur.’ ‘Conspiciuntur Inuisibilia’, [8] inquit, non visa, Sed ‘intellecta’, et 
hoc ‘ex operibus a creatione [9] mundi’. Sic Ergo Intelligere super Christo est habere cognitionem [10] de 
inuisibilibus in illo, que in alio homine non sunt. Et [11] ‘Beatus’ omnis ille. Alias ‘omnes schandalisantur’ 
in illo. ⌈⌈Vnde Psal. 31.: [12] ‘Nolite [fieri] sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus.’⌉⌉ Sic [13] certe 
vsque hodie Rari, qui intelligunt super Christum habitantem in pauperibus [14] et despectis. Quia enim non 
videtur Christus in illis sensibiliter, [15] non intelligunt neque consyderant eum inhabitare spiritualiter. Et 
sic [16] vsque hodie Schandalisantur. Similes ergo tales sunt Iud is. Quare semper [17] 3, 231 | ‘Inuicem’ 
meliora presumere de ‘Inuicem’ debemus secundum Apostolum, [18] ‘honore preuenire’ et superiores 
arbitrari. O quam sepe loquitur [19] Christus de contemptibili corde et persona, Et non aduertitur. Loquitur 
[20] autem magnus et diues, et omnes mirantur.” 
See also WA 55, II, 222, 57 – 223, 66. 
706
 See chapter 2.2.4.3. 
707
 WA 55, II, 604, 2-7: “[2] 81, 5 Nescierunt neque intellexerunt, i. e. Noluerunt Scire ipsum esse [3] 
Christum, Dominum glori , Et ideo ‘neque intellexerunt’. Quia habere intellectum [4] spiritualium non nisi 
ex Scientia seu notitia Christi habetur. [5] Nescito enim Christo impossibile est habere intellectum in 
Scrip⌊tura, [6] Cum ipse sit sol et veritas in Scrip⌊tura. Ergo ‘nescire’ refertur ad Christum, [7] ‘Non 
Intelligere’ ad veritatem fidei.” 
See also WA 55, I, 780 gloss 52; WA 55, II, 994, 2970-2987. 
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understanding”, the spirit hidden by the letter, especially with regard to the Psalms.708 
Furthermore, the intellect of faith opens up the New Testament as well, as even there its 
spiritual content is hidden under evils and passions.
709
 Only by illumination and the 
intellect of faith can the symbolic teachings and precepts of God be understood.
710
 
Sometimes Luther even defines the intellect (in the proper sense) as the ability to 
recognize the allegories appearing in the Scriptures and creatures.
711
 While referring to the 
spiritual sense of the word, Luther can say that the word of the New and Old Law is the 
same. That is, the “abbreviated word” (verbum abbreviatum) or the spiritual content 
understood by the intellect of faith is the same in both of them.
712
 Sometimes Luther also 
refers to this process of understanding as “spiritual hearing” or “hearing in the spirit”. 
Only the one who participates in the spiritual by faith can understand the spiritual 
meaning, which the scribe of the Holy Scripture intended.
713
 One might presume that the 
intellect of faith has an analogous function with regard to understanding the sacraments as 
it has with regard to the Scripture, but Luther does not discuss this aspect in connection 
with the Eucharist and Baptism explicitly.
714
 However, the idea that faith is required for 
sharing in the sufferings of Christ and for being incorporated with him, comes up in the 
Operationes in Psalmos in connection with the words of John 6:61 on eating the flesh and 
drinking the blood of Christ. This idea can also be interpreted sacramentally, though the 
focus of the text seems to be on understanding them as a metaphor of the sufferings of 
Christ and the sufferings to which Christ leads the believer.
715
 Nevertheless, Luther’s 
statement, that God first appears and is sensed as being contrary to that which is later 
grasped by faith, seem to be applicable to Christ, the external and internal Word, 
sacraments and sufferings alike.
716
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 WA 55, I, 772, 19 – 774, 2; 773-774 glosses 25-26; 796, 18 – 798, 7; WA 55, II, 493, 112 – 494, 121; 
903, 368-374; 916, 751 – 917, 769; WA 57, b195, 20 – b196, 19. See also chapter 2.3.2. 
709
 WA 55, I, 796-797 gloss 107, 7-9. 
710
 WA 57, b30, 3-16; b30 gloss 1; b185, 9 – b186, 12. 
711
 WA 55, II, 937, 1319-1331: “[1319] Intellectus proprie est Allegorias in Scrip⌊turis et creaturis 
agnoscere, [1320] et vltra id, quod videtur oculis aut sensu percipitur, etiam intus intellectu [1321] aliud 
percipere; quod est vtilissimum donum contra Iud orum, [1322] hereticorum insidias, qui Scrip⌊turas et 
creaturas false adducunt et seducunt [1323] simplices, qui non interiora penetrare possunt. [1324] Consilii et 
fortitudinis [donum] satis supra dictum. Scientia autem [1325] Iam dicta est que sit. Et pietas atque timor 
supra latius oct⌊onario [1326] 5. Vnde hic formulam ponimus [1327] Quod Vbi intellectus dari petitur in hoc 
psal⌊mo vel al⌊io, debet intelligi [1328] Spiritualis intelligentia vel allegoria alicuius Scrip⌊ture, que 
figuratiue [1329] ponitur vel poni videtur contra eos, qui eam figuraliter accipiunt vel allegant, [1330] sicut 
Psal. 31. contra Iud os: ‘Nolite fieri sicut  quus et mulus, quibus [1331] non est intellectus’, i. e. nolite 
carnaliter omnia intelligere.” 
712
 WA 55, II, 431, 159-183; WA 56, 408, 1 – 409, 12. 
713
 The metaphor of hearing, which may contain analogies to the theory of the spiritual senses, is 
employed especially in the Operationes in Psalmos, but the concept of the theological intellect likewise 
continues in that work to be employed as the necessary condition for understanding the Scriptures. 
Sometimes the terms seem to be synonymous. WA 55, II, 649, 136-137; WA 56, 228, 12-13; AWA 2, 35, 
23-25 ; 55, 16; 60, 1; 233, 14-18; 323, 4-7; 389, 13-15; 561, 4-5; WA 5, 395, 27 – 396, 3. 
714
 See, however, WA 57, b113, 21 – b114, 20 (where the term “sacrament” is used of the Passion of 
Christ), b169, 9 – b171, 8; b191, 19 – b192, 15; b205, 16 – b208, 4. In all these passages faith is presented as 
the condition for the right reception of the sacrament. 
715
 See AWA 2, 179, 15 – 182, 18. However, at WA 57, b208, 22 – b209, 27 Luther interprets the 
sentence as referring to the spiritual eating of Christ through meditation on his sufferings. 
716
 AWA 2, 181, 7-15. “Aliud agitur et aliud longe apparet: Occidere videtur, sed revera vivificat; 
percutit, sed vere potius sanat; confundit, sed vere tunc glorificat; deducit ad indferos, sed vere reducit potius 
ab inferis et similia, de quibus multa diximus in praecedentibus. Quid ergo mirabilius divina hac voluntate? 
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As we can infer from the previous discussion, the sufferings, tribulations and 
afflictions (i.e., Anfechtungen) are yet another object which the intellect of faith 
understands. Luther holds that the works of God always follow the rule that they inflict 
suffering on the flesh which only feels and sees the sensible, whereas the spirit by the 
intellect of faith grasps their real, salutary content. This is also true of God’s judgment 
which meets the wicked: externally their life seems to prosper, but internally they are 
condemned by God.
717
 Without instruction (eruditio) and intellect the nature of the works 
of God in suffering is impossible to comprehend.
718
 Sinners without faith do not 
understand this rule and perish, but the faithful are saved through “night”, i.e., 
adversities.
719
 Luther also applies this principle to the Church. Its nature (structura) is 
invisible and internal, before God (intus coram Deo). The foolish and stupid do not 
understand this as they seek only external beauty; therefore they are offended and 
scandalized.
720
 Luther emphasizes that tribulation teaches by experience how God works. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Habitat quidem in altis, sed humilia respicit; stultos facit, ut sapientes fiant; infirmos facit, ut potentes 
reddat. Verum prius quidem apparet et sentitur, at posterius, nisi fidem habeas, non assequeris. Sic enim 
Petrus 1Pt 1 dicit in prophetis esse praenuntiatas priores passiones et posteriores glorias.” 
See also chapter 2.4.2.1 
717
 WA 55, II, 341, 94 – 342, 121: “[94] 63, 10 Et annunciabunt opus Dei et opus eius intelligent, i. e. 
opus redemptionis [95] per Christum fact  ⌈et totius vit  Christi⌉, et intelligent, quoniam [96] opus Dei est 
Iudicium et veritas et  quitas, Non autem vmbra et vanitas, [97] vt Psal. infra 110. et Supra 27. Quia Iud i 
carnales Expectant a [98] Domino solum opera visibilia et vmbratilis huius vit  salutaria. Sed opera [99] Dei 
sunt Spiritualia et  tern  vit  operatiua. Ideo non possunt ab illis intelligi, [100] Sed ab Apostolis et 
fidelibus. Ideo enim opera eius dicuntur veritas. [101] Opera enim Dei sunt intelligibilia i. e. solum intellectu 
[102] et ⌈i. e.⌉ fide perceptibilia in spe, non in re. Nam Qui [103] sensum tantummodo sequitur, in cruce 
Christi et in Ecclesi  [104] su  directione necessario Schandalisatur, cum non [105] nisi penas et priuationes 
huius vit  in ea videat. Et ita [106] fit ei crux Christi schandalum. Quare intellectu opus est, ne stultitia [107] 
3, 368 nobis sit sapientia Dei. Similiter et opera | Dei in malis viuentibus positiue [108] in hac vita solum 
sunt intellectualia, Quia secundum spiritum sunt [109] damnati coram Deo, quibus concedit vitam secundum 
carnem. Et ita [110] opera Domini sunt veritas pro sanctis et Iudicium pro impiis. [111] ⌈⌈Immo pro vtrisque, 
Quia veritas [propter] spiritum saluatum, Iudicium [112] propter [carnem] contemptam et abie[ctam]. In 
Malis econtra [veri]tas [113] quia verum ... in spiritu et ... in carne.⌉⌉ Vnde et ⌈Econtra⌉ hoc [114] ipsum nisi 
quis intelligat, Schandalisabitur, vt queritur [115] Psal. 36. et 72.: ‘Mei autem pene moti sunt pedes.’ Vnde 
ait: ‘Existimabam [116] vt cognoscerem, hoc labor est ante me’, scil. ex mea inuestigatione id non [117] 
apprehenderem, nisi per fidem mihi reuelaretur aliunde, scil. a Deo; ideo [118] sequitur: ‘donec intrem’, scil. 
per fidem a visibilibus vertendo oculum ad [119] Inuisibilia, ‘in sanctuarium Dei’, i. e. in mysterium et 
Ecclesiam et sanctum [120] non s culare Sed spirituale, ‘Et sic intelligam’, i. e. intelligens fiam, [121] ‘in 
nouissimis eorum.’” 
See also WA 55, I, 520, 1-8; glosses 17-18. 
718
 WA 55, I, 362 gloss 10: “GLOSSA:10) [1]Ab hoc versu potest simul intelligi sub eisdem verbis 
abiectio [2]Apostolorum secundum carnem Et Abiectio Iud orum secundum spiritum; [3]pro vtroque igitur 
hic plorant Apostoli. primum sequitur August⌊inus, [4]quod et prophetauit Isaias 28.: ‘Alienum est opus 
eius, vt operetur opus suum’. Quia perdit, vt saluet, damnat secundum carnem, vt glorificet [6]spiritum 
suum. Quid enim a saluatore magis alienum quam perdere? [7]Et tamen sic facit Christus suis. Et hoc est, 
quod nemo intelligit, nisi qui [8]‘eruditionem filiorum Core’ habet, i. e. spiritualium cognitionem. Vide 
[9]tot⌊um c⌊apitulum Isa⌊ie pulcherrimum.” 
719
 WA 55, I, 630, 7 – 632, 1; 630-632 glosses 2-8. 
720
 WA 55, II, 718, 11-17: “[11] 91, 7 Secundo Quia dicit, quod Insipiens ipsa non cognoscet. Quod 
exinde [12] fit, Quia opera et factura Christi Ecclesia non apparet aliquid esse foris, [13] Sed omnis structura 
eius est intus coram Deo Inuisibilis. Et ita non [14] oculis carnalibus, Sed spiritualibus in intellectu et fide 
cognoscuntur. Insipientes [15] autem eam contemnunt, Quia sapiunt tantummodo speciosa foris, [16] vt 
sequitur: Cum exorti fuerint, q. d. factura tua non apparet ita et floret, [17] sicut illi volunt florere. ⌈Et ideo 
Schandalisantur et offenduntur in il[la].⌉” 
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Therefore it provides a deeper understanding of the Scripture.
721
 Furthermore faith and 
sufferings also lead to self-understanding. Faith shows that all people are in sin, even if the 
senses and human opinions contradict this.
722
 Participation in the divine truthfulness 
through faith causes the believer to concede that every human being is false and deceitful. 
Faith makes the believer partake of eternal spiritual goods, so that they understand the 
perishable nature of the temporal goods and the foolishness and misery of the old person 
that clung to them and are humiliated.
723
 Through the light of faith, the believer can see 
                                                 
721
 WA 55, II, 56, 20 – 58, 1: “Est autem triplex dilatatio, quam Deus dat [20] in tribulatione: prima 
Eruditionis. Quia in tribulatione plurima discit, [21] que prius nesciebat, plurima per experientiam certius 
cognoscit, que [22] etiam speculatiue nouit. Et Scrip⌊turam sanctam melius intelligit quam [1] sine 
tentatione; vnde vocatur ‘disciplina Domini’. Et Psal⌊mus Confitetur: [2] ‘Et disciplina tua ipsa me docebit.’ 
Et Sap⌊iens: ‘Qui non est tentatus, [3] quid nouit?’ Igitur per tribulationem homo dilatat suas synthereses et 
[4] elicit conclusiones practicas miro modo. Et iterum Psal⌊mus: ‘A mandatis [5] tuis intellexi.’ Credo, Quod 
hanc eruditionem, quam lata sit, [6] soli intelligant experti. Opera enim et praxis exponunt et intelligunt [7] 
Scripturas, figuras et creaturas. Et hec latitudo appropriatur filio in [1] diuinis, cuius est sapientia et 
doctrina.” 
722
 WA 56, 228, 12-22: “[12] Solutio autem Est: Quia Apostolus in spiritu loquitur, ideo non [13] 
intelligitur nisi ab iis, qui in spiritu sunt. Vnde Non valet solutio Lyrensis, [14] Quod peccatum per accidens 
valet ad commendationem Dei, quia neque [15] per se neque per accidens valet ad gloriam veritatis Dei, | 
maxime | Si [16] de veritate Dei intrinseca intelligatur siue verborum eius. Valet autem [17] per se et proprie 
ad commendationem veritatis Dei moraliter siue tropologice; [18] i. e. credulitas, qua Deo credimus nos esse 
in peccatis, licet noster [19] sensus id Vel nesciat vel non putet, ipsa est, que nos peccatores constituit [20] et 
Deo gloriam dat acceptando sermones grati  et veritatis tanquam sibi [21] necessarios. Quis enim gratiam 
excipiat et Iustitiam, nisi qui se peccatum [22] habere fateatur?” 
723
 WA 55, II, 880, 19-25: “[19] 115, 11 Ego dixi in excessu meo: omnis homo mendax. Quamdiu et 
ego [20] homo sum et fui, non vidi, quod esset omnis homo mendax. Nunc quia credidi [21] et in excessu 
sum et spiritualis homo factus per fidem, omnes Iudicans, [22] a nemine Iudicatus, Video quod qui non est 
in eodem excessu et non [23] credit, est mendax. Et hoc locutus sum et predicaui; ideo humiliant et [24] 
affligunt. Nolunt audire, quod sint stulti, vani, mendaces, mali etc., Sed se [25] Iustos et sapientes et veraces 
putant et putari volunt.” 
WA 55, II, 887, 230 – 888, 261: “[230] Ego autem humiliatus sum nimis. Hic totam literam et 
sapientiam [231] carnis destruit et deiicit, Quia per fidem eruditur, quod omnis gloria [232] carnis sit flos 
f ni. Fides enim facit temporalia comparari cum  ternis et [233] carnalia cum spiritualibus. Tunc videt, 
quanta sit miseria spiritualibus [234] carere et temporalibus abundare. Ideo dicit: Ex fide nunc intelligo, 
quod [235] vehementer nihil fui et miser, cum extra fidem in me fuerim, Etiam si rex, [236] Bl 234 v diues, 
potens sim etc. *Hoc autem non dicit, qui carnem sapit, Sed omnino [237] contraria. Quia non habet fidem, 
non credidit, Sed presentia possedit; [238] 4, 273 ideo in illis quiescit | et tacet et exaltatum se nimis 
existimat, non [239] loquitur, non querit alia ab illis, Sed habet pacem in substantia sua. Non [240] est 
clamor in plateis eorum. Et hinc elucet quarto, quare dixit ‘locutus [241] sum, quia credidi’, Scil. Inuocando, 
orando, clamando ad Dominum pro [242] iis, qu  fide percepit. ⌈⌈[Qu]i enim habet, quod [vo]luit, tacet, [vt] 
videtur [243] Apostolus 2. Cor. [4.] Exponere et [acci]pere, quia de futu[ris] non tacemus, [244] quia [ea 
no]ndum habemus ... rum aliud nisi ... n de illis pos[sumus] cum [245] opus nostrum ... illis sit futurum ... 
maximum quod possumus ... re de [246] illis Est ... m.⌉⌉ Sentit enim ea absentia, que credit; ideo fit 
inquietus, [247] donec ea apprehendat, et loquitur in corde suo sine intermissione magno [248] desiderio ad 
Deum. Et ita videt se humiliatum nimis, quia longe abesse [249] illis. Quanto enim maiora sunt que 
credimus, tanto profundius miseri [250] sumus, quod ea nondum habemus. Sunt autem maxima, ideo 
humiliati [251] nimis sumus. Et quoniam carnales contraria sapiunt et errant, ideo dicit: [252] 115, 11 Ego 
dixi in excessu meo: omnis homo mendax. Iste est excessus, [253] quo per fidem leuatur super se, vt videat 
futura bona. Alioquin et ipse [254] erat homo mendax, Sed in excessu factus mendacium excessit et verax 
factus [255] est per fidem. Et ideo eos, qui vanitatem diligere conspexit et fidem [256] posthabere, mendaces 
esse vidit, Quia reputant ea bona sua, que non [257] sunt. Et cum humiliati sint nimis, exaltati sibi videntur. 
Et ideo mirum [258] est, quomodo simul dicat humiliatum se et in excessu esse, Scil. quia agnoscit [259] se 
humiliatum et miserum per excessum. Illi autem non sunt humiliati [260] (i. e. non agnoscunt), quia nondum 
sunt in excessu, Sed in volucro [261] mendacii.” 
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himself as sinful and evil and God as good, attribute to God glory, praise and confession, 
and hate and judge the evil that is in himself.
724
 
Finally, by the means of the intellect of faith even the entire creation is understood as a 
work of God. By faith God is perceptible even in sensible things. As the Church has been 
created with the word of the Gospel, so also in the beginning the whole world has been 
created with the word of Wisdom. By faith all things can in some sense be read as 
pointing to the Incarnation of Christ, the virtues and vices, the future glory and misery. All 
created things exist for the assistance of the intellect and affect, and their activity 
(negotium) is a prelude of the spiritual. A soul which has been made capable, sees by the 
light of faith the wisdom of God in which visible things have been created, and which they 
reflect in this spectacle of the world going towards its eschatological realization in the 
New Creation.
725
 All of them are transitory signs pointing to that which is permanent: 
Christ. Christ is their center, meaning and their invisible content grasped by the intellect of 
faith.
726
 All the works of God are beautiful, praise God and point to him, but this reality is 
only seen with the intellectual light that must first be received internally.
727
 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                   
See also WA 55, I, 756, 3-9; 756 gloss 3; WA 56, 229, 7 – 230, 8; WA 57, b213, 22 – b215, 14; AWA 2, 
131, 22 – 132, 16; 305, 16 – 306, 7. 
724
 WA 55, II, 748, 19-28: “[19] Confessio et pulchritudo etc. Duo sunt in homine, Spiritus et caro. [20] 
Ad spiritum pertinet primus versus locus, Alter ad carnem. Quia In Conspectu [21] Dei esse propri  
secundum animam convenit Ecclesi  et non secundum [22] corpus. In Anima autem est intelligentia et 
voluntas, ista per confessionem, [23] h c per pulchritudinem ornatur; ista per lucem, h c per colorem; [24] 
ista per fidem, h c per amorem; ista per intellectum, h c per affectum. Ergo [25] Confessio est ipsa lux 
mentis, Qua cognoscimus nos, quid simus in [26] nobis et quid Deus in nobis, Quid ex nobis, quid ex Deo 
habemus. Agnitio [27] autem ista vtriusque rei Est ipsa vera duplex confessio, scil. miseri  nostr  [28] et 
misericordi  Dei, peccati nostri et grati  Dei, malitie nostr  et bonitatis [29] Dei. Et iste est totus ornatus 
intellectus, rationis, speculatiu  virtutis; [30] per hanc enim fit, vt homo non possit negare Deo que Dei sunt, 
nec [31] potest sibi attribuere que sua non sunt. Ideo propriissime dicitur ‘confessio’, [32] Quia confitetur et 
tribuit vnicuique quod suum est. Sed ‘pulchritudo’ [33] Est bona voluntas, totus ornatus practic  virtutis, vis 
appetitiue, [34] Quo amat in se que Dei sunt et odit que sua sunt, Sicut confessio prior [35] ostenderat. Sed 
h c omnia non nisi in conspectu Dei sunt, ibi enim ad hoc [36] illuminatur. Et idem habet trans⌊latio 
heb⌊raica ‘Gloria et decor ante vultum [37] eius’, i. e. clara cognitio laudis Dei et ignomini  su  et bona 
voluntas [38] odiens sua et diligens ea que sunt Dei.” 
725
 WA 55, II, 511, 138 – 512, 165; 824, 698-708; 825, 723-729. 
726
 WA 55, II, 342, 126 – 343, 144: “[126] Quarto sic, Quia omnia opera Creationis et veteris legis signa 
sunt [127] operum Dei, qu  in Christo et suis sanctis facit et faciet, et ideo in Christo [128] illa preterita 
tanquam signa omnia implentur. Nam omnia illa sunt transitoria, [129] significantia ea, que sunt  terna et 
permanentia. Et hec sunt opera [130] veritatis, illa autem omnia vmbra et opera figurationis. Ideo Christus 
finis [131] omnium et centrum, in quem omnia respiciunt et monstrant, ac si dicerent: [132] Ecce iste est, qui 
est, nos autem non sumus, Sed significamus tantum. [133] Vnde Iud i arguuntur Psal. 27. quod non 
intellexerunt opera et in [134] opera, i. e. opera in veteri lege non intellectualiter aspiciebant, Sed tantum 
[135] carnaliter, non vt signa et argumenta rerum, Sed res ipsas. Quia [136] quod intelligitur, Inuisibile est 
ab eo, quod videtur, aliud longe. Vnde [137] Apostoli Annunciauerunt opera Dei (scil. in Christo facta) et 
exinde Intellexerunt [138] facta eius, i. e. res preteritas in gestis et creationis, scil. intelligentes, [139] 
quoniam ista opera Christi in illis olim sint figurata et significata. [140] Quia tunc perfecte intelligitur 
signum, quando res ipsa signi videtur. [141] Vnde et nos omnes modo in Ecclesia Intelligimus, i. e. 
intellectualiter et [142] spiritualiter accipimus, facta Dei, olim scil. in lege et natura facta, Iudei [143] autem 
eadem facta non intelligunt, Sed sentiunt tantum vsque in hodiernum [144] diem.” 
See also WA 55, I, 468 gloss 7; 546 gloss 6; WA 55, II, 535, 33 – 536, 40 and chapters 2.2.3 and 2.3.  
727
 WA 55, II, 801, 51-64: “[51] Tercio Est Dominum ex operibus confiteri et honorare, i. e. sicut [52] 
‘magnificare’ est eius opera magna estimare et agnoscere, Ita ‘Confiteri’ [53] est omnia opera eius 
confessionem eius intelligere et videre et decorem. [54] Sed hic opus est luce intellectus et quod primo 
ipsum Dominus confessione [55] et decore ornauerit intus, quam ab eo possit decorari et confiteri [56] foris. 
⌈⌈Maxime sanctos et Ecclesiam eius, in quibus lucet confessio et [57] decor eius.⌉⌉ Omnia enim opera Dei 
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Luther posits the general rule that all things must be examined by the spiritual intellect 
which reaches to their interior, before a judgment is made about them. Nothing can be 
judged by its superficial appearance alone.
728
  
The function of the theological intellect in Luther’s thought can therefore be 
summarized as the ability to understand God in all things, an ability given through faith in 
Christ. All things point to Christ as their beginning, content and end. For Luther the whole 
visible world is a covering or vestment of God, under which the presence of God can be 
seen by the light of faith. Thus our analysis can be summarized by a quote from Luther’s 
exposition of Psalm 103:2, “With confession and beauty you covered yourself in a cloak 
of light as in a garment”729: 
In a cloak of light as in a garment. Understand this in the same threefold manner as the 
preceding. Because, first, the garment of light is the glorious humanity. Second, 
tropologically, it is faith and the entire Church. Third, it is every creature understood in the 
spiritual light. Fourth, however, what it is anagogically we do not try to say, as it is where 
the holy angels and all creatures in their new brightness encircle their Lord. But in the 
meanwhile we have an enigmatic light.
730
 
First, faith opens up the understanding of Christ as God and man, first despised and 
then glorified. Second, it opens up the understanding of the Church and its spiritual things 
and faith, including the Scripture and sacraments. Third, it opens up the understanding of 
all creatures as beautiful works of God pointing to spiritual reality. The proper object of 
faith is God, hidden under all external things. However, at the same time faith shows all 
the external things in its light. Yet at the same time, Luther maintains the difference 
between the light of faith and the light of glory. The light of faith remains an enigmatic 
light, mixed with and seen under the cover of Christ’s human nature and the darkness of 
                                                                                                                                                   
sunt Confessio Dei, laudantia, [58] ostendentia, confitentia Deum. Similiter omnia sunt decor eius, quia eum 
[59] decorum et pulcherrimum ostendunt. Sed hoc non videt in rebus et creaturis, [60] nisi qui ipse intus 
decorem et confessionem habeat a spiritu. Non autem [61] habet, nisi prius negationem sui et humilitatem 
feditatis sue habeat. [62] Vnde qui se aliquid esse putant, Multam feditatem putant in rebus esse et [63] 
Deum neque esse neque decorum esse. Quia ipsi nondum fedi et negati [64] sibi sunt, Omnia enim sunt 
pulcherrima et recte Deum confitentia.” 
728
 WA 55, II, 977, 2451-2464: “[2451] 118, 130 Declaratio ser⌊monum t⌊uorum illu⌊minat; et 
intellectum dat [2452] paruulis. [2453] Hoc est, vt dixit, quod mirabilia sunt, quia paruulis dant intellectum 
[2454] et excecant superbos, qui contenti de superficie verbi auditi dedignantur [2455] 4, 367 | scrutari 
ipsum, et prompti sunt ipsum Iudicare et damnare secundum [2456] faciem, antequam Scrutentur. Disce 
igitur hic obsecro [2457] Regulam Generalem. [2458] Nullius dictum aut factum, Nullius Consilium aut 
[2459] laborem mox Iudices, Sed ante omnia Scruteris primum [2460] interiora eius. Nec species et 
superficies te fallat. Hoc [2461] autem optime facies, si nunquam tuo sensui credas, Sed semper tibi ipsi 
[2462] suspectus alios meliora sapere arbitreris, Ac sic promptus, paratus, Cupidus [2463] sis semper magis 
doceri, Iudicari, audire, quam docere, Iudicare, [2464] audiri.” 
729
 “Confessionem et decorem induisti amictus lumine sicut vestimento.” See WA 55, I, 682, 21-23; WA 
55, II, 800, 31; 801, 68. 
730
 WA 55, II, 801, 68-73: “[68] 103, 2 Bl 205 Amictus lumine sicut Vestimento, eodem modo intellige 
triplicitate [69] predicta. Quia primum Vestimentum Lucidum Est humanitas gloriosa. [70] Secundum 
tropol⌊ogice fides et tota Ecclesia. Tercium omnis creatura [71] spirituali luce intellecta. Quartum autem, 
quod in Anagoge est, nos [72] non attentamus dicere, Vbi Angeli sancti et omnis creatura noua claritate [73] 
circundabunt Dominum suum. Interim Enygmaticum habemus lumen.” 
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the believer’s carnal nature. In the future, God shall be known in clarity, without the 
covering of faith and the hindrance of the flesh.
731
  
However, one further reservation needs to be made here concerning the development 
of Luther’s thought as manifested in the sources. As already pointed out above, as 
Luther’s thought moves from the Dictata super Psalterium towards the Operationes in 
Psalmos, the significance of the third point (i.e., understanding the created things in the 
light of faith) seems to diminish. The intellect of faith retains its function of seeing divine, 
spiritual, intellectual and theological content under the cover of the humanity of Christ, 
Scriptures and sufferings, but the idea of the whole creation functioning as a sign of the 
spiritual seems to vanish. This change may be connected with the weakening of the role of 
theological Platonism in Luther’s thought. Visible things are no longer compared to 
invisible things primarily in terms of their general metaphysical nature (e.g., fleeting vs. 
eternal, empty vs. solid, finite vs. infinite), but in terms of their double hiddenness or 
hiddenness under contraries. Thus especially the visible evil things (i.e., cross, suffering 
and passions, foolishness of the Scripture) become the hiding place of God.
732
 Further 
inquiry into the role of faith in understanding the creation in the other writings of Luther 
falls outside the scope of this work. In my opinion it would be worthwhile in order to 
further examine the nature of this shift. 
One can see here, how Luther joins in his understanding of faith as the theological 
intellect created by the infusion of the divine light, to the theological tradition of divine 
illumination. For Luther, the understanding of faith is not primarily propositional, but is 
knowledge revealed by divine illumination. This illumination is received only in 
connection with Christ, who is the access to the invisible world, through the light of faith. 
In its essence, this divine intellectual light allows one to understand Christ as the internal 
and eternal Word and Wisdom in all things: i.e., as their first and final cause. In this sense, 
the intellect of faith has an interpretive function with regard to the whole of reality, even 
though the understanding of theological objects such as Christ the Incarnate, the Scripture 
and the Church, where God is hidden under contraries, is in the foreground. Thus with 
regard to the tradition, Luther places very much stress on the light of faith. This light 
essentially functions as the true intellect or higher mind of the believer. It is very strongly 
contrasted with the light of the natural reason, which only grasps sensible things. 
Nevertheless, for Luther there is also the higher light of glory, which is yet more clear and 
bright than the light of faith. Compared to it, the light of faith is still shadowy and 
enigmatic. The precise difference between the light of faith and the light of glory will be 
examined in the next main subchapter.  
3.3.2.2 Faith as Moral Direction 
In the previous subchapter we examined the nature of the light of faith with regard to the 
intellect. This chapter will focus on the light of faith with regard to the affect, or will, of 
the human being. As we have seen, for Luther the term affect (affectus), used as a 
synonym for will (voluntas), heart (cor) and love (amor), signifies the orientation of the 
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person as a whole. The affect has two possible orientations: When turned away from God, 
it is carnal, servile and self-seeking; when united with God, the highest good, in faith, it is 
spiritual, free and self-giving,.
733
  
Previous research has contained discussion about whether Luther’s concept of faith is 
related primarily to the affect, or to the intellect. Günther Metzger and Miikka Anttila 
among others emphasize the role of the affect, interpreting faith as trust in the unknown. 
Reinhard Schwarz and Antti Raunio represent the view that the knowledge of an object 
must come first before the will can be oriented towards it, thus giving priority to the 
intellect.
734
 Even Luther himself sometimes seems to vacillate over which to give pre-
eminence to.
735
 One finds, for example, an oft-quoted text in the Dictata super Psalterium, 
where (in connection with Ps. 118) Luther says that faith does not illumine the intellect 
but the affect, as faith blinds the intellect.
736
 However, as has been argued in previous 
chapters of this study, the idea that faith is a light with regard to the intellect permeates the 
entire corpus of Luther’s writings. On the other hand, we have seen that Luther also 
insists, that the natural light of the intellect must be extinguished and made darkness. 
Thus, in my opinion Luther’s interpretation of Ps. 118 should be understood as speaking 
about the natural intellect. That is, in this text Luther speaks of the intellect with regard to 
its natural light, which becomes and must become darkness when the superior light of 
faith is received. Other similar texts emphasizing the role of the affect and trust and 
describing the birth of faith as stepping into darkness, speak either of the first infusion, or 
of the augmentation, of the light of faith in tribulations. These passages thus concern a 
special event and do not constitute a description of the normal relation between faith and 
intellect outside of such trials.
737
 If we examine the Dictata’s exposition of Ps. 118, we 
can see that this text as well actually speaks about the beginning of faith, as it continues 
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with the statement that the faith of the beginner is first less bright and more closed 
(clausum) to the mind, like an oil lamp (lucerna), but with experience the intellect receives 
more light.
738
 Therefore this and similar texts cannot be taken as a description of the 
general relationship of the intellect and affect in faith, as Metzger and Anttila do. Rather, 
they describe the birth of faith from the perspective of a person who in the beginning is 
only carnal and does not yet comprehend the light of faith. Such a person has just begun to 
ascend from natural cognition to the cognition of faith, which is still incomprehensible. 
But after the believer has been made anew by the infusion of the light of faith and has 
acquired experience and spiritual education (eruditio) through that light, faith becomes a 
guiding light both for the understanding and the affect. Therefore, it must be said that for 
Luther faith is, in general, a light for the intellect and the affect alike. Illumination by faith 
removes both the impediment of the intellect and the impediment of the affect, converting 
both towards God.
739
 With regard to the intellect faith is light that shows truth
740
, with 
regard to the affect it is light that shows good.
741
  
Luther speaks of faith as an ascent (ascensus) and extasis which elevates the mind of 
the believer to God. This elevation extracts, withdraws and reduces (reducit) the believer 
from the multiplicity of external works and circuitous ways, and directs (dirigit) him to the 
right way. That right way is faith, in which all good things are given and from which they 
flow forth.
742
 On the one hand, its object is God himself; on the other hand, it consists of 
the understanding of the final spiritual causes or reasons (novissimis, rationes) and 
specific moral criteria.
743
 Thus faith as intellectual cognition shows how true goods are 
spiritual and intellectual, and how sensual and temporal goods are evil for the soul. 
Furthermore, only by adhesion to the better good things in faith can the soul turn away 
from temporal goods and recognize the spiritual good things hidden under sufferings.
744
 
Therefore one can distinguish between faith as showing moral criteria (theoretical 
knowledge, faith as illumination), and faith as directing the believer by the knowledge of 
these criteria (practical knowledge, faith as direction). Moreover, when Luther speaks of 
faith as direction, this term is both spiritual (as faith straightens the affect and directs it 
towards God), and concrete (as faith guides people in concrete things). Below we will first 
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examine the knowledge of the moral criteria provided by faith, and then discuss the 
function of faith as the dynamic guiding principle which directs Christians. 
As we have seen, with regard to the affect the primary object of faith  is God as good, 
both in a general and in a distinct sense. However, as was the case with the knowledge of 
God as truth, the knowledge of God as good also functions as a criterion through which 
other aspects of reality are understood. Thus the light of faith functions as a criterion with 
regard to the person who believes, when he is brought before God by that light. It 
illumines the believer such, that he can recognize the sin that is in him. It constitutes a 
higher criterion of good, to the knowledge of which the believer is elevated (insofar he 
becomes spiritual by faith), so that he can discern the evil of the flesh. Through it the 
carnal, incurvate nature of the natural light is seen and can be judged as being contrary to 
grace and God.
745
 Precisely through this illumination the human being is able to confess 
himself a sinner and God as good, and through that confession give to God what is God’s 
and to himself what is his (i.e., to each his own, filling the criterion of righteousness). In 
this way God’s coming out of himself (exire), when he creates faith in the human person, 
leads the human being to enter into himself (introire) and to know his own sinful and evil 
state through the knowledge of God received in faith. This recognition, moreover, is not 
only theoretical but practical. It leads to correction of the affect, will and appetitive 
powers, and to the growth of practical virtue, because the light of faith creates beauty 
(pulchritudo, decor) when it shines in the soul.
746
 The light also gives moral instruction to 
the intellect with regard to the Holy Scriptures, so that it can understand things that are to 
be hoped for and loved, and thus access the intimate and internal moral sense of the 
Scripture instead of the external letter. In this way the light directs the spirit, or the 
spiritual will.
747
 And even with regard to all creation, the instruction (eruditio) that the 
intellect receives from faith is accompanied by the growth of the affect, when they both 
understand and comprehend ever more clearly how admirable and miraculous the works of 
God are. In this sense, according to Luther all creation is intended for the help of the 
intellect and the affect likewise.
748
 The light of faith works harmoniously with regard to 
both the intellect and the affect so that they support each other and grasp different aspects 
of the same reality: i.e., truth and goodness.  
What is surprising, however, is that in these texts Luther does not relate the theological 
affect distinctly to the concrete humanity and sufferings of Christ. Its birth is directly 
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connected to the intuition of the passion of Christ in only a few places. Usually spiritual 
goods are presented instead as the opposite of visible things. The reason for this seems to 
be that Luther understands the theological affect as an ontological concept created by 
grace. It does not operate within the psychology of the human person as a created being. 
Purely sensible things, therefore, cannot affect the affect. Rather, internal divine 
instruction of the will is required, as is the case with the theological intellect. Even the 
intuition of the passions of Christ is related to an internal pulling (trahere) by the Father, 
which causes the believer to perceive the grace of Christ. It is precisely this internal being 
drawn and being led in faith which creates the free and joyful affect in the Christian.
749
  
Having made this observation we can now move to the second function of the light of 
faith with regard to the affect: its dynamic nature as a guiding principle for Christians. As 
we have seen, for Luther the light of faith allows the believer to immediately grasp the 
goodness of God in joy and delight, as well as to judge himself and other things.
750
 At the 
same time, however, the light of faith also has the function of directing and instructing the 
believer through this life to the eternal life. With regard to this function, the good things 
grasped in faith function in the manner of the final cause guiding the will. All good things 
are shown in the light of the face of God, the light of faith, grasped by the intellect of 
faith.
751
 These good things satisfy the soul and turn it away from temporal, visible and 
carnal goods. Nevertheless, the spiritual goods are acquired in this life only partially and 
incipiently.
752
 According to Luther, this is the reason why the life of the Christian is called 
a “way”.  The Christians travel this way by faith, progressing from virtue to virtue, as their 
soul is filled with the divine good, towards the Eternal Jerusalem.
753
 However, they have 
not yet arrived; they still need the guidance and direction of the light of faith as they 
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journey on the way. By this guidance is meant that the heart of the believer is made “right” 
or “straight” and given direction, when it is tended  by faith and hope towards God and the 
spiritual good. Without faith it is not possible for the heart to be right, as God is invisible 
and incomprehensible to the natural capacities. A person cannot tend towards him who is 
the true good through them. Therefore, the heart of carnal people is never right and is 
without direction. Carnal people strive towards good by looking for it in a roundabout way 
in the created things that are merely circumferential signs and coverings of the true good, 
i.e., God. The heart of carnal people remains fixed on those created goods; they seek to 
find God in them and through them. They hope that God would be with their flesh (i.e., 
serve the wishes of their carnal nature) rather than being against their flesh and with the 
spirit and the internal man.
754
 However, in faith God is present in the spirit and for the 
spirit, not in the flesh and for the flesh. For the flesh, God  resides in a dark cloud (i.e., is 
not perceivable) but for a spirit he resides in a shining cloud which directs the spirit.
755
 
From that cloud shines forth the light of the face of God which directs everyone who is to 
be saved through the deserts and tribulations of this world.
756
 This is how Christ present in 
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faith directs the Christian through this life. Using additional biblical images Luther says 
that in the midst of prosperity and of carnal pleasure Christ is the pillar of cloud, because it 
is more difficult to follow and perceive against the light of the day. In adversity and in the 
midst of suffering of he is the pillar of fire, which is perceived more easily against the 
night of suffering. Being thus present in faith for the spirit, Christ leads the faithful 
through the prosperity and adversity of this world, as he led Israel through the Red Sea 
and in the desert. He is the pillar of cloud and fire in the hearts of the believers, by whose 
guidance they cross over from this world to the next so that their heart remains protected 
and they remain fixed on the goal.
757
 Therefore, the relationship between the “upright” of 
heart (recti) and the “crooked” (pravi) is connected with how they relate themselves to the 
future. The crooked turn their heart to the present: to visible things and the letter. The 
upright of heart, on the other hand, turn their heart towards the future glory through the 
spiritual goods which they already know in faith. Thus for them a light is rising in the 
spirit, whereas the crooked remain in darkness. The faithful are leaving the world by the 
means of their intellect and affect and progressing in the knowledge of spiritual things, 
turning their face towards heavenly things.
758
 
From the above analysis we can see that the nature of the spiritual affect is very much 
connected to Luther’s understanding of the nature of temporal and spiritual goods and the 
Platonist ontology behind them. This ontology is, moreover, connected to the relationship 
between the letter and the spirit; law and gospel (i.e., grace, or faith). Spiritual goods are 
received in connection with the external word through the Holy Spirit. They then become 
the internal reality that constitutes the new nature of the believer and which guides his 
affect. In itself, the external word or letter is dead and empty like a hollow reed. The 
Spirit, however, gives it its content, “increase” (incrementum), its spirit. Luther describes 
it as a speedy teacher, which joined to the external word teaches by writing living letters in 
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the heart, conferring with a single word or expression the maximum good that fills the 
heart of the believer.
759
 The letter is the reed of a slow scribe which leads to wandering in 
the desert, whereas the spirit (i.e., the internal content of the external word given in faith) 
is fast and direct.
760
 Luther connects these two to the Law and Gospel: i.e., to law and 
grace; the law of the letter and the spiritual law. The law of the letter contains only empty 
signs. It is heavy and irritating, as it does not grant the grace for its fulfillment. As an 
external form and letter the Gospel is similar to it, but when God works in the spirit along 
with the external word, he teaches its internal content and gives the grace required to 
fulfill it. Therefore the law must be formally (formaliter) written into the heart, so that it 
can be fulfilled. When it is written in this way by the spirit, it becomes an internal law, the 
law of the spirit. In this way by internal education (eruditio) God purifies the heart and 
writes living, luminous and burning letters to it. Illuminated by them, the believer can call 
God his Father. This education (i.e., faith) is the intellectual light of the mind and flame of 
the heart, the law of faith, the new law, the law of Christ, the law of spirit, the law of 
grace, a law not written in stone but on human hearts. In faith, the believer is therefore 
united with the eternal Word (i.e., the content of the external word understood spiritually) 
which makes the heart share in its properties so that the heart becomes pure and good like 
the word it is attached to. Thus Luther says it is precisely faith which is the “good tree” 
providing good fruit. Faith is the living and experienced new will, written on the heart of 
the believer by the finger of God, the Holy Spirit. Therefore without faith and the divine 
love in the will which results from it, all external good works are evil, vanity and madness. 
No created virtue can suffice to fulfill the divine law. Apart from Christ (extra Christum) 
no one can do any good. Even faith, without the spirit which gives it its content, is dead 
faith. But faith in Christ is the fulfillment and fullness of all laws, because it possesses 
Christ, the one who fulfills them. It is the whole substance of the new law in which Christ 
lives and works.
761
  
Therefore the relationship between faith and good works is not accidental. Above all, 
there is a substantial unity between them. This unity stems from the nature of divine good, 
which is self-diffusing.
762
 It is the nature of faith, according to Luther, that it is operative 
and efective (operosa et efficax), active and working (activa et actuosa).
763
 True faith is 
not speculative (fides ficta) or acquired (acquisita), but infused (infusa) by the Holy Spirit, 
living and one which effects all in all (omnia in omnibus). Thus it is necessarily followed 
by love; if love is not present, then certainly it is not true faith.
764
 Accordingly, Luther 
calls faith the substance, foundation, fountain, origin, principle and first-born of all 
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spiritual graces, gifts, virtues, merits and works. They all flow from the new spiritual will, 
which is given by Christ in faith.
765
 Faith is the head of all virtues and the principle of all 
good, as Christ is the head of all Christians.
766
 It is the moral sunrise from which all good 
propositions rise in the soul, and which kills all evil movements, vices, suggestions and 
thoughts. However, in this life it is always dawning, not yet having become full day.
767
 
Thus faith constitutes the spiritual nature of the Christian, a nature which seeks to serve 
the will of God. It kills the old will of sin and constitutes a new will in the Christian, 
changing him into a new man.
768
 In this sense faith also constitutes the beginning of the 
moral life of the believer with regard to his neighbour. What happens in faith is that the 
Christian becomes in faith a son of God. That is, he is divinized so that with Christ and in 
Christ he sits and rules over the flesh in the spirit. Christ liberates the conscience from the 
servility of sin, judges the vices of the flesh and subjugates the flesh to serve the spirit and 
God. This happens not at once, but incrementally.
769
 The presence of Christ in faith thus 
becomes a foundation, rock (petra), foothold (locus), and substance on which the spiritual 
life of the soul is built. On one hand this fixed, non-transitory place is the foundation from 
which the soul ascends to the eternal things.
770
 On the other hand, it is the solid place on 
which the “feet” (i.e., affects) of the soul are grounded, and upon which the soul can 
“walk” (i.e., act and operate in the world). In this sense the affects of the believer can even 
be said to be the feet of Christ himself, on which he walks in the world.
771
 Through faith, 
the Christian becomes the blessed man (beatus vir) whose will is in the law and grace of 
God, and who walks without coercion on the paths of God.
772
 By faith he is a co-operator 
with God, a person of right heart whom the light of faith directs and on whom it shines, 
creating spiritual beauty. Thus a Christian, insofar he or she is led by the spirit, freely 
follows the law of God and can be said to be co-operating with God. On the other hand, 
however, Luther also calls the Christian an instrument of God, whose works are the works 
of God, not his own. This is because faith and grace are the necessary requisites of all 
good works. In the infusion of faith the Christian is passive and not a co-operator. 
However, when faith comes to be incarnated in works, the believer is active in the sense 
that he becomes a tool for God through whom and in whom God operates. In this way the 
pure, internal, passively received theological virtues are “incarnated” into external visible 
virtues and acts, and faith is born into action.
773
 These external acts, however, are not 
without fault because they take place through the flesh that is corrupted. Only the 
theological virtues in the spirit are pure, as they are wholly divine.
774
 
From these ontological presuppositions of Luther’s it follows that the good works 
stemming from faith flow from it spontaneously and joyfully, without coercion. However, 
what they are exactly and what they are not seems to be something Luther does not usually 
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describe, for one reason or another. Such a description might even run against his 
theological intention, which is based on the dynamic and efficient nature of the divine 
good and the principle that God works all in all (omnia in omnibus). A closer description 
of those works might limit Christian freedom. Even when Luther deals with a concrete 
interpretation of a concrete command, he emphasizes meditating on it and extending it 
from an external deed to a review of internal thoughts, emotions and motives.
775
 
Nevertheless it is clear that for Luther, contraries to good works must also exist. Luther 
mentions evil movements, vices, suggestions and thoughts. Although he does not list what 
these are, it seems implausible that all of them can be interpreted merely as internal 
motives. Vices or suggestions are, after all, usually motivating principles for an evil habit 
or action. In the texts examined here Luther does not describe their nature more closely. 
He only provides their general criteria, which are: carnality, preferring created goods to 
God, and the incurvated love of oneself. This omission of Luther’s seems consonant with 
a distinction he makes between being wicked (impius) and being a sinner (peccator). A 
sinner is one who does crude evil deeds manifestly. He is, according to Luther, easy to 
recognize. Luther does not seem to consider the possibility that there could be arguments 
between Christians on the nature of right external moral action. It seems that for him the 
concrete course of action is somehow self-evident.  The more dangerous are, according to 
Luther, the wicked, who lack true faith and try to cover their evil affect with external 
deeds of righteousness. Those deeds are performed out of servile love of merits, or fear of 
punishment, in order to appear pious. Therefore Luther calls people engaged in them 
doubly a sinner (duplex peccator): sinners who claim that their sin is righteousness. They 
can be recognized by the hate which they express if the righteousness of their deeds is 
questioned, because they rely on the goodness of the external deed, not on faith.
776
 From 
Luther’s deliberations here we can see that his primary interest is constantly in the internal 
man, his relation to God and the quality of his affect. When this affect is right, Luther 
trusts that external good deeds will follow. Because of this view Luther is not interested in 
pondering specific moral questions, but is interested in the overall orientation of the 
human being. Nevertheless, Luther’s approach as reflected in the sources is somewhat 
problematic, as it does not give guidance for solving specific moral conflicts that may 
arise in the Church. However, more concrete guidance can be found in other locations in 
Luther’s works, e.g., in the Catechisms, although they also follow the general principle of 
meditating on the commandment and then attempting to apply its internal spirit. 
In summary, we can say that for Luther faith is a light with regard both to the intellect 
and the affect. For the affect it is a light which shows good, in accordance with the 
traditional interpretation of Ps 4, an interpretation which Luther joins in. In an 
indiscriminate sense the object of faith with regard to the affect is God as good, but it can 
be said that  in a discriminate sense the light of faith functions first of all 1) as a criterion 
of good. This function as a criterion takes place especially with regard to the final ends 
and in the sufferings, in which faith sees the spiritual goods that are contained in and 
hidden by them. The light of faith also has the function of a criterion with regard to the 
person himself, when it shows the evil of the flesh. In addition, it has a function with 
regard to understanding the moral content of the Scriptures, and being affected by the 
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intuition of the passions of Christ. In terms of moral philosophy, faith is here connected 
with moral principles which regulate action.  
The second function of faith is that it 2) motivates and leads the Christian. It directs the 
Christian through this life to the future life by fixing the heart on the future spiritual goods 
already possessed incipiently in faith.  Drawn and directed by these superior spiritual 
goods shown by the light of faith, the Christian can resist being allured by temporal 
prosperity and adversity. Furthermore, faith is dynamic in its nature. Because it unites the 
believer with the living Christ and God, the highest good, it satisfies the soul internally 
insofar the person is spiritual. It produces all good movements and virtues, subduing the 
flesh and its vices. It is the necessary requirement for all good works in the theological 
sense, as it creates in the believer a new will grounded in God’s spiritual law, which 
wishes to serve God freely. The ontological status of the new will as divine virtue also 
explains why Luther rejects all (e.g., Scholastic) interpretations of moral psychology in 
which the principles of action would stem from a natural capacity (e.g., from natural 
reason’s participation in the divine law). If the human being had a natural capacity to 
good, he would seek self-justification (as he already does according to Luther, but vainly, 
as he does not know the true good). The divine nature of faith on the one hand guarantees 
the passivity of the believer in justification. On the other hand, however, the dynamic 
nature of divinity results in faith itself being operative and creating action. Thus faith is 
constantly incarnated in good works. These works can be attributed either to God, in the 
sense that he is their causa sine qua non, or to the believer, in the sense that he functions 
in faith as God’s instrument in doing good. In this sense, in terms of moral philosophy, 
faith has the function of moral motivation. However, Luther’s emphasis only on the 
general qualities of the new spiritual will causes the difficulty that Luther’s theory does 
not give very good answers to concrete moral dilemmas. Rather, the specific nature of 
faith as a moral criterion seems very hazy. In the sources examined here Luther does not 
give an account on the particular contents of the moral criteria or principles shown by the 
light of faith. Their nature is described only generally, and these descriptions are mostly 
related to the ontological status of those criteria: i.e., to the ontological difference between 
the letter and the spirit, law and grace, etc.  
Finally, it can be said that the two functions of faith with regard to the affect (i.e., faith 
as criterion and faith as direction), seem to be related to God as the first cause and as the 
final cause. As the first cause, God is the source and criterion of all good. As the final 
cause, he is the reality towards which the believer progresses by faith. Luther does not, 
however, make an explicit distinction between these two in his writings; rather, it seems 
that for him these two aspects are united in God. This coinciding of aspects corresponds to 
Luther’s Christological metaphysics, according to which Christ is the center and end of all 
things, the One to which all things are drawn, and the reality signified by all things.
777
 
This same ontological framework can be seen as the background for Luther’s 
understanding of the functions or faith with regard both to the intellect and the affect. For 
the intellect of faith, Christ is the Word and Wisdom in which all things are constituted 
and the consummation which they reflect. For the affect, Christ is the Good as the 
criterion of good and the ultimate end. Thus the understanding of reality that lies behind 
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the functions of faith seems to follow the Platonic scheme of exitus and reditus, going 
forth from and returning to the First Principle. 
3.4. Faith as the Enigmatic Middle Stage between the Earthly and 
Heavenly Vision 
3.4.1. Faith as Theological Sign and Partial Possession 
In the previous chapter we examined Luther’s understanding of faith as an intellectual 
light which has God as its immediate object, i.e., seeing God “face-to-face”. On the one, 
hand faith grasps God as truth and goodness; on the other hand, it perceives the whole 
creation in the divine light which flows from God as its source and points to God as its 
fullfilment. Luther stresses this immediacy of faith in multiple places, and stresses that 
God is present in the light of faith itself. On the other hand, however, Luther also speaks 
of faith as some kind of intermediate stage between a purely carnal view of things and the 
bright vision of God participated in in the heavenly glory. In this sense Luther speaks 
about faith as an enigmatic light, or even as darkness. On the one hand, God is the 
immediate object of faith but on the other hand, the knowledge acquired in faith is still 
somehow shadowy, partial and hidden.
778
 Furthermore, one can even find passages in 
Luther’s works that speak about faith as a sign and not yet reality (signum factum, nondum 
autem res), which shows (ostendit) or possesses future, not-present things. When 
examined without regard for their context, these statements even seem to exclude from 
faith the possession of Christ as its present object. This exclusion runs contrary to the 
analysis of the relation of the ontological and epistemological aspects of faith presented in 
the previous chapter.
779
 What is the relation of these differing statements to each other, 
and can they be reconciled?  
The wider context  for the question at hand lies in the history of the doctrine of 
illumination. The doctrine of Augustine and Bonaventure was criticised for ontologism, 
especially by the Thomists. The underlying question concern how to distinguish the vision 
of God by the wayfarer through the light of faith from the vision of God in Heaven 
through the light of glory, if by the light of faith the wayfarer already possesses immediate 
knowledge of the divine ideas or divine nature. The Thomist resolution to this question 
lies in distinguishing between the three lights, of which only the light of glory possesses 
the divine nature as its direct object, the light of faith having only created mediating 
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species as its object. The Scotist answer is to reserve the intuitive knowledge of God as 
present object only for the state of the heavenly vision. Luther’s understanding of the 
difference between the stage of faith and the stage of heavenly vision appears to provide a 
unique answer to this question. 
As is well known, German scholarship reads in an exclusive sense Luther’s definition 
of faith as sign and not reality, and excludes the presence and participation of the spiritual 
goods in faith. The interpretation offered by Schwarz, Ebeling and Joest holds that faith 
merely changes the orientation of the person towards the future spiritual things, which as 
yet remain absent. The spiritual things are then possessed only in hope, not in reality (in 
spe, nondum in re). Furthermore, this reading has been connected to an interpretation of 
Luther’s use of the term “substance” (substantia), according to which Luther has been 
portrayed as a representative of relational ontology. According to this view for Luther the 
term “substance” does not mean a self-subsisting ontological entity, but instead that upon 
which one bases his faith, hope and love, and from which one derives the quality of one’s 
own existence as a person. Thus, for example, when faith is defined as “the substance of 
things hoped for” (substantia sperandorum), this means that in faith one bases one’s 
existence on the extrinsic, future things that are hoped for, and on the act of hope itself, the 
definition excluding the real participation in or possession of those things.
780
 Perhaps the 
best example from Luther’s writings supporting this view is the definition of faith given in 
the 1516 scholia of Dictata on Ps. 4:7, which replaced the missing original scholia: 
But the light of your face (i.e., faith, by which we know your face and glory), is sealed 
(i.e., made a sign, not yet the thing itself [signum factum, nondum autem res], because 
‘faith is an argument of things’, but not the thing itself) upon us (i.e., from above: because 
‘every gift is from above’ and faith is above all understanding, from above: it is the ‘light’ 
in which ‘good things are shown [ostenduntur] to us’).781 
Based on this and a number of similar passages one could draw the conclusion that for 
Luther the light of faith serves a function similar to its function according to St. Thomas. 
It seals upon the intellect truths or concepts, which function as a mediating factor between 
God (and the future spiritual goods) and the believer. God, as the final object of faith, is 
only grasped in the future glory. The content of faith is the promising (promissio), 
showing (ostensio) and announcing of those things, in the sense that faith points towards 
them. It is a sign, an argument (argumentum) and testimony of things which are promised, 
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things not present but absent, and which will be given in the future. They are possessed 
only in faith and hope: i.e., as hoped-for on the ground of God’s sure promise, not yet in 
reality. Faith hears, knows and trusts God, his name and promises, but it does not yet see 
the reality of the things promised.
782
 
As we have seen, however, one can also find in Luther’s writings completely different 
accounts of the nature of the light of faith. In the Operationes in Psalmos, for example, 
Luther writes about the light of faith: 
Faith is best called the light of the face of God, which is divine illumination of our mind 
and a kind of ray of divinity infused in the heart of the believer […]. But as then the pillar 
was present and travelled before their faces, so now faith has a God who is present, so that 
the illumination of the heart proceeds as from the face of the God who is present, so that it 
is rightly and most properly the light of the face of God, that is, knowledge of and trust in 
the God who is present. For he who does not know or feel that God is present for him does 
not yet believe, does not yet have the light of the face of God. 
It does not matter whether the light of the face of God is understood actively, in that he 
himself illumines us with his presence when he kindles faith – or passively as the light of 
faith itself, by which we with trust, feel and believe his face and presence. For ‘Face’ and 
‘countenance’ signify presence in the Scriptures, as is known. They are the same and both 
are at the same time: the illuminating God and the illuminated heart, God seen by us and 
God who is present.
783
 
From this text a totally different picture emerges of Luther’s understanding of the 
nature of the light of faith. Here the light itself is divine, making God himself present and 
known in the heart, not in the future but now.
784
 Are we therefore looking at a change in 
Luther’s standpoint, from an emphasis on faith as a sign of absent things to an embrace of 
faith as participation in present things? Or can the texts be reconciled somehow? In my 
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 AWA 2, 200, 3 – 201, 21. “Optime autem vocatur fides lumen vultus dei, quod sit illuminatio mentis 
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lumen vultus dei, id est, agnitio et fiducia praesentis dei sit. Qui enim praesentem sibi deum non novit aut 
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accendens, sive passive  ipsum lumen fidei, quo nos cum fiducia vultum et praesentiam eius sentimus et 
credimus – nam ’facies’ seu ’vultus’ in sacris litteris praesentiam significat, ut notum est. Idem enim est et 
utrumque simul est: deus illuminans et cor illuminatum, deus visus a nobis et deus praesens.” 
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discrepancy between present and not present things. See also Chung 2000, 87-90; 121; 138-139. 
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opinion the latter is the case. One needs to turn back only one page in the Dictata scholia, 
where faith as a sign and not yet the thing itself was emphasized, to find the following: 
“‘To hope in God’ is to be in Christ, our God, and to participate in him and so, existing in 
him to hope in God.”785 Or one can look at the following gloss to Ps. 17, in which Luther 
defines the term “face of God” as “knowledge of God who is present”786, or to the scholia 
in which Luther proclaims that God is present immediately in the soul by faith.
787
 Both 
Luther’s early and late Psalm expositions speak of God as being in the midst of the 
believers in their souls, like he is present in the midst of the Church.
788
 Christians are even 
described in the Dicatata as ‘seats’ of Christ, on whom he sits and in whom he is present 
by faith.
789
 Therefore it seems clear that we are not looking at a chronological 
development, but rather that the texts need to be reconciled in another way. 
In my opinion, the key to understanding Luther’s divergent texts with regard to the 
presence of the divine things in faith are the three stages of God’s work in the world 
discussed above in chapter 2.3.3.3. The first stage is the visible creation, which merely 
points to God and the final glory as a sign of an absent thing. The second stage is the 
Church Militant, in which the spiritual, invisible and divine things are already present and 
participated in, but as hidden, in accordance with the principle of the Incarnation. The 
theological signs of the Church, such as the sacraments, and the Church itself, not only 
point to something outside of themselves as the visible creation does, but they already 
participate in and hiddenly offer that, of which they are a sign. The third stage for Luther 
is the heavenly glory, the Church Triumphant, where spiritual, invisible and divine things 
are seen directly, immediately and without cover of humanity.
790
 In this scheme the things 
of the Church Militant stand in the middle, participating in both realities: the visible and 
the invisible.  
Connected to this scheme is the duplicate way in which Luther speaks about something 
being “present” or “reality”. For Luther these terms are usually connected to an 
immediate, direct and unobstructed vision. Therefore, for carnal eyes only carnal things 
which are visibly seen with the physical eyes are “present” and “real”. Likewise, for the 
souls in the heavenly vision only the divine things that are seen by that vision are 
“present” and “real”.791 But for the Church, which is positioned between the two, the 
divine things are not an object of direct, unobstructed vision, but rather are concealed 
under the humanity of Christ and under the humanity of the believer. They are “seen”, but 
only spiritually and internally by faith. Although Luther defines faith itself as immediate 
and direct knowledge of God face-to-face,
792
 it is only immediate and direct for the spirit 
and the new man, and obstructed by the flesh for the old man and the carnal people who 
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 See chapter 2.3.3.3. 
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cannot see that hidden reality. Therefore, with regard to what is seen by the senses the 
things present in faith are not present in re, as the senses and objects of faith stand in 
contrast with each other. But with regard to the invisible and hidden reality, the Church 
already now possesses its eternal object.
 793
 However, that reality is only possessed in 
faith, in contrast to seeing.
794
 Accordingly Luther speaks of three faces of God: 1) the 
Incarnation, 2) the spiritual advent (i.e., faith) and 3) the final advent (i.e., Christ’s coming 
in glory). In faith the face of God is seen spiritually, not in terms of direct and 
unobstructed vision, unlike how humanity is seen in the Incarnation and how the divinity 
will be seen in the heavenly glory.
795
 Therefore the objects of faith can be said to be at the 
same time present (for the spirit in faith) and absent (as they are not yet the object of the 
unobstructed vision attained in heaven). Furthermore, one can say that they are possessed 
already now (with regard to faith), but still hoped for (with regard to their unveiled and 
complete possession in the heavenly glory). With this in mind, it is understandable that 
Luther often speaks about the vision or understanding of faith as that which grasps the 
reality (res) instead of mere appearances (species). In this case, primacy is given to the 
spiritual reality, and visible things are contrasted to it as illusory and transient. This is the 
sense in which the theologian of the Cross sees “the real thing”, or things as they are.796 
But for the bodily eyes, the things present under the appearance of the Cross are hidden 
under contraries. Therefore, depending on which perspective is given primacy, Luther is 
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 WA 55, II, 758, 50 – 759, 63: “[50] In Scripturis et psal⌊mis ‘Videre’ distinctum ab ‘intelligere’ 
accipitur [51] pro visu exteriori, Vnde et hic ita oportet accipi. Quia vere Christum in [52] carne viderunt 
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Scrip⌊tura tantum loquitur, Licet per eorum visum corporalem mystice intelligatur [56] visus interior 
omnium gentium. Nam omnes gentes viderunt, [57] scil. per intellectum ex verbo euangelii nunciantis 
Christum. Vnde quod [58] Bl 193 Psal. 5. et 8. * dicitur: ‘Mane astabo tibi et videbo’, et ‘Videbo c los tuos, 
[59] opera’ etc., Et Psal. 62.: ‘Vt viderem virtutem tuam et gloriam tuam’, similiter [60] de visu corporali 
oportet accipi. Quia loquitur ibi in persona seu pro [61] persona futuri populi tempore Christi, Ita vt ex 
auctoritate Apostoli [62] Hebr. 2. Cogamur Psal⌊mum 8. exponere de mystico mundo, dicentis: ‘Non [63] 
enim angelis subiecit orbem terr  futurum, de quo loquimur’.” 
WA 55, II, 152, 13-17: “[13] Absconditum ergo Ecclesie Est ipsa fides seu spiritus, quod idem [14] est. 
Quia in fide et spiritu viuunt, i. e. in cognitione et amore Inuisibilium. [15] Sicut carnales non in fide sed in 
re viuunt et non in spiritu Sed [16] in carne; ideo non sunt in abscondito Sed in manifesto, voluuntur in [17] 
rebus visibilibus.” 
WA 55, II, 886, 184-193: “[184] 115, 10 Credidi. Intentio psalmi Est docere tantum spiritualia bona in 
[185] Christo expectare, et promissa in lege de spiritu et fide intelligenda esse, [186] non de re temporali, 
contra Insipientiam carnalium Iude  orum, Qui fidem [187] respuunt et rem expectant. Rem inquam 
temporalium; Nam fides habet [188] rem e  ternam. Dicit ergo: [189] Credidi, i. e. fidem habui, et he  c tota 
mea possessio, que est substantia, [190] i. e. possessio rerum sperandarum, non autem substantia rerum 
[191] presentium. Non ait ‘diues sum, potens sum et delicatus sum’. Quia vltra [192] he  c omnia querit aliud 
et id allegat, quod presens non est, quod fide tantum [193] tenetur.” 
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 WA 55, II, 783, 134-141: “[134] 101, 3 Non Auertas faciem tuam a me. Sepe dictum est, Quid 
facies [135] Domini significet, Scil. ipsum spiritum distinctum contra literam, que est [136] dorsum, vt Psal. 
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WA 55, I, 751 gloss 8: “GLOSSA:8) Geminat ‘a facie’ Quia Christus duas habet naturas, secundum 
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able to refer to the content of faith either as absent or present. It is absent from the carnal 
eyes and present for the eyes of faith, but not yet present in the terms of the unobstructed 
heavenly vision. 
When Luther speaks about faith being a sign or a testimony, what he means thereby is 
not a sign of an absent thing, but a theological sign which participates in the reality it 
signifies. It is a sign of a thing which is present. However, it is not present in a publicly 
demonstrable manner, but is hidden under its visible opposites. In the case of faith this 
means that faith itself is hidden under the flesh of the believer. Luther himself verifies in a 
passage concerning the meaning of the terms “sign” and “testimony”, that they are to be 
interpreted thus:  
Something is often called testimony in distinction from a thing, as a sign in distinction 
from the signified. Because carnal people do not want faith that concerns future things, 
which is a sign or an argument or a testimony of non-appearing things, but rather want the 
present thing itself. [ …] But a testimony is something hidden in which the promised thing 
is possessed, but not yet manifestly. But they do not wish it to be hidden, but manifest, not 
spiritual and internal, but external and manifest.
797
  
The passage continues with Luther explaining that the Church Militant is a sign and 
figure of the Church Triumphant. It is, enigmatically, already that which it will be in the 
future. An internal continuity rather than an external relation exits between the Church 
Militant and the Church Triumphant. The Church Militant is incipiently the same Church 
Triumphant, as it will be made that by God. Likewise the faithful already partially see God 
by faith, and through that vision are being prepared for the final, heavenly vision.
798
 
Luther also provides a similar definition concerning the words of God: God does not give 
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 WA 55, II, 1019, 113-120: “Testimonium enim sepe dictum est, quod ad [114] differentiam rei 
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mensa, vestis, domus, cum [131] iam sit partim tale, Sed nondum perfectum. Ac sic non alieno signo et 
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us the reality (res) but words (verba). But in these words the non-apparent things are 
already hidden in and possessed by faith.
799
  
Therefore the relation between faith and heavenly vision is according to Luther not a 
relation between an absent thing and a present thing, but the difference between 
participation (participatio) and fullness (plenitudo). The Church Triumphant sees and 
knows God in his fullness, the Church Militant sees and knows God partially.
800
 Thus the 
Church Militant is situated between the two extremes, passing from the visible and carnal 
world to the future world. In this sense, Luther does indeed emphasize that the signs, 
testimonies and words of God must be understood in a relative or relational manner. This 
means that through them a Christian already participates in eternal life; however  he or she 
must at the same time progress forward. Therefore, relationality does not stand for the 
opposite of participation, as in the German scholarship, but for dynamicism, in which the 
participation is growing. Thus the Christian life is for Luther a continuing transitus from 
this life to the future one, a process which reflects the birth of Christ from the Father. It is 
a process in which the union with Christ and the infusion of faith is the starting point, 
which initiates the battle between the spirit and the flesh, as well as which initiates the 
healing and sanctification of the Christian.
801
 The Christian therefore participates in both 
saeculi, “hanging” suspended between them by faith, which has already raised up his heart 
to the heavenly and invisible things.
802
 Thus, when Luther writes that in faith Christ 
becomes our substance, this is not an expression of a purely relational ontology, but an 
expression of an ontology of participation. Faith is the beginning (i.e., the partial 
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res, Sed signa rerum. [2835] Quis enim pro verbis tam anxie vnquam clamauit? Sed Quia in verbis per 
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Vbi euacuatum fuerit, [98] quod ex parte est. Interim autem Dominus sustinet infirmitates, offensiones [99] 
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See also WA 5, 464, 36 – 465, 16. 
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possession) of the new life and of new creation of the Christian, which will be perfected in 
the future. It is the “firm place” (fundamentum), the initial possession of eternal good 
things, things which are seen and grasped by faith. In their dynamic nature, these things 
give the orientation to the soul, directing it towards the possession of the fullness of those 
things.
803
  
The same dynamics of the different stages can also be seen in the way Luther discusses 
the nature of the faith of Abraham. The exact difference between Abrahamic faith and 
Christian faith lies in that Christian faith possesses more than only the external promise. 
Luther describes the faith of Abraham and the Patriarchs as faith in the promise regarding 
Christ. For them Christ was still hidden by the letter, not yet revealed and known 
immediately in faith. Because of its nature as a reference point for the reality that is later 
grasped in Christ, it is called “faith without form” (fides informis) and “faith in faith” 
(fides fidei).
804
 To illustrate the nature of the letter hiding the content of the promise, 
Luther refers to it figuratively as the “first veil of the Tabernacle”. The Synagogue did not 
yet discern the spiritual goods hidden behind that veil. In the Passion of Christ the veil was 
torn and the Church, in which Christ rules spiritually (though hiddenly) came to be. The 
second veil, in turn, signifies the difference between the stage of the Church and the 
heavenly glory.
805
 Therefore the Christian faith for Luther is not only faith in an external 
promise. It is faith in which the content of the promise is already in a hidden manner 
incipiently participated in through the words of the promise. The context for the passages 
where Luther speaks about the content of faith as “the sign of things, not the things 
themselves” is provided by the image of the Tabernacle and the nature of the Church as 
the middle stage, in which the spiritual things are grasped and possessed, but still only 
partially and hiddenly. They are already possessed in faith, which is itself the sign in and 
through which they are participated in. Faith, signified by the middle chamber of the 
Tabernacle, is the middle stage between the mere external letter and the direct heavenly 
vision.
806
 
In a summary, one can state that Luther’s definition of faith as signum and not res does 
not mean (as it is often stated in the German research) that faith is a sign of an absent thing 
and that there is only an external relation between the believer and God constituted by 
faith. Rather, in its nature faith is a theological sign, a sign of the Church which 
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participates in the reality it signifies. It already confers an incipient vision of God, 
although this vision is only internal and hidden under contraries. Because of the 
hiddenness and partial nature of this vision, Luther can say in the same breath that faith 
both possesses its object, and that it does not yet possess it. Faith is the beginning of the 
transformation and possession which will be made perfect in the future resurrection. This 
is also the first aspect in which faith differs from the heavenly vision in the light of glory: 
The heavenly vision has the divine nature in its fullness as its object, but faith has partial 
knowledge and possession.
807
 
3.4.2. Faith and the Human Nature of Christ 
In the previous subchapter we examined the nature of faith as a theological sign which 
already participates incipiently in the reality which it will possess in fullness in the future. 
The first difference between the light of glory and the light of faith is the degree of 
participation, as by faith human beings know God only partially. But we have also noted 
another aspect of faith: the divine things participated in in faith are hidden under 
contraries. The nature of these contraries seems to be dual. On the one hand, it is the 
humanity of Christ under which the divine good is hidden; on the other hand, it is the flesh 
and the old nature of the believer which obscures the divine reality. When Luther speaks 
about faith as darkness or enigma instead of as divine light (as earlier we have seen he 
often does), it is primarily these three things to which this notion is connected: 1) 
Compared to the full light of glory, the light of faith is dimmer and weaker; it does not yet 
fully grasp God and his mysteries. 2) Moreover, faith as the middle stage is also in some 
way still connected to the humanity of Christ and the incarnational nature of the Church, 
both of which function as a kind of ‘veil’ obscuring the divine light. 3) In addition to 
these, the old nature of the believer also forms an obstacle for the divine light, because it is 
opposed to and contrary to it. These in succession form three enigmatic aspects due to 
which faith can be called a enigma, shadow, cloud, veil, or even darkness. 
The first aspect, the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, was already examined in 
detail in chapters 2.2.4 and 3.3.1.2, so only a short exposition is necessary here. This 
aspect means that God is incomprehensible in his essence. Accordingly, even as the 
immediate object of the mind in faith he transcends the capacity of the mind and is not 
comprehended fully by it. The mind must be humiliated in faith to follow that which it 
does not completely comprehend. This incomprehensibility, however, pertains not only to 
the divine nature but also to the Incarnation, the manner of which is incomprehensible. 
Incarnation also introduces another aspect of the enigma of the work of God: the 
hiddenness. In Christ, the Church and the Sacraments God is present as hidden under 
contraries.
808
 Thus one aspect of the enigma of faith is the incomprehensibility, the other is 
the hiddenness.  
With regard to the incomprehensibility, there are two approaches according to which 
God can be meditated on: ascent (i.e., divine nature), and descent (i.e., Incarnation). 
According to Luther, believers “ascend” in Christ when they recognize him as true God, 
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but “descend” in him when at the same time they recognize him as true man. Both are 
incomprehensible; Luther states, that by means of them both “a cloud” is formed in our 
intellect.
809
 This cloud has two aspects or directions. First, Luther speaks of a cloud which 
ascends. This cloud refers to the supereminence of God: his remaining above our intellect. 
It constitutes the “superior waters” through which the divine light shines upon the 
intellect. It also seems to be analogous to the second veil of the Tabernacle, which stands 
between the partial knowledge of God in the light of faith and the future full knowledge of 
him in heavenly glory. Even Christians can be called clouds in this sense, when they 
ascend by faith and contemplation towards God.
810
  
However, one can also speak in another sense, with regard to hiddenness, of faith as 
forming a cloud, of a believer being a cloud, or of Christ being present inside a cloud. It is 
this second sense we will examine in detail at this chapter. This sense refers to the 
hiddenness of God in the human nature of Christ as well as in the Church, the word and 
the sacraments and Christians. This hiddenness is a cloud which descends to those, who 
do not know God. Christians are also clouds in this sense, as by faith Christ is hidden in 
them from the flesh and unbelievers, and they carry the gospel to those who do not believe 
and see that presence. Luther even refers to the soul, body and Church as three 
tabernacles, because God is present in each of them in succession. This presence is not 
local and corporal, but spiritual and invisible, yet nevertheless it is connected to the 
humanity of Christ and the incarnatorial principle.
811
 This descending cloud seems to be 
analogous to the first veil of the Tabernacle (i.e., the letter), because its exterior is seen by 
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those who are in the forecourt (i.e., the Synagogue), although its content is hidden from 
them.
812
  
When faith is born, this first veil (the veil of Moses) is removed from the face of the 
mind. Thereafter the mind sees God by the light of faith emanating from behind the 
second veil. But this immediate, internal knowledge in the light of faith is not yet perfect 
in full clarity. It is not yet the light of glory; it does not yet see God in his divinity alone. It 
is made enigmatic by the humanity of Christ because of the interpenetration of the two 
natures in him, so that the light of faith can in some sense be said at the same time to be 
divine and human. Moreover, there is also the obscurity caused by the remaining flesh of 
the believer.
813
 Luther refers to this shadowy nature of faith in his statement that a shadow 
(umbra) consists of light (which is divinity) and body (which is humanity). When Christ 
entered human nature he was made a cloud and shadow for us. This shadow, nevertheless, 
for the spirit is a bright light descending from Christ. For the body, however (which adds a 
second layer of hiddenness), it is obscure. As a light, it is seven times weaker in 
comparison to the heavenly clarity, in which the glorified body also will shine like a 
sun.
814
 For the spirit the light of faith is therefore more dim than the light of glory, and for 
the body it is only darkness. 
The light of faith can thus be pictured by means of the image of the middle chamber of 
the Tabernacle: a space extending between the two veils. At one end is the entrance 
covered by the first veil, the letter of the Scripture, the external knowledge of Christ as 
man. One passes through this veil through Christ, as well as the Sacraments, Scripture, 
faith and preachers. They are the “doors” of the Church or “clouds” which, following the 
principle of the Incarnation, are the external and material covering under which Christ is 
carried to the unbelievers. Entering through the veil of their external form represents the 
beginning of faith, the point at which Christ is recognized as God, his divinity is 
understood, the mind receives the light of faith, Christ enters the heart of the believer, and 
one enters into communion with divine things.
815
 From there on, faith continues as a 
progression through the chamber, a progression in which the light of faith increases, the 
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letter is left behind and the spirit participated in more and more. This progression can be 
seen in how Luther compares faith to a movement and transitus from the temporal to the 
spiritual. Thus, as faith increases, one progresses closer to the heavenly glory, growing in 
the knowledge of and participation in spiritual things.
816
 Nevertheless, throughout the 
entire progress through this chamber, which stands for the earthly life of a Christian, some 
things remain hidden behind the second veil. This hiddenness is caused by faith being 
penetrated by the humanity of Christ, which in faith partially obscures the divinity, as well 
as by the obscurity that stems from the flesh of the believer. This humanity even protects 
from judgment the sinful flesh, to which no light is admitted. It also serves as shadow and 
cover for the spirit which is not yet able to receive the intense light of glory. It shields both 
from the light which they cannot yet receive. Participation in the humanity of Christ even 
functions as a cover for the sins of the Christian with regard to God (i.e., as related to 
justification). The life of the Christian under the reign of grace and faith ends at the second 
veil, which is crossed through in the death of the carnal life and at the resurrection to 
future life.
817
 Thus the three chambers of the Tabernacle represent the three stages of 
history and three modes of God’s communion with the human beings: the Incarnation, 
faith which grasps the divine things internally in spirit, and the direct heavenly vision.
818
 
As a stage pertaining to the Church Militant faith is therefore always connected to the 
humanity of Christ. The humanity of Christ is the beginning, the descent of God, which 
allows the Christian to enter into participation in Christ as God, but which is also 
connected to the life of the Church as a whole. When a Christian ascends in faith to the 
knowledge of Christ as God, that knowledge remains at the same time connected to Christ 
as a man. The humanity always penetrates and covers the full knowledge of the divinity 
until the time when the Christian crosses the second veil into direct and full knowledge of 
God, where the shadow and protection formed by the humanity is no longer needed. Thus 
the humanity of Christ, in a sense, extends from the first veil (where it is the entrance and 
starting point) to the second veil (where it is the endpoint and terminus). At death, when 
the animal life (vita animalis)
819
 connected to the carnal and bodily life ends, the Christian 
enters the purely spiritual life, to the direct admiration of God in the heavenly glory. The 
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body of sin is left behind, and the Christian is no longer ruled and guided by the humanity 
of Christ, because he enters the reign of glory where Christ reigns with Father as God.
820
 
Compared to the light of faith, which is shadowed by the cloud of humanity, this clear 
vision contains a sevenfold brightness and clarity, because it has as its object the 
immediate admiration of God in his divine essence.
821
  
In order to understand the nature of faith as the middle stage, one therefore needs to 
pay attention to the manner in which the situation of the Church as well as that of the 
individual Christian between the two saeculi reflect the principle of Incarnation, a 
principle which concerns also faith. By this principle I mean the connection of the 
humanity of Christ and the Incarnation to the stage of the Church Militant and the stage of 
faith. According to Luther, the Christian in the Church Militant belongs through faith to 
the kingdom of grace (regnum gratie), where Christ reigns through his humanity. Granted, 
Christ is possessed in faith as both man and God, meaning that the object of faith is his 
whole person, but the knowledge of him in his divine nature is still obscure and will be 
seen with full clarity only in heaven.
822
 But at the same time, as we have seen, the 
knowledge of Christ means not only the salvific knowledge of his person, but that Christ 
rather functions as the access to the entire spiritual world. He is the light of faith in which 
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all creation is seen as pointing to God, the light which Luther defines as an immediate and 
direct knowledge of God.
823
 Although at the same time this knowledge is internal and 
hidden, nevertheless it is in its essence divine intellectual light, which makes Christ 
present in the soul. The question therefore becomes, how should the nature of this light be 
understood with regard to Luther’s statements concerning the connection of faith and the 
humanity of Christ? The answer seems to be that there are two aspects according to which 
Christ rules in the Church. In the Psalm Commentaries Luther connects the relationship of 
the reign of grace and reign of glory to the concept of Christ as king and Christ as God.
 
While interpreting Ps. 2:6 in the Operationes in Psalmos as speaking about the rule of 
Christ in the Church as king, Luther emphasizes the dual nature of the Church. The 
Church has been founded and instituted in a concrete event and at a concrete place by the 
sending of the Holy Spirit, but it has spread to the whole world so that it is no longer 
restricted to any place, but transcends place. In this way the concrete mountain of 
Jerusalem is transformed into the spiritual Zion, the “mirror” or “watch-tower” (specula), 
in which the heavenly things are speculated or looked at from afar through faith, in the 
spirit. Christ as man and God unites the temporal and the heavenly things, drawing the 
believers to him by his word.
824
 In this drawing and passover (transitus), he rules as king 
when he carries the Christians away from themselves, and as God when he receives and 
fills them with divine goods. The first condition, drawing away, is connected to the 
mortification and cross, the latter to the glorification.
825
 Therefore, that which applies to 
the Church in general is also applicable to the faith of an individual. Both require a 
concrete starting point; faith requires the external word or sacraments. But this starting 
point functions as the access or entrance through which one is drawn to the embrace of 
spiritual and invisible things.
826
 
However, this transition is not instantaneous and total but incipient and growing. 
Therefore the humanity of Christ, which in the light of faith interpenetrates his divinity, 
functions with regard to the flesh and the old man as a covering, by which the divine 
goods are hidden from the flesh. It also functions as a ‘rod’ or ‘scepter’ by means of which 
the flesh in its mortification is simultaneously ruled, straightened and forced to submit to 
Christ against its will. But with regard to the spirit, it functions as a veil which admits 
more and more light as the Christian passes over from the flesh to the spirit and partakes 
more and more of the divine goods which fill him with joy. Thus there is a complex 
interconnection between Christ and the Christian. Here Luther quotes a maxim of 
Augustine (de Trin. III, 4): that which is simple in Christ corresponds to a twofold reality 
in us. Thus the passing over of Christ in the flesh to Heaven represents in us a passing 
over of both our flesh (which is killed and finally made spiritual in the resurrection) as 
well as well as of the spirit (which is gradually made more alive and receives more divine 
light).
827
 The relationship of the humanity and divinity of Christ in the light of faith 
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therefore is connected to the nature of Christ as man and as God, to him as incarnate and 
as resurrected, to his work as being simultaneous mortification and glorification, as well as 
to the relationship between the spirit and the flesh in the human person and the diverging 
effect of the work of Christ on them.  
In the beginning of this main chapter we raised a question regarding the difference 
between the heavenly vision in the light of glory and the vision of God in faith. We saw 
that the views of Augustine and Bonaventure received criticism for ontologism, that 
Thomas solves the problem by defining the light of faith as impressing in the mind species 
which have a mediating function between the light of faith and light of glory, and that 
Nominalism deals with the issue by differentiating between intuitive and abstractive 
cognition. For Luther one aspect of the difference between the light of glory and light of 
faith lies in the nature of the light of faith as partial knowledge and light of glory as perfect 
knowledge. The second aspect which differentiates between the two lights is the 
connection of faith with the humanity of Christ. In faith, God is not grasped apart from 
the humanity of Christ, although faith can entail partial and immediate knowledge of the 
divinity itself. This knowledge in faith of the divine nature nevertheless remains 
enigmatic, and is differentiated from the heavenly vision by the way in which it is 
obscured and interpenetrated by the humanity of Christ. What is clear is that Luther is not 
speaking here about the presence in faith of the concrete, local human nature of Christ, 
although the concrete external things function as a starting point of faith. But to the extent 
to which the humanity of Christ seems to be involved in the inhabitation of Christ in the 
Christian by faith, his humanity must be understood in terms of its assumption in the 
hypostatic union and the communication of attributes (communicatio idiomatum), through 
which it has become spiritual and free of the constraints of circumscribed locality. It is 
nevertheless effective and present only in those who believe, by faith. That is, this mode of 
presence is not identical with God’s omnipresence. Regarding the presence of this 
‘spiritualized’ humanity in Christians, Luther states: 
The Lord is in them in Sinai. First: Christ is in the holy ones in Sinai; i.e., according to 
the assumed humanity in the holy place i.e., in their hearts or spiritually, as if he said: 
Now he is not in them through his humanity in the way (sicut) he was before his Passion in 
various profane places without difference and among the impious Jews, nor in any place 
defined as spatial body, as any profane thing is, but he is ‘in them in a holy place’, i.e., as 
if to say: in a holy way or spiritually, when he is borne in their bodies and hearts by faith 
and the virtues. Second: ‘In them in Sinai’ i.e., in them who are in Sinai, but ‘in the holy 
place’, as if he indeed is in them who are in Sinai, as in the ancient times he was literally in 
                                                                                                                                                   
ut sit ‘conversatio [4] nostra’ iuxta Apostolum ‘in coelis’. Huius mysticae et exemplaris passionis [5] Christi 
Paulus ferme per omnes epistolas plenus est, ut ad Rom. 6. [6] et 8., Eph. 4., Col. 3., Philip., et ubicunque 
docet de mortificando vetere [7] homine et renovando interiore. Igitur quod Christus egit secundum [8] 
carnem tantum (non enim aliquando transiit a vitiis sicut nos, sed [9] semper fuit et est in coelis, sicut Iohan. 
3.: ‘Nemo ascendit in coelum [10] nisi filius hominis, qui in coelis est’), per hoc simplo suo concinit duplo 
[11] nostro. Ut ait Augustinus lib. 3. de trinitate cap. 4.: Nos enim carne et [12] spiritu transimus, Christus 
autem carne solum transiit. Ideo transitus [13] carnis nostrae exemplum est (quia similes ei erimus), transitu 
autem [14] carnis Christi significatur tamen velut sacramento transitus spiritus.” 
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the profane Sinai, but now he is in the holy and mystical Sinai, i.e., in the Sinai of the 
Church, in which they are.
828
  
In theory it is possible to translate the words iam non est in eis per humanitatem, sicut 
erat ante passionem as “now he is not in them through his humanity, as he was before his 
passion” and not “in the way he was”, i.e., denying the presence of the humanity of Christ. 
However, the previous sentence which states that Christ is in the holy place according to 
his assumed humanity, i.e., “spiritually”, confirms that Luther is indeed speaking about the 
humanity of Christ, which is present now in the faithful: not in a spatial mode, but in a 
spiritual mode. “Spiritual”, therefore, is not the opposite of “humanity”, but Luther does 
indeed refer to a spiritualized humanity of Christ. (The term “spirit” in the human being 
also implies some kind of nexus between God and man, where both meet). This reading 
clarifies how Luther can emphasize that Christ rules in the Church by means of his 
humanity without this coming into conflict with the numerous passages in which he 
speaks of the immediacy of the light of faith. The humanity of Christ does not only mean 
“Christ the crucified” as an historical object (as that would be the letter, not the spirit). It 
is, rather, an object of faith in which the believer actually participates, because Christ is 
present in faith both as man and God through his spiritualized humanity.
829
 Luther even 
refers to the glorified humanity of Christ as an abstractum (i.e., some kind of universal) in 
which believers participate by faith, thereby becoming its concretum.
830
 Unfortunately, he 
does not explain the underlying metaphysics further. Attempting a thorough explanation 
of Luther’s idea here would probably be against Luther’s own theological intentions: he 
emphasizes that the mode of the union of the natures in Christ is incomprehensible. Luther 
approaches this relation primarily by means of a series of typologies and images taken 
from the mystical tradition, such as the three chambers of the Tabernacle, the two veils, 
and the image of the cloud. He also states that the difference between the two lights is that 
the light of glory is brighter, the light of faith dimmer; and that the humanity is 
comparable to darkness or shadow which makes the light of faith dim as it contains both 
elements. The brightness of the lights thus seems to be associated with an ontological 
hierarchy akin to the metaphysics of light of Bonaventure, in which the brightness of the 
light represents its degree of being.
831
 This appears to be the most fundamental 
                                                 
828
 WA 55, II, 376, 574-584: “[574] Dominus in eis in Sinai. Primo sic: Christus in sanctis illis In Sina 
[575] i. e. secundum humanitatem assumptam In sancto i. e. in cordibus eorum, [576] siue spiritualiter, q. d. 
iam non est in eis per humanitatem, sicut erat [577] ante passionem indifferenter in locis prophanis 
quibuscunque et inter impios [578] Iud os nec loco corporaliter amplius definitus, sicut quelibet res 
prophana. [579] Sed est ‘in eis in sancto’ i. e., vt sic dicam, Sanctiter siue spiritualiter, [580] quando in 
corpore et corde eorum portatur per fidem et [581] virtutes. Secundo ‘In eis In Sina’ i. e. qui sunt In Sinai, 
Sed ‘in sancto’, [582] q. d. Est quidem in eis existentibus in Sina, sicut olim fuit ad literam et in [583] 
prophano Sinai, Sed in Sinai sancto et mystico, i. e. in Ecclesiastica Sinai, [584] in qua ipsi sunt.” 
829
 See WA 55, II, 494, 141 – 495, 147, where Luther emphasizes that the Church possesses Christ 
simultaneously (simul) as man and God.  
830
 See WA 55, II, 801, 48-50; 857, 147-155. The background of this idea in the history of dogma 
probably is the doctrine of Christ’s assuming the universal humanity, exemplified, among others, by Tauler 
in his Christmas sermons. The participation in Christ in faith therefore is not only participation in his 
divinity, but also participation in the glorified humanity of which he is the head and “abstractum”. 
831
 On the metaphysics of light, see chapter 2.2.3. In Luther’s thought there is an analogy between 
Christology and metaphysics in general, as demonstrated by WA 55, 494, 141 – 495, 164. 
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explanation one can provide here for the issue how the two natures are related to each 
other as cognitive objects of faith.  
The question about the mode of the presence of the humanity of Christ in faith also 
touches upon another interesting topic. Strictly confessional Lutheran circles have accused 
the Finnish School of Luther research of following the view of Anders Osiander 
condemned in the Formula of Concord. According to this condemned view, the 
inhabitation of the divine nature of Christ in the believer is the cause of his or her 
justification.
832
 Some Mannermaa’s writings may indeed have given cause for this 
accusation. One can also note in the present study that in Luther’s early writings the divine 
nature of the light of faith is emphasized and treated in a much larger number of texts than 
its human nature. However, the discussion of Luther’s texts presented in the present study 
shows that for Luther the light of faith is not only divine. The light has a Christological 
nature, so that the humanity of Christ is also present in that light, although the exact 
manner in which this spiritual presence of Christ’s human nature is be understood remains 
vague. Nevertheless, understood in this manner Luther’s definition of faith and the manner 
of the inhabitation of Christ seems to escape most of the condemnations of the Formula of 
Concord.
833
 Christ is not present in faith only in his divine nature, but as God-man. 
3.4.3. Faith and the Conflict between the Spirit and the Flesh 
The previous subchapter examined how the light of faith is made enigmatic by the 
humanity of Christ. In addition, however, the light of faith is also obscured in Christians 
by their own flesh. Luther states that the light of faith and the natural light of reason are 
related to each other as darkness is to light. The spirit of the fallen person is completely in 
darkness, as Christ is not present in him, and without divine light the natural capacities 
cannot recognize the presence of God under opposites elsewhere, either. But for the 
Christian, Christ who is present in faith is a light for the new spiritual nature. However, 
the old nature and the flesh of the Christian do not perceive that presence, so in relation to 
                                                 
832
 See e.g. Schumacher 2010; Vainio 2008. 
833
 See FC Ep III; FC SD III. The analysis presented in this chapter shows that the inhabitation of Christ 
is not restricted to the presence of his divine nature, but embraces both natures. Thus objections 1 and 2 (FC 
Ep. III, 12-13; FC SD III, 60-61), which condemn the view that Christ is our righteousness according to one 
nature alone, do not apply. The Luther interpretation presented in the present study comes close to the view 
of Joachim Mörlin, who emphasizes that the content of inhabitation is the whole person of Christ both in his 
divine and human nature. On Mörlin see Vainio 2008, 119-127.  
However, it is debatable whether this view satisfies objection 4 (FC Ep. III, 16; FC SD II, 63), according 
to which the view “That faith looks not only to the obedience of Christ, but to His divine nature, as it dwells 
and works in us, and that by this indwelling our sins are covered” is condemned. Although the question of 
justification is beyond the scope of this study, it can be observed that for Luther the relationship between the 
natures and the cognitive functions related to them seems much more complex than FC allows. It does 
indeed seem certain that for Luther it is not only the indwelling of the divine nature by which the sins are 
covered (i.e., from God). They are covered rather by the human nature of Christ, which Luther describes as a 
shadow and refuge, whereas the divine nature does not function as a covering, but as a light which among 
other things shows the sins of the human person. Moreover, according to Luther the light of faith shows the 
person of Christ and the justification in him, as well as purifies, justifies and gives the peace of the remission 
of sins (WA 55, II, 341, 94 – 342, 107; WA 2, 469, 7-20; AWA 2, 205, 1-14). The functions of the light of 
faith as a light which shows, and light which possesses that which it shows, cannot be separated, but they are 
ontologically connected to each other.  
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them that same light is darkness. This results in a cognitive conflict in the Christian, as a 
duality of opposite experiences exists in his person.
834
 To complicate the issue further, 
Luther usually discusses only one cognitive aspect of faith (i.e., light or darkness) in a 
single passage. This practise of Luther’s has resulted in conflicting interpretations of the 
cognitive nature of faith in previous studies, as usually only one of the aspects (i.e., either 
light, or darkness) has been taken into full account. In the Finnish research as well, which 
has accepted the notion of the union with Christ in faith, faith has often been described 
from only one perspective: either as a light, which knows God face to face, or as darkness, 
in which Christ is present secretly such that this presence remains completely unknown.
835
 
Therefore in order to form a complete picture of the cognitive nature of faith, both of these 
opposite aspects must be taken into account and related to the anthropological constituents 
which are the cause of the juxtaposition. 
The previous chapters have examined the enigmatic nature of the light of faith from 
the points of view of the partial nature of the knowledge provided by it, the 
incomprehensibility of the divine nature, and the obscurity caused by human nature of 
Christ. The third aspect of the enigmatic nature of faith is caused by constitution of the 
human being. With regard to this third aspect, in the Dictata one can discern three reasons 
for why God can be said to be in a cloud or darkness. The first of these is that he is present 
by faith in the soul of Christians, where he descends. His presence is not visible to the 
outside, and even faith itself is shadowy and enigmatic because of the humanity of Christ. 
The second of these is God’s hiddenness from wicked persons (i.e., unbelievers), who 
have not been humbled and brought to recognition of God by faith. The third is God’s 
hiddenness even in the faithful from their sinful flesh, which is blinded, and does not 
recognize the affects which the inhabitation of God creates.
836
 Thus, as we can see, the 
various aspects of the human being and his relation to God determine the degree to which 
and the manner in which God is known. For those who do not believe, God is completely 
covered in darkness. For those in whom God dwells, the flesh and the old nature remain in 
darkness. But for the soul (i.e., spirit)
837
, God is present in a shadowy manner in faith. 
Luther defines these different aspects of hiddenness and revelation in the Dictata super 
Psalterium by stating that: 
                                                 
834
 The relation of the light of faith to different anthropological constituents is discussed in chapter 2.4. 
This chapter pays special attention to the question of how these constituents are interrelated in the same act 
of faith. 
835
 See the introduction to the present study and the history of research in chapter 1.1. 
836
 WA 55, II, 136, 7 – 137, 2: “Caligo sub pedibus eius, i. e. per fidem tantummodo [8] cognoscitur. 
Est expositio descensus Dei; pedes eius stant in anima, [9] Sed in fidei nebula et ‘caligine’; tunc autem 
ascendemus ad eum in futuro [10] 3, 124 per speciem. | Nunc autem ‘descendit’ ad nos per fidem. Et iste 
primus [11] sensus.        Secundo vt in glo⌊sa, Quod ‘Caligo’ operit impios, qui sunt [12] ‘terra’ et 
‘scabellum pedum eius’, quando illustrat c los inclinatos. [13] Tercio ‘Caligo’ operit carnem peccati et 
excecat, vt non videat concupiscibilia, [14] et Iacet ‘sub pedibus’, i. e. affectibus Dei, qui sunt Dei 
‘habitantis [1] in c lis’, i. e. animabus. Et istis sic factis et humiliatis animabus [2] 17, 11 et carne 
conculcata” 
See also WA 55, I, 136, 10 – 138, 1; WA 55, I 136 gloss 13, which Luther refers to here. See also 
Schwarz 1962, 147-148. 
837
 As discussed in chapter 2.4.1 Luther does not always differentiate between the soul and the spirit, 
especially not in the Dictata. The explanation for this is that they are of the same essence or nature, although 
the term spirit is usually used of the soul when it is concerned with divine things. 
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Note: Faith is a “cloud” for those who believe, or for the spirit, but “darkness” for those 
who do not believe, and for the flesh. This is because the unbelievers and the flesh in no 
way perceive those things that are of God, since for them all wisdom is foolishness. But 
believers and the spirit, even if they do not perceive clearly, still “know partially” as if in a 
“shining cloud”. In the same way also the Church itself is a cloud and darkness, as well as 
all every faithful person. Ps. 18 refers to this: “Day brings forth a word for the day, and 
night indicates knowledge for the night”, as both are the same thing.838 
In another passage in the Dictata he comments on the same cloud: 
Cloud and darkness is around Christ, and he himself is in the middle of the cloud that is in 
the soul, and in the middle of the darkness that is in the flesh. For the new man by faith 
receives the cloud, that is, a gloomy light, and by this the old man receives the darkness 
and is obscured in a beneficial way. Because when the spirit is illuminated, the flesh is 
blinded, the latter by justice and the former by righteousness. And so is the throne of Christ 
restored.
839
 
The apophatic image of the cloud is here joined to different biblical images which 
represent God’s presence, and to the way the recognition of this presence differs with 
regard to different people and different anthropological constituents. For the spirit and the 
believers, Christ is present in a shining cloud or a pillar of fire which guides, protects and 
illumines. In this way Luther connects the notion of faith as a light to the enigmatic nature 
of faith caused by divine incomprehensibility and Christ’s humanity. It is not yet the clear 
light of the heavenly vision, but nevertheless a guiding and protecting light, making the 
presence of God known for the spirit. Still God is only known partially, and some things 
remain hidden as if behind the second veil or cloud.
840
 But at the same time, for the flesh 
as well as for the unbelievers that same presence of Christ is darkness. For them it is the 
fearsome cloud in which God was hidden on Mount Sinai. Externally it represents the 
letter, the law, adversities and the corporeal humanity of Christ under which the presence 
of God is hidden. But when by faith this presence becomes internal, the cloud becomes the 
representation of the hiddenness of the presence of Christ for the old man.
841
 This 
                                                 
838
 WA 55, I, 650 gloss 1: “GLOSSA:1) [1]Nota: fides Est ‘Nubes’ iis, qui credunt, seu spiritui, Sed 
‘Caligo’ iis, [2]qui non credunt, seu carni. Quia Increduli et caro nullo modo percipiunt [3]ea, que sunt Dei, 
Sed est illis stultitia omnis sapientia. Sed Creduli et [4]spiritus, licet non clare percipiant, tamen ‘ex parte 
cognoscunt’ ac velut [5]in ‘nube lucida’. Eodem modo Et ipsa Ecclesia Est Nubes et Caligo et [6]quilibet 
fidelis. Vnde et psal. 18.: ‘Dies diei eructat verbum, et nox nocti [7]indicat scientiam’, cum sit idem 
vtrunque.” 
839
 WA 55, II, 754, 14-19: “Nubes et caligo sit in circuitu Christi, Et ipse in [15] medio nubis, que est in 
anima, Et caliginis, que est in carne  . Nam Nouus [16] homo per fidem accepit nubem, i. e. enygmaticam 
lucem, Et per hoc vetus [17] homo accepit caliginem et obscuratus est salubriter. Quia dum spiritus [18] 
illustratur, caro excecatur; hoc per Iudicium et illud per Iustitiam. Et sic [19] est sedes Christi correcta.” 
The descent of Christ in the Incarnation, assumption of risen humanity, humbling of the proud and in 
sacrament of the altar all follow the same logic. See WA 55, II, 139, 3 – 140, 19. 
840
 The image is based on the following biblical passages, among others: Math. 17:5; Exodus 13:21-22; 
Numbers 9:15-16. On faith as the shining cloud and pillar of fire, see also WA 55, I, 660, 1-3; 660 gloss 9; 
814 glosses 5 and 7; WA 55, II, 548, 426 – 549, 449; AWA 2, 200, 3 – 201, 21; WA 5, 524, 27 – 525, 20. 
See also Schwarz 1962, 148-149. 
841
 WA 55, I, 134, 7-9; 609 gloss 19; WA 5, 503, 4-34; 506, 26-34. On the distinction between the 
external and internal cloud, see chapter 2.4.2.2. 
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darkness and hiddenness on protects the flesh internally from the divine justice and 
splendor which it cannot receive. At the same time, it is the result of the inability of the 
flesh and the natural capacities to perceive the invisible and spiritual content of faith. 
Therefore it creates anguish in the old man. The old man does not understand how and 
where the person is being drawn by the light of faith, when the flesh is subjected by faith 
under the rule of the spirit.  
The differing relations of the flesh and spirit to God and divine things can therefore be 
partially explained by the nature of the object of faith. On the one hand, Luther stresses the 
invisibility of the objects of faith. Christ is present spiritually and internally in faith. When 
faith functions as the theological intellect and understands the presence of God under 
visible objects,  then as well the actual object understood by the theological intellect is the 
invisible content grasped by faith. The senses and the natural reason connected to visible 
things cannot reach this invisible content. On the other hand, Luther also stresses the 
actual conflict between the light of faith and the light of nature. They are connected with 
their respective affects and notions of good, which are opposed to each other. Therefore it 
is unavoidable that the light of faith remains darkness to the light of nature. The light of 
faith not only is superior to the light of nature, but the light of nature itself must be 
diminished and driven out by the light of faith in order for the person to become 
spiritual.
842
 This conflict concerns not only the beginning of faith, but all growth in faith, 
as each step in the infusion of faith is first experienced as anguish and darkness.
843
In this 
duality one can also see again the ontological hierarchy among the lights, as well as a 
hierarchy of capacities within the Christian. Luther compares the Christian subjected 
under this duality, to the moon which is partially (i.e., with regard to the spirit in faith) 
made bright by a ray from the sun (i.e., Christ), but which partially remains dark and 
                                                 
842
 WA 56, 356, 17 – 357, 17: “[17] Bl. 92. *Corol⌊larium. [18] Frustra magnificatur ab aliquibus Lumen 
natur  et comparatur [19] Lumini grati , cum potius sit tenebra et contrarium grati . Vnde et A [20] Iob et 
Ieremia maledicitur, quod sit dies mala et visio pessima, quod [21] Lumen statim post peccatum ortum est, 
sicut Scriptum est: ‘Et aperti [22] sunt oculi eorum’, Genes. 3. Gratia enim sibi preter Deum nullum [23] 
statuit obiectum, in quod feratur et tendit; hunc solum videt, hunc [24] solum querit et in omnibus intendit 
c teraque omnia, qu  in medio sui [25] et Dei videt, quasi non videat, transit et in Deum pure dirigit. Hoc 
[26] est ‘cor rectum’ et ‘spiritus rectus’.” [27] Natura vero pr ter seipsam nullum sibi statuit obiectum, in 
quod [28] feratur et intendat; se solam videt, querit et in omnibus intendit, C teraque [29] omnia, ipsum 
quoque Deum in medio, quasi non videat, transit [30] et in seipsam dirigit. Hoc est ‘cor prauum’ et 
‘iniquum’. Sicut gratia [1] Deum statuit in loco omnium, que videt, etiam suiipsius, et prefert sibi [2] 
solumque ea querit, que Dei sunt, non que sua sunt: Ita Natura econtra [3] seipsam statuit in locum omnium 
et in locum etiam Dei solumque ea [4] querit, que sua sunt, non que Dei. Ideo Idolum est ipsa sibi primum et 
[5] maximum. Deinde et Deum sibi transmutat in idolum et veritatem Dei [6] in mendacium, tandem omnia 
creata et dona Dei. Gratia in omnibus, [7] que videt, non est contenta, nisi Deum in illis et supra illa videat 
[8] et in gloriam Dei omnia esse, videri, operari velit, optet et gaudeat. [9] Natura contra omnia, que videt, 
nihil esse putat, nisi in sua commoda [10] veniant et sibi sint et operentur. Tunc autem  stimat ea, si in [11] 
suam fruitionem et vsum et bonum ea perduxerit.[12] H c est fornicatio spiritualis et iniquitas et curuitas 
nimia valde. [13] Non ergo Lumen, sed tenebre rectius vocari potest ista prudentia, Nisi [14] quis ideo 
Lumen appellet, quia videt illa et cognoscit per rationem et [15] sensum, Alioquin quoad affectum, quo illa 
cognita sibi inflectit, verissime [16] tenebr  sunt. Nec potest aliter ex natura sua nisi sibi inflectere. Deum 
[17] enim et legem eius diligere non potest, Vt hic Apostolus dicit.” 
See also WA 55, II, 722, 134-142; WA 57, b143, 7 – b144, 12 as well as chapters 2.4.1.1, 2.2.4.2 and 
3.3. The same idea is expressed by Schwarz 1962, 384-385. 
843
 AWA 2, 283-321; WA 56, 379, 1-17; WA 57, b79 gloss 3. See also chapter 2.4.2.1. 
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obscure.
844
 The flesh and the natural capacities are ontologically more distant from God 
than the spirit, which receives the divine rays. They cannot recognize the divine light, and 
the natural light of the reason cannot comprehend it. Only the spirit, illuminated by the 
divine light, can be made receptive to it and become able to recognize it. But even then (in 
Christians as well) the light remains incomprehensible to the lower natural capacities. 
These are oriented only to sensible things.
845
 
This opposite relationship of the spirit and flesh to the light of faith and the presence of 
Christ in faith can be observed in a number of Luther’s texts. In faith the Christian is made 
to conform more and more to the image of Christ. However, because this image is 
connected to invisible spiritual goods and is opposed to visible carnal goods, faith and all 
progress in it cause suffering for the flesh. Likewise, the flesh does not understand the 
self-giving love stemming from participation in spiritual goods in faith, and resists it. It 
does not experience or understand the spiritual reality upon which the person relies in 
faith, nor the internal drawing and guidance which the spirit receives from Christ.
846
 
Therefore, both experiences (i.e., light as faith and darkness, resistance of the flesh and 
comfort of the spirit) take place simultaneously in the same person.
847
 Because of this dual 
relationship of the spirit and the flesh to spiritual reality, the objects in which God is 
hidden under opposites and through which he acts (e.g., the word of God, sacraments and 
the Church) also have a dual effect on the Christian. They bring joy and comfort for the 
spirit, which grasps Christ hidden under them. But they bring suffering for the flesh, 
which does not understand the spiritual content and which receives their crushing external 
effect.
848
 Because of this conflict Luther describes the cognitive nature of the presence of 
Christ in faith in terms of such paradoxical opposites as in the following: 
That in the Holy of Holies there was no light signifies that God is present in the Church by 
the faith of Christ in their hearts, which does not comprehend and is not comprehended, 
does not see and is not seen, but still sees all things. It is a powerful proof of present but 
not visible things.
849
 
                                                 
844
 WA 55, II, 443, 279, 444-286: “Sic Ecclesia, luna spiritualis, ‘auferetur’, Quando secundum corpus 
[280] fulgebit sicut sol, Et secundum animam, qua iam fide fulget, fulgebit in [281] clara visione Dei. Qu  
visio excedit fidei claritatem septies et amplius. Interim [282] autem, donec Est media parte sui (i. e. 
secundum spiritum per fidem) [283] clara, que est radius a sole Christo in eam descendens, Et altera [284] 
parte sui (i. e. secundum corpus) obscura, semper oritur Iustitia et abundantia[285] pacis. Sic enim 1. Corin. 
13.: ‘Cum venerit, quod perfectum est, euacuabitur, [286] quod ex parte est.’” 
845
 On the restrictions of the natural capacities and the way they are connected to the concepts of the old 
and new man, the spirit and the flesh, see chapter 2.4.1. 
846
 See e.g. WA 55, II, 626, 402 – 627, 412; 971, 2287-2300; 972, 2321 – 973, 2348; WA 56, 57, 13 – 
58, 18; 127, 3 – 128, 12;  329, 17 – 330, 5; 392, 17 – 393, 20; WA 2, 535, 26 – 536, 13; 570, 5-20; WA 57, 
b143, 7 – b144, 12; b186, 13-33. 
847
 See e.g. WA 56, 344, 23 – 345, 2; 409, 13 – 410, 19. See also chapter 2.4.2.3. 
848
 See e.g. WA 55, I, 608 gloss 14; 630, 7 – 632, 2; 704, 21- 706, 1; WA 55, II, 123, 18 – 124, 20; 717, 
542-557; 848, 214-224; 904, 383-388; 926, 1039 – 927, 1051; AWA 2, 97, 12 – 98, 8; 101, 1-8. See also 
chapter 2.4.2.2. 
849
 WA 5, 506, 12-16: “[12] Quod enim in sancto sanctorum nullum fuit lumen, significabat, inhabitante 
[13] Ecclesiam suam deo per Christum fidem esse in cordibus eorum, quae nec [14] comprehendit nec 
comprehenditur nec videt nec videtur et tamen omnia [15] videt. Est enim argumentum rerum valde quidem 
praesentium, sed nequaquam [16] apparentium.” 
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The text continues by elaborating on this presence, comparing it to a daybreak, among 
other things.
850
 One can see in this passage all the defining characteristics of faith as 
cognition.
851
 In addition, the juxtaposition here is clear. God is present in faith in the 
hearts of believers, and with regard to spirit and the internal man, faith sees all things. But 
with regard to the flesh, this presence does not appear, is not comprehended and does not 
comprehend: it is nothing apparent or visible. For the flesh it is mere darkness, although at 
the same time for the spirit it is a light guiding and making the presence of God known. 
Therefore one can conclude, that faith itself also corresponds to Luther’s general idea of 
God being present under opposites. In faith God is hiddenly present under the body of the 
Christian, as well as hidden in the spirit from the external man and the flesh (i.e., the old 
nature, which is turned away from God and the spiritual reality). 
3.5. Faith as Beliefs and Trust 
3.5.1. Acquired and Infused Faith 
In previous chapters (3.2 - 3.4) we constructed a theory of Luther’s understanding of faith 
based on a distinctly realist epistemology which defines faith in terms of divine 
illumination. The reservations we have expressed regarding faith as the intermediate stage 
do not undermine the Platonist epistemology behind this theory. They only limit and 
define its scope in relation to the ultimate knowledge of God in heavenly glory. In terms 
of this theory faith, first of all, is defined as immediate and direct (even though partial and 
enigmatic) knowledge of the object. In this sense the content of faith is not conceptual 
(e.g., revealed truth propositions), but is intuitive and facial knowledge of an object 
present to the mind that can be described as knowledge by acquaintance. In this regard, 
any conceptual content of the faith is secondary, although such content has an important 
(even necessary) role in the external means of grace which are required for the creation 
and sustenance of faith. But even in the act of the creation of faith, the conceptual content 
of faith works as a covering for and a vehicle of Christ. In itself, it is an external sign, 
requiring the internal act of faith in order to be understood properly with regard to its 
proper content: Christ. Moreover, when faith is defined as direct cognition, the definition 
does not appear to leave much place for the aspect of trust. Granted, one can find room for 
trust in the cleft that still stands between the partial knowledge of God in faith and the full 
knowledge of God in heaven. For example, one can discern such room for trust with 
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 WA 5, 506, 16-25: “Sicut Arca foederis erat praesentissime in sancto [17] sanctorum, non tamen 
apparebat, ita tabernaculum eius fuit in circuitu [18] eius, quia in medio sancti sanctorum ipse sedebat, quo 
significatum est, ut [19] [Ps. 46, 6.] ps. 45. dicit, Deum esse in medio Ecclesiae suae, ideo non posse eam 
[20] commoveri, quam et similes prophetias ex ea figura hauserunt. Non enim [21] deus in nobis regnat 
superficietenus, lingua et verbo, sed in virtute, nec sunt [22] [Röm. 10, 9.] stabiles, qui in lingua et verbo in 
eum credunt, sed ‘qui corde credunt, iusti [23] sunt’, in quorum medio ipse habitat. Hi sunt fortes et 
adiuvantur in [24] [Ps. 46, 6.] omnibus vultu dei (idest praesentia dei), ut ps. 45. ‘Adiuvabit eam deus [25] 
vultu suo’, seu mane diluculo, idest praesenti valde numine et ipso vultu.” See the full text and translation at 
footnote 443. 
851
 See chapter 3.3. 
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regard to predestination and the question of why God allows sin and evil.
852
 Nevertheless, 
Luther’s definition seems to exclude from faith many aspects, which in modern theology 
are often connected to the concept of faith, such as believing certain dogmas, or trusting in 
a person or in the content of revelation. When faith is defined as immediate cognition, 
such aspects do not constitute the essence of faith but are a kind of secondary 
consequences or results of faith.  
There are specific passages in Luther’s works in which Luther explicitly addresses the 
question of the relationship between faith as divine virtue (i.e., infused cognition of an 
object present for the mind) and faith as an acquired habit (having as its object the external 
word as understood by means of human wisdom). In the Disputation on Acquired and 
Infused Faith (1520) and its resolutions, Luther begins the disputation with the statement 
that to receive the things promised in the sacrament, it is necessary to believe the 
promises.
853
 At first glance this statement seems to point towards an interpretation 
stressing the content of the external promise as the content of faith. However, during this 
disputation Luther proceeds to state that it is exactly infused faith which is necessary for 
participating in the sacrament. Christ is the content of the sacrament, and he is 
apprehended only by the infused faith created by grace.
854
 Thus in this disputation Luther 
sets against each other acquired faith (which he defines as a habit or act produced by 
human powers) and infused faith (created by the Holy Spirit).
855
 He states that “Acquired 
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 See e.g. WA 56, 182, 14-31. 
853
 WA 6, 88, 31 – 89, 12:  “[31] Primo, ubicunque est verbum Dei promittens aliquid homini, ibi 
necessaria [32] est fides hominis, qui credat hanc promissionem esse veram et implendam [1] adeo certe et 
firmiter, ut potius omnem sensum, omnem rationem, omnem [2] scientiam, omnem contradictionem, omnem 
creaturam deberet negare quam [3] Dei verbo non credere. Quia qui verbo Dei non credit, Deum facit 
mendacem [4] et negat eius veritatem et peccat contra primum praeceptum. Sed in [5] omni Sacramento est 
verbum Dei promittens homini aliquid, ut ‘Baptiso et [6] in nomine Patris, &c.’ ‘Immergo te et omnia 
peccata tua’, item ‘Absolvo [7] te, &c.’ ‘Remitto tibi peccata tua, &c.’ Ergo in omni sacramento necessaria 
[8] est fides certissima de promissione Dei &c. [9] [Röm. 4, 3.] Secundo probatur Autoritate Rom.4. 
Abraham credidit Deo promittenti [10] sibi filium, et reputatum est ei ad iusticiam. Quod Apostolus dicit 
scriptum [11] propter nos, ut et nos credamus promittenti, ut iustificemur. Ergo necessaria [12] est fides.” 
854
 WA 6, 90, 22-27: “[22] Altera pars: Fides infusa sine acquisita est omnia, quia ipsa sola facit [23] 
omnia et est in omnibus bonis caput et vita: videtur in exemplis quae [24] [Hebr. 11, 1 ff.] Hebr. XI. 
adducuntur. Unde et Christiani appellantur fideles a fide tanquam [25] [Hebr. 11, 6.] a forma et natura et 
proprietate sua. Sine fide enim impossible est placere [26] Deo. Quare fidem esse in omnibus operibus quae 
placent necesse est, ac [27] per hoc necessaria est etiam ad sacramentum accessuro.” 
See also WA 6, 97, 4-36. 
855
 The concepts of fides infusa and fides acquisita especially bear Franciscan connotations. One of 
Luther’s points in the disputation seems to be to reject the via moderna’s concept of acquired faith as 
sufficient and necessary for justification. Scotus defines infused faith as an additional virtue which God does 
not require for justification, but which could incline the intellect to accept theological truths not known by 
pure reason (see p. 168 of the present study). Hägglund 1955, 55-59; 71-76 analyses the disputation and 
shows, that Luther’s use of the concept stands in complete contrast to that of Biel and other Nominalists, for 
whom infused faith is not necessary. According to them, even if infused faith does exist, it must be 
complemented by acquired faith, as infused faith concerns only the fides qua, but is devoid of content 
without external teaching. However, Hägglund is wrong in reasoning that through his rejection of the 
Nominalist interpretation Luther rejects the medieval interpretation of infused faith in general. The 
distinction made by Luther between the two types of faith, as well as the concept of infused faith as a divine 
light, especially echo Bonaventure’s understanding of the infused virtues. See Guardini 1964, 57-60 and 
White 2001, 347-350. This is consonant with Luther’s positive reception of the Platonic tradition in general, 
as discussed in chapter 3.2. For a thorough analysis of the reception of the concept of infused faith in older 
Luther research and of infused faith as the faith of a baptized child, see Huovinen 1997, especially pages 
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faith is nothing without infused faith, infused faith without acquired faith is 
everything”.856 Acquired faith can be likened to foam and surface decoration. It appears as 
opinions or a kind of display (species) and can simulate the infused faith externally, but 
only when it is not tested in tribulations.
857
 Its object is the same word of God, but as 
understood without grace, so that the quality of the word remains unknown and it is 
changed into foolishness.
858
 True faith, on the other hand, perseveres and necessarily does 
good, because it is participation in the living divine Word.
859
 Infused faith in itself is 
sufficient to teach the Christian internally: Luther refers in this context to a baptised infant 
who is captured by the Turks. As a living and spiritual thing, infused faith necessarily 
brings forth both good works and correct opinions concerning God. It is better than any 
                                                                                                                                                   
123-141.  See also the analysis of the divine character and unity of the infused virtues presented in Schwarz 
1962, 38-42. 
856
 WA 6, 85, 7: “[7] 2. Fides acquisita sine infusa nihil est, infusa sine acquisita est omnia.”  
The same text is found in the resultions to the disputation at WA 6, 89, 27-28.  
857
 WA 6, 89, 26 – 90, 21: “[26] CONCLVSIO SECVNDA. [27] Fides acquisita sine infusa nihil est, 
infusa sine acquisita [28] omnia est. [29] [Ps. 116, 11. 39, 6.] Probatur primo: Quia omnis homo mendax et 
universa vanitas omnis [30] homo vivens. Quare omnis generis opus extra gratiam Dei peccatum est. [31] 
Sed Fides acquisita est habitus vel actus, ut dicunt, humanis viribus paratus. [32] Quare ipse vanus et 
mendax est. Nam in hoc concordant etiam Doctores [33] scholastici, quod virtus vel opus extra gratiam non 
sit meritorium et malum. [34] Sed fides acquisita est virtus natura acquisita et naturaliter operans: quare [35] 
prorsus nihil est ad sacramentum vel gratiam sacramenti assequendam. [36] [Röm. 4, 3.] Secundo, Fides 
Abrahae Rom. 4. nobis in exemplum posita non potest [37] de acquisita intelligi, sed de infusa per Spiritum 
sanctum. Alioquin Pauli [1] tota Epistola corrueret, in qua negat et destruit, aliquem ex operibus suis [2] 
iustificari. At fides acquisita est inter opera nostra propria citra gratiam. [3] Cum ergo nos sicut Abraham 
credere oportet, sequitur, quod fide infusa et [4] quae hominum operibus ant viribus non habetur credere 
oportet. [5] Tertio Rom. 14. ‘Omne quod non est vex fide peccatum est’ necessario [6] de fide infusa 
loquitur: ergo fides acquisita peccatum est, quia non est ex [7] fide infusa propter accidens, quia si non, tunc 
sequitur, quod fide infusa [8] non esset opus, quia sine ipsa potest acquisita fides sine peccato esse, quod [9] 
est contra totam epistolam. [10] Ex quibus sequitur, quod fides acquisita est quasi hypocrisis, fictio et [11] 
simulatio et velut spuma fidei infusae. Sicut opera superborum bona et [12] vestimenta ovium, quibus lupi 
rapaces utuntur vel teguntur, apparent esse [13] bona, sed non sunt: ita fides acquisita apparet esse fides, sed 
est species [14] fidei et quasi opinio, imo non persistit in tentationibus nec est fundata super [15] petram. 
Patet ergo differentia fidei acquisitae et infusae. Quia acquisita [16] est valde similis fidei infusae, sicut 
omnia opera naturaliter bona sunt valde [17] similia operibus gratiae bonis, ut etiam a subtilibus hominibus 
vix discernantur, [18] sed in cruce probantur, quia tempore adverso natura cedit cum suis [19] operibus, 
gratia autem stabilit cor. Tunc inventur falsitas, vanitas et mendacium [20] [Ps. 116, 11.] naturae, operum 
suorum et fidei acquisitae, sicut dicit Ps. 115. Ego [21] dixi in excessu meo ‘omnis homo mendax’, &c.” 
858
 WA 6, 96, 17-26: “Obiectum vero videtur [18] [Röm. 1, 25.] idem esse, scilicet verbum veritatis, sed 
non est. Quia sicut gentes mutaverunt [19] veritatem Dei in mendacium, ita et facit fides acquisita. Licet 
enim [20] [Luc. 18, 10 ff.] verbum Dei audiat idem quod infusa, sicut Pharisaeus in Euangelio eidem [21] 
Deo gratias agere visus est, cui publicanus confitebatur, et tamen vere non [22] egit gratias Deo, quia non 
talem cogitavit qualis erat, scilicet misericordem [23] in humiles, sed cogitabat Deum esse respectorem 
personarum, superborum, [24] divitum, potentum, atque hoc erat Dei veritatem in mendacium mutare: sic 
[25] facit fides acquisita et omnis notitia Dei humana, quia sola gratia facit vere [26] nosse Deum.” 
859
 WA 6, 95, 6-19: “[6] Opera sequuntur iustificationem fidei infallibiliter, cum [7] non sit otiosa. [8] 
Sicut iam dictum est de operibus fidei, sic ad concupiscentiam carnis [9] sequuntur opera carnis sua sponte, 
sic etiam ad fidem spiritus sequuntur [10] fructus spiritus sua sponte. Carbo ab igne ignitus urit et lucet: ita 
cor a [11] verbo fidei per copulam immutatum facit bona opera. Et sicut nec concupiscentia [12] nec ignis 
potest esse otiosus, ita nec fides, cum sit non nisi divini [13] verbi participatio, quo semper movetur ad 
bonum, secundum naturam verbi: [14] quare non recte dicitur, quemquam iustificari per opera, sed rectius 
diceretur, [15] aliquem operari per iustificationem. Opera enim non faciunt bonum, sicut [16] nec fructus 
faciunt bonam arborem, sed fructum facit bona arbor et bonum [17] opus facit vir bonus. Vir autem bonus et 
arbor bona fit sine operibus per [18] solam fidem in veritatis verbum Dei, cui adhaeret, et adhaerens 
participat [19] veritate, iusticia, sapientia, bonitate verbi &c.” 
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external teachers.
860
 An analogous text can be also found in the Dictata super Psalterium, 
in which Luther discusses the relationship between the faith of a heretic and faith of a 
Christian. According to Luther, the heretic has a literal and mortal faith lacking intimate 
power and spirit. By means of it he only has words with their grammatical signification. 
They are vain and empty, comparable to Christ without his divinity and the letter without 
the spirit. The theological signification given by living faith to the external words is the 
divinity in humanity, the spirit in the letter, the soul in the body, the life of things, honey 
in the honeycomb, kernel in the nut, etc.
861
 Therefore, it is exceedingly clear that for 
Luther the grammatical, or conceptual, understanding of the external word (or dogmas) is 
not enough. For Luther, true Christian faith is faith infused by the Holy Spirit, faith, which 
becomes a living reality in the human person, guiding and educating him and producing 
good works. It is the living water which makes the tree good, so that the tree can bring 
forth good fruit and give shelter under its leaves.
862
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 WA 6, 91, 5-11: “[5] Quarto, fabula illa tertimonium est coecitatis eorum, quia dicunt, puerum [6] 
baptisatum et ad Turcas raptum, cum adoleverit, non posse credere, [7] nisi acquisita fides accesserit. Quis 
temeritatem istam ferat Christianus? [8] De gratia Dei ita loquuntur, quod esset opus naturae, quae indiget 
humano [9] adiutorio, cum ipsa sit Spiritus vivens ac movens ac nunquam quiescens. [10] Nam et parvuli 
baptisati non sunt otiosi. Opera autem eorum omnia placent [11] Deo, quia sunt in fide vivunt ac moventur.” 
See also WA 2, 566, 28 – 567, 7: “[28] Illud quod ait ‘fides, quae per dilectionem operatur’, declaratio 
[29] est sermonum illuminans et intellectum dans parvulis, ut intelligamus, de [30] qua fide toties loquatur, 
nempe de vera et syncera atque, ut ad Timotheum [31] [1. Tim. 1, 5.] primo dicit, conscientia bona et fide 
non ficta. Ficta vero est, quam [32] Theologi nostri acquisitam vocant, tum quae, et si infusa est, sine 
charitate est. [33] Neque hic tracto frivolas quaestiones et rancidas opiniones eorum, [34] quibus statuunt 
fidei infusae necessariam fidem acquisitam, quasi spiritus [35] sanctus nostri egeat et non potius nos illius in 
omnibus. Nam quod somniant, [36] si puer recens baptisatus inter Turcas et infideles sine christiano [37] 
doctore aleretur, non possit scire, quae sint christiano homini scienda, nugae [38] sunt: quasi non cotidie ad 
sensum experiantur, quid prosit christiana doctrina [1] iis, qui non trahuntur intus a deo, rursum quanta fiant 
per eos, qui foris [2] non docentur tot et tanta quanta Theologi docent et docentur. Viva, immo [3] vita et res 
est, si spiritus doceat: scit, loquitur, operatur omnia in omnibus [4] quem deus docuerit, non secus certe 
quam dum creat hominem e novo. [5] Quis enim rude semen viri docet vivere, videre, sentire, loqui, operari 
et [6] totum mundum in omnibus operibus suis vigere? Ridicula sunt illa commenta [7] et de deo nimis stulte 
cogitantia.” 
Luther’s conviction has a parallel in Gerson. See Tractatus septimus super magnicat, De mente veritates 
duodecim (DP IV, 333D-334A)  
861
 WA 55, II, 893, 49-63: “[49] Imitantur autem Istos allegorice, Qui licet non abiiciant Christum [50] 
Bl 236 v neque fidem eius Sicut Iud i Neque negant eum aut fidem eius, *tamen [51] veritatem fidei 
abnegant et veritatem Christi. Sicut Iud i Christum hominem [52] non negabant, tamen diuinitatem in 
Christo, que sola facit Christum [53] ex isto homine, tanquam si quis spiritum hominis neget, licet corpus 
eius [54] fateatur atque tamen contemnat, Ita heretici Viam fidei non negant, [55] tamen totam eius intimam 
vim et spiritum negant. Et habent fidem et [56] Euangelium mortuum ac literale; Ideo et ipsi sunt maculati in 
ista via [57] sua. Quia fides eorum in Christum est quidem via, Sed quia est mortua, [58] Et habent verba 
tantummodo qu  nos habemus, sensum autem nostrum [59] contemnunt. Que verba vna cum grammaticali 
sua significatione sunt [60] velut Caro Christi sine diuinitate, litera sine spiritu, vana et vacua omnino. [61] 
Sensus autem verus in illis et theologica significatio Est velut diuinitas [62] in carne Christi, spiritus in litera, 
anima in corpore, Vita in rebus et [63] mel in fauo, Nucleus in cortice, Vinum in vase, oleum in 
lampadibus.” 
862
 See Luther’s interpretation of the palm tree of Ps. 1 (AWA 2, 38, 17 – 52, 19). 
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3.5.2. Tribulations as a Test of Trust and Teacher of Faith 
Nevertheless, there seems to be one instance in which faith as trust plays very significant 
role. This instance concerns the tribulations and afflictions (i.e., Anfechtungen, 
tentationes) experienced at the beginning and in the growth of faith.
863
 As we have seen 
earlier in connection with analysis of Luther’s understanding of the affective side of faith, 
Luther appears to hold that the content of faith is perceived as darkness by the intellect in 
the growth and beginning of faith, especially at its first infusion. The capacities of the 
person, especially his or her natural abilities, at that point do not yet grasp the spiritual 
reality: Christ, who is present in the objects of faith, and can illumine the intellect and 
guide the believer later, when he has been assumed in faith.
864
 Therefore, there must 
always be suffering at the beginning of faith, because the human being is led to rely on a 
reality which he or she does not yet know, understand or recognize. The reason and 
senses, the capacities belonging to the natural man, do not understand it, because the flesh 
and the spirit are opposed to each other with regard to their objects, and in the beginning 
of faith the human being is merely flesh.
865
 Therefore, the person must be consoled in 
some way by the external word and the Holy Spirit so that he or she can suffer the work of 
God. Only with this help can he or she withstand the anguish and be drawn into the dark 
cloud of the external word, sacraments and sufferings, inside of which Christ is present as 
the eternal Word, so that faith can be born.
866
 
However, the same is to a lesser extent also true of all the consequent infusions of 
grace. Growth in faith and grace takes place by a similar process in which the Christian is 
being led to suffering which he or she does not yet understand. In this process patience, 
faith and trust in God are required, so that the person accepts the judgements of God 
without murmuring or blasphemy, giving praise and glory to God and considering God 
justified in his deeds regardless of whether he saves or damns. The Christian must not 
seek any external grounds for justification besides faith and trust in God. For example, the 
Christian must not try to conclude using natural reason or philosophical arguments, that he 
or she is (or is not) be predestined. Therefore, in tribulations faith has the character of a 
complete trust and surrender to God. The person must not seek to rely in tribulation on any 
merit or created thing beside God. The memory and experience of God’s previous help 
can, however, support the Christian in tribulation: he or she can trust and believe that God, 
who has helped and delivered from the tribulation before, will also deliver him or her now. 
Because of this humility, confession, and faith, God will give his help. Afterwards, when 
the help has been received, the person will have even more faith, trust and admiration 
towards God. Thus faith has been tested by tribulation, and has grown because of it.
867
  
                                                 
863
 These tribulations must be considered separately from the suffering that results from the ongoing 
conflict (treated in the previous chapter) between the flesh and the spirit in the Christian. In that conflict, the 
spirit by faith understands what is happening, even though the flesh does not. However, in the tribulation 
connected to the increase of faith even the spirit does not understand at first the content and the reasons of 
the tribulation. It does so only after the tribulation has passed and faith has increased. 
864
 See WA 55, II, 962, 2027 – 963, 2059 and the analysis of this text at the beginning of chapter 3.3.2.2. 
865
 WA 56, 379, 1-17; AWA 2, 106, 28 – 107, 19; 2, 139, 14-17; 140, 27 – 141, 3; 299, 20 – 300, 17. 
866
 WA 56, 375, 1 – 378, 17; WA 57, b186, 13-33;  AWA 2, 77, 1-8; 179, 15 – 184, 5. 
867
 AWA 2, 137, 5 – 138, 29; 299, 20 – 30, 8; 309, 17 – 311, 2; WA 5, 622, 24 – 624, 3. 
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Moreover, Luther stresses that in tribulation the Christian does not understand what is 
happening and where God is leading him or her. On the contrary, in tribulation it seems 
that there is no conceivable help available and that all is lost. According to Luther, God 
will do his proper work under the hidden work in such a manner that his wisdom is found 
to be miraculous. That is, the way God delivers the Christian from tribulation is something 
that a human being could in no way himself come up with or conceive of. Tribulation is 
resolved only by divine wisdom. The prime example of God working in this way is God’s 
action in the crucifixion of Christ, in which the most salvific act was hidden under 
something that at first appeared to be complete defeat. Regarding the concept of faith, the 
primary point here is that a person in tribulation does not yet see its outcome by the light 
of faith. Rather, such a person seems to be in complete cognitive darkness. He is being led 
somewhere he does not yet know or understand.
868
 Experience and understanding come 
only after delivery, such that the wisdom and guidance of God in the tribulation is 
understood only after it has taken place.
869
 Therefore, the intellectual aspect of faith is 
excluded during tribulation; on the contrary faith acquires a rather voluntarist quality. It 
becomes steadfast trust in God contrary to all that is experienced or understood, a trust 
based on the consolation of the Holy Spirit and the memory and experience of the 
previous saving work of God.  
We can therefore say that tribulations constitute an exception to Luther’s general 
understanding of faith, in which faith is connected to the intellect. The German 
existentialist approach to Luther comes closer to the truth in explaining the nature of faith 
in tribulations, a situation in which the will of the person suddenly is emphasized against 
the intellect and immediate experience.
870
 The tribulations require patience and trust, as 
well as believing contrary to all apparent evidence that God is justified in doing what he 
does.
871
 Luther also emphasizes the role of the Holy Spirit in granting perseverance in the 
midst of tribulations. Though he does not explain very clearly what the Holy Spirit 
precisely does in tribulation, the role of the Spirit seems to be linked to the affect. The 
internal consolation by the Holy Spirit can empower the person to withstand the external 
suffering in spite of the person not understanding what is happening. But although Luther 
emphasizes the role of the Spirit, his focus on the perseverance of the will in the middle of 
suffering leads to the question of whether his concept of faith in the midst of tribulations is 
in line with his rejection of the activity of the human being in justification, as so much 
weight is put on submission to the will of God. This apparent self-surrender, Gelassenheit 
and resignatio ad infernum, usually linked to Tauler, Gerson and Nominalist mysticism of 
will,
872
 raises the question of whether Luther’s conception of faith is completely coherent, 
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 WA 56, 375, 1 – 377, 2; AWA 2, 61, 6-16; 179, 15 – 182, 8; 318, 5 – 319, 3. 
869
 WA 56, 377, 23 – 378, 2: “[23] Corol⌊larium.[24] Semper ita fit, vt opus nostrum intelligamus, 
antequam [25] fiat, [26] Dei autem opus non intelligimus, donec factum fuerit, [27] Iere. 23.: ‘In Nouissimis 
intelligetis consilium eius’, q. d. In principio[1] seu primo nostrum intelligimus, Sed in vltimo Dei consilium 
intelligimus. [2] || Iohann. 14.: ‘Cum factum fuerit, credatis.’” 
See also WA 55, II, 314, 143-145; 734, 109 – 735, 131. 
870
 See e.g. Metzger 1964, 115-118. 
871
 See Vind 2010, 33-35, where the certitude of faith is interpreted as the rare experience of joy that 
makes it possible to understand tribulation and despair as a positive act of God. However, in my opinion 
tribulations constitute an exception to the usual role of faith, not the other way around.  
872
 See e.g. WA 56, 377, 23 – 378, 17; 388, 10-28; AWA 2, 301, 14-20; WA Tr. 1, 494, 24 – 495, 43 
(977); 496, 7-16 (979). 
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or whether there are actually two conflicting tensions in his conception: The intellectualist 
Augustinian-Bonaventurean model explored in depth in this study (i.e., in which the will 
is captured by the divine good shown to it by the light of faith), and the Taulerian model 
(in which the self-surrender of the will in the face of divine judgement is the primary act 
of faith and justification), that is often seen as parallel to the Nominalist mysticism of 
love. Luther himself seems to hold that the suffering connected to tribulations ensures that 
the human person cannot have an active role in the justification: it is impossible for the old 
man to wish to suffer. However, if one approaches the tribulations from a more voluntarist 
and personalist point of view emphasizing the subjective experience and will of the 
individual, then the issue may appear to be precisely the contrary: It is the firm decision to 
endure suffering without complaint and to wait for divine deliverance, which justifies the 
person, just as he or she by this faith reciprocally justifies God in considering the actions 
of God in inflicting the tribulation justified. However, if one is able to weave the work of 
the Holy Spirit into the latter model to guarantee the passivity of the person in justification 
by attributing their patience to the consolation of the Holy Spirit, then there is no 
necessary conflict between the two models. The first model merely describes the normal 
state of faith, the second model describes the tribulations and infusion at the birth and 
increase of faith. In this relation one can also see the Trinitarian economy at work: in the 
birth of faith the Holy Spirit brings the human being to Christ, so that he or she can be 
illumined by faith.  
However, the tribulations can also be understood in terms of ontological hierarchy. In 
the sense that the object of faith (God) exceeds human cognition, the light of faith can be 
said to shine from superior darknesses, i.e., the divine incomprehensibility.
873
 When a 
person grows in faith, the process can be understood as a transition to a greater 
participation of the divine light. The knowledge being assumed is always at first 
incomprehensible (i.e., ‘darkness’). It becomes ‘light’ when it is subsequently 
comprehended, and the capacity of the intellect is ‘enlargened’ in the process. Thus the 
Christian progresses, passing over from the carnal into the spiritual and heavenly, from 
faith to faith, from clarity to clarity, ever closer to the cloud of incomprehensibility (i.e., 
the second veil), which separates the light of faith from the light of glory. In this process, 
the understanding of Scripture, dogmas and tribulations grows as the person becomes 
more and more able to understand their spirit and content.
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 Accordingly, the Christian 
also becomes more capable of teaching others. Therefore Luther can also describe this 
process in terms of progress from wisdom (sapientia), which means teaching given by 
others, to the understanding (intellectus) of its content and, finally, experience 
(experientia) or knowledge (scientia), when faith has been tested and strengthened by the 
experience of tribulation and delivery.
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 Thus, even though the proper content of faith is 
spiritual, and understanding it requires contact with that spiritual reality, it is nevertheless 
possible to convey it in a external sense by words and teaching. This teaching, however, is 
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not properly understood until it is experienced personally, when its content becomes living 
and effective. Moreover, even though the teacher cannot convey this internal experience 
and trust, he or she can give advice on enduring tribulation, which in its turn teaches 
internally how magnificent the content of the external word is. 
Therefore one can conclude that for Luther the true content of faith is indeed the 
contact with Christ, the eternal Word of God, who is the content of the external word. This 
internal reality cannot be adequately described with words, but requires personal 
experience to be understood. Luther maintains that external teaching, moreover, is not 
absolutely necessary, as the grace received in baptism can internally teach the Christian a 
correct understanding of the contents of faith. In the normal situation, however, Christian 
teaching and proclamation is possible and required for the faith to be born and increased. 
However, the proper content of the proclamation is not deliverable as the external word, 
but as the internal word and the action of the Spirit, which adjacent to the external words 
teaches to understand them. The word of God is active and effective: it brings the old man 
into tribulations where faith is born, the content of the word understood, and the Christian 
begins to understand the word by his own experience. This understanding (intellectus) 
given by Christ is faith in the proper sense. However, in the process of the birth of faith 
the consolation of the Holy Spirit or consolation given by a wise teacher is necessary. It is 
required so that a human being under the action of the word, when it brings him or her into 
sufferings, can stand patiently and suffer the work of God in the creation of faith. During 
these tribulations the role of faith as trust (over against faith as understanding) is 
emphasized, because the content of the word is not yet understood. These tribulations also 
function to test, confirm and strengthen faith as trust, as the Christian can withstand them 
with the help of their previous experience of the work of God.   
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4. Conclusions 
The aim of this dissertation was to to investigate and clarify Martin Luther’s 
understanding of faith and his understanding of reality in his biblical lectures between the 
years 1513 and 1521. The method of the study has been that of systematic analysis. Unless 
significant historical development was observed, I strove to represent the results as 
systematized summaries, first chapter by chapter and then in the final conclusions. 
For the general rationale of the study we referred to the claim made by Pope Benedict 
XVI in his encyclical Spe salvi, where he sets against each other a Thomist definition of 
faith as a habitus in which the objects of faith are initially reality already present, and a 
supposedly Lutheran definition of faith according to which faith is only a subjective 
interior attitude, a conviction of things that are not yet present reality. We set ourselves the 
task of showing that this juxtaposition is incorrect, and that Luther actually sees faith as an 
even stronger participation in the divine reality than the notion of habitus is able to 
convey. We took as our starting point the thesis of the Finnish School of Luther research 
that Christ is present in faith, and that this union with Christ lies at the heart of Luther’s 
teaching about justification. However, as we pointed out, simply citing the concept of 
union does not suffice to explain what faith is, and the question of the specific ontological 
or metaphysical nature of that union has remained open until now. A brief review of the 
research of the Finnish School concerning the relation of the ontological and 
epistemological aspects of faith demonstrated that the picture which emerges from the 
main studies of the school regarding the cognitive nature of faith seems quite unclear. 
Contradictory statements have been made, especially concerning the role of the human 
and divine natures of Christ and the question of whether the cognitive nature of faith can 
be described as a darkness in which Christ is secretly present, or as an ontologically divine 
light making the presence of God known. These questions, however, are not limited to 
previous studies, but arise from Luther’s own writings.  
Moreover, we proposed that the ontological nature of the union with Christ cannot be 
treated separately from the whole ontological substructure of Luther’s thought and that 
Luther’s whole theological cosmology or understanding of reality 
(Wirklichkeitsverständnis) has to be taken into consideration. This understanding includes 
the nature of God, the nature of the universe and the nature of the human being, and the 
way these are related to each other. Therefore we chose to undertake the research by first 
examining Luther’s understanding of reality, which we did in the first main chapter 
(chapter 2), and then Luther’s understanding of faith, which was done in the second main 
chapter (chapter 3). We furthermore stated that though the aim of this study is not 
historical explanation of the origins of Luther’s thoughts, nevertheless the results of the 
present study are often compared with Luther’s predecessors with the explicit aim of 
locating Luther within the wider metaphysical and epistemological traditions of Christian 
theology. It was the intention of this study to compare Luther especially with the theology 
of the so-called Augustinian School, in which the Platonist theology of Augustine was 
combined with ideas deriving from Pseudo-Dionysius. As the main representatives of this 
school we named Augustine, Bonaventure and Jean Gerson. This comparison was done 
with the aim of demonstrating, that Luther’s concepts and arguments can best be 
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comprehended in relation to that tradition, and we stated that in this sense this work can 
also be viewed as an investigation in the history of ideas or dogma. With regard to most of 
its content, this study can also be viewed as a study of philosophical psychology. 
In the first main chapter we analysed Luther’s understanding of reality. In this task 
Luther’s understanding of God, the universe, and the human being were examined. 
Through this it was sought to form a composite picture and bring the individual ideas into 
the context of the whole, as well as to analyse the general nature of Luther’s cosmological 
system or understanding of reality these form together, which serves as the basis for 
understanding the nature of faith in  Luther’s theology.  
With regard to Luther’s understanding of God, we were able to see how Luther’s idea 
of the Trinity as movement is based on the fundamental principle of God extending 
himself outside of himself in Christ while staying within himself, so that there is in God a 
unity of rest and movement, being and action. This principle manifests itself in Luther’s 
understanding of the intra-Trinitarian and extra-Trinitarian birth of the Son, as well as in 
the way Luther understands the nature of the good in general. The idea of the continuous 
birth of the Son is reflected in the way Luther understands the participation of the 
Christian in God through Christ. The idea of God as the highest good follows the same 
line of thought, but explicated with the help of the Platonic view of the nature of the good.  
Luther is in explicit agreement with the Platonic principle of good: that it is in the nature 
of the good to spread itself. Especially in this context, Luther calls Christ the highest good 
(summum bonum).  Luther associates this idea especially with the birth of the Son from 
the Father. In so doing he is connected to the Trinitarian theology introduced by Richard 
St.Victor through the fusion of Augustinian and Pseudo-Dionysian ideas, Trinitarian 
theology which continues in the thought of the Augustinian School (in the theology of 
Bonaventure among others). This tradition, in which the goodness of God is understood as 
the motivating principle of creation, stands in direct opposition to the Thomist 
understanding in which it is understood as the final end of creation. Luther’s distinction 
between the two loves is associated with this difference.  
The same inherent Christian Platonism can be seen in Luther’s understanding of the 
divine nature as light, which in its primal unity is incomprehensible but which in Christ 
breaks out from the Father and is reflected in all creation: even to the point that all 
creation exists by participating in Christ. Furthermore, different stages of participation can 
be seen in Luther’s thought, stages which reflect whether the creatures are turned towards 
the Creator, or away from him. Luther’s understanding of the Creation as having been 
made in Christ the divine Wisdom, and pointing to him as its final cause also reflects the 
Neoplatonic principle of emanation and return. The priority of the invisible over the 
visible reflects an ontological hierarchy. Luther’s idea of God as light, and of the universe 
as existing by participating in that light, are connected to the light metaphysics of the same 
tradition, the prime medieval exponent of which is Bonaventure.  
With regard to the incomprehensibility and hiddenness of God, we saw a need to make 
a distinction between the two terms. Neither term constitutes a rejection of ontological 
thought. When it comes to the concept of incomprehensibility, Luther emphasizes the 
experiential nature of faith and the difference between the divine nature and all created 
things. The divine nature is incomprehensible because it is infinite and supereminent, and 
no higher principle can be set above it. Luther’s remarks about the incomprehensibility of 
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the divine will may also evince Nominalist influence. Moreover, in his use of the concept 
of incomprehensibility Luther rejects the idea of ascent by negation, but describes the 
experiential nature of union with God in faith in terms of negative theology. Luther’s 
understanding of God as hiding under contraries is connected to the Platonist idea of the 
divine nature uniting contrary things by divine wisdom, which is central in the thought of 
Bonaventure and the Victorines. In the analysis of this theme we even noted textual 
connections between Luther and preceding works of mystical theology. 
The structuring principle of Luther’s views concerning the universe is the difference 
between the visible and the invisible worlds. For Luther all visible things are fleeting and 
transient, signifying the permanent invisible spiritual things and above all, Christ. This 
signification can only be seen by means of intellectual light. However, we can note in 
Luther’s theology a transition from a simple opposition of metaphysical properties 
towards a theological concept of dual hiddenness, in which the invisible spiritual good is 
not only opposite to the visible, but hidden under a contrary (i.e., an externally evil and 
undesirable) visible form. The two worlds of visible transient and invisible, permanent 
things thus stand in opposition to each other, but are brought together in the Church. In 
contrast to the visible works of the first creation, the Church and the things proper to it are 
theological signs in which invisible things are already hiddenly present under the visible 
exterior, thus forming the beginning of the second New Creation. In the Church, the 
Christian is transitioning from the visible world to participation in the invisible, from the 
Old Creation to the New. These two points form two perspectives from which the world 
can be viewed. From a carnal point of view, spiritual things are unreal and not present, but 
from the point of view of faith and the heavenly vision, carnal things are unreal and 
spiritual things real and present. The Church stands between the two, already possessing 
its eternal objects now, but not yet visibly. Luther describes the relationship between these 
three stages (i.e., the visible word, the Church as the middle stage, and the heavenly glory) 
with the help of the image of the tripartite Tabernacle. The works of God form three 
phases through which the human being transcends: from the visible world through the 
Church, into the invisible. In these works, a Platonic ontology is integrated with the 
Christian history of salvation. The underlying concept of the two worlds, visible and 
invisible, the concept of signification, as well as the three stages in which the participation 
of the spiritual reality increases, are related to a Platonic and Augustinian understanding of 
reality. The image of the Tabernacle and the concept of transitus Luther uses to illustrate 
this process again display connections to Victorine and Bonaventurean mysticism. 
Luther’s theological anthropology (i.e., his understanding of the human being) is 
divided into three interpenetrating structures: the natural constituents (body, soul, spirit); 
the qualitative anthropology (flesh – spirit); and the concept of the person, which unites 
the the first two. In the present study we first examined the natural composition of the 
human being and the development of the three-part anthropology (body – soul – spirit). 
Luther also illustrates this division with the help of the Tabernacle image. For Luther, the 
spirit is the highest part of the human being, dead and empty in the carnal person, but 
made alive by faith, which is the indwelling of God in the human spirit. Faith is a divine 
light received from God illumining the intellect, a cognitive light which makes this higher 
part alive. It constitutes the true intellect, the higher part of reason and the image of God in 
the human being, which alone is capable of grasping spiritual and intellectual things. The 
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concepts Luther uses to define it are derived from Augustine, Tauler and Gerson, among 
others. But for the lower capacities (i.e., senses and reason which belong to the body and 
the soul respectively), the light of faith as well as the presence of God in faith is cognitive 
darkness. The spirit is thus the part of the human being which determines the theological 
quality of the person before God, making him either dead or alive to God. The lower 
capacities cannot understand divine things. The tripartite natural composition of the 
human being thus forms the basis for the distinction Luther draws between the human 
being as carnal and the human being as spiritual: flesh or spirit. In faith, the human being 
can grasp the infinite goodness of God by his spirit and live a spiritual life (vita 
spiritualis) which leads to a love that desires to give good to others. Without faith, 
however, the human being is empty and carnal, and dominated by the lower parts. This 
results in a carnal love which desires to gather good unto itself, yet can never be satisfied 
by the finite created things it knows. Luther describes this life ruled by the lower 
constituents as animal life or the life of soul (vita animalis). The difference between the 
two lives and two loves is connected to their different objects (visible vs. invisible), 
different capacities (reason belonging to the soul vs. intellect of faith belonging to the 
spirit) and the different understandings of the nature of the good (Aristotelian vs. 
Platonic). The participation in the object of either kind (i.e., visible carnal good or 
invisible spiritual good) makes the human being respectively either carnal or spiritual. 
However, although for Luther a human being without faith is completely carnal, the 
Christian becomes completely spiritual only at the Resurrection. On this Earth, the 
Christian is simultaneously both flesh and spirit, there being a conflict between the two 
‘natures’. This conflict begins in the infusion of faith, which the old carnal nature 
experiences as darkness and anguish, but which the new spiritual nature created in the 
process experiences as light and pleasure. Luther describes this process of infusion with a 
number of images taken from mystical theology. The spirit wishes to serve the law of God 
and grasps the invisible spiritual things with the intellect of faith, but the flesh does not 
understand them and resists God’s law of love. Therefore, there is an ongoing conflict in 
the Christian. Luther explains how it is possible for this conflict to take place within the 
same individual with the help of the Christological concept of communicatio idiomatum. 
The Christian person shares in both ‘natures’ of the flesh and the spirit, and likewise in 
their opposite affects and experiences. Thus faith can be at the same time both a light 
directing the Christian, and darkness which he resists. This idea also explains how there 
can be progress in which that the Christian becomes more spiritual, yet in spite of this 
progress, at the same time he remains simul iustus et peccator. 
Our examination of Luther’s understanding of God, the universe and the human being 
reveals that Luther’s understanding of reality is related especially to the theology of the 
Augustinian School, represented by the Victorines, Bonaventure and Gerson, both in its 
use of single terms and images as well as a whole. We can see influences of as well other 
theological traditions: Aristotelianism and Nominalism, and German mysticism. But for 
the system as a whole, the following ideas are of central importance: the nature of the 
divine highest good as self-giving and as simultaneous being and movement; the nature of 
the divine light as the structuring principle of the universe; the contradistinction between 
the visible and invisible and their respective qualities, expressed in the creation; and 
finally the nature of the divine as uniting these contraries. Especially interesting in this 
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regard is the motif of being and understanding as participation in the divine light. This 
motif is seen in Luther’s understanding of God as light, of the universe as participating in 
and reflecting the divine light and wisdom, as well as the true intellect of the human being 
(i.e., faith) described in terms of intellectual light. Created things, on their own, on the 
other hand, are contrasted to this light as being shadow and darkness. This difference 
forms the basis for Luther’s use of many mystical expressions and images. Therefore, 
Luther’s understanding of reality as a whole seems Platonist in the general sense of the 
word, and connected to the Augustinian School and its mystical representatives: the 
Victorines, Bonaventure and Gerson. Luther’s own innovations especially concern 
theological anthropology: the radical opposition between the old and new man, nature and 
grace, as well as the Christological means of bringing these opposites together. 
Luther’s understanding Luther of the nature of God, the universe and the human being, 
as well as the general nature of the system formed by these three and their relations, 
suggested that one should also attempt to examine his understanding of faith from the 
basis of a realist ontology and epistemology of Platonist nature. We saw how the concept 
of intellectual light is present in Luther’s understanding of reality and in his theological 
anthropology. Therefore, in the second main chapter (chapter 3) we examined the concept 
of faith using the doctrine of divine illumination as the conceptual and dogmatic-historical 
basis. In this investigation we chose to follow especially the medieval Augustinian School, 
for which the epistemological doctrine of divine illumination is central. We distinguished 
between the interpretation that illumination only gives the human being a general capacity 
of abstraction, and the interpretation that illumination sets the mind into direct contact 
with the divine ideas. We also noted the question of ontologism, which if the latter 
interpretation of illumination is accepted, concerns the question of how illumination is 
distinguished from the beatific vision. Moreover, we distinguished between illumination 
as a general epistemological theory, and illumination as the basis of theological 
epistemology. As we saw, in the Early Middle ages illumination was accepted as a general 
epistemological theory. However, illumination was also connected to spiritual experience. 
Bonaventure, one of the major proponents of the theory of illumination, divided the light 
of Augustine into three lights: exterior, interior and superior. Through meditation on the 
visible world (exterior light) and internally known concepts (interior light), one could 
progress to the recognition and knowledge of God (superior light), the source of 
intellectual light. However, later in the Middle Ages the theory of illumination as a general 
epistemological theory explaining all cognition was replaced in the rising Thomism, 
Scotism and Nominalism with different epistemological schemes. In this process the 
theory developed into a distinction among three lights (light of nature, light of faith or 
grace, light of glory), to each of which were attributed different epistemological qualities. 
For the Thomists and the proponents of the via moderna, only the light of glory could 
attain the immediate knowledge of God. The other lights came to acquire ontological 
independence from the divine light, becoming its created natural and supernatural 
similitudes. The natural light thus began to signify the capacity of abstraction inherent to 
the intellect. The light of faith acquired the role in which it referred to grace that inclined 
the will to trust in revealed propositions, the truth of which it did not yet see, so that it 
acted in a mediating position between the mind and God. The proponents of the via 
moderna denied in general, that in this life God could become the object of immediate 
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intuitive cognition. However, the concept of immediate illumination survived (at least 
partially) in mystical writings such as the works of Jean Gerson, which evince 
Bonventure’s idea that certain concepts are impressed on the mind directly by divine 
illumination. 
One of the central biblical passages associated with the doctrine of divine illumination 
is Ps. 4:7, which speaks about the light of the face of God. To determine Luther’s relation 
to the doctrine of divine illumination we examined the interpretation of Psalm 4:7 by 
Augustine, Bonaventure, Gerson, Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas of Lyra and Luther. 
Augustine associates text with the knowledge of eternal principles, especially regarding 
the question of how true good can be known. For Augustine, the answer is that the divine 
internal eternal light shows the true good. By turning towards that light, the mind 
participates in God (the true good) and in the eternal principles it knows by that light. 
Bonaventure builds upon Augustine by distinguishing among the three lights that the soul 
can progressively recognize through turning from exterior things to interior, and then 
superior, things. This process serves as the basis for the meditation on and contemplation 
of God in the Itinerarium. Gerson interprets Psalm 4:7 in compliance with Bonaventure, 
as speaking of both the natural knowledge of God as well as the intuition of God by the 
gracious light of faith. He attributes the knowledge of the face of God especially to the 
light of faith. For Bonaventure and Gerson, the lights are not separated temporally but in 
degree and by the orientation of the person, so that one ascends from the lower light to the 
higher through meditation. The natural light already confers upon the soul an immediate 
knowledge of God as being and good, although without meditation the soul does not 
recognize the fact that God is the source of these foundational principles. Thomas 
Aquinas, on the other hand, draws a stricter separation among the lights of nature, faith 
and glory. For him, the light of nature does not allow access to the divine ideas. It is only a 
natural capacity of the intellect which abstracts concepts from sense material, a created 
similitude of the eternal light. Nevertheless, as an a imprint of the eternal law, it also 
allows the human being to discern between good and evil. For Thomas neither does the 
light of faith allow the cognition of God or the eternal types. Its function is to dispose the 
soul towards the heavenly glory by discerning dogmas that are to be believed and by 
allowing the soul to receive prophetic images which serve a mediating function between 
the soul and God.  Unlike in the system of Bonaventure and Gerson, for Thomas there 
exists an insurmountable gap between the two lower lights and the light of glory. This gap 
can be transcended only in the heavenly vision by the light of glory. Thomas’s idea is 
developed further in the via moderna.  For example, Nicholas of Lyra, the biblical 
commentator used by Luther, interprets the Psalm as speaking of the first principles of the 
speculative and practical sciences, which are known by means of themselves (per se nota) 
by all. Therefore according to Lyra by natural reason the human being can sufficiently 
know the works of righteousness. From one side the ontological relationship between God 
and the human mind established by illumination is eliminated, but on the other side the 
human being becomes capable of knowing the principles sufficient for righteousness by 
natural reason. These ontological and epistemological presuppositions form the basis for 
the via moderna’s radically Pelagian understanding of facere quod in se est. 
Luther associates his interpretation of Ps 4:7 explicitly to that of Augustine, but in 
understanding the light of the Psalm as the light of faith he also uses the medieval 
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distinction among the three lights. This can also be seen in his utilisation of the image of 
the Tabernacle, which is used as well by Bonaventure and Gerson. In Luther’s 
interpretation, the Psalmist asks who will show what is the true good, and by asking the 
question he demonstrates that he does not know. Based on this premise, Luther rejects 
Thomist and Nominalist interpretations, according to which the Psalm speaks about the 
light of natural reason known to all. Faith is required for knowing the true good, i.e., God, 
who hides under opposites. The light of faith constitutes a new spiritual intellect in the 
human being, an intellect which can discern the presence of God under seemingly evil 
things. The light of even faith shows in incipient manner the very face and vision of God 
(visio dei), so that in a sense by faith the believer already possesses the future good things. 
Luther stresses the real presence of God in the heart by the light of faith, and defines faith 
as an infused theological virtue that is ontologically divine. As the object of faith, God is 
the real, self-diffusing good which gives joy to the will and directs the believer in the 
midst of external sorrows. However, this knowledge is hidden from carnal people, who 
lack the light of faith. Faith is thus the removal of the first veil of the Tabernacle, through 
which one enters into the cognition and possession of spiritual things. However, the 
second veil, which distinguishes the vision of faith from the eschatological vision, remains 
in place. This means that there are still things which are concealed from faith, and in this 
sense faith can be considered a sign of future goods. Thus Luther’s interpretation is clearly 
connected to the medieval tradition, where Luther joins especially Augustine, Bonaventure 
and Gerson against the Thomists and Nominalists. The point at which he departs from the 
tradition lies in his interpretation of the light of the Psalm exclusively as the light of faith, 
as well as his emphasis on the sharp conflict between it and the light of reason. In general, 
however, the essence and function of the light on Luther follows the Augustinian doctrine 
of illumination. 
The functions of the light of faith in Luther’s thought can be distinguished from each 
other by their relation to the concepts of knowledge and good (and the respective 
capacities of intellect and affect), and by their relation to the God and the creation. The 
light of faith functions in relation to God as 1) as an incomprehensible light making the 
presence of God known (intellectual aspect or the aspect of knowledge); and 2) as a 
captivating light making the goodness of God experienced (affective aspect or the aspect 
of goodness). In relation to the creation, the light of faith functions as 3) the light of the 
intellect which gives understanding and shows the true content of things (intellectual 
aspect); and 4) as the light which directs and guides the affect of Christians and makes 
them able to internally obey the law of God and do good joyfully (affective aspect). 
Moreover, faith as the theological intellect has both a passive role with regard to its 
receiving the divine light, and an active role, regarding to which it understands things with 
the help of that light.  
Regarding this the passive role in relation to God, Luther defines faith as the 
knowledge of the face of God (i.e., actual and direct knowledge) in which the mind, 
comprising both the intellect and affect, is illuminated by the divine light. Luther thus 
rejects the idea of the via moderna which limited the direct knowledge of God to the state 
of the blessed. For Luther, faith follows the Platonic principle according to which only 
like is able to know like. By the light of faith impressed on the soul, the soul receives the 
form of Christ the Word, becoming one spirit with God and thus able to know him. Luther 
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explains this relation between God and the soul with various Aristotelian, Platonic and 
mystical metaphors emphasizing the receptive passivity of the believer in this union. The 
passivity is also related to the suffering of the flesh, when in faith the person crosses over 
from the knowledge of visible carnal things to the knowledge of God and invisible things. 
Although direct and immediate, this knowledge is still imperfect and partial. Luther’s 
understanding of the way God is grasped in faith seems to follow the Bonaventurean 
concept of cognitio per modum excessus: ecstatic knowledge. Characteristic of this type of 
cognition is the soul being taken captive by an object which it does not comprehend, 
because the object exceeds the capacity of the soul. The infinite goodness of the object 
(i.e., God) nevertheless captures the intellect and the will to follow it. The soul 
experiences the presence, help and goodness of God, but cannot define the experience. 
Luther uses various images from the Victorine and Bonaventurean tradition of mysticism 
to describe the incomprehensible nature of the object of faith. One of these is the wings of 
the Cherubim (which represent the reconciliation of mutual opposites in God) upon which 
Christ “flies” in the soul over faith, casting his shadow on the heart. Luther also 
commonly describes faith in terms of elevation and rapture, reflecting the central features 
of Bonaventure’s idea.  
Luther also describes the cognition of God in faith in relation to the affect. Faith shows 
God as the true good and source of all good, creating joy and delight in the heart. The light 
of faith shows God as the self-diffusing highest good, and the other good things in the 
light of this good. Spiritual goods flow from God and are sustained by him. Participation 
in these spiritual goods enlarges the heart such, that faith becomes the fountain and 
principle of all good works and virtues in the believer. Nevertheless, the joy and 
blessedness acquired by faith is still partial and shadowy, as is the knowledge of God. It 
will be perfected in the future heavenly vision.  
Thus for Luther faith is immediate and direct, actual and experiential knowledge of 
God. In faith God is known “face-to-face”, with the highest part of the mind receptive to 
the divine light. Through the light of faith the believer is united with the divine nature. 
This ontological union is the foundation of the epistemological knowledge of God. Luther 
thus in his concept of faith agrees with the doctrine of divine illumination. One can also 
distinguish three different approaches in Luther’s texts, which can be termed Augustinian 
(emphasis on the divine light), Aristotelian (emphasis on the concept of form and passive 
receptivity) and Mystical (emphasis on shadow, enigma, ecstasis, image of the Cherubim). 
These three different approaches are, however, fused together to reflect the same central 
ideas: faith is divine activity and human receptivity. In faith God is known directly, 
immediately and experientially, but this knowledge is still partial and exceeds human 
comprehension. In general, Luther’s concept appears to be related especially to the 
doctrine of illumination in the form in which it exists in the theology of Bonaventure and 
Gerson.  
In relation to the universe, faith has an active function as the theological intellect. This 
concept has an extensive basis in Luther’s texts. Before the Fall, human beings possessed 
this true intellect but it was lost in the Fall: the natural intellect became fixed on the 
sensible. Faith restores the theological intellect, allowing the human being to grasp 
invisible and spiritual things. However, the objects of the intellect are not spiritual things 
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separate from the visible. The intellect functions as a light which is able to see the 
invisible things which are present in visible things, or to which the visible things point to.  
The first question related to this function is Luther’s understanding of the nature of the 
intellect and of the relationship it has to its object. Unlike sometimes claimed, it does not 
seem possible that the object of the intellect is simply revealed propositional knowledge. 
If such were the case, the same natural intellect could be considered as theological when it 
merely thinks of theological objects. Luther indeed states that the intellect is not a power 
of the soul (potentia), but an act or actuality (actus). However, by this he refers to the fact 
that the intellect is created by external divine illumination, and without actual illumination 
it does not exist. It is born in the union with Christ, the eternal Word, by which the human 
being becomes a spiritual man. Luther speaks of this union in terms of instruction 
(eruditio), which includes being drawn away from sensual things, and being united with 
Christ. As the eternal, internal Word Christ grants the believer the access to the spiritual 
world. Thus as the Word he himself is the understanding both with regard to the capacity 
(i.e., intellect) as well as with regard to the the object (i.e., invisible spiritual things 
grasped by it). As Luther states, both the subject and the object of faith are divine, the 
subject as participating in Christ, the object as being the spiritual things which are the true 
signatum of the external things. That signatum is ultimately Christ himself, as we saw in 
our analysis of Luther’s understanding of reality. Luther thus describes the process of 
eruditio, with regard to the subject, as the removal of the impediment (i.e., blindness of 
the original sin), by the divine light, which purifies the intellect in order that the believers 
can see God in all things. With regard to the objects, their external sensual covering is 
‘removed’ so that their internal invisible content is grasped. Luther uses the image of the 
Tabernacle to illustrate this process. By faith the person enters through the first veil into 
the Sanctuary, becoming the internal man and seeing God face-to-face by the light of faith. 
This vision especially signifies the revelation of the divinity of Christ. It is necessarily 
connected to Christ as man and God, but not limited only to understanding his divinity 
under his humanity. Rather, Christ functions as the entrance to understanding the entire 
spiritual world.  
The connection of the light of faith to the concrete humanity of Christ as its point of 
departure is even one of the factors separating the light of faith from the light of glory. 
However, considered in abstraction from its connection to the human nature of Christ, the 
nature of the light is very Augustinian. It is the light of truth and the light of the intellect 
which makes the person capable of and receptive to spiritual things and able to understand 
the invisible. Moreover, the intellect of faith does not function by abstracting the 
intellectual reasons (rationes) from sensible things, but rather those reasons come directly 
from the light of faith. The connection between the sensible things that are understood, 
and the end result of understanding, is guaranteed not by the process of abstraction (as in 
Thomism). It is guaranteed by the ontological link between the final ends or the true 
content of things (rationes), and the intellectual light showing those ends. That link is 
Christ as the eternal Word, in whom those ends exist as the reality signified by all things, 
and who as the eternal Word is also the light of faith illumining the intellect and showing 
those ends. Luther’s theory of the nature of the theological intellect therefore follows the 
logic of Augustine and Bonaventure’s doctrine of illumination. By the light of faith, the 
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theological intellect understands all things, although theological objects such as Christ the 
Incarnate, the Scripture and the Church lie on the foreground. 
Luther’s definition of faith as the light of the face of God includes both the intellect 
and affect. However, there has been some discussion about whether faith is related 
primarily to the intellect or to the affect. It indeed seems that in the infusion of faith the 
affect is concerned first, but when faith has been born it becomes a guiding light for both. 
To the intellect it shows the truth; to the affect, the true good. The function of the light 
with regard to the affect is thus based on the idea that it shows God as the true good, both 
in an indistinct sense (highest good) and in a distinct sense (the source and criterion of all 
good things). With regard to the universe, this experience of true good in faith withdraws 
the affect from the multiplicity of external objects of desire, and directs it to the right way. 
It also enlightens the evils of the flesh, the moral content of the Scriptures and the Passion 
of Christ. In this sense, faith is connected to regulative moral principles. Faith, however, 
also leads the Christian by fixing his heart on the future goods incipiently possessed 
through it. It becomes in the Christian a new spiritual will which produces good 
movements and virtues. Even as Luther emphasizes the passivity of the believer in the 
birth of faith, in its essence faith itself is dynamic and active, because it connects the 
Christian to the self-diffusing good that God is. In this sense, faith also functions as a 
motivating principle. The infused internal virtue of the heart comes to be incarnated in 
concrete external deeds, such that the Christian can be said to co-operate with faith. 
However, these works are always dependent on the existence of faith. Luther’s emphasis 
on the dynamic nature of faith can be seen as problematic in the sense that it usually does 
not give answers to concrete moral dilemmas. Luther’s interest is in the quality of the will, 
reflected in the ontological difference between the letter and the spirit, law and grace. The 
two functions of faith as criterion (regulative principle) and as direction (motivating 
principle) also seem to be related  to God as the first cause and the final cause. As the first 
cause, he is the source and fountain of good; as final cause, he is the reality towards which 
the believer progresses. These two aspects are united in God, as in Christ he is the 
principle of creation, its center and its end. The same ontological framework can be 
distinguished behind Luther’s understanding of faith both with regard to the intellect and 
the affect. He is the Word and Wisdom in which all things are constituted, and the 
consummation of which they reflect. Thus Luther’s Platonic, or Augustinian, 
understanding of reality also forms the precondition for the functions of faith. 
However, although for Luther faith in itself is an intellectual light having God as its 
direct object, Luther also speaks of faith as a kind of intermediate stage between the 
earthly, carnal vision of things and the bright vision of God in Heaven. Compared to the 
light of glory, the light of faith is still in some sense enigmatic, even darkness. The 
knowledge of God acquired in faith is still shadowy, partial and hidden. One can even find 
in Luther’s writings statements speaking of faith as a sign and not yet a reality. This issue 
is related to the wider question of how the light of faith and the light of glory differ from 
each other. Luther’s understanding of the issue seems to provide an unique answer to this 
question. 
First of all, when Luther speaks about faith as a sign and not yet a reality, he 
understands faith as a theological sign of the Church which participates in the reality it 
signifies, but in a hidden manner. This hiddenness is constituted by the different 
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perspectives of the carnal, earthly vision and the glorious heavenly vision. The relation of 
the Church to these two visions is illustrated by the middle chamber of the Tabernacle 
which is hidden from the forecourt. From the carnal perspective, the content of faith is 
absent (i.e., from the senses) but from the spiritual perspective, the content is present. 
Moreover, although faith immediately possesses its object in the spirit, it possesses it only 
partially and incipiently. It is not yet the heavenly vision. Faith is the beginning of a 
process which will be perfected in the heavenly glory. This partialness is the first aspect in 
which faith differs from the beatific vision.  
The second aspect in which faith differs from the heavenly vision is the presence of the 
humanity of Christ in faith. Faith and the Church are connected to the human nature of 
Christ and to the general principle of God’s hiddenness under material or human form 
both in Christ as well as in sacramental reality. Christ, Scripture, the Sacraments and the 
Christians, which are all related to the principle of Incarnation as hiding their proper 
content under a material form, form the ‘doors’ of the Church that are signified by the first 
veil of the Tabernacle. The humanity of Christ is thus the starting point, from where the 
Christian enters into growing participation in divine things. However, the humanity of 
Christ stays commixed with his divinity in faith until the point the Christian enters 
heavenly life in death. Luther emphasizes this point by speaking about the Church as the 
reign of grace, in which Christ reigns as human, in contrast to the reign of glory where he 
reigns as God. This reign means that Christ rules in the Church mortifying the flesh of the 
Christians by his humanity, while he by his divinity simultaneously draws Christians into 
participation in the eternal goods, bringing the spirit to life. The process of transition 
(transitus) through the middle chamber of the Tabernacle from earthly life into heavenly 
life is constituted by these two points. In the course of this process, the spiritual light, 
knowledge and joy the Christian receives grows. The theological basis for this process and 
for distinguishing between the light of faith and the light of glory appears to be Luther’s 
peculiar understanding of the spiritual humanity of the resurrected Christ. The starting 
point of faith is related to Christ’s concrete humanity and the sacraments, but in faith 
Christ becomes present spiritually in the heart of believers. This presence not only takes 
place by his divinity but also by his humanity, which is not spatially constricted. This 
union of the human and divine natures in Christ, who even in faith is also present in his 
humanity, dims the brilliance of the divine light in faith, distinguishing it from the light of 
glory. Luther’s idea appears to imply an ontological hierarchy of lights akin to that of 
Bonaventure. Christ’s spiritual presence in faith in his humanity (and not only in his 
divinity) seems to answer (at least partially) the accusations of Osianderian heresy which 
have been leveled against the Finnish School’s interpretation of Luther. 
The third aspect in which faith differs from the heavenly vision is that it is hidden from 
the old, carnal nature of the believer. For the spirit, faith is a divine light although one that 
is made more dim by the humanity of Christ, but for the flesh, it is mere darkness. On the 
one hand, this hiddenness causes suffering for the flesh; the flesh does not understand 
where the person is being drawn and led by the light of faith. On the other hand, however, 
this covering also protects the flesh from the divine justice and splendor, a splendor and 
justice it cannot withstand. The inability of the flesh to perceive the spiritual light is 
partially caused by the objects of faith, which are invisible. Therefore, the reason and the 
senses (which have visible things as their objects) cannot reach to it. However, there is an 
 276 
 
 
actual conflict as well between the light of faith and the light of nature, due to their being 
connected to their respective affects and notions of good, which are at conflict with each 
other. Thus Luther can state that the light of nature and the light of faith are related to each 
other as darkness is to light. The light of nature must diminish when the light of faith 
grows. Behind this duality one can see again an ontological hierarchy among the lights. 
The spirit receives the light of faith directly from Christ, in like manner to the luminous 
part of the Moon from the Sun. However, the other part (i.e., flesh and the lower portion of 
the soul) remains dark and obscure, not directly illumined. From this conflict between the 
flesh and the spirit the situation results that in his writings Luther can describe the 
experiences of the Christian using expressions that seem contrary to each other, yet which 
take place simultaneously. The Christian perceives faith at the same time as light and 
darkness, both feeling the resistance of the flesh and the comfort of the spirit. Both take 
place simultaneously within the same person, which is explained by Luther’s application 
of the concept of communicatio idiomatum to the Christian person. Thus faith also follows 
Luther’s general idea of God being present under opposites.  
Therefore we can see that in its general form Luther’s concept of faith follows the 
theory of divine illumination. The reservations we have made concerning faith as the 
middle stage limit and define the light of faith with regard to the vision of God in the light 
of glory. However, ontological structure behind these reservations follows the idea of the 
hierarchy of lights and displays similarities to the thought of Bonaventure and Gerson. In 
light of our findings, we can see that Luther defines faith as an immediate cognition of a 
present object, even though this cognition is in part shadowy and enigmatic. Therefore, for 
Luther faith is not primarily propositional, but knowledge of acquaintance. This view is 
confirmed by Luther’s Disputation on Acquired and Infused Faith (1520). In this 
disputation Luther describes the difference between faith as an infused virtue, and faith as 
acquired opinions or grammatical understanding of the external word. According to Luther 
the latter, acquired faith amounts to nothing without infused faith. Infused faith, on the 
other hand, is capable of teaching the Christian internally, as it dynamically sprouts forth 
correct opinions concerning God. Nevertheless, there is one instance in which faith as trust 
in the unknown plays a very significant role in Luther’s thought. This involves the 
tribulations and afflictions at the beginning and growth of faith. Especially in the 
tribulation connected to the first infusion, the content of faith is perceived as darkness by 
the intellect, because the natural capacities do not perceive the spiritual reality. In this 
infusion, the person is thus led to rely on a reality which he or she does not yet 
comprehend. In this process the person must be way consoled in some way by the external 
word and the Holy Spirit in order to suffer the work of God in patience. The same is true 
to a lesser extent of consequent infusions of grace. Growth in grace takes place through a 
similar process in which the Christian does not at first understand what is happening, but 
must trust and rely on the will of God over against what is experienced. The reasons for 
such tribulation can only be understood afterwards, so that the experience increases trust 
in God. The intellectual aspect of faith is thus excluded in these tribulations, and the 
emphasis falls on the will of the person. In this sense, these tribulations constitute an 
exception to Luther’s general understanding of faith. One can ask, whether there is a 
tension in Luther’s understanding of faith between the intellectualist Augustinian-
Bonaventurean model, and the model emphasizing the function of the will in the 
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tribulations, a view usually associated with Tauler, Gerson and Nominalist mysticism. 
Further, one can ask whether the latter model is able to guarantee the human passivity 
usually so important for Luther in the process of justification. However, if one approaches 
these tribulations by attributing the Christian’s patience to the consolation of the Holy 
Spirit, there need be no conflict between these two models. One can rather view the 
Trinitarian economy as working in these tribulations, because the Holy Spirit brings 
human beings to Christ through them. Moreover, such tribulations can even be understood 
in terms of an ontological hierarchy. The light of faith can be said to shine from the 
superior darknesses formed by the divine incomprehensibility. When a person grows in 
faith, this process can be understood as coming to a greater participation in the divine 
light. The knowledge that is assumed in this process is always ‘darkness’ first, and 
becomes ‘light’ only when it is understood. The Christian thus progresses from faith to 
faith and from clarity to clarity, with increasing participation in the divine light. Moreover, 
through this process according to Luther the Christian becomes more capable of teaching 
others. Although the proper content of faith is spiritual, nevertheless it is therefore 
possible to convey it by means of words. However, the content of the teaching is not 
understood until it is experienced personally. The teacher can, however, give advice on 
enduring the tribulations in which God internally teaches the content of the word. One can 
therefore conclude that for Luther the true content of faith is Christ, the eternal Word. This 
internal reality cannot be adequately described with external words alone, but requires 
personal experience to be understood. Nevertheless, God works in the creation of faith 
with the help of external proclamation, which functions as the vehicle of Christ in infusion 
of faith. Moreover, although a Christian by their own  means cannot create faith in other 
people, it is possible to teach and assist them in enduring the tribulations the word of God 
(as the effective word) creates in the infusion of faith. 
As a general conclusion to this work, we can see that Luther’s theology of faith in his 
biblical lectures between 1513 and 1521 can best be understood against the background 
formed by the illuminationist theology of the Augustinian School of thought of the Middle 
Ages. Besides Augustine himself, the primary proponents of this tradition were (among 
others) the Victorine theologians and Bonaventure. The central ideas of this school were 
also mediated to Luther through the works of Jean Gerson. Luther is expressedly known to 
have read the writings of both Bonaventure and Gerson, and he explicitly quotes Gerson in 
his definition of faith. Especially important with regard to the definition of faith as direct 
and actual knowledge of God face-to-face is the Augustinian understanding of the doctrine 
of illumination, with which Luther explicitly associates himself in his definition of faith as 
a divine light. Luther’s association with this tradition explains why he views the Thomist 
and Nominalist concepts of faith as inadequate. Both these traditions exclude the 
possibility of immediate or intuitive knowledge of God in this life so that the content of 
faith becomes trust in propositions revealed by doctrinal authority, and their 
anthropological emphasis shifts to the will of the human being, which grace disposes to 
believe in the revealed content. In this sense, the Thomist and Scholastic definition of faith 
can be viewed merely as an empty silhouette given life and colour by love infused by 
grace. But for Luther, who joins in the Platonic understanding of Augustine, Gerson and 
Bonaventure, faith itself is a dynamic reality, direct and actual contact with the divine, 
which illumines both the intellect and the affect. It teaches the Christian internally as well 
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as creates in him a new will which joined to the self-giving nature of God participated in 
through the light of faith, constantly brings forth correct opinions and good works. Thus it 
is not only the understanding of faith as immediate illumination which Luther adopts from 
the tradition. The Platonic concept of the good as a self-diffusing first cause also plays a 
very important role in Luther’s understanding of reality. More in the background is the 
metaphysics of light, which Luther does not explicitly discuss at length, most probably 
because of his general reservations towards metaphysical speculation. Nevertheless, these 
form the necessary background for the ontological hierarchy reflected in Luther’s tripartite 
anthropology, in the related conception of the three lights, and in the cosmology consisting 
of the three ‘stages’ of the works of God in the world. They are reflected in the image of 
the Tabernacle, used by Luther both as an image of the universe and of the human being. 
In light of this ontological hierarchy, spiritual and divine things are more real (and thus 
more properly “light”) than the created things, especially those which are visible and 
corporeal. However, in its natural state the fallen intellect, turned away from the divine 
light and blinded by sin, perceives those higher lights as darkness. The light of faith must 
come from outside, as an external infusion granting the spirit the capacity of perceiving 
superior spiritual reality. Even then, however, the lower capacities remain in their 
darkness. Moreover, Luther seems also to understand the corporality itself as a kind of 
shadow obscuring the divine light. This understanding can be seen in the relation of the 
light of faith and the Church to the light of glory and the heavenly vision. Even as the light 
of faith liberates the Christian from the impediment formed by sin and by the theological 
intellect perceives the spiritual objects present in the theological signs of the Church, at 
the same time the stage of the Church is distinguished from the heavenly glory by 
corporeality: both of the Christian himself existing in his perishable animal body which 
still lives an animal life, and of Christ himself, ruling the Church through his humanity. 
This pertains not only to the external sacraments but to the light of faith itself, which is 
made more dim and more obscure by the humanity of Christ, and is spiritually commixed 
with it. These two: the sin of the evil flesh and the corporality of the human nature 
constitute (besides the partialness of ecstatic cognition of faith) the factors which 
distinguish the vision of faith from the heavenly vision. 
Therefore, Luther’s early theology can be therefore seen as a continuation of the 
theology of the medieval Augustinian School with regard to the concept of the light of 
faith and with regard to his understanding of reality. His views seem especially connected 
to those of Bonaventure and Gerson. This type of theology views the historical acts of 
God within a Platonic understanding of reality from which these acts derive their nature as 
mere signs, sacramental signs, or heavenly reality. However, one should note the central 
point which Luther emphasizes, and which characterizes both his anthropology and his 
concept of faith. For Luther, there is no natural or created grounds for a human being to 
ascend to the divine and invisible world, but these grounds are given in faith ab extra, 
outside the human being’s own capacities. Thus in a sense it can be said that Luther also 
breaks the continuity between the three lights, but that whereas the Thomists and the 
proponents of the via moderna situate the break between the light of faith and the light of 
glory, Luther situates it at the chasm between the light of nature and the light of faith. 
Without grace, there is no natural ascent to the cognition of God from the light of nature. 
Therefore the fundamental principles of justification for Luther: sola fide, sola gratia, 
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solus Christus, can also be observed with regard to the cognition of God. Such cognition is 
possible only by faith or grace given in Christ. But at the same time Luther understands 
the nature of the light of faith within the context offered by the theology of the 
Augustinian School, especially Gerson and Bonaventure.  
In addition to these general conclusions regarding Luther’s thought there are also some 
things to be paid attention to concerning the state of the research in general. During the 
course of my research it became apparent that only a scant amount of research exists on 
the concepts of light of faith and divine illumination after Bonaventure. Even with regard 
to Bonaventure, most of the serious scholarly work examines the theory of illumination 
only as a general epistemology, and is not concerned with the relevance of this theory to 
the knowledge of God. One can find even less material concerning the period after 
illumination was discarded by the Thomists and the via moderna as a general 
epistemological theory. This is because the philosophers writing the compedia of the 
history of ideas have not usually been interested in topics that are relevant only to 
theology. Most studies that do examine the concept of the light of faith after Bonaventure 
focus on the meaning of the concept in the works of Thomas Aquinas, without referring to 
the wider context of the theory. On the relation of Gerson to the doctrine of illumination, 
one can find totally conflicting statements. My research shows that a serious study should 
be made of the concept of the light of faith (or the three lights together) that would 
examine the role of the theory of illumination as a theological epistemology in the late 
Middle Ages, as none seems to be available. In my opinion, the lack of such research is 
one reason explaining why Luther’s concept of faith up until now has not been understood 
within its proper context. 
Another topic for subsequent research should be the examination of how the concepts 
of the light of faith and the intellect of faith are further developed in Luther’s later works. 
Already in the course of this study we noted the shift from a simple to a double hiddenness 
(i.e., hiddenness under contraries) and as well the development in which especially 
theological objects such as Christ, sacraments and Scripture become the objects of the 
intellect of faith. We also noted that within the scope of the sources of this study the so-
called pro me aspect of faith, as well as faith as beliefs, does not have much significance. 
However, it seems plausible that this situation changes (at least to some extent) in the later 
works of Luther. In this regard it would be interesting to observe how Luther relates these 
ideas to the concept of illumination. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the earlier 
Finnish research, some central ideas such the use of image of the Tabernacle or the 
Temple in illustrating the nature of the presence of Christ in faith, continue in the mature 
works of Luther such as the second Commentary on Galatians. More research is necessary 
in order to track the changes and developments that take place with regard to the concept 
of faith in Luther’s thought. 
Finally, the introduction stated that Luther’s theology of the Cross was left on purpose 
without systematic examination in order to to limit the present study to manageable 
proportions. On the other hand, however, we have seen how Luther connects the concepts 
of the Cross and transitus to the crossing-over from the visible to the invisible which takes 
place through faith, and which causes suffering for the flesh. The concept of the 
tribulations is directly linked to this process of crossing-over, as are many of the mystical 
expressions Luther employs. The examination of Luther’s understanding of reality and 
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faith is therefore directly connected with how the theology of the Cross is understood. 
Therefore, one avenue for continuing the investigation of Luther’s theology presented in 
this study would be to take it as the basis for conducting a similar analysis of Luther’s 
understanding of the theology of the Cross. 
When it comes to the wider significance of the findings of this study, its results bring 
about ecumenical possibilities as well as challenges. As we have seen, with regard to the 
point of contention raised by Pope Benedict XVI, the situation is actually the other way 
around. As has already been noted by other researchers such as Eero Huovinen in his 
Fides infantium (1997), in Luther’s theology the concept of faith is actually more 
immediate and bears more efficacy than the Catholic notion of habitus, which posits a 
third element of created grace between the soul and God. In Luther’s understanding, the 
soul knows God by faith in a more immediate and direct sense than is possible to convey 
using the Aristotelian philosophy underlying Thomist theology. What kinds of ecumenical 
possibilities might this insight offer? At least the traditional claim made by some Catholic 
theologians, that grace and faith are not effective in the Lutheran view, appears to have 
been demonstrated to be false. The core point of this issue was solved in the Joint 
Declaration on the Docrine of Justification, but the findings of this study illustrate how 
the notion of faith and the presence of Christ in Luther’s theology should be understood. 
They up open avenues for comprehending the nature of Luther’s theology within the Late 
Medieval context and demonstrate why the concept of faith has such central significance 
for Luther’s theology in comparison to that of the Thomists and the proponents of the via 
moderna. The divine nature of the light of faith itself explains why for Luther no further 
infused grace is required in the process of justification in addition to faith itself. Faith 
itself is already a divine virtue which grasps God, thus it cannot be complemented by 
adding something to it. As a such divine virtue faith itself is also already dynamic and 
active, and in this sense it is sufficient for bringing about the renewal which in Catholic 
theology is attained only by complementing faith with charity. 
Another question concerns the possible uses of the findings of this study in the life of 
the Church. This study shows that Luther’s theology cannot be considered an antithesis of 
all things mystical and ontological, properties attributed in some of the older studies to 
Catholicism, in contrast to Lutheranism. Luther’s theology should rather be understood as 
a continuation of specific lines of thought in medieval and late medieval mysticism. 
Luther mentions Jean Gerson and Johannes Tauler by name, but Bonaventure and the 
Victorine School also seem to have had a major influence on his early thought. Probably 
one should endeavor to read Luther in the context of his possible sources also in the 
context of the Lutheran Church in the attempt to understand the nature of Luther’s 
theology better. The findings of this study could thus open up possibilities for spiritual 
ecumenism, as well as serve the movements within the Lutheran Churches attempting to 
build a deeper, authentic Lutheran spirituality in continuity with the ancient practices and 
teachers of the Church. 
Finally, specific theological and philosophical considerations also arise from Luther’s 
epistemology of faith. First of all, Luther associates himself with the mystical tradition in 
general by his understanding of the relation between faith and its object as immediate and 
non-propositional (i.e., knowledge by acquaintance). From this understanding results that 
the knowledge which faith has of its object is in the first case private. As we have seen, 
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Luther holds that the content of faith cannot be mediated merely by the grammatical 
signification of words, but that the ontological element must accompany the words. 
External words are only understood properly when they are accompanied by the 
illumination given by the internal Word, Christ, who is the source of the theological 
intellect. Therefore faith is also communal, but it is communal only for the community 
which by faith participates in Christ. The Church in the proper sense thus becomes 
(following the Apology of the Augsburg Confession VII and VIII) the community of those 
who have faith, and proper theology can be accordingly understood as theologia 
regenitorum (i.e., theology of the regenerate). Therefore, Luther’s concept as it exists in 
the sources examined in this study fits well with Pietism. This idea can be considered 
problematic, however, if one wants theology to play a significant role in the public sphere. 
As the truth of theological propositions would be apparent only to those who have true 
faith, it would be difficult to rely to them in a public argument. Moreover, this idea causes 
problems for doctrinal dialogue. If Christians have differing views concerning God, and 
the decisive criteria of truth are private (i.e., seen only in faith), it would seem that it is 
impossible to demonstrate who is right and who is wrong in a theological argument. 
Luther’s criterion for this situation would be to test whether the faith is genuine by means 
of tribulation. However, because Luther emphasizes the infusion of faith at baptism, his 
focus does not seem to lie on the individual believer, but rather on the sacramental nature 
of the Church as a sign and effective instrument of the Kingdom of God in the world, the 
Church the faithful already participate in in the New Creation. In this sense, it is not only 
the individual experience of the Christian which forms the basis for theological 
argumentation, but rather it is Baptism and connection to the sacramental life of the 
Church which gives the Christian the right to have his voice in the life of the Church. The 
same idea (that understanding the nature of Christian doctrine requires an experience of 
faith, but it is formed communally) is also expressed in the Catholic concept of the sensus 
fidelium (i.e., the sense of faith or of the faithful), which functions as a criterion for the 
teaching of the Church. Nevertheless, it seems that the idea of the internal illumination of 
faith needs to be complemented with an argument related to the external clarity of the 
Scripture (as Luther does later, e.g., in his 1525 On the bondage of the will) to make it 
possible to use theological arguments in public debate. This question, however, extends 
too far beyond the scope of this study. Finally, the anthropological structures of Luther’s 
thought raise the question of the unity of the person. What is the ‘person’ (persona) which 
unites the contradictory experiences of the old and new man, he flesh and the spirit? The 
question of how opposing affects can exist in one person (i.e., with regard to the weakness 
of the will or at the moment of temptation) of course has been discussed extensively. 
However, Luther’s answers seem to hover somewhere between the medieval model of 
parts of the soul and a modern model of person as the focus of experience. Nevertheless, 
Luther’s concept is ingenious in that despite the discontinuity between the old and the new 
man, the identity of the person during the transformative work of God is guaranteed by the 
Christological model of two natures, in which the old man gradually dies away while the 
new spiritual man is simultaneously led towards the participation of heavenly life, the 
person being constituted of both these two.  
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